

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND
PRIVACY ACTS**

**SUBJECT: CUSTODIAL DETENTION
SECURITY INDEX
(INTERNAL SECURITY) "SEE
REFERENCES"**

SECTIONS: 1 - 5



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

NOTICE

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individuals whose activities are of paramount intelligence importance such as individuals closely connected with political or other groups abroad, individuals prominent in organizational activity of significance or individuals falling within similar categories. It is realized, of course, that in connection with the intelligence jurisdiction of the Bureau it will be necessary to investigate the activities and affiliations of certain individuals considered key figures in nationalistic and related activities or considered leaders of importance in various foreign nationality groups. In the future, all investigations of such individuals should carry the character "Internal Security." The character "Security Matter" in the future, in view of the above instructions, will be limited to cases involving Communists or other subjects falling within the specific exceptions to these instructions set out in paragraph one. The above instructions do not, of course, affect or change your responsibility for the investigation of organizations, situations and fascist individuals of prosecutive or intelligence significance. In the event there comes to your attention, by virtue of his activities, an individual whom you consider to be of importance from an intelligence or prosecutive standpoint, an appropriate investigation should, of course, be conducted. If in such an instance you have any question as to the advisability or desirability of instituting such an investigation in view of the above instructions, you should, of course, refer the matter to the Bureau for an appropriate decision.

4. REPATRIATION

Effective immediately, the Bureau is withdrawing completely from the repatriation program, including that phase thereof involving the return to the United States of evacuees from the Philippine Islands. In view of this, the Bureau will no longer check through its files the names of repatriates returning to the United States nor will such repatriates be paneled upon their arrival. Consequently, it will no longer be necessary for you to forward passenger lists of repatriates to the Bureau or to make arrangements to interview or panel repatriates upon their arrival in the United States. It is realized, of course, that in certain individual instances persons who are subjects or sources of information in pending investigations may return to the United States in the future as repatriates and, of course, the above instructions are not intended to impose any restriction on the interviewing of such individual subjects or sources of information where necessary in connection with an active investigation.

5. SEDITION INVESTIGATIONS

Effective immediately, the Bureau is discontinuing the broad investigation of sedition cases involving violations of either the wartime or peacetime Sedition Statutes. In view of this change in policy, you are instructed to immediately close administratively all sedition investigations presently pending with the following noted exceptions: In the event there is pending in your office a sedition case or cases in which prosecution has been instituted or authorized, the investigation should, of course, be continued and brought to a logical conclusion. In the event there is presently pending in your office a sedition case or cases which present what appear to be excellent possibilities of prosecution, it is desired that you immediately advise the Bureau thereof by letter with your recommendation as to whether or not the investigation or investigations should be continued.

2. ...

In the future, no new sedition cases should be opened unless specifically requested by the Bureau or unless facts come to your attention of an unusual character which indicate an aggravated, widespread or important violation of the Sedition Statutes in force and effect. In the event a case does come to your attention which falls within that category or which is considered by you to offer definite prosecutive possibilities or to be of importance from a general intelligence standpoint, it is desired that before any investigation is conducted you specifically call this case to the Bureau's attention by letter containing your recommendation as to the investigation thereof and requesting Bureau authority to conduct such investigation if considered advisable or necessary by you. The Bureau's change of policy in this regard has been called to the attention of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice and it is possible that in the future the Department will request that certain sedition investigations be continued or that certain new investigations be opened. In this event you will, of course, be appropriately instructed by the Bureau as to what investigative attention should be afforded such requests.

6. TREASON, MISPRISION OF TREASON AND PUBLIC LAW #47 INVESTIGATIONS

In view of the cessation of hostilities in both the European and Pacific theaters and in view of present conditions, the Bureau is curtailing its investigation of treason and misprision of treason cases within the United States. Cases involving treason or misprision of treason that are presently under investigation should be completed and brought to a logical conclusion by each field office as soon as possible. No new treason cases should be opened in the future unless you receive specific instructions from the Bureau or unless a case comes to your attention which appears to involve the probability of prosecutive action or which appears to be of extreme intelligence importance. In the event a case does come to your attention which appears to offer prosecutive possibilities or which is considered by you to be of intelligence significance, this case should be called to the Bureau's attention by letter containing your recommendation as to what investigation, if any, should be conducted. No investigation should be conducted without Bureau authority.

It is desired to point out specifically that the above instructions do not affect the investigation of violations of Public Law #47 which, as you will recall, involves persons aiding and abetting escaped prisoners of war or alien enemies and which Law will, of course, remain in effect as long as there are prisoners of war or alien enemies in detention in the United States. Consequently, investigations of violations of Public Law #47 should be continued as in the past so long as this Law remains in full force and effect.

(B) TRAVEL REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO GERMAN ALIENS. -- Subsequent to the defeat of Germany, the Department of Justice issued the following instructions to all United States Attorneys covering travel regulations applicable to German alien enemies.

Travel of alien enemies and misprision

66-03-697

The Attorney General authorized the United States Attorneys to grant German aliens not on parole, residing in their respective judicial districts, a general permission to travel within the judicial district or within a specified distance not more than 400 miles from the community in which the aliens reside.

This general permission may, in the discretion of the United States Attorneys, be granted upon the basis of individual applications or by the adoption of a general rule applicable to all German aliens residing in the judicial district, except those German aliens who are on parole.

This authority to travel does not apply at this time to Japanese aliens.

(C) ~~X~~ VOUCHERS ~~X~~ BILL OF LADING. — The Bureau has recently received several copies of vouchers which have not been properly supported by the necessary yellow copies of the Bill of Lading. Two of the yellow copies of each Bill of Lading issued must be forwarded to the Bureau. The third copy is retained in the files of the Field Office.

(D) ~~X~~ SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES ~~X~~ ESPIONAGE ~~X~~ COASTAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. — Reference is made to Bureau Bulletin Number 8, Series 1945, issued under date of January 24, 1945, directing that all coastal offices institute a program to obtain complete coverage of the shore line and adjacent areas in order that all persons living in those vicinities would become aware of the Bureau's responsibility and interest and the necessity for reporting information indicating a possible landing by enemy agents.

In view of the cessation of hostilities, it is suggested that all offices retain any informants developed in this matter in the Source of Information File which may be of potential value in other types of criminal investigations and general activities in the future. It is not desired that further steps be taken to develop other informants in the category of investigations set forth in Bureau Bulletin No. 8, Series 1945.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
Typed August 30, 1945

66-03-697
(ENCL.)

BUREAU BULLETIN NO. 55
SERIES 1945

(A)

TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

RE: Intelligence Summaries - Security Matters - Substitution
Sedition - Treason.

1. QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Effective immediately, the Bureau is discontinuing the preparation and dissemination of the Quarterly Intelligence Summary. The last Quarterly Intelligence Summary which will be issued will be the one dated August 15, 1945, which is presently in process of preparation, the material for which was, of course, submitted by you to the Bureau some time ago. In view of this, in the future you should not submit to the Bureau material for the Quarterly Intelligence Summary.

2. MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Effective immediately, the Bureau is discontinuing the preparation and dissemination of the Monthly Intelligence Summary. Consequently, no further material for the Monthly Intelligence Summary should be submitted to the Bureau by you.

3. SECURITY MATTER INVESTIGATIONS

You are instructed to immediately discontinue ~~the investigation of~~ all general individual security matter investigations in all nationalistic categories with the specific exceptions of cases involving Communists, Russians, individuals whose nationalistic tendencies result from ideological or organizational affiliation with Marxist groups such as the Socialist Workers Party, The Workers Party, the Revolutionary Workers League or other groups of similar character and members of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.

Pending investigations falling in the above category should be closed administratively in each field office without delay. No closing report or letter to the Bureau in these cases is necessary or desired. Security index cards which may have been prepared on individuals falling within the above category should immediately be placed in the investigative case file in each field office. The security index cards maintained on such subjects at the Bureau are being placed in the cancelled section of the Security Index. In view of this, letters from the field requesting the cancellation of security index cards on subjects falling within the above category which have been received by the Bureau but have not as yet been answered will not be answered but will be filed without action.



Ind. 9-13-45

In the future, no new general individual security matter investigations should be opened by you unless they fall within the above specific exceptions.

It should be clearly understood that the above instructions apply only to general individual security matter cases and do not apply to cases involving individuals whose activities are of paramount intelligence importance such as individuals closely connected with political or other groups abroad, individuals prominent in organizational activity of significance or individuals falling within similar categories. It is realized, of course, that in connection with the intelligence jurisdiction of the Bureau it will be necessary to investigate the activities and affiliations of certain individuals considered key figures in nationalistic and related activities or considered leaders of importance in various foreign nationality groups. In the future, all investigations of such individuals should carry the character "Internal Security." The character "Security Matter" in the future, in view of the above instructions, will be limited to cases involving Communists or other subjects falling within the specific exceptions to these instructions set out in paragraph one. The above instructions do not, of course, affect or change your responsibility for the investigation of organizations, situations and fascist individuals of prosecutive or intelligence significance. In the event there comes to your attention, by virtue of his activities, an individual whom you consider to be of importance from an intelligence or prosecutive standpoint, an appropriate investigation should, of course, be conducted. If in such an instance you have any question as to the advisability or desirability of instituting such an investigation in view of the above instructions, you should, of course, refer the matter to the Bureau for an appropriate decision.

4. REPATRIATION

Effective immediately, the Bureau is withdrawing completely from the repatriation program, including that phase thereof involving the return to the United States of evacuees from the Philippine Islands. In view of this, the Bureau will no longer check through its files the names of repatriates returning to the United States nor will such repatriates be paneled upon their arrival. Consequently, it will no longer be necessary for you to forward passenger lists of repatriates to the Bureau or to make arrangements to interview or panel repatriates upon their arrival in the United States. It is realized, of course, that in certain individual instances persons who are subjects or sources of information in pending investigations may return to the United States in the future as repatriates and, of course, the above instructions are not intended to interpose any restriction on the interviewing

WKH:TD

Typed August 30, 1945

BUREAU BULLETIN NO.

Series 1945

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✓ ENCLOSURE

9/4/45 - Approved by Exec. Conf. consisting of Messrs.

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In the future, no new sedition cases should be opened unless specifically requested by the Bureau or unless facts come to your attention of an unusual character which indicate an aggravated, widespread or important violation of the Sedition Statutes in force and effect. In the event a case does come to your attention which falls within that category or which is considered by you to offer definite prosecutive possibilities or to be of importance from a general intelligence standpoint, it is desired that before any investigation is conducted you specifically call this case to the Bureau's attention by letter containing your recommendation as to the investigation thereof and requesting Bureau authority to conduct such investigation if considered advisable or necessary by you. The Bureau's change of policy in this regard has been called to the attention of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice and it is possible that in the future the Department will request that certain sedition investigations be continued or that certain new investigations be opened. In this event you will, of course, be appropriately instructed by the Bureau as to what investigative attention should be afforded such requests.

6. TREASON, MISPRISION OF TREASON AND PUBLIC LAW #47 INVESTIGATIONS

In view of the cessation of hostilities in both the European and Pacific theaters and in view of present conditions, the Bureau is curtailing its investigation of treason and misprision of treason cases within the United States. Cases involving treason or misprision of treason that are

presently under investigation should be completed and brought to a logical conclusion by each field office as soon as possible. No new treason cases should be opened in the future unless you receive specific instructions from the Bureau or unless a case comes to your attention which appears to involve the probability of prosecutive action or which appears to be of extreme intelligence importance. In the event a case does come to your attention which appears to offer prosecutive possibilities or which is considered by you to be of intelligence significance, this case should be called to the Bureau's attention by letter containing your recommendation as to what investigation, if any, should be conducted. No investigation should be conducted without Bureau authority.

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Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-11111
(ENCL.)

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Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-05-617
(ENCL.)
(August 30, 1945)

BUREAU BULLETIN NO.

TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

RE: TRAVEL REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO GERMAN ALIENS

Subsequent to the defeat of Germany, the Department of Justice issued the following instructions to all United States Attorneys covering travel regulations applicable to German alien enemies.

The Attorney General authorized the United States Attorneys to grant German aliens not on parole, residing in their respective judicial districts, a general permission to travel within the judicial district or within a specified distance not more than 400 miles from the community in which the aliens reside.


This general permission may, in the discretion of the United States Attorneys, be granted upon the basis of individual applications or by the adoption of a general rule applicable to all German aliens residing in the judicial district, except those German aliens who are on parole.

This authority to travel does not apply at this time to Japanese aliens.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ENCLOSURE



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

(September 5, 1945)

66-3517
(E1.241)
BUREAU BULLETIN NO. 55
Series 1945

TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

RE: TRAVEL REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO GERMAN ALIENS

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This authority to travel does not apply at this time to Japanese aliens.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

(September 5, 1945)

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This authority to travel does not apply at this time to Japanese aliens.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-03-677
(ENCL.)

August 30, 1945

BUREAU BULLETIN NO. _____

SERIES 1945

The Bureau has recently received several copies of vouchers which have not been properly supported by the necessary yellow copies of the Bill of Lading. Two of the yellow copies of each Bill of Lading issued must be forwarded to the Bureau. The third copy is retained in the files of the Field Office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

36-25-677
(Encl.)
315

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

August 30, 1945

BUREAU BULLETIN NO. 55

SERIES 1945


(c)

Re: Vouchers - Bill of Lading.

The Bureau has recently received several copies of vouchers which have not been properly supported by the necessary yellow copies of the Bill of Lading. Two of the yellow copies of each Bill of Lading issued must be forwarded to the Bureau. The third copy is retained in the files of the Field Office.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director



JDD:cmw;csh

(typed September 5, 1945)

BUREAU BULLETIN NO.
SERIES 1945

TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

RE: SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES - ESPIONAGE
COASTAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Reference is made to Bureau Bulletin Number 8, Series 1945, issued under date of January 24, 1945, directing that all coastal offices institute a program to obtain complete coverage of the shore line and adjacent areas in order that all persons living in those vicinities would become aware of the Bureau's responsibility and interest and the necessity for reporting information indicating a possible landing by enemy agents.

In view of the cessation of hostilities, it is suggested that all offices retain any informants developed in this matter in the Source of Information File which may be of potential value in other types of criminal investigations and general activities in the future. It is not desired that further steps be taken to develop other informants in the category of investigations set forth in Bureau Bulletin No. 8, Series 1945.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
(typed September 5, 1945)

65-03-1017
(ENC.)
BUREAU BULLETIN NO. 55
SERIES 1945

(D)

TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

RE: SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES - ESPIONAGE
COASTAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Reference is made to Bureau Bulletin Number 8, Series 1945, issued under date of January 24, 1945, directing that all coastal offices institute a program to obtain complete coverage of the shore line and adjacent areas in order that all persons living in those vicinities would become aware of the Bureau's responsibility and interest and the necessity for reporting information indicating a possible landing by enemy agents.

In view of the cessation of hostilities, it is suggested that all offices retain any informants developed in this matter in the Source of Information File which may be of potential value in other types of criminal investigations and general activities in the future. It is not desired that further steps be taken to develop other informants in the category of investigations set forth in Bureau Bulletin No. 8, Series 1945.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

6-03-617
(E. 11.)
BUREAU BULLETIN NO.
SERIES 1945

Typed: August 31, 1945

TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

RE: SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES - ESPIONAGE
COASTAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Reference is made to Bureau Bulletin Number 8, Series 1945, issued under date of January 21, 1945, directing that all coastal offices institute a program to obtain complete coverage of the shore line and adjacent areas in order that all persons living in those vicinities be made aware of the Bureau's responsibility and importance of reporting information indicating a possible landing by enemy agents.

In view of the cessation of hostilities, it is suggested that all offices retain any informants developed in this matter in the Source of Information File which may be of potential value in the future. It is not desired that further steps be taken to develop other informants in this category of investigation *as far as*
in Bureau Bulletin No. 8 Series 1945

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.
Typed: August 31, 1945

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Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

*For other types of
criminal investigations
and general activities*



ENCLOSURE

- 697

*OK in
KR in
Sgt 5-4*

1/20/48

RE: SECURITY INDEX

The Bureau has noted that many division offices are neglecting to recommend the preparation of Security Index Cards on individuals who are now or who have been the subjects of Internal Security - R and Espionage - R cases in accordance with existing instructions.

Each Special Agent in Charge should bear in mind that if the individual's activity is such that he could be considered a threat to the internal security of this country then he should consider recommending that a Security Index Card be prepared on that individual. This is true whether prosecution of the individual is contemplated or not. This, of course, pertains not only to persons who are the subjects of pending Internal Security - R and Espionage - R cases but also closed cases as well.

In the event your division office has not recommended that Security Index Cards be prepared on such individuals in the past, you are instructed to do so immediately in each case in which one is justified.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover
RECORDED

John Edgar Hoover
Director

1/20/43

66-04-613

1/20/48 Personal communication 673

To All Special Agents In Charge

RE: SECURITY INDEX

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John Edgar Hoover
Director

(Typed name and title)

1/10/48

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In the event your division office has not recommended that Security Index Cards be prepared on such individuals in the past, you are instructed to do so immediately in each case in which one is justified.

Very truly yours,

JAN 15

U.S. DEPT.

OF JUSTICE

John Edgar Hoover
Director

1/10/48

RE: SECURITY INDEX

The Bureau has noted that many division offices are neglecting to recommend the preparation of Security Index Cards on individuals who are now or who have been the subjects of Internal Security - R and Espionage - R cases in accordance with existing instructions.

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Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover
RECORDED
1/10/48
John Edgar Hoover
Director

SONAL ATTENTION
CONFIDENTIALSAC LETTER NO. 52
Series 1948

March 30, 1948

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	DETROIT	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	EL PASO	NEWARK	ST. PAUL
	BALTIMORE	HONOLULU	NEW HAVEN	SALT LAKE CITY
	BIRMINGHAM	HOUSTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN ANTONIO
	BOSTON	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN DIEGO
	BUFFALO	KANSAS CITY	NORFOLK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUTTE	KNOXVILLE	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN JUAN
	CHARLOTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OMAHA	SAVANNAH
	CHICAGO	LOS ANGELES	PHILADELPHIA	SEATTLE
	CINCINNATI	LOUISVILLE	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
	CLEVELAND	MEMPHIS	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	DALLAS	MIAMI	PORTLAND	QUANTICO


RE: COMMUNIST SABOTAGE AGENTS; INTERNAL SECURITY - C AND R 27856

In further regard to the necessity that we be fully prepared in the event of a sudden outbreak of war with Russia, I wish to call your attention to the possible disastrous consequences to the national defense of specially trained Communist saboteurs launching a concerted sabotage attack against our communication and transportation systems, water supply facilities, public utilities and other vital installations before we can locate them for detention.

We dare not risk such a "Pearl Harbor" on the home front. It is your personal responsibility, of course, to carefully consider the problems raised by this threat in your Division so that there may be no serious interference with nor disruption of communication systems nor of other facilities vital to our defense effort.

I desire that you attempt to determine through informants or through the evaluation of available information, who the possible Communist or Russian underground leaders are in your district who might be in charge of sabotage or resistance activities and what plans for action they might have. It is believed that the Communist Party has selected and trained some of the lesser known Communists to take over such operations when an emergency develops since the present Party leaders apparently expect to be interned.

You will subsequently be advised of the plans presently being formulated at the Seat of Government for the detention of dangerous persons in the



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MAY 1 1948

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of an emergency. In the meantime suggestions of problems coming to your attention in this regard should be immediately forwarded to the Bureau.

Regarding the Security Index you should hereafter tab the cards of those persons listed in the Security Index who you feel are trained or potential saboteurs, and advise the Bureau of their identities so that their cards may be tabbed here. In this connection, you should give particular consideration to such persons as the veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, Communist veterans of OSS, Communist veterans of the U. S. Armed Forces, graduates of the Lenin school, as well as suspected Communist and Russian agents having access to vital installations. There is at least some indication that the national office of the Communist Party is sending or has already sent special representatives to strategic areas who are to be placed in industries and housed by the local Communist organization.


For the proper channeling of this information, a new file has been opened at the Bureau entitled Communist Sabotage Agents, Internal Security - C and R in which will be filed tickler copies of the serials relating to potential Communist saboteurs or relating to Communist sabotage plans. Communications submitted to the Bureau by the Field on such matters should be captioned in that manner or by the code name "Comsab." This file should not be confused with the file recently set up entitled "Communist Party, USA, Slowdown in Industry, Internal Security - C." It is felt that the latter file should relate primarily to "Slowdowns" or other related Communist activity in industry. 27857

It is my desire that the foregoing matters receive the most serious and careful consideration of your office particularly as related to the situation in your Division and that Supervisors and Agents handling these matters be kept fully informed of all developments in order that they will be in a position to attach the proper significance to information coming to their attention.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

SAC LETTER NO. 52
Series 1948
3-30-48



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.
March 20, 1948

66-04-725

ENC

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

FILE NO.

PERSONAL ATTENTION

~~Confidential~~

Letter

TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE, BUREAU OFFICIALS AND SUPERVISORS:

RE: COMMUNIST SABOTAGE AGENTS
INTERNAL SECURITY - C and R

27864

Dear Sir:

In further regard to the necessity that we be fully prepared in the event of a sudden outbreak of war with Russia, I wish to call your attention to the possible disastrous consequences to the national defense of specially trained Communist saboteurs launching a concerted sabotage attack against our communication and transportation systems, water supply facilities, public utilities and other vital installations before we can locate them for detention.

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You will subsequently be advised of the plans presently being formulated at the Seat of Government for the detention of dangerous persons in the event of an emergency. In the meantime suggestions or problems coming to your attention in this regard should be immediately forwarded to the Bureau.

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3/20/48
C.I.*

ENCLOSURE


*OK
CWM*


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It is my desire that the foregoing matters receive the most serious and careful consideration of your office particularly as related to the situation in your Division and that Supervisors and Agents handling these matters be kept fully informed of all developments in order that they will be in a position to attach the proper significance to information coming to their attention.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director



66-04-757
United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL ATTENTION
CONFIDENTIAL

SAC LETTER NO. 71
Series 1948

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

May 7, 1948

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	DETROIT	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	EL PASO	NEWARK	ST. PAUL
	BALTIMORE	HONOLULU	NEW HAVEN	SALT LAKE CITY
	BIRMINGHAM	HOUSTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN ANTONIO
	BOSTON	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN DIEGO
	BUFFALO	KANSAS CITY	NORFOLK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUTTE	KNOXVILLE	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN JUAN
	CHARLOTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OMAHA	SAVANNAH
	CHICAGO	LOS ANGELES	PHILADELPHIA	SEATTLE
	CINCINNATI	LOUISVILLE	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
	CLEVELAND	MEMPHIS	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	DALLAS	MIAMI	PORTLAND	QUANTICO


RE: DETENTION OF COMMUNISTS IN THE EVENT OF
SUDDEN DIFFICULTY WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 57, Series 1948, dated April 10, 1948, in which all Special Agents in Charge were instructed to cause a review of their files to be made for the purpose of ascertaining just what information we do have and do not have with respect to individual Communists, looking toward the detention of dangerous and potentially dangerous ones in the event of an emergency.

You were instructed in connection with the file review to prepare a Communist Index as distinguished from the Security Index which will contain information on all known Communist Party members. I want you to be certain that no pertinent data have been overlooked in files under the 61 (Treason and Related Cases) and 65 (Espionage) classifications.

Prior to World War II considerable information regarding individual Communists was placed in files bearing these classifications. You may find therein information of value regarding Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, persons trained in Russian schools, possible informants, possible hideouts for the Party leaders when they go completely underground, and possible sources of information in connection with investigations conducted under the loyalty program.

You should also bear in mind that similar material may be found in files bearing the following classifications: 3 (Overthrow and Destruction of Government); 39 (Immigration Matters); 40 (Passport and Visa Matters); 97 (Foreign Agents Registration Act); 98 (Sabotage); 101 (Hatch Act); and 102 (Voorhis Act), prior to December 7, 1941.



Very truly yours,
RECORDED - 47
John Edgar Hoover
INDEXED - 47
Director

66-04-757
22

59 MAY 24 1948



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

66-04-757

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IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

(Typed May 1, 1948)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: DETENTION OF COMMUNISTS IN THE EVENT OF
SUDDEN DIFFICULTY WITH THE SOVIET UNION

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Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Letter sent to Bur. of Gen. Inv.
5-7-48
EJ

66-04-757

OK
Curtis

7/11/50 65-471149

(L) SECURITY INDEX -- In view of the present international situation, I again wish to call your attention to the importance of including in the Security Index the names of all individuals who might be potentially dangerous to the internal security of this country. It is realized that in the past certain criteria were set up to determine whether a particular individual should be included in the Index. In view of recent international developments, however, you should be constantly alert with respect to the individuals who are, in spite of the Korean situation, supporting the Communist cause and are active in it today. The information which your office is currently receiving from your informants regarding the activities of various individuals should be carefully analyzed to determine whether such individuals are potentially dangerous. I cannot emphasize too strongly that the responsibility for the inclusion of all such individuals in the Security Index rests with the respective offices.

In this same connection, the Bureau desires that subjects of espionage investigations be included in the Security Index in accordance with instructions contained in SAC Letter #97, dated October 19, 1949, where in your opinion such subjects remaining at liberty would constitute potential danger to the internal security of our country. It should be borne in mind that even though it is not possible to develop a prosecutable espionage case, investigation of the individual may still clearly reveal his potential dangerousness which would warrant the inclusion of his name in the Index.

In following the activities of the various individuals under investigation, you should also be constantly alert for any information which might indicate that Communists and members of other subversive groups may be violating Federal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative jurisdiction. This would include such violations as espionage, sabotage and sedition.

This matter must be given your personal attention.

7-11-50
SAC LETTER NO. 43
Series 1950

Very truly yours,
- 7 -
John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-1149

(Typed July 7, 1950)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

RE: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

In view of the present international situation, I again wish to call your attention to the importance of including in the Security Index the names of all individuals who might be potentially dangerous to the internal security of this country. It is recalled that in the past certain criteria were used to determine whether or not an individual should be included in the Index. In view of recent international developments, however, you should be constantly alert with respect to the individuals who are, in spite of the Korean situation, supporting the Communist cause and are active in it today. The information which your office is currently receiving from your informants regarding the activities of various individuals should be carefully analyzed to determine whether such individuals are potentially dangerous. I cannot emphasize too strongly that the responsibility for the inclusion of all such individuals in the Security Index rests with the respective offices.

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This matter must be given your personal attention

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-1149
(ENCL)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

October 19, 1949

SAC LETTER NO. 97
Series 1949

(A) SECURITY INDEX INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES, - ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING, AND RELATED MATTERS -- From the standpoint of efficiency, economy, supervision and adequate handling, the Bureau desires that the investigative procedures and steps and the administrative handling of all matters relating to the investigations of individuals under the security characters be as uniform throughout the field as possible. However, the Bureau does realize that the volume of work which the number of individuals, as well as the particular or peculiar local circumstances, create, does present diverse problems of administration. This may be graphically illustrated by comparing extreme totals on the Security Index and Communist Index Cards.

Offices vary from one Security Index Card to a high of 1,842 Security Index Cards and similarly vary from 14 Communist Index Cards to a high of 39,700 Communist Index Cards. Obviously an administrative procedure used for a particular purpose set up for a small volume would be wholly inadequate for an office with a large volume. Reversing this thought, an administrative procedure set up for a large volume would, of course, be cumbersome and probably unnecessary for an office with a small volume. Therefore, a basic level of uniformity must be strived for.

Within this framework of uniformity, however, the Bureau realizes the necessity of allowing and permitting a local approach to particular administrative or investigative problems.

ENCLOSURE

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(ENCL.)

In order to obtain uniformity and efficiency of operation there follow herein new instructions pertaining to various aspects of the Security Index Program. It is expected that each Special Agent in Charge and every Special Agent will take steps immediately to make each office's procedures conform with these instructions. These changes result from the various suggestions and observations obtained from the monthly self-inspection of the Security Index and an intensive study of this problem at the Bureau.

Should it be found that after reviewing these instructions some particular local problem or suggestion appearing in the inspection reports can not be resolved by this Bulletin, you should immediately prepare a communication to the Bureau setting forth the problem involved and the suggested solutions. The Bureau will thereupon give consideration to your particular problem.

THE SECURITY INDEX ARRANGEMENT

In order to clarify the instructions pertaining to the arrangement of the Security Index, Section 87 E (4) (C) of the Manual of Instructions is being rewritten as follows:

The Security Index shall be prepared on 5 x 8 white cards. The index itself is to be prepared in two sections. The original Security Index card shall be filed geographically in accordance with the needs existing in the particular office. For example, where necessary it should be broken down by state, county, city and, if conditions warrant, into precincts. Under each geographical breakdown the cards should be filed alphabetically. It will no longer be necessary to separate and maintain breakdowns as to organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency e.g. Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, etc. When the occasion demands, this card may readily be drawn from the geographical section of the Index and utilized by the apprehending Agent. It is this card which must be tabbed under the Detcom and Comsab programs.

A duplicate card shall be prepared which shall be filed alphabetically. This card will be identical in appearance to the geographical card. It will be maintained in a strict alphabetical order without any breakdown whatsoever. It will be in the nature of a control card, and when the original card is withdrawn from the geographical index for apprehension purposes, an appropriate notation shall be made on the duplicate card in the alphabetical section for the purpose of administrative handling.

CONTENTS AND APPEARANCE OF CARD

(1) The Security Index card should contain on the front side the following information:

- (a) Name and aliases
- (b) Race

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(ENCL.)
- (c) Sex
 - (d) Citizenship (Native born, naturalized or alien)
 - (e) Organizational affiliation or Nationalist tendency (Communist, Socialist Workers Party, etc.)
 - (f) Dangerousness Classification, if any (Detcom and Comsab)
 - (g) Date and Place of Birth
 - (h) Vital industry and code number (this may be omitted for the present until such vital industry list has been obtained and the code developed)
 - (i) Field Office file number
 - (j) Residence address
 - (k) Business address

(2) In addition, the reverse side of the original (geographical) card should contain the following:

- (a) Complete description
- (b) Photograph

(3) If any of the above items are missing, with the exception of a photograph, the case should not be closed. However, the absence of information concerning race, sex, citizenship, date and place of birth and description should not deter the preparation of a Security Index Card where one is otherwise warranted. The case should be left in a pending status and active investigation should be conducted to determine such items of information as are missing. It is not desired that a case be left in a pending status merely to obtain a photograph. Every effort should be made to obtain a photograph during the course of the investigation, however. Nothing should appear on the Security Index card which does not appear in the subject's case file.

For your guidance there is attached hereto a model Security Index Card. The front side, of course, sets forth all information required. Additionally, the residence and business addresses are set up approximately one-half way down the card with spaces under each for several additions and corrections.

It is not desired that you institute any large project at the present time to change the form of Security Index Cards in your office. However, as corrections are made and new cards are needed the sample form of preparation should be used. It is expected that within a period of time all the cards throughout the field will be prepared in this uniform manner.

As an aid to the inclusion of descriptive data concerning the subject on the reverse side of the card, the uniform field photograph stamp used on the back of photographs may be used on the back of the Security Index Card. This uniform stamp, you will note, also calls for the date on which the photograph was taken. Additional descriptive information, such as the subject's possession of firearms, his potential dangerousness, etc., should also be included as descriptive information on the back side. The stamp should not be considered as an all inclusive description and additional information should be added where necessary for a fuller description.

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FORMS FOR USE WITH THE SECURITY INDEX AND RELATED MATTERS

(1) Form FD122. There is attached hereto a copy of the revised form FD122. The old form in the past was used to recommend the preparation of a Security Index card. The revised form in the future will serve two purposes, namely, (1) to recommend the preparation of a Security Index card as in the past; and, (2) to advise the Bureau of any revisions or additions to the Security Index card. The revised form calls only for factual data and it will no longer be necessary to prepare a replica of the card. In reference to the last line of the form calling for data as to the individual's connection with a vital or strategic installation or industry, you are instructed to disregard this item of information for the present. Separate instructions concerning this aspect are under preparation and will shortly be furnished to the Field.

Henceforth, Form FD122, when used to recommend the preparation of a Security Index Card, should be prepared in triplicate. The original and thin white will be forwarded to the Bureau and, of course, a copy will be retained in the field office case file. If the recommendation is approved by the Bureau, the Bureau will return the thin white copy to the office requesting the Security Index Card appropriately stamped "Prepare Security Index Card." This thin copy bearing the Bureau's response shall be filed. The card can then be prepared by the field office.

When using the form to accomplish any revision or addition to the Security Index Card, only the item or items being revised or added should be set forth. When used for this purpose, only the original copy need be furnished to the Bureau.

Care should be taken to insure the proper selection of the opening paragraph, option depending upon which of the two uses is being made of the form.

(2) Form FD128. There is attached hereto a copy of revised Form FD128. You will recall that the old Form FD128 was used in the past to transfer a Security Index Card from one division to another and automatically changed the office of origin without requesting the Bureau to make such a change. This form has also been revised and will serve the same purpose as before. However, by the use of this form, it is now permissible to change the office of origin without prior Bureau authority in security cases where the individual is not the subject of a Security Index Card. This can be accomplished by using the proper options on the form. You will note that the form, as revised, calls for several additional items of information to be indicated for the benefit of the Bureau and the new office of origin. Only those items which are applicable to the particular case would be checked. Before executing this form, however, it is absolutely essential that the new office of origin have verified the new addresses of the subject.

(3) Form FD119 has been discontinued. You will recall that this form was used in order to amend or change the Security Index Card. In lieu of the form FD119, you are now instructed to use the revised form FD122.

66-04-1147
(ENCLOSURE)

You are also instructed to discontinue the practice of having local law enforcement agencies verify the addresses of Security Index subjects. In this connection you are instructed to destroy Form FD110 which form was a request of the Police Departments to verify the stated addresses.

Obviously you should destroy all your old forms FD119, FD122, and FD128 when you have received your new supply. Orders for the revised forms FD122 and FD128 should immediately be submitted to the Bureau.

PROCEDURE IN HANDLING CASE WHERE SECURITY INDEX CARD IS RECOMMENDED

In order that a uniform field procedure can be adopted and that individuals who have been recommended for the Security Index, but who have as yet not been approved by the Bureau, will at all times be at the attention of the field office so recommending, the following procedure must immediately be instituted:

Present instructions permit the submission of a closing report when all necessary and required information has been developed and when a recommendation for the preparation of a Security Index card has been submitted to the Bureau. In the future the report should be submitted in a pending inactive status and the case should be so kept until the response from the Bureau has been obtained relative to the preparation of the Security Index Card. All such cases will, therefore, be readily located by a quick review of the pending and pending inactive "100" cases in the office. Upon receipt of the Bureau's response and the handling thereof the case may be closed administratively. The Security Index card should not be prepared until the Bureau authority is received.

SECURITY INDEX CARDS IN AUXILIARY OFFICES

Security Index Cards should be maintained by the office of origin only. Any duplicate cards presently maintained by auxiliary offices should be destroyed.

CHECKING AND POSTING ADDRESS VERIFICATIONS OF SECURITY INDEX CARD SUBJECTS

It is recommended where the volume of Security Index dictate that form FD154 be used when verifying the addresses of Security Index card subjects.

If a form FD154 is not used in the mechanics of verifying the addresses it is desired that a notation be made on the last form FD154, FD122, or FD128 appearing in the case file reflecting the subject's current addresses, the date the addresses were verified. This is being done to insure that the file will contain all information concerning the status of the case and it will also permit the file to come to the attention of the Agent or Supervising official to determine if any additional action is warranted at that time in the case.

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(Encl.) 117

The method by which Security Index address checks are followed by the supervising official and the administrative manner in which it is handled is solely within the judgment of the Special Agent in Charge. The basic rule must be remembered that the Security Index must at all times be kept in a current status and addresses must be checked at least every six months. Whether this is done by individual case ticklers, administrative ticklers, or an arbitrary arrangement of checking certain sections of the index on a periodic basis will depend on the needs of each office.

DETCOM AND COMSAB TABBING

- (1) As set forth in the Manual of Instructions the Detcom program is concerned with individuals on the Security Index who are to be given priority arrest in the event of apprehension of security index subjects at the time of an emergency. As such, the original (geographical) Security Index Cards of individuals falling into the following categories must be tabbed for Detcom:
- (a) All top functionaries
 - (b) All key figures
 - (c) All individuals tabbed under the Comsab program
 - (d) Any other individual who, though he does not fall in the above groups, should be given priority arrest because of some peculiar circumstances.

No effort should be made to distinguish between the various degrees of priority.

- (2) In connection with the Comsab program your attention is again directed to the Manual of Instructions pointing out that Communist individuals, either because of their training or because of their position relative to vital or strategic installations or industry, should be considered under this program. Where individuals are tabbed under the Comsab program they must also be tabbed under the Detcom program. As set forth above, the Comsab program is a portion of the Detcom program.

- (3) The Security Index Cards should be tabbed as follows:

They should be tabbed with a metal signal tab attached to the card. All individuals tabbed under the Detcom program should be tabbed with a colored tab and those tabbed under the Comsab program should be tabbed with a contrasting colored tab. The Security Index Cards of Detcom and Comsab subjects should not be of any particular distinguishing color. All Security Index Cards should be the standard 5" x 8" white cards. Separate colored cards should not be used for Detcom, Comsab, key figures, top functionaries, etc. The Security Index Card, however, should contain the code word applicable, that is, Detcom, Comsab or both. (See model Security Index Card attached)

- (4) In the event of the transfer of the subject of a Security Index Card which card has been tabbed for Detcom, Comsab, or both, such tabbing is automatically deleted by both the new office of origin and the Bureau. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the new office of origin to consider the subject in the light of these programs and determine if the subject is to be tabbed under

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Series 1949

either or both of these programs. The new office of origin should so advise the Bureau. This rule is similar to that governing the transfer of Security Index Card subjects who have been designated key figures. Such a designation is immediately deleted upon the transfer. (See revised Form FD128 attached)

(5) Obviously, if an individual no longer fits the standards under either the Detcom or Consab programs, such designation should be deleted. It is expected, therefore, that you will follow this matter closely in line with the general principles that the Security Index and all information appearing therein is at all times in a current status.

KEY FIGURES

Previous instructions concerning the method by which the key figure list is to be maintained are again called to your attention. You will note that the Bureau does not require a specific method. The number of key figures a particular office has will govern the method which is used. The list may be kept by a simple list system, by maintaining a file wherein all additions and deletions to the list are reported or by a card index system. The Bureau does not desire, however, that the Security Index cards of any key figures be tabbed as such. The key figure list should be maintained separate from the Security Index. Of course, all key figures will be tabbed under the Detcom program. It should be clearly borne in mind that the Security Index is an apprehension list and the key figure list is but an administrative set-up.

SPECIAL SECTION OF THE SECURITY INDEX

For your information, the Bureau maintains a section in the Security Index at the Seat of Government labeled "Special." Cards on individuals falling into the following categories are kept in this section:

- (1) Government employees
- (2) Atomic Energy Program employees and subjects
- (3) Espionage subjects
- (4) Prominent individuals
- (5) United Nations Secretariat
- (6) Foreign government employees

A similar special section shall not be set up by any Bureau field office without specific Bureau authority.

For your confidential information the Security Index Cards maintained at the Seat of Government have been reproduced in IBM Cards and it is, therefore, possible for the Bureau to categorically separate into any given type or combination of types all the Security Index Cards presently in file. Any tabulation or listing of the cards by the following information or combinations can be obtained,

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(ENCL.)

Name, Race, Sex, Citizenship, Organizational affiliations, Dangerous classification (Detcom or Comsab), Date of Birth, Country of Birth, Bureau file number and office of origin. Vital industry or strategic installation designation will also be available when that program has been completed.

All individuals appearing in this section will be given individual attention in the event of an emergency.

COMMUNIST INDEX

In order that the Communist Index will be uniformly understood, arranged, and handled throughout the field the following complete instructions are being set out concerning it. Where instructions conflict with previously issued instructions regarding this index this Bulletin will govern.

(1) PURPOSE

The Communist Index should be prepared so as to have a ready record in the way of a complete alphabetical index separate and distinct from the general office indices representing those identified persons who, in the light of ever changing conditions, should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view to possible investigation, interrogation, or action under the Security Index program.

Within this purpose the Index may additionally serve as an administrative aid and working index reflecting a central repository of the names of all individuals having an affiliation with the Communist Party or similar ideological groups.

(2) INDIVIDUALS TO BE INCLUDED

This Index should contain the names and other information as to those persons who may be described as Communists in the broad sense of the word. Therefore it will include those persons who have been affiliated with the Communist Party or other similar ideological groups and as such have (1) been present or past subjects of Security Index Cards, (2) been reported past or present members or (3) thru their activities and expressed sympathies strongly indicated affiliation or agreement with such ideologies.

(3) CONTENTS OF THE INDEX CARD:

The card should contain the following information where available:

- (a) Name and aliases
- (b) Field Office file number
- (c) Position in the Party
- (d) Place of residence
- (e) Place of employment

- (f) Citizenship
- (g) Source and date information received
- (h) A general statement to be included, if necessary, by the reviewing Agent which will assist for evaluation purposes in determining whether the Communist in question is potentially or actually dangerous.

If it is desired that additional information appear on the card, the Bureau should be advised as to the exact type of information so desired to be placed on the card, and consideration will be given by the Bureau to authorizing such additional information. However, before the Bureau will authorize additional information, it will be incumbent upon the particular office to show that such information serves a day to day value. Additionally, if other information is added thereon, the office will be under an obligation to keep such additional information in a current and up-to-date status at all times.

(4) ARRANGEMENT AND PHYSICAL SET-UP OF THE INDEX

Index Cards should be maintained in a strictly alphabetical arrangement. No breakdowns or sub-divisions should be made as to organizational affiliation, geographical location, etc. The card should preferably be a 3" x 5" plain white card.

Again, if any special breakdown or arrangement of the index is desired, Bureau authority will be needed and a special communication should be sent to the Bureau setting forth the nature of the breakdown or arrangement and the day to day value of such a special arrangement.

(5) TRANSFERS, REMOVALS AND DELETIONS OF CARDS

Communist Index Cards should be maintained in the Index indefinitely and no project should be undertaken to keep the Index in a current status. Individual cards should be retained in the Index even though a subject moves to a place within the jurisdiction of another field division, is imprisoned, enters military service, or departs from the Continental United States or territorial possessions. Cards may be destroyed if it is found that they should rightfully never have been prepared in the first instance or upon the death of a subject. No investigative or administrative effort should be expended solely, however, to purge the Index of deceased individuals or to keep the cards in an up-to-date status. It is mandatory only to destroy Communist Index cards on individuals who subsequently become confidential national defense informants or established sources of information in the national defense field.

ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS DEVELOPING INFORMATION CONCERNING INDIVIDUALS WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR THE SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

Individuals investigated during the course of the above type of cases should constantly be borne in mind for inclusion in the Security Index. If the

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individual otherwise meets the standards of potential dangerousness or dangerousness required for the inclusion of his name in the Security Index and your office is not in a position to give this individual continuous investigative and surveillance attention in the event of an emergency he should be included in the Security Index. He must also be borne in mind for inclusion in the Communist Index. It will be the primary responsibility of the investigating agent and the supervising official in the Field to make the appropriate recommendation for the preparation of a Security Index Card. At the time the recommendation is made there must be borne in mind the necessity of having a summary type report concerning the subject's activities prepared if a report or reports have not previously been prepared on him as an individual for submission to the Division of Records of the Department of Justice. The fact that an individual is an espionage subject should not alone deter the preparation of a Security Index Card, in view of the fact that such an individual will be carried in the Special Section of the Security Index, Form FD122 will carry in the caption the appropriate character under which the subject was investigated e.g. "John Doe - Espionage - R."

LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE INVESTIGATIONS DEVELOPING INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO THE SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

All cases investigated under the character of Loyalty of Government Employees where any disloyal information is developed should be considered under the Security Index Program. It is incumbent upon each Agent conducting such investigation to call the attention of the appropriate field supervisor, having charge of the Security Index, to the case in order that it may be given such attention. At the same time if it is deemed inadvisable to place the subject of a loyalty investigation on the Security Index because the investigation fails to reflect sufficient disloyal information warranting the preparation of such a card, the individual should, of course, also be considered as being the possible subject of a Communist Index Card. Obviously if the Communist Index is to become a comprehensive compilation of individuals of interest to the internal security it would be seriously incomplete without numerous individuals considered under the loyalty program.

In this connection your attention is again directed to Bureau Bulletin No. 28, Series 1948 wherein instructions were issued that in a loyalty investigation where an office conducts investigation in an area not covering the residence of the individual and develops information of a disloyal nature reports must be submitted to the office covering the residence area. It is noted that in numerous cases this practice has not been followed, even in cases where Security Index Cards are presently on file on such subjects.

Where an individual, who has been investigated under the loyalty program, is also the subject of a Security Index Card it is desired that a dual character be used in reports namely Loyalty of Government Employees; Security Matter - C. This will insure that the reports are also given appropriate consideration by the Security Index Desk at the Bureau as well as in the field. The reports should, of course, be written according to the standards prevailing for loyalty reports.

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OTHER INVESTIGATIONS DEVELOPING INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO THE SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

In all other types of investigations, exclusive of espionage, foreign intelligence, security, and loyalty cases, which are covered separately, it is desired that the investigating agent bring the reported case to the attention of the appropriate supervising official of the Security Index and the Communist Index where information is developed which could warrant the preparation of either or both of the Index cards. This, of course, will include Atomic Energy Act investigations, Voice of America Applicant investigations, Departmental Applicants, Bureau Applicants, etc.

Where an individual is so investigated and he is presently the subject of a Security Index Card, a letter should be directed to the Bureau at the time the report is submitted advising that the individual is a Security Index Card subject. This must be done in order to insure that the reports will receive attention by the Security Index Desk at the Seat of Government.

Obviously any individual who can be considered dangerous in the event of an emergency and fitting the standards for the Security Index should be included irrespective of the character of the investigation conducted of him by the Bureau. Should such an individual ever commit an act of hostility against the United States it will be no defense for the Bureau that we had never conducted a security type investigation of him but only, for example, an applicant type investigation.

CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF THE SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

As previously reiterated on several occasions no mention must be made in any investigative report relating to the classifications of top functionaries and key figures, nor to the Detcom or Comsab Programs, nor to the Security Index or the Communist Index. These investigative procedures and administrative aids are confidential and should not be known to any outside agency.

The revised forms FD128 and FD122 should be placed in the FBI Form Book and Form FD119 deleted.

(B) TESTS AND EXAMINATIONS GIVEN IN FIELD OFFICES DURING INSPECTIONS -- Effective immediately, you are advised that Inspectors will not give second examinations or tests to Special Agents, stenographers, typists or other clerical employees who fail to pass the first test or examination given. The Inspector will furnish the Special Agent in Charge with a record of the failing grades made on these tests and examinations, and this information shall be given consideration in the preparation of efficiency ratings.

(C) SUPPLIES -- The Bureau is forwarding to your office one copy of the current Bureau of Federal Supply Stock Catalog and a Washington, D. C. Warehouse Supplement, dated October, 1949. This catalog supersedes the catalog of

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(ENCL.)

April, 1949, which should be destroyed. Particular attention should be paid to the change of addresses of the Atlanta, Cleveland, Kansas City and Los Angeles warehouses. Bureau Offices ordering from these warehouses should consult Page III of the catalog for the proper addresses.

The Warehouse Supplement of Washington, D. C. contains items stocked only in the Washington Warehouse. Bureau Offices outside of the area served by this warehouse can procure any needed items in that catalog by listing the Warehouse in Washington as the seller in place of the usual regional warehouse on the purchase order form. You should not list any items contained in the main stock catalog.

In addition the instruction contained on the back cover must be adhered to, with the exception of the pricing instructions. Pay particular attention to arranging the items in numerical and alphabetical order according to item number, and using the correct unit when ordering. For example some Bureau Offices continue to order cheesecloth by the bolt even though the unit of issue established by the Bureau of Federal Supply is by the yard. If the Bureau Offices follow these instructions closely it will facilitate rapid filling and shipment of orders by the Federal Supply Warehouses.

It is requested that these instructions be issued to each clerk in your office writing Bureau of Federal Supply Purchase Orders.

(D) MONTHLY ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT - DELINQUENT CASE LISTS -- Semiannually each office is required to submit with the monthly administrative report a delinquent case list on which delinquent cases are listed on separate pages for each classification. This procedure is to continue but, in the future, you should submit an original and five copies of such delinquent case lists to the Bureau.

In addition, you should submit on separate pages, those cases relating to "Internal Security - R" from those relating to "Internal Security - C." This separation is necessary for Administrative purposes at the Bureau. At the top of each page of the delinquent case list, the identity of the office submitting the list and the date of submission should be shown as well as the words "Delinquent Case List."

The Bureau expects that each office will carefully review the delinquent cases listed for the purpose of taking prompt, corrective action to remove the delinquencies as soon as possible.

MODEL SECURITY INDEX CARD

DOE, JOHN HENRY

W-M

NATIVE BORN

COMMUNIST-Detcom


Comsab

100-123456

June 1, 1900
Central City, Ohio

Res - 167¹/₂ Jones Boulevard
Paducah City, Kentucky

Bus - The John Henry Smith Constuction Co.
1744 Henry Avenue, N. W.
Paducah City, Kentucky



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

— It is recommended that a Security Index Card be prepared on the above captioned individual.

— The Security Index Card on the captioned individual should be changed as follows: (Specify change only)

NAME _____

ALIASES _____

RACE _____ SEX _____ NATIVE BORN _____ NATURALIZED _____ ALIEN _____

COMMUNIST _____ SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY _____ INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST LEAGUE _____

MISCELLANEOUS (Specify) _____

TAB FOR DETCOM _____ TAB FOR COMSAB _____

DATE OF BIRTH _____ PLACE OF BIRTH _____

RESIDENCE ADDRESS _____

BUSINESS ADDRESS (Show name of employing concern and address) _____

NATURE OF INDUSTRY OR BUSINESS (Specify from Strategic and Vital Industry List)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT:

DATE:

The captioned individual has been the subject of a security investigation by this office. The _____ Division has verified the permanent presence of the subject in its division as residing and working at the addresses listed below. The _____ Division is being considered the new office of origin.

Residence Address: _____

Business Address: _____

Check the following applicable statements:

- This individual has been the subject of a Communist Index Card.
- This individual is the subject of a Security Index Card.
(The Bureau is requested to make the appropriate changes in the Security Index at the Seat of Government. The _____ Division should affix the addresses reflected above and the appropriate case file number.)
- This subject was tabbed for Detcom.
- This subject was tabbed for Comsab.
- This subject was carried as a Key Figure or Top Functionary.
- Handwriting specimens have been furnished to the Bureau.
- A photograph has been furnished to the Bureau.


The following pertinent items are being forwarded to the new office of origin with its copies of this letter:

- Security Index Cards
- Serials (specify)

R U C

cc: _____ Division (Enc.)

11/11



12/28/50

(C) SECURITY INDEX -- Under present instructions, the data recorded on Security Index cards shall at all times be in an up-to-date status and addresses for Security Index subjects must be checked by the Field at least once every six months.

Beginning January 15, 1951, and each six months thereafter, you should advise the Bureau by letter as to whether all Security Index cards are in an up-to-date status and whether addresses for all Security Index subjects have been checked within the last six months.

66-04-1248
(ENCL.)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

(Typed December 18, 1950)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

Under present instructions, the data recorded on Security Index cards shall at all times be in an up-to-date status and addresses for Security Index subjects must be checked by the Field at least once every six months.

Beginning January 15, 1951, and each six months thereafter, you should advise the Bureau by letter as to whether all Security Index cards are in an up-to-date status and whether addresses for all Security Index subjects have been checked within the last six months.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

*Letter sent to all SAC's, Sup's +
Bur. of 12-28-50.
E*

66-04-1248
12-28-50

66-04-1248
(1CL.)

RECEIVED
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(If changed, please specify date)

DATE

1. SUBJECT

- It is recommended that a Security Index Card be prepared on the above-captioned individual.
- The Security Index Card on the captioned individual should be changed as follows: (Specify change only)

NAME

ALIASES

NATIVE BORN NATURALIZED ALIEN

COMMUNIST SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST LEAGUE

MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)

TAB FOR DETCOM TAB FOR COMSAB RACE SEX

DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH

BUSINESS ADDRESS (Show name of employing concern and address)

NATURE OF INDUSTRY OR BUSINESS (Specify from Vital Facility List)

RESIDENCE ADDRESS

(1CL)

[illegible]



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

March 3, 1951

SAC LETTER NO. 23
Series 1951

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

66-54-1282
File Copy
PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	PORTLAND
	ALBUQUERQUE	DETROIT	MINNEAPOLIS	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	EL PASO	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BALTIMORE	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BIRMINGHAM	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BOSTON	KANSAS CITY	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUFFALO	KNOXVILLE	NORFOLK	SAN JUAN
	BUTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CHARLOTTE	LOS ANGELES	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CHICAGO	LOUISVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SPRINGFIELD
	CINCINNATI	MEMPHIS	PHOENIX	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	CLEVELAND	MIAMI	PITTSBURGH	QUANTICO
	DALLAS			

LETTER

66-04-1282

(C) SECURITY INDEX -- Special Section - Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 61, Series 1950, dated August 29, 1950, listing the categories in the Special Section of the Bureau's Security Index. Security Index cards are filed in the appropriate subdivisions of the Special Section when for one reason or another special consideration should be given prior to arrest in the event of an emergency.

In order to clarify further procedure regarding the placing of cards in the Special Section of the Security Index, the following requirements should be borne in mind. However, these requirements and all references hereafter in this letter to Security Index subjects do not in anyway change the primary requirement for inclusion of a subject in the Security Index, namely, that the subject's activities are sufficiently dangerous to the internal security to warrant apprehension in the event of an emergency.

Espionage subjects are maintained in the Special Section when apprehension in the event of an emergency would destroy chances of penetration and control of an operating Soviet espionage parallel or would destroy known chances of penetration and control of a "sleeper" parallel.

United States Government employees are maintained in the Special Section in order that the identities of Security Index subjects so employed can be readily determined.

Atomic energy employees are maintained in the Special Section because their apprehension must be cleared with the Atomic Energy Commission representatives in order to avoid interference with atomic energy work.

Foreign government employees are maintained in the Special Section so that in the event of war we can give individual consideration to each such individual on the basis of the relations then existing between the United States Government and the country by which he is employed.

United Nations and international organization employees are maintained in the Special Section by reason of the fact that they are employees of international organizations regardless of their national origin.

Prominent individuals are maintained in the Special Section because their apprehension might affect adversely other persons not in the Security Index who are necessary to the war effort, or their apprehension might be attended by considerable publicity tending to make martyrs of them and thereby embarrassing the Bureau. Those individuals must receive special attention in order that the Security Index card in each instance is fully justified at all times.

A new category is being added to the Special Section. This category will consist of those Security Index subjects who, although Marxist-Leninist or sympathizers with Marxism-Leninism, are pro-Tito and anti-Stalin, anti-Cominform and anti-Soviet. Briefly, these persons can be referred to in the Special Section

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Series 1951

category as "pro-Tito," but the opposition to Stalin, the Cominform and the Soviets must be a definite factor in their support of Tito. The reason for this is clear. At the present time the Government of the United States is furnishing food and funds and is prepared to furnish arms and military supplies to the Tito Government of Yugoslavia in the event of an international crisis involving the Soviet Union. In other words, at the present time the Tito Government of Yugoslavia and its supporters are considered as potential allies of, rather than potential dangers to, the United States. As long as the Tito Government of Yugoslavia is aligned with the United States and its Western European allies against the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellite countries, no good purpose could be served in applying the Detention Program to the supporters of the Tito Government in the United States. Supporters of the Tito Government are not considered to include any Communist splinter group which from time to time makes statements in support of Tito but should include those individuals, particularly of Yugoslav birth or descent, whose support of Tito against the Cominform countries and Stalin is clear and unequivocal.

At the present time the code YUG indicates the nationalistic tendency for Yugoslavia. This code will likewise be used in indicating the pro-Tito category in the Special Section. Field offices having subjects falling within this category should inform the Bureau promptly of their identities in order that this category in the Special Section may be properly established.

In all cases of additions to the Special Section the form FD-122 should be accompanied by a memorandum from the field office explaining specifically why the change in the status of the subject should be made. When the field requests a removal of a subject's card from the Special Section, this request should be made by memorandum setting forth clearly the reason advanced by the field for such removal.

In every case involving a subject maintained in the Special Section in the foreign government employee or United Nations and international organization employee categories, reports suitable for dissemination should be submitted to the Bureau. Where an individual in either of these categories has been the subject of no report intended for distribution, a summary report should be submitted to the Bureau and reports suitable for distribution should be furnished thereafter on a regular basis.

In every case involving a subject maintained in the Special Section in the espionage category where a summary for distribution has not been prepared, a summary report suitable for distribution must be submitted to the Bureau within thirty days of the receipt of this letter. In any case involving a double agent operation, these summaries should stress, where possible, a basis other than the espionage activity of the subject for inclusion in the Regular Section of the Security Index. For example, if a collateral subject in a double agent operation, who is maintained in the Special Section under the espionage category because his apprehension would destroy the effectiveness of the double agent operation, has a record of Communist Party membership which in itself would justify his inclusion in the Security Index, such Communist Party membership should be stressed in the report prepared for ultimate distribution. If the sole basis for inclusion in the Security Index is collaboration with espionage agents, this should be set forth concisely, appropriately concealing the sources of information and informants.

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Series 1951

Regardless of the number of reports covering the investigation of a subject in the espionage category which are prepared subsequent to the above summary and which are not intended for distribution, a report suitable for distribution should, after the preparation of the summary requested above, be prepared each six months during such time as the subject remains in the Special Section.

Special summaries of the type requested need not be prepared for the U. S. Government employee and atomic energy employee categories since reports submitted on such individuals are regularly distributed. In the case of pro-Tito subjects who will be maintained in the Special Section reports suitable for distribution should be prepared at six-month intervals if the investigative reports regularly submitted have not been intended for distribution.

Maintenance of Special Section Security Index Cards

In order that the Security Index cards in the Special Section will be uniformly handled throughout the field, the two copies of the Special Section Security Index cards received from the Bureau should be filed in accordance with the following instructions:

One card should be placed in the Alphabetical Section of the Security Index and the other should be filed in the Special Section of the Index. Under no circumstances should Special Section Security Index cards be filed in the Geographical Section of the Security Index inasmuch as it is contemplated that the Geographical Section of the Index will be used for a mass apprehension of Security Index subjects.

Inactive Section

Instructions have been furnished the field on page 38 of Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions and in Bureau memorandum dated December 11, 1950, to the Albany Office captioned "Security Investigations - Removal of Cards from Security Index" that the Security Index cards for subjects who have entered the Armed Forces should be placed in a section of the Security Index designated "Inactive" and that a six-month tickler must be set up for each subject in this Section. At the termination of each six-month period appropriate inquiry should be made to determine if the subject has been discharged from the Armed Forces.

In order to clarify the administrative handling of cards of this type, at the time the Bureau is advised by memorandum that the subject of a Security Index card has entered the Armed Forces you should remove subject's cards from the Alphabetical and either the Geographical or Special Sections of the Security Index. The card taken from the Alphabetical Section should be destroyed and the other card should be filed in the "Inactive" Section. For your information, similar action is taken at the Bureau in cases of this type after the memorandum is received from the field advising that the subject has entered the Armed Forces. Subject's Security Index card is removed from the master Security Index records and a card is maintained in an "Inactive" section of the Bureau's Security Index.

At such time as a subject carried in the "Inactive" Section returns to civilian life, if you believe his activities at that time warrant his name being carried in the Regular Section of the Security Index, you should submit

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Series 1951

66-07-1283

another form FD-122 recommending that new Security Index cards be prepared, along with a report bringing his activities up to date.

Internal Security - YU

You will recall that Tito, the dictator of Yugoslavia, openly broke with the Soviet Union and the Cominform countries in July of 1948. While ideologically the Tito Government of Yugoslavia adheres to Marxism-Leninism, it no longer accepts the Stalinist interpretation and direction which is accepted by the Cominform countries.

In recent months the United States and its Western European allies have given material assistance to the Tito Government of Yugoslavia and it appears now that in the event of hostilities involving the Soviet Union with the United States, the Tito Government of Yugoslavia would not align itself with the Soviet Union against the United States but might be allied with the United States.

For this reason it becomes necessary to know whether subjects who have been investigated because of Yugoslav nationalistic tendencies and who have been placed in the Security Index because of Communist affiliations are actually Stalinists or are pro-Tito.

In the event of hostilities with the Soviet Union and in the event Yugoslavia has not aligned itself with the Soviets, special consideration must be given to the adherents of Tito in this country.

You should be alert through investigation to resolve immediately any doubts as to whether persons adhering to Tito prior to July, 1948, are now pro-Cominform or pro-Tito. Any Security Index subject of an Internal Security - C or Security Matter - C investigation of Yugoslav nationalistic tendencies who is now determined to be pro-Tito and anti-Stalin, anti-Cominform and anti-Soviet should be clearly designated in investigative reports by a change of the character of the investigation to Internal Security - YU.

"Prominent Individuals" - Special Section Security Index

The following instructions should be followed in regard to the "Prominent Individuals" sub-Division of the Special Section:

1. All cases in this category shall at all times be in either a pending or a pending inactive status and shall never be closed.


2. A prosecutive type summary report should be prepared immediately in each case covered in this category in your office. The summary report should be suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau reflecting all pertinent derogatory information on which justification for the Security Index card is based, including derogatory information developed through all types of confidential sources. All of the information received from each person, confidential informant or confidential source should be set out in chronological order under the name or symbol number of the respective person, informant or source. The identity of confidential informants and sources should be fully protected.

After a summary report has been prepared, a case in this category should be carried pending inactive and an appropriate tickler set up to insure that the Bureau will receive an investigative report six months from the date of the summary report, and thereafter an investigative report must be submitted at least every six months reflecting subject's activities since the date of the last report.

3. In addition to submitting reports each six months on persons in this category, it is the responsibility of each Special Agent in charge promptly to advise the Bureau of any information that might affect the retention of a Security Index card, for a prominent individual, either favorably or unfavorably.

4. It is also the responsibility of each Special Agent in charge to maintain cases in this category in such condition that you can at any time evaluate the case to determine whether the Bureau is fully justified in apprehending the subject should the Detcon Program be placed in operation.

5. If you believe that other subjects of Security Index cards are of such prominence in the business or professional fields that their cases should receive the additional attention to be given to this subdivision of the Special Section, in order that arrests can be fully justified at all times, you should submit recommendations that their cards be removed from the regular section and placed in the Special Section of the Index. In this connection, if you believe that an individual, presently carried in the "Prominent Individuals" subdivision of the Special Section, is not of such prominence as to warrant this special designation, you should submit your recommendation that the Security Index card be placed in the regular section of the Index.



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

(Typed February 8, 1951)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

Special Section

Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 61, Series 1950, dated August 29, 1950, listing the categories in the Special Section of the Bureau's Security Index. Security Index cards are filed in the appropriate subdivisions of the Special Section when for one reason or another special consideration should be given prior to arrest in the event of an emergency.

In order to clarify further procedure regarding the placing of cards in the Special Section of the Security Index, the following requirements should be borne in mind. However, these requirements and all references hereafter in this letter to Security Index subjects do not in any way change the primary requirement for inclusion of a subject in the Security Index, namely, that the subject's activities are sufficiently dangerous to the internal security to warrant apprehension in the event of an emergency.

Espionage subjects are maintained in the Special Section when apprehension in the event of an emergency would destroy chances of penetration and control of an operating Soviet espionage parallel or would destroy known chances of penetration and control of a "sleeper" parallel.

United States Government employees are maintained in the Special Section in order that the identities of Security Index subjects so employed can be readily determined.

Atomic energy employees are maintained in the Special Section because their apprehension must be cleared

with the Atomic Energy Commission representatives in order to avoid interference with atomic energy work.

Foreign government employees are maintained in the Special Section so that in the event of war we can give individual consideration to each such individual on the basis of the relations then existing between the United States Government and the country by which he is employed.

United Nations and international organization employees are maintained in the Special Section by reason of the fact that they are employees of international organizations regardless of their national origin.

Prominent individuals are maintained in the Special Section because their apprehension might affect adversely other persons not in the Security Index who are necessary to the war effort, or their apprehension might be attended by considerable publicity tending to make martyrs of them and thereby embarrassing the Bureau. These individuals must receive special attention in order that the Security Index card in each instance is fully justified at all times.

A new category is being added to the Special Section. This category will consist of those Security Index subjects who, although Marxist-Leninist or sympathizers with Marxism-Leninism, are pro-Tito and anti-Stalin, anti-Cominform and anti-Soviet. Briefly, these persons can be referred to in the Special Section category as "pro-Tito," but the opposition to Stalin, the Cominform and the Soviets must be a definite factor in their support of Tito. The reason for this is clear. At the present time the Government of the United States is furnishing food and funds and is prepared to furnish arms and military supplies to the Tito Government of Yugoslavia in the event of an international crisis involving the Soviet Union. In other words, at the present time the Tito Government of Yugoslavia and its supporters are considered as potential allies of, rather than potential dangers to, the United States. As long as the Tito Government of Yugoslavia is aligned with the United States and its Western European allies against the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellite countries, no good purpose could be served in applying the Detention Program to the

supporters of the Tito Government in the United States. Supporters of the Tito Government are not considered to include any Communist splinter group which from time to time makes statements in support of Tito but should include those individuals, particularly of Yugoslav birth or descent, whose support of Tito against the Cominform countries and Stalin is clear and unequivocal.

At the present time the code YUF indicates the nationalistic tendency for Yugoslavia. This code will likewise be used in indicating the pro-Tito category in the Special Section. Field offices having subjects falling within this category should inform the Bureau promptly of their identities in order that this category in the Special Section may be properly established.

In all cases of additions to the Special Section the form FD-122 should be accompanied by a memorandum from the field office explaining specifically why the change in the status of the subject should be made. When the field requests a removal of a subject's card from the Special Section, this request should be made by memorandum setting forth clearly the reason advanced by the field for such removal.

In every case involving a subject maintained in the Special Section in the foreign government employee or United Nations and international organization employee categories, reports suitable for dissemination should be submitted to the Bureau. Where an individual in either of these categories has been the subject of no report intended for distribution, a summary report should be submitted to the Bureau and reports suitable for distribution should be furnished thereafter on a regular basis.

In every case involving a subject maintained in the Special Section in the espionage category, where a summary for distribution has not been prepared, a summary report suitable for distribution must be submitted to the Bureau within thirty days of the receipt of this letter. In any case involving a double agent operation, these summaries should stress, where possible, a basis other than the espionage activity of the subject for inclusion in the Regular Section of the Security Index. For example,

if a collateral subject in a double agent operation, who is maintained in the Special Section under the espionage category because his apprehension would destroy the effectiveness of the double agent operation, has a record of Communist Party membership which in itself would justify his inclusion in the Security Index, such Communist Party membership should be stressed in the report prepared for ultimate distribution. If the sole basis for inclusion in the Security Index is collaboration with espionage agents, this should be set forth concisely, appropriately concealing the sources of information and informants.

Regardless of the number of reports covering the investigation of a subject in the espionage category which are prepared subsequent to the above summary and which are not intended for distribution, a report suitable for distribution should, after the preparation of the summary requested above, be prepared each six months during such time as the subject remains in the Special Section.

Special summaries of the type requested need not be prepared for the U. S. Government employee and atomic energy employee categories since reports submitted on such individuals are regularly distributed. In the case of pro-Tito subjects who will be maintained in the Special Section reports suitable for distribution should be prepared at six-month intervals if the investigative reports regularly submitted have not been intended for distribution.

Maintenance of Special Section Security Index Cards

In order that the Security Index cards in the Special Section will be uniformly handled throughout the field, the two copies of the Special Section Security Index cards received from the Bureau should be filed in accordance with the following instructions:

One card should be placed in the Alphabetical Section of the Security Index and the other should be filed in the Special Section of the Index. Under no circumstances should Special Section Security Index cards be filed in the Geographical Section of the Security Index inasmuch as it is contemplated that the Geographical Section of the Index will be used for a mass apprehension of Security Index subjects.

Inactive Section

Instructions have been furnished the field on page 38 of Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions and in Bureau memorandum dated December 11, 1950, to the Albanian Office captioned "Security Investigations - Removal of Cards from Security Index" that the Security Index cards for subjects who have entered the Armed Forces should be placed in a section of the Security Index designated "Inactive" and that a six-month tickler must be set up for each subject in this Section. At the termination of each six-month period appropriate inquiry should be made to determine if the subject has been discharged from the Armed Forces.

In order to clarify the administrative handling of cards of this type, at the time the Bureau is advised by memorandum that the subject of a Security Index card has entered the Armed Forces you should remove subject's cards from the Alphabetical and either the Geographical or Special Sections of the Security Index. The card taken from the Alphabetical Section should be destroyed and the other card should be filed in the "Inactive" Section. For your information, similar action is taken at the Bureau in cases of this type after the memorandum is received from the field advising that the subject has entered the Armed Forces. Subject's Security Index card is removed from the master Security Index records and a card is maintained in an "Inactive" section of the Bureau's Security Index.

At such time as a subject carried in the "Inactive" Section returns to civilian life, if you believe his activities at that time warrant his name being carried in the Regular Section of the Security Index, you should submit another form PD-122 recommending that new Security Index cards be prepared, along with a report bringing his activities up to date.

Internal Security - YU

You will recall that Tito, the dictator of Yugoslavia, openly broke with the Soviet Union and the Cominform countries in July of 1948. While ideologically the Tito

Government of Yugoslavia adheres to Marxism-Leninism, it no longer accepts the Stalinist interpretation and direction which is accepted by the Cominform countries.

In recent months the United States and its Western European allies have given material assistance to the Tito Government of Yugoslavia and it appears now that in the event of hostilities involving the Soviet Union with the United States, the Tito Government of Yugoslavia would not align itself with the Soviet Union against the United States but might be allied with the United States.

For this reason it becomes necessary to know whether subjects who have been investigated because of Yugoslav nationalistic tendencies and who have been placed in the Security Index because of Communist affiliations are actually Stalinists or are pro-Tito.

In the event of hostilities with the Soviet Union and in the event Yugoslavia has not aligned itself with the Soviets, special consideration must be given to the adherents of Tito in this country.

You should be alert through investigation to resolve immediately any doubts as to whether persons adhering to Tito prior to July, 1948, are now pro-Cominform or pro-Tito. Any Security Index subject of an Internal Security - C or Security Matter - C investigation of Yugoslav nationalistic tendencies who is now determined to be pro-Tito and anti-Stalin, anti-Cominform and anti-Soviet should be clearly designated in investigative reports by a change of the character of the investigation to Internal Security - YU.

"Prominent Individuals" - Special Section Security Index

The following instructions should be followed in regard to the "Prominent Individuals" sub-Division of the Special Section:

1. All cases in this category shall at all times be in either a pending or a pending inactive status and shall never be closed.
2. A prosecutive type summary report should be prepared immediately in each case carried in this category.

in your office. The summary report should be suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau reflecting all pertinent derogatory information on which justification for the Security Index card is based, including derogatory information developed through all types of confidential sources. All of the information received from each person, confidential informant or confidential source should be set out in chronological order under the name or symbol number of the respective person, informant or source. The identity of confidential informants and sources should be fully protected.

After a summary report has been prepared, each case in this category should be carried pending inactive and an appropriate tickler set up to insure that the Bureau will receive an investigative report six months from the date of the summary report, and thereafter an investigative report must be submitted at least every six months reflecting subject's activities since the date of the last report.

3. In addition to submitting reports each six months on persons in this category, it is the responsibility of each Special Agent in charge to promptly advise the Bureau of any information that might affect the retention of a Security Index card, for a prominent individual, either favorably or unfavorably.

4. It is also the responsibility of each Special Agent in charge to maintain cases in this category in such condition that you can at any time evaluate the case to determine whether the Bureau is fully justified in apprehending the subject should the Detcom Program be placed in operation.

5. If you believe that other subjects of Security Index cards are of such prominence in the business or professional fields that their cases should receive the additional attention to be given to this subdivision of the Special Section, in order that arrests can be fully justified at all times, you should submit recommendations that their cards be removed from the regular section and placed in the Special Section of the Index. In this connection, if you believe that an

6-10-41
(EX-101)
individual, presently carried in the "Prominent Individuals
sub-division of the Special Section, is not of such prom-
inence as to warrant this special designation, you should
submit your recommendation that the Security Index card
be placed in the regular section of the Index.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-1286

3/10/51

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

March 10, 1951

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

(F) SECURITY INDEX -- Present Bureau regulations require that one copy of the Security Index card maintained in the field include the description and a photograph of the subject.

Form FD-186 has been approved by the Bureau to be used in compiling information to be posted on Security Index cards. This form may be filled in by legible handprinting by the Agent handling the case and will subsequently be routed to the clerical employee designated to post this information to the Security Index card. The form should thereafter be placed in the case file of the subject involved. It is believed that the use of this form will facilitate the placing of descriptions on the Security Index card in that it will insure a complete accurate description with a minimum of administrative effort and will insure that a uniform procedure be established throughout the field.

Form FD-186, which is attached, should be filed in the Field Office Form Book and each office should requisition from the Bureau the necessary number of copies of this form in accordance with the needs of the office.

66-04-1226
(ENCL.)

Washington 25, D. C.

(Typed February 26, 1951)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

LETTER TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

RE: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

Present Bureau regulations require that one copy of the Security Index card maintained in the field include the description and a photograph of the subject.

Form FD-126 has been approved by the Bureau to be used in compiling information to be posted on Security Index cards. This form may be filled in by legible handprinting by the Agent handling the case and will subsequently be routed to the clerical employee designated to post this information to the Security Index card. The form should thereafter be placed in the case file of the subject involved. It is believed that the use of this form will facilitate the placing of descriptions on the Security Index card in that it will insure a complete accurate description with a minimum of administrative effort and will insure that a uniform procedure be established throughout the field.

Form FD-126 should be filed in the Field Office Form Book and each office should requisition from the Bureau the necessary number of copies of this form in accordance with the needs of the office.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

DATE:

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

FILE NO:

Section 37C, 3b(4), Manual of Instructions, directed the description and photograph should be placed on the reverse side of the Security Index Card. In regard to the photograph, the most recent one should be used if there is a choice. A review of the subject's file reflects there is - is not - a photograph of the above-captioned subject available for placing with the Security Index Card. (If more than one photograph is available, the Agent handling the investigation should indicate the photograph to be used.)

A review of the subject's file also reflects the following to be the most complete and current description of the subject, which description should be placed on the reverse side of the Security Index card at the time it is made up:

(1) Name and Aliases:

(2) Sex:

(3) Color (race):

(4) Age:

(5) Residence:

(6) Height:

(7) Weight:

(8) Build:

(9) Hair:

(10) Eyes:

(11) Complexion:

66-64-1286

88-00-1-35
(1961)

(12) Scars and Marks:

(13) Peculiarities:

(14) Occupation:

(15) Marital Status:

(16) Immediate Relatives (including the number of
minor children):

(17) Nationality:

(18) Country of Birth:

(19) Fingerprint Classification:

(20) FBI or Police Number:


(21) Criminal Record, showing sources:

(22) Social Security Number:

(23) Seamen's Certificate Number:

Check following:

Should subject be tabbed for Detcom (), Comsab ().





66-04-17807

PERSONAL ATTENTION
CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
LETTER NO. 26
Series 1421

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

March 13, 1951

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMO FOR MR. HOOVER
TOLSON
CLEGG
CONNELLEY
GLAVIN
HARBO
LADD
NICHOLS
ROSEN
TRACY
BAUMGARDNER
BELMONT

BOWLES
BROWN, B. C.
CALLAHAN
CALLAN
CARLSON
CONRAD
DOWNING
EDWARDS, H. L.
EGAN
FEENEY
GEARTY, G.

HENNRICH
HOLLOMAN
JONES, M. A.
KEAY
LAUGHLIN
LEONARD
LONG
MCGUIRE
MCINTIRE, F. H.
MCINTIRE, K. B.
MOBLEY
MOHR

NANNA
NAUGHTEN
NEASE
PARSONS
PENNINGTON
PONTZ
PRICE
RENNBERGER
ROGERS
SIZOO
TAMM, G.
WALKART
AND SUPERVISORS

(A) SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES -- In order that all field offices will handle investigations of Security Index subjects employed in a vital facility in a uniform manner the following is called to your attention. In many instances form FD-122 when received at the Bureau fails to indicate the subject's occupation, the vital facility's code number where the subject is employed, if such is the case, and the correct tabbing for Detcon or Consab.


No number SAC Letter dated February 5, 1951, captioned "Vital Facilities, National Military Establishment, Internal Security - C; Confidential Plant Informants," furnished a vital facilities list to each field office making the vital facilities located in the respective field office territories.

In checking the employment of Security Index subjects, you should make certain the vital facilities list in your office is checked and that correct information is submitted to the Bureau when a subject is employed in a vital facility. The contributors (agencies) to the vital facilities list are designated by letters and should be set forth on form FD-122 along with the code number of the vital facility.

For clarification of the Bureau's desires in these instances an example is set forth in detail showing the action to be taken when the subject is employed in a vital facility.

John Jones is employed as an electrical engineer. The vital facility at which Jones is employed, the description of the contract being handled, the code number, and the agency (contributor) having security responsibility are as follows:

60 MAR 21 1951



Title and Location	Description	Code	Contr.	Resp.
Bendix Aviation Corporation,	Electronics	9	AF	AF*
Radio and Friez Instrument	Radio, Radar and	9	A	
Division, Taylor Avenue and Loch	Meteorological			
Raven Boulevard, Towson, Maryland	Equipment (D)			
	Electronics (D)	9	MB	
	Electronics; Elec-			
	tronic R&D (B)	38	N	
	AEC Production (D)	1	AEC	

On form FD-122 under the caption "Nature of Industry or Business" the following code numbers would be listed AF 9, A 9, MB 9, N 38, AEC 1.

Dissemination of reports by the field office in this example should be made locally to the Air Force, which has security responsibility in addition to having a contract with the company, Army and Navy. Dissemination of reports in this instance at Bureau headquarters will be made to the Air Force, the agency having the security responsibility, the Department, and the Atomic Energy Commission. The Atomic Energy Commission at Washington will handle dissemination of reports to their local offices.

The Bureau believes that complete dissemination of reports by field offices on a local level to the interested agencies is absolutely necessary. The Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the agency having security responsibility of a certain vital facility are the only agencies at the Seat of Government that will be furnished reports. Therefore, the field office must be certain that sufficient copies of each report are prepared to insure complete dissemination in the field and that there will be the required three copies remaining in your office as office of origin.

The reports prepared in Security Matter cases where the subject is employed in a plant designated as a vital facility or has access to the facility in the usual course of his employment, should have a statement on the administrative page of each report stating that the individual is employed in a vital facility and setting forth the name of the agency having security responsibility. If the Atomic Energy Commission has an interest a statement to this effect should also be included on the administrative pages in order that the Bureau will make proper dissemination.

It will be noted that some of the vital facilities in the list sent to the field offices were marked with an asterisk. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prohibited the Atomic Energy Commission from Delegating security responsibility to another agency. The over-all security responsibility of the vital facilities marked with an asterisk is assigned as indicated in the list without infringement on Atomic Energy Commission responsibility. Necessary arrangements in these instances will be coordinated and delineated locally by the interested agency with AEC.

In those instances where it becomes necessary to furnish reports to the United States Coast Guard, the reports should be sent direct to the District Commander of the Coast Guard for the District even though his office is located outside the field division territory. It will not be necessary to send a report to the Bureau field office in whose territory the District Coast Guard office is located.

3-13-51
SAC LETTER NO. 26
Series 1991

In order to eliminate any misunderstanding which might exist, any Security Index subject employed in a vital facility or having access to the facility in the usual course of his employment should be tabbed "Comsab."

The Bureau's responsibility relative to individual Security Index subjects employed in vital facilities requires that we furnish information concerning these subjects to the appropriate agencies within a reasonable time after any derogatory information is available. It is, therefore, imperative that the field offices have appropriate arrangements made to be advised of the changes in employment of Security Index subjects. Each office is instructed to check the employment of each Security Index subject with the vital facilities list furnished with No Number SAC Letter dated February 5, 1951.

In view of the interest of other agencies in the subjects of these cases, it will be necessary that each office expedite its check of the places of employment of Security Index subjects with the vital facilities list as furnished by the National Military Establishment.

It will be necessary to submit changes by Form FD-122 wherever changes are indicated by this review.

You are instructed to advise the Bureau within thirty days after the receipt of this letter that the employment check of all Security Index subjects has been completed and that Form FD-122 has been submitted to the Bureau wherever necessary.

In addition to the above, a current report must be submitted within ninety days on each Security Index subject employed in a vital facility unless a report was submitted during the previous six months. If a report was submitted during the past six months you should insure that the reports were properly disseminated to the agencies having an interest in the facility including the agency having security responsibility.

Each office is requested to advise the Bureau by letter when all of the requested reports have been submitted.

LETTER TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

RE: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Dear Sir:

In order that all field offices will handle investigations of Security Index subjects employed in a vital facility in a uniform manner the following is called to your attention. In many instances form FD-122 when received at the Bureau fails to indicate the subject's occupation, the vital facility's code number where the subject is employed, if such is the case, and the correct tabbing for Detcom or Comsab.

No Number SAC Letter dated February 5, 1951, captioned "Vital Facilities, National Military Establishment, Internal Security - C; Confidential Plant Informants," furnished a vital facilities list to each field office naming the vital facilities located in the respective field office territories.

In checking the employment of Security Index subjects, you should make certain the vital facilities list in your office is checked and that correct information is submitted to the Bureau when a subject is employed in a vital facility. The contributors (agencies) to the vital facilities list are designated by letters and should be set forth on form FD-122 along with the code number of the vital facility.

For clarification of the Bureau's desires in these instances an example is set forth in detail showing the action to be taken when the subject is employed in a vital facility.

John Jones is employed as an electrical engineer. The vital facility at which Jones is employed, the description of the contracts being handled, the code number, and the agency (contributor) having security responsibility are as follows:

Title and Location	Description	Code	Contr.	Resp.
Bendix Aviation Corporation,	Electronics	8	AF	AF*
Radio and Friez Instrument	Radio, Radar and	9	A	
Division, Taylor Avenue and Loch	Meteorological			
Raven Boulevard, Towson, Maryland	Equipment (D)			
	Electronics (D)	9	MB	
	Electronics; Elec-			
	tronic R&D (B)	38	N	
	AEC-Production (D)	12	AEC	

Settlement to be made by [unclear] and [unclear]
S-13-51
E.P. [unclear]

Dissemination of reports by the field office in this example should be made locally to the Air Force, which has security responsibility in addition to having a contract with the company, Army and Navy. Dissemination of reports in this instance at Bureau headquarters will be made to the Air Force, the agency having the security responsibility, the Department, and the Atomic Energy Commission. The Atomic Energy Commission at Washington will handle dissemination of reports to their local offices.

The Bureau believes that complete dissemination of reports by field offices on a local level to the interested agencies is absolutely necessary. The Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the agency having security responsibility of a certain vital facility are the only agencies at the Seat of Government that will be furnished reports. Therefore, the field office must be certain that sufficient copies of each report are prepared to insure complete dissemination in the field and that there will be the required three copies remaining in your office as office of origin.

The reports prepared in Security Matter cases where the subject is employed in a plant designated as a vital facility or has access to the facility in the usual course of his employment, should have a statement on the administrative page of each report stating that the individual is employed in a vital facility and setting forth the name of the agency having security responsibility. If the Atomic Energy Commission has an interest a statement to this effect should also be included on the administrative pages in order that the Bureau will make proper dissemination.

It will be noted that some of the vital facilities in the list sent to the field offices were marked with an asterisk. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prohibited the Atomic Energy Commission from delegating security responsibility to another agency. The over-all security responsibility of the vital facilities marked with an asterisk is assigned as indicated in the list without infringement on Atomic Energy Commission responsibility. Necessary arrangements in these instances will be coordinated and delineated locally by the interested agency with AEC.

In those instances where it becomes necessary to furnish reports to the United States Coast Guard, the reports should be sent direct to the District Commander of the Coast Guard for the District even though his office is located outside the field division territory. It will not be necessary to send a report to the Bureau field office in whose territory the District Coast Guard office is located.

In order to eliminate any misunderstanding which might exist, any Security Index subject employed in a vital facility or having access to the facility in the usual course of his employment should be tabbed "Comsab."

The Bureau's responsibility relative to individual Security Index subjects employed in vital facilities requires that we furnish information concerning these subjects to the appropriate agencies within a reasonable time after any derogatory information is available. It is, therefore, imperative that the field offices have appropriate arrangements made to be advised of the changes in employment of Security Index subjects. Each office is instructed to check the employment of each Security Index subject with the vital facilities list furnished with No Number SAC Letter dated February 5, 1951.

In view of the interest of other agencies in the subjects of these cases, it will be necessary that each office expedite its check of the places of employment of Security Index subjects with the vital facilities list as furnished by the National Military Establishment.


It will be necessary to submit changes by Form FD-122 wherever changes are indicated by this review.

You are instructed to advise the Bureau within thirty days after the receipt of this letter that the employment check of all Security Index subjects has been completed and that Form FD-122 has been submitted to the Bureau wherever necessary.

In addition to the above, a current report must be submitted within ninety days on each Security Index subject employed in a vital facility unless a report was submitted during the previous six months. If a report was submitted during the past six months you should insure that the reports were properly disseminated to the agencies having an interest in the facility including the agency having security responsibility.

Each office is requested to advise the Bureau by letter when all of the requested reports have been submitted.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION SAC LETTER NO. 4
Series 1952In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 11, 1952

SAC

ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
ANCHORAGE
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
DALLASDENVER
DETROIT
EL PASO
HONOLULU
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE
MEMPHIS
MIAMIMILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
MOBILE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW ORLEANS
NEW YORK
NORFOLK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGHPORTLAND
RICHMOND
ST. LOUIS
SALT LAKE CITY
SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
QUANTICO

(E) SECURITY INDEX -- RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUMMARY REPORTS WHEN TRANSFERRING OFFICE OF ORIGIN -- Henceforth, when a Security Index case is transferred from one office of origin to another and the initial summary report required by instructions in SAC Letter Number 95 (B) dated September 22, 1951, has not been prepared, the old office of origin shall prepare and submit the required summary report.

If the initial summary report has been submitted, the report submitted at the time office of origin is changed shall be a summary report containing any pertinent information developed subsequent to the last summary report. Each case will thus be in a current condition when received in the new office of origin.

These reports must be prepared by the old office of origin as expeditiously as possible without regard to the schedule set up in SAC Letter Number 95 for the preparation of summary reports.



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
(Typed January 5, 1952)

66-04-1484
(ENCL.)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INDEX -
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUMMARY REPORTS
WHEN TRANSFERRING OFFICE OF ORIGIN

Dear Sir:

Henceforth, when a Security Index case is transferred from one office of origin to another and the initial summary report required by instructions in SAC Letter Number 95 (B) dated September 22, 1951, has not been prepared, the old office of origin shall prepare and submit the required summary report.

If the initial summary report has been submitted, the report submitted at the time office of origin is changed shall be a summary report containing any pertinent information developed subsequent to the last summary report. Each case will thus be in a current condition when received in the new office of origin.

These reports must be prepared by the old office of origin as expeditiously as possible without regard to the schedule set up in SAC Letter Number 95 for the preparation of summary reports.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Letter sent to all SACs, Bureau.

Offices and supervisors

1-11-52

See 66-1-1-1-1



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC LETTER NO. 27
Series 1952

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

March 15, 1952

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SAC

ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
ANCHORAGE
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
DALLAS

DENVER
DETROIT
EL PASO
HONOLULU
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE
MEMPHIS
MIAMI

MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
MOBILE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW ORLEANS
NEW YORK
NORFOLK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGH

PORTLAND
RICHMOND
ST. LOUIS
SALT LAKE CITY
SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
QUANTICO

(C) ~~SECURITY INDEX - SPECIAL SECTION PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS SUB-DIVISION~~ -- The Prominent Individuals Subdivision of the Special Section of the Security Index is being discontinued. "Prominent Individuals" divider guide cards should be removed from each field office's Special Section. The Bureau is of the opinion that prominent and nationally known individuals should not be set apart from the general Security Index because of their prominence.

All offices heretofore having Security Index cards in the Prominent Individuals Subdivision are being advised specifically by separate communications as to the action to be taken in regard to the respective Security Index cards and individual cases.

(II) DELINQUENCY IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -- The importance of investigations in the security field and our corresponding responsibilities in regard to the internal security of the nation have been reiterated to you during the past year. Despite this fact the delinquency in this field has not been brought within normal bounds in comparison with the delinquency in other types of investigations and a tremendous backlog of pending security matters still remains. The fact that this unworked backlog of security matters still confronts us is of the greatest concern to me.

It is fully realized that heavy demands have been made in the security field during the past year. These demands were necessary to remain "on top" of the security situation. Every effort has been made to make manpower available to you for assignments to security work without impairing other programs of the Bureau. The progress each field office is making in reducing the backlog of security matters is being analyzed carefully at the Bureau on a monthly basis. An analysis of the over-all problems in the security field has been made and I believe the following steps and instructions will facilitate bringing your security investigations into a current status.

1. Intensive study has been given to the program of preparing summary reports on all Security Index subjects. A separate SAC Letter has been prepared streamlining the summary reports, yet maintaining the information and content for the purpose for which the reports are being prepared. Observations presented by Agents attending the current Internal Security - Espionage schools have been taken into full consideration and considerable time will be saved by the measures incorporated in that SAC Letter.
2. Effective immediately, you should discontinue recontacts with plant informants in the following types of facilities:
 - a. Key facilities designated by the Secretary of Defense.
 - b. Atomic Energy facilities (Class B and C only)
 - c. Facilities having classified contracts.
 - d. Facilities designated as vital by the Army or the Navy.
 - e. Facilities designated as vital by each individual field office.

3/15/52
SAC LETTER NO. 27
Series 1952

Recontacts with plant informants should still be made in accordance with existing Bureau instructions concerning the following types of facilities which are not included in the above categories.

- a. Class A facilities of the Atomic Energy Commission.
- b. Strategic Air Command Bases of the Air Force.

Plant informants should continue to be developed in all types of facilities set forth above until adequate informant coverage is acquired at each plant or facility. The foregoing instructions are meant to apply to recontacts with plant informants. You will be advised when the recontact program with plant informants should be reinstituted.

3. Effective immediately, you should discontinue recontacts with American Legionnaires for a period of one year. You will be advised when the recontact program with American Legionnaires should be reinstituted. However, it will be necessary for you to make initial contacts with newly-elected American Legion officials at post, state, district and national levels. You should also continue to make initial contacts with each American Legion post until adequate coverage has been effectuated.
4. I am giving careful consideration to the personnel needs of each field office. As personnel becomes available we are endeavoring to reallocate this personnel to the field offices where there is the greatest need in line with the Bureau's over-all investigative responsibilities.
5. In view of the fact that a considerable proportion of the Agents now in the Field are inexperienced in security work, Internal Security-Espionage training schools have been instituted at the Bureau for key Agents assigned to security work to bring them thoroughly up to date on all Bureau security programs, policies and responsibilities. These key men will provide the focal point for the further training of personnel assigned to security investigations in your office. You should be certain you are making full use of the training these key Agents have received.

If you have not already instituted a planned program to train Agents inexperienced in security work you should do so

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Series 1952

immediately in order to increase the efficiency in the handling of security investigations, to eliminate wasted effort and to receive maximum benefits from the personnel presently assigned to you.

6. It has been noted that some offices have opened security investigations on nonspecific and vague allegations which do not come under any of the existing Bureau standards for opening security cases. Such procedure increases the case load in your office and is unwarranted. It results in a waste of manpower during this period when we need to utilize our resources to the fullest measure on important and necessary matters. In several offices, Inspectors from the Seat of Government have found it necessary to instruct that more careful evaluation be given to the opening of security cases.

In order to insure that we are not wasting time and effort on the investigation of nonspecific and vague allegations you are instructed to survey the procedure followed in your office in opening security cases with particular reference to the evaluation being placed on items of a nonspecific and vague nature. In addition, you should institute a review of a representative number of pending security cases to insure that there is a sound basis for each investigation and that unwarranted investigation is not being requested of auxiliary offices. You should take appropriate administrative steps to insure that proper evaluation is given to these matters as future allegations are received.

These instructions do not in any way change the basis for opening security investigations as set forth in existing Bureau instructions but rather are for the purpose of insuring that proper evaluation is being given to the substance of allegations prior to the opening of the cases.

7. From the number of security matters presently assigned to approved law enforcement agencies for investigation I am convinced that most offices are not taking advantage of this means to reduce the heavy backlog of security matters in the Field. In many instances field offices have no security cases assigned to law enforcement agencies for investigation.

You should review this situation in your office immediately and make appropriate assignments to approved law enforcement agencies in accordance with prior Bureau instructions. The

3/15/52
SAC LETTER NO. 27
Series 1952

extent of assignments to law enforcement agencies is being closely followed at the Bureau.

In view of the continued tense international situation, we in the Bureau have no choice but to face squarely the problems in the security field and take positive concrete steps to meet our responsibilities in that field by bringing our security work into a current status. You should afford this important matter your close personal supervision.


Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

3/15/52
SAC LETTER NO. 27
Series 1952

- 9 -



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Typed March 5, 1952

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge


RE: SECURITY INDEX - SPECIAL SECTION
PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS SUBDIVISION

Dear Sir:


The Prominent Individuals Subdivision of the Special Section of the Security Index is being discontinued. "Prominent Individuals" divider guide cards should be removed from each field office's Special Section. The basis of the opinion that prominent and nationally known individuals should not be set apart from the general Security Index because of their prominence.

All offices heretofore having Security Index cards in the Prominent Individuals Subdivision are being advised specifically by separate communications as to the action to be taken in regard to the respective Security Index cards and individual cases.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-1-2



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
(Typed March 7, 1952)

65-4-1573
(ENCL.)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: DELINQUENCY IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

Dear Sir:

The importance of investigations in the security field and our corresponding responsibilities in regard to the internal security of the nation has been reiterated to you during the past year. Despite this fact the delinquency in this field has not been brought within normal bounds in comparison with the delinquency in other types of investigations and a tremendous backlog of pending security matters still remains. The fact that this unworked backlog of security matters still confronts us is of the greatest concern to me.

It is fully realized that heavy demands have been made in the security field during the past year. These demands were necessary to remain "on top" of the security situation. Every effort has been made to make manpower available to you for assignments to security work without impairing other programs of the Bureau. The progress each field office is making in reducing the backlog of security matters is being analyzed carefully at the Bureau on a monthly basis. An analysis of the over-all problems in the security field has been made and I believe the following steps and instructions will facilitate bringing your security investigations into a current status.

1. Intensive study has been given to the program of preparing summary reports on all Security Index subjects. A separate SAC Letter has been prepared streamlining the summary reports, yet maintaining the information and content for the purpose for which the reports are being prepared. Observations presented by Agents attending the current Internal Security - Espionage schools have been taken into full consideration and considerable time will be saved by the measures incorporated in that SAC Letter.

65-4-1573

- 66-10000-10
(1)
2. Effective immediately, you should discontinue recontacts with plant informants in the following types of facilities:

- a. Key facilities designated by the Secretary of Defense.
- b. Atomic Energy facilities (Class B and C only)
- c. Facilities having classified contracts.
- d. Facilities designated as vital by the Army or the Navy.
- e. Facilities designated as vital by each individual field office.

Recontacts with plant informants should still be made in accordance with existing Bureau instructions concerning the following types of facilities which are not included in the above categories.

- a. Class A facilities of the Atomic Energy Commission.
- b. Strategic Air Command Bases of the Air Force.

Plant informants should continue to be developed in all types of facilities set forth above until adequate informant coverage is acquired at each plant or facility. The foregoing instructions are meant to apply to recontacts with plant informants. You will be advised when the recontact program with plant informants should be reinstituted.

3. Effective immediately, you should discontinue recontacts with American Legionnaires for a period of one year. You will be advised when the recontact program with American Legionnaires should be reinstituted. However, it will be necessary for you to make initial contacts with newly-elected American Legion officials at post, state, district and national levels. You should also continue to make initial contacts with each American Legion post until adequate coverage has been effectuated.
4. I am giving careful consideration to the personnel needs of each field office. As personnel becomes available we are endeavoring to reallocate this personnel to the field offices where there is the greatest need in line with the Bureau's over-all investigative responsibilities.

5. In view of the fact that a considerable proportion of the Agents now in the Field are inexperienced in security work, Internal Security-Espionage training schools have been instituted at the Bureau for key Agents assigned to security work to bring them thoroughly up to date on all Bureau security programs, policies and responsibilities. These key men will provide the focal point for the further training of personnel assigned to security investigations in your office. You should be certain you are making full use of the training these key Agents have received.

If you have not already instituted a planned program to train Agents inexperienced in security work you should do so immediately in order to increase the efficiency in the handling of security investigations, to eliminate wasted effort and to receive maximum benefits from the personnel presently assigned to you.

6. It has been noted that some offices have opened security investigations on nonspecific and vague allegations which do not come under any of the existing Bureau standards for opening security cases. Such procedure increases the case load in your office and is unwarranted. It results in a waste of manpower during this period when we need to utilize our resources to the fullest measure on important and necessary matters. In several offices, Inspectors from the Seat of Government have found it necessary to instruct that more careful evaluation be given to the opening of security cases.

In order to insure that we are not wasting time and effort on the investigation of nonspecific and vague allegations you are instructed to survey the procedure followed in your office in opening security cases with particular reference to the evaluation being placed on items of a nonspecific and vague nature. In addition, you should institute a review of a representative number of pending security cases to insure that there is a sound basis for each investigation and that unwarranted investigation is not being requested of auxiliary offices. You should take appropriate administrative steps to insure that proper evaluation is given to these matters as future allegations are received.


These instructions do not in any way change the basis for opening security investigations as set forth in existing Bureau instructions but rather are for the purpose of insuring that proper evaluation is being given to the substance of allegations prior to the opening of the cases.

7. From the number of security matters presently assigned to approved law enforcement agencies for investigation I am convinced that most offices are not taking advantage of this means to reduce the heavy backlog of security matters in the Field. In many instances field offices have no security cases assigned to law enforcement agencies for investigation.

You should review this situation in your office immediately and make appropriate assignments to approved law enforcement agencies in accordance with prior Bureau instructions. The extent of assignments to law enforcement agencies is being closely followed at the Bureau.

In view of the continued tense international situation, we in the Bureau have no choice but to squarely face the problems in the security field and take positive concrete steps to meet our responsibilities in that field by bringing our security work into a current status. You should afford this important matter your close personal supervision.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SAC LETTER NO. 65

Series 1952

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

July 8, 1952

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMO FOR MR.	HOOVER	BROWN, B. C.	HENNRICH	PRICE
	TOLSON	CALLAHAN	HOOD	RENNEBERGER
	LADD	CALLAN	HOLLOMAN	ROGERS
	NICHOLS	CLEVELAND	HURLEY, L.P.	SCATTERDAY
	BELMONT	CONRAD	JONES, M. A.	SIMON
	CLEGG	CROSBY	KEAY	SIZOO
	CONNELLEY	DeLOACH	LAUGHLIN	STANLEY
	GLAVIN	DOWNING	LEONARD	STEIN
	HARBO	EAMES	MALLEY	TAMM, Q.
	ROSEN	EDWARDS, H. L.	MASON, E. D.	TROTTER
	TRACY	EGAN	McGUIRE	VECHERY
	BAUMGARDNER	FEENEY	MOHR	WHERRY
	BOWLES	FLYNN	NAUGHTEN	WICK
	BRANIGAN	GEARTY, G.	PARSONS	WINTERROWD
		GRESHAM	PENNINGTON	<u>AND SUPERVISORS</u>

(A) SEMIANNUAL LISTING OF DELINQUENT MATTERS -- Section 6U (2) of the Manual of Rules and Regulations requires that each Field Division submit on a staggered schedule a semiannual listing of delinquent matters. Form FD-29D is used to report these delinquencies.

In reporting the delinquency of Internal Security and Espionage matters in the future, it will be necessary to list only those cases in which reports have not previously been sent to the Seat of Government, i.e., those cases which the Bureau has no knowledge of. All other classifications, with the exception of Security Matter - C cases, are to be reported as usual.

As you were advised in SAC Letter #50, Section N, dated April 26, 1949, it will not be necessary to list Security Matter - C cases.

(B) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -- A recent survey of pending security-matter investigations in the Field indicates that cases are being investigated or scheduled for investigation in which the subversive information available in the office considered along with other factors does not bring the cases within existing Bureau standards for conducting such investigations. In view of this it is

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66-111111
believed necessary to reiterate and define existing instructions regarding the opening of security-matter cases. These instructions apply to those security-type investigations initiated solely for the purpose of determining whether the activities of the subjects warrant their inclusion in the Security Index and do not encompass those investigations involving espionage, foreign intelligence, et cetera.

Because of the manner in which the Communist Party and other revolutionary organizations function and because of the great scope and variety of their activities it is not possible to formulate hard-and-fast standards by which the dangerousness of individual members or affiliates may be automatically measured. Sound judgment and discretion must be applied in evaluating the importance and dangerousness of individual members and affiliates of those groups.

In certain cases Bureau authority is necessary under existing instructions before security-matter investigations may be initiated. However, as a matter of general policy security-matter cases shall be opened and a thorough investigation conducted of any individual who comes within one or more of the following categories:

1. Membership in Basic Revolutionary Organizations Subsequent to January 1, 1949.

Any individual reported as having been a member of the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, Independent Socialist League, Revolutionary Workers League, Proletarian Party of America or other basic Marxist revolutionary organizations or splinter groups or the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, on or after January 1, 1949.

2. Espousing Line of Revolutionary Movements

Any individual who since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea (June 25, 1950) continued to espouse the line of one or more of the above-mentioned revolutionary organizations or related groups thereby defining his or her adherence to policies opposed to the best interests of the United States.

The espousal mentioned above encompasses a wide variety and range of activities and as mentioned previously

7/8/52
SAC LETTER NO. 65
Series 1952


it is not possible to formulate any hard-and-fast standards to cover all cases falling in this category that warrant investigation. Membership in one or more of the basic revolutionary organizations is not a prerequisite to the institution of an investigation of an individual within this category.

In connection with espousal expressed by membership and active participation in subversive front groups (whether or not cited by the Attorney General) the nature and type of the front organization as well as the extent of the individual's activities on behalf of the front organization or in support of the Communist Party must be evaluated in each case. Investigation should be opened in every instance when the derogatory information available indicates the subject is actively engaged in the affairs of a subversive front organization in a leadership capacity or by active participation in the furtherance of the aims and purposes of the front organization.

When there is an allegation of mere membership alone in a front organization and there is no supporting information to indicate active participation or leadership in the group, investigation should not be instituted unless information is available indicating past membership at any time in a basic revolutionary organization or sufficient other derogatory information is known.

Of course, in determining whether an investigation should be conducted when an allegation of membership in a front organization is received you should be guided also by the nature and activities in behalf of the Communist Party of the particular front group throughout the country or in a certain area. For example, members of the Labor Youth League should be investigated because of the organization's close affiliation with the Communist Party in carrying out the dictates of the Party. On the other hand, an allegation of routine membership in the International Workers Order alone does not warrant the institution of an investigation, while leadership or active participation in carrying out the subversive aims and purposes of the International Workers Order does warrant investigation.

7/8/52
SAC LETTER NO. 65
Series 1952



3. Special Training in a Subversive Movement

Any individual who has received training in the Lenin School or has received training in a subversive movement abroad.

Any individual who has received at any time leadership training in one of the basic revolutionary organizations mentioned above.

4. Military Service

Any individual who served with the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Membership in one of the basic revolutionary organizations is not a prerequisite to initiating investigations of individuals in this category.

Any individual who has been alleged to have been a member of one of the basic revolutionary groups at any time and has served in the Office of Strategic Services or has served in the military forces of any country including the United States Armed Forces.

5. Employment in Vital Facilities

Any individual employed in or having access to a vital facility who is alleged to have been at any time in the past a member of any of the basic revolutionary organizations or against whom sufficient other subversive information is known which warrants investigation.

6. Other Individuals with Revolutionary Beliefs

Individuals who, because of anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, are likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety and welfare. The individuals in this category should be investigated where sound judgment and discretion dictate. Membership or affiliation in basic revolutionary or front groups is not a prerequisite to initiating investigations of individuals in this category.

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Series 1952

66-64-1511

As you have been instructed previously, complaints alleging subversive activities of individuals which are received from anonymous sources should not be disregarded. If the facts of the complaints are sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight to bring the cases within existing standards for opening cases for investigation, such investigation should be conducted just as it would be if the identity of the source were known.

In this same connection, cases should not be opened for investigation based on nonspecific or vague allegations which do not come within the existing standards in this matter.

In order that we can direct our investigative efforts and resources to the fullest measure on important and necessary matters in accordance with existing Bureau standards for opening investigations and upon sound judgment and discretion, you are instructed to immediately undertake a review of the pending active security-matter cases in your office and you should be guided by the following instructions:

All pending active assigned security-matter cases should be reviewed carefully by the Agents to whom they are assigned and if any of the cases examined are not within the standards requiring investigation such cases should be brought to the attention of the office supervisor in order that they can be closed administratively or by a letter or report.

A project should be instituted to review all pending active unassigned security-matter cases to close administratively, or by appropriate notice to the Bureau, those which do not fall within the Bureau's standards for opening security-matter cases.

In addition, during the examining of case files under the preceding two paragraphs to determine whether there is sound basis for conducting an investigation, an examination should be made of all outstanding leads for auxiliary offices to be certain that auxiliary offices are not being requested to conduct unwarranted and needless investigations. If the examination and re-evaluation of outstanding leads indicates that requested investigations of auxiliary offices are not essential in the matter you

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SAC LETTER NO. 65
Series 1952

should immediately advise the auxiliary office to disregard your request.

In connection with the foregoing instructions regarding cases that should be closed because there is no sound basis for the investigation under current Bureau standards, it is realized that there may be cases which do not come within the standards but which good judgment dictates should be investigated. If you have any question in any individual case of this nature you should communicate with the Bureau for guidance and instructions.

The project outlined above should be completed within thirty days of the receipt of this communication. As soon as the project is completed, each Field office should advise the Bureau by a memorandum captioned "Security Investigations of Individuals."



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

(Typed June 24, 1952)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Dear Sir:

A recent survey of pending security-matter investigations in the Field indicates that cases are being investigated or scheduled for investigation in which the subversive information available in the office considered along with other factors does not bring the cases within existing Bureau standards for conducting such investigations. In view of this it is believed necessary to reiterate and define existing instructions regarding the opening of security-matter cases. These instructions apply to those security-type investigations initiated solely for the purpose of determining whether the activities of the subjects warrant their inclusion in the Security Index and do not encompass those investigations involving espionage, foreign intelligence, et cetera.

Because of the manner in which the Communist Party and other revolutionary organizations function and because of the great scope and variety of their activities it is not possible to formulate hard-and-fast standards by which the dangerousness of individual members or affiliates may be automatically measured. Sound judgment and discretion must be applied in evaluating the importance and dangerousness of individual members and affiliates of those groups.

In certain cases Bureau authority is necessary under existing instructions before security-matter investigations may be initiated. However, as a matter of general policy security-matter cases

Letter sent to all SACs. Bu O, 7/8/52
7/8/52
[Signature]

shall be opened and a thorough investigation conducted of any individual who comes within one or more of the following categories:

1. Membership in Basic Revolutionary Organizations Subsequent to January 1, 1949.

Any individual reported as having been a member of the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, Independent Socialist League, Revolutionary Workers League, Proletarian Party of America or other basic Marxist revolutionary organizations or splinter groups or the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, on or after January 1, 1949.

2. Espousing Line of Revolutionary Movements

Any individual who since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea (June 25, 1950) continued to espouse the line of one or more of the above-mentioned revolutionary organizations or related groups thereby defining his or her adherence to policies opposed to the best interests of the United States.

The espousal mentioned above encompasses a wide variety and range of activities and as mentioned previously it is not possible to formulate any hard-and-fast standards to cover all cases falling in this category that warrant investigation. Membership in one or more of the basic revolutionary organizations is not a prerequisite to the institution of an investigation of an individual within this category.

In connection with espousal expressed by membership and active participation in subversive front groups (whether or not cited by the Attorney General) the nature and type of the front organization as well as the extent of the individual's activities on behalf of the front organization or in support of the Communist Party

must be evaluated in each case. Investigation should be opened in every instance when the derogatory information available indicates the subject is actively engaged in the affairs of a subversive front organization in a leadership capacity or by active participation in the furtherance of the aims and purposes of the front organization.

When there is an allegation of mere membership alone in a front organization and there is no supporting information to indicate active participation or leadership in the group, investigation should not be instituted unless information is available indicating past membership at any time in a basic revolutionary organization or sufficient other derogatory information is known.

Of course, in determining whether an investigation should be conducted when an allegation of membership in a front organization is received you should be guided also by the nature and activities in behalf of the Communist Party of the particular front group throughout the country or in a certain area. For example, members of the Labor Youth League should be investigated because of the organization's close affiliation with the Communist Party in carrying out the dictates of the Party. On the other hand, an allegation of routine membership in the International Workers Order alone does not warrant the institution of an investigation, while leadership or active participation in carrying out the subversive aims and purposes of the International Workers Order does warrant investigation.

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Any individual who has received training in the Lenin School or has received training in a subversive movement abroad.

Any individual who has received ~~at~~ at any time leadership training in one of the basic revolutionary organizations mentioned above.

4. Military Service

Any individual who served with the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Membership in one of the basic revolutionary organizations is not a prerequisite to initiating investigations of individuals in this category.

Any individual who has been alleged to have been a member of one of the basic revolutionary groups at any time and has served in the Office of Strategic Services or served in the military forces of any country including the United States Armed Forces.

5. Employment in Vital Facilities

Any individual employed in or having access to a vital facility who is alleged to have been at any time in the past a member of any of the basic revolutionary organizations or against whom sufficient other subversive information is known which warrants investigation.

6. Other Individuals ^wWith Revolutionary Beliefs

Individuals who, because of anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, are likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety and welfare. The individuals in this category should be investigated where sound judgment and discretion dictate. Membership or affiliation in basic revolutionary or front groups is not a prerequisite to initiating investigations of individuals in this category.

As you have been instructed previously, complaints alleging subversive activities of individuals which are received from anonymous sources should not be disregarded. If the facts of the complaints are sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight to bring the cases within existing standards for opening cases for investigation, such investigation should be conducted just as it would be if the identity of the source were known.

In this same connection, cases should not be opened for investigation based on nonspecific or vague allegations which do not come within the existing standards in this matter.

In order that we can direct our investigative efforts and resources to the fullest measure on important and necessary matters in accordance with existing Bureau standards for opening investigations and upon sound judgment and discretion, you are instructed to immediately undertake a review of the pending active security-matter cases in your office and you should be guided by the following instructions:

All pending active assigned security-matter cases should be reviewed carefully by the Agents to whom they are assigned and if any of the cases examined are not within the standards requiring investigation such cases should be brought to the attention of the office supervisor in order that they can be closed administratively or by a letter or report.

A project should be instituted to review all pending active unassigned security-matter cases to close administratively, or by appropriate notice to the Bureau, those which do not fall within the Bureau's standards for opening security-matter cases.

In addition, during the examining of case files under the preceding two paragraphs to determine whether there is sound basis for conducting an investigation, an examination should be made of all outstanding leads for

66-41111
(Encl.)


auxiliary offices to be certain that auxiliary offices are not being requested to conduct unwarranted and needless investigations. If the examination and re-evaluation of outstanding leads indicates that requested investigations of auxiliary offices are not essential in the matter you should immediately advise the auxiliary office to disregard your request.

In connection with the foregoing instructions regarding cases that should be closed because there is no sound basis for the investigation under current Bureau standards, it is realized that there may be cases which do not come within the standards but which good judgment dictates should be investigated. If you have any question in any individual case of this nature you should communicate with the Bureau for guidance and instructions.

The project outlined above should be completed within thirty days of the receipt of this communication. As soon as the project is completed, each Field office should advise the Bureau by a memorandum captioned "Security Investigations of Individuals."

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
(Typed June 27, 1952)

66-11111
10000

PERSONAL ATTENTION

To All Special Agents In Charge

Re: Semiannual Listing of
Delinquent Matters

Dear Sir:

Section 6U (2) of the Manual of Rules and Regulations requires that each Field Division submit on a staggered schedule a semiannual listing of delinquent matters. Form FD-29D is used to report these delinquencies.

In reporting the delinquency of Internal Security and Espionage matters in the future, it will be necessary to list only those cases in which reports have not previously been sent to the Seat of Government, i.e., those cases which the Bureau has no knowledge of. All other classifications, with the exception of Security Matter - C cases, are to be reported as usual.


As you were advised in SAC Letter #50, Section A, dated April 26, 1949, it will not be necessary to list Security Matter - C cases.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

*Letter sent to all SACs, SAC Officials &
Saps 7/8/52 MPJ-*

A



PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
66-24-1308
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SAC LETTER NO. 53-30
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 1, 1953

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

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RE: ~~SECURITY INDEX~~ - UNAVAILABLE SECTION

Missing Subjects

There are included in the Security Index several subjects whose whereabouts is unknown. These subjects have ostensibly divested themselves of any contact with their previously known associates and places of residence and employment either to engage in underground subversive activity or deliberately to avoid detection by representatives of the Federal Government. The Security Index cards of such missing subjects are now maintained either in the Geographical or Special Sections of your Security Index. Henceforth, the cards of such subjects will be placed in the Unavailable Section of your Security Index in accordance with the instructions set forth below.

Security Index Subjects Who Are Out Of The Country

Heretofore, we have cancelled Security Index cards of subjects who are citizens of the United States when it has been learned that they have departed from the United States for an extended period of time. So long as such individuals retain their United States citizenship they can be expected to return to this country at some time in the future. In fact, in the event of world-wide hostilities resulting in an actual state of war involving the United States such

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ENCLOSURE

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citizens of the United States would probably be required to return to this country. Under such conditions those subjects returning to this country who were included in the Security Index at the time of their departure from the United States would, in many instances, constitute a threat to the internal security at the time of their arrival. In view of this the Security Index cards of United States citizens will henceforth not be cancelled upon their departure from the United States regardless of the intended length of their stay abroad.

Henceforth, no Security Index card will be cancelled by reason of the subject's having departed from this country unless that subject is an alien who has permanently departed either voluntarily or as a result of deportation proceedings. In such instances the Security Index cards will be cancelled only after the subject's departure has been verified as being permanent. If a United States citizen who is included in the Security Index and has been out of the country is found to have renounced his citizenship and taken citizenship of a foreign country his Security Index card may be cancelled only after it has been determined that he does not intend to return to the United States.

At the present time there are included in the Security Index numerous subjects who are outside the United States. Their cards are maintained in either the Geographical or Special Sections of the Security Index. Henceforth, their Security Index cards will be maintained in the Unavailable Section in accordance with the instructions set forth below.

Security Index Subjects Who Are Imprisoned

Heretofore, when a Security Index subject has been imprisoned for a relatively short period of time his Security Index card has been retained. If the period of confinement was for an extensive period of time you have been authorized to destroy the Security Index card without prior Bureau authority. In either case you have been required to advise the Bureau by memorandum of the details concerning the imprisonment of the subject and that arrangements have been made to be notified of the subject's release. Upon receipt of information reflecting the release of a subject who was included in the Security Index at the time of his confinement, you have been required to advise the Bureau immediately by memorandum of the release.

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and of your recommendation as to whether the subject should be continued in the Security Index or a new Security Index card should be prepared for the subject.

Henceforth, no Security Index card will be cancelled by reason of a subject's having been imprisoned regardless of the length of time he will be incarcerated. Security Index cards of such subjects will be maintained in the Unavailable Section in accordance with the instructions set forth below.

Unavailable Section of the Security Index

Subjects who are missing, who are out of the country or are imprisoned at the time of an emergency would be unavailable for apprehension. In order that such subjects may be readily identified and no time will be wasted in handling their cases in the event of an emergency, each office is to set up and maintain an Unavailable Section in its Security Index in accordance with the following instructions.

1. The Unavailable Section will be maintained separate from but in conjunction with the Geographical and Special Sections of the Security Index behind a tab marked "Unavailable Section." This Section will be broken down into three subsections headed by tabs and marked, "Missing," "Out of the Country," and "Imprisoned." The Security Index cards of subjects falling in any one of these categories will be filed alphabetically by the name of each subject behind the card designating the category of such subjects.

2. All Security Index cards now in the Geographical and Special Sections of your Security Index must be checked to determine the identities of subjects whose whereabouts is unknown, who are out of the country or who are imprisoned. Form FD-122 will be submitted on each subject. Each such Form FD-122 will have the words "Unavailable Section" typed in the upper right portion thereof.

If the subject is missing the word "Missing" will be typed in the space provided on the Form FD-122 behind the line marked "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." A cover memorandum will be submitted with each Form FD-122

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submitted on a missing subject advising in detail of the steps that have been taken by your office to locate the subject. Thereafter, the case will be handled in accordance with instructions set forth under 6 below. It is not desired that a subject be listed as missing when the only action taken to locate him has been merely a determination that he is no longer located at his previously known residence or place of employment.

If the subject is out of the country the words "Out of the Country" will be typed in the space provided on the Form FD-122 behind the line marked "Miscellaneous (Specify)." If the foreign address is known this should be placed on the FD-122 in the space provided for the residence address. If the subject is only known to be in a certain foreign country and his residence there is not known or is only known to be traveling abroad this information should be very briefly included on the FD-122. If the subject's current employment abroad is known this should be included on the FD-122.

If the subject is in prison the word "Imprisoned" will be typed in the space provided on the Form FD-122 behind the line marked "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." The identity of the institution in which the subject is incarcerated will be typed in the space provided for the residence address. The space for the business address will be left blank.

It is not desired that places of former residence or former employment be included on Security Index cards of subjects who are missing, who are out of the country or who are imprisoned inasmuch as such data serves no useful purpose on the card.

3. The action required under 1 and 2 above must be instituted immediately and completed as soon as possible. You are to advise the Bureau under the caption "Security Index - Unavailable Section" when you have completed the submission of Forms FD-122 on all of your Security Index subjects who should be included in the Unavailable Section at this time.

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4. Upon receipt of the Forms FD-122 at the Bureau new Security Index cards will be prepared. Two cards for each subject will be sent to your office. Each card of a missing subject will bear the code letters "MI" in the upper right-hand corner. Each card of a subject who is out of the country will bear the code letters "OC" in the upper right-hand corner. Each card of a subject who is imprisoned will bear the code letters "PR" in the upper right-hand corner.

5. Upon receipt of the two cards in the field they must be checked for accuracy and the necessary data, field office file number, description and photograph (if available) will be placed on one of the cards. This card will then be filed in the Unavailable Section alphabetically behind the "Missing," "Out of the Country," or "Imprisoned" subdivisions. The other card will be filed in the Alphabetical Section of the Security Index. The old Geographical or Special Section card and the old Alphabetical card will be destroyed.

6. It is not desired that Security Index subjects be included in the Unavailable Section as missing immediately upon determination that they are no longer located at their previously known places of residence or employment. It will be necessary for Agents to whom such cases are assigned to first ascertain any logical leads as to the subject's whereabouts and, if such leads are determined, to conduct the necessary investigation to locate the subjects. If it becomes obvious that the subject can actually be classified as a missing subject by reason of information developed indicating that he has deliberately absented himself from his previous environment and contacts to avoid detection by us, has gone into hiding, or is working clandestinely in an underground capacity, that subject should then be included in the Unavailable Section of the Security Index as a missing subject. At the time the Form FD-122 is submitted to the Bureau placing the subject in the Unavailable Section a cover memorandum must be submitted advising of the investigative steps already taken to locate him.

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You have previously been instructed that the cases of missing Security Index subjects are to be retained in a pending status and are to be given preferential and continuous investigative attention. Every conceivable means must be utilized to locate such subjects in the least possible time. Investigations of missing subjects must be handled as thoroughly and promptly as any fugitive investigation. Close supervision of such cases must be maintained in the field at all times.

Henceforth, the Bureau must be advised each 45 days of the investigative steps which have been taken during the period to locate a subject who is designated as missing. It is not desired that investigative reports be submitted which merely set forth negative results of investigation conducted to locate a subject. Such data should be properly included in memoranda to the Bureau. The Bureau will closely follow your investigative action to locate missing Security Index subjects.

7. The case of any Security Index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least each six months for verification of the subject's address, the same as any other Security Index case, to determine if the subject has returned to this country.

8. When a Security Index subject is imprisoned it will be necessary to make arrangements with the confining institution to be informed of the subject's release in accordance with past instructions. An administrative tickler should be set up for a date shortly prior to the expected date of the subject's release to assure that you are informed of the subject's release. Upon receipt of advice of the release of the subject you should ascertain whether the subject should be continued in the Security Index. If so, Form FD-122 should be submitted per instructions set forth below.

9. In the future, if a subject who has been

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missing is located in your office territory or a subject who has been out of the country has returned to your territory or an imprisoned subject has been released, Form FD-122 must be submitted reflecting the subject's current residence and place of employment. The words "Remove From Unavailable Section" should be typed in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)" which are on the Form FD-122. If the subject's card is to be placed in the Special Section the statement "Place in Special Section - Espionage (or Foreign Government Employee, etc.)" should be added in this space. When the new cards are received from the Bureau they should be checked for accuracy and the file number, description and photograph (if available) should be placed on one of the two cards. This card should then be filed in the Geographical or Special Section (where applicable) and the other card should then be filed in the Alphabetical Section of your Security Index. The old cards in the Unavailable and Alphabetical Sections should be destroyed.

10. In the future, if a subject who has been included in the Unavailable Section is located in another division, Form FD-128 should be submitted to the Bureau and the new office of origin with the pertinent data placed thereon including his current residence and business addresses. The notation "Remove From Unavailable Section" should be typed in the space to the right of the addresses. New Security Index cards will then be submitted to the new office of origin.

11. In the future, when a subject who is included in the Geographical or Special Sections of the Security Index is determined to be missing, out of the country or imprisoned, Form FD-122 will be submitted in accordance with instructions set forth under 2 above and the Security Index cards will thereafter be handled as set forth under 3 through 8 above.

Recommendation of Subjects for the Security Index Who Are Missing
or Are Out of the Country

Missing Subjects

It may sometimes be found that a subject of a pending security investigation who has not as yet been included in the Security Index has disappeared and efforts to locate him have met with negative results. That subject may have been found to be potentially dangerous even though his current whereabouts is not known and he is suitable for inclusion in the Security Index at that time. In such an instance the only factor which would preclude him from inclusion in the Security Index is that his location is not known. In the past such subjects have not been recommended for the Security Index until they have been located.

Henceforth, such a subject should be recommended for inclusion in the Unavailable Section of the Security Index at the time it is found that he fits the standards for inclusion regardless of the fact that his location is not known. At that time Form FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau with the word "Missing" appearing in the appropriate space. The Bureau should be advised at that time of the action taken to locate the subject. Security Index cards will be prepared and returned for appropriate filing in the Unavailable Section.

These instructions are issued to provide for appropriate early inclusion of persons in the Security Index who are dangerous to the Internal Security and who may be acting in an underground capacity but whose whereabouts is not known. The fact that such persons have been included in the Security Index must not be interpreted as license for casual handling of their cases thereafter. Such cases must be given continuous vigorous attention until the subject is located in accordance with previous instructions.

Of course, the determination as to whether a subject is actually missing must be judged by the extent and results of previous investigations to

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determine his whereabouts. If location of a subject merely involves the pursuit of leads already developed and there is a definite indication of the subject's location, recommendation for inclusion in the Security Index may be withheld until his location is verified.

If you have any pending cases in your office in which the subjects should be recommended for inclusion in the Security Index and the only factor precluding inclusion at this time is the fact that they are missing, you should recommend their inclusion in the Unavailable Section of your Security Index upon receipt of these instructions.

Subjects Departing From The United States

In some instances a security investigation of a subject not yet included in the Security Index may be in progress at the time that it is found that the subject has recently departed for a foreign country. If the evidence developed at that time warrants the inclusion of the subject in the Security Index were it not for the fact that he is outside the United States, Form FD-122 should be submitted recommending his inclusion in the Unavailable Section of the Security Index. The words "Out of the Country" should be typed in the space provided in the FD-122 and if his foreign address and employment is known it should be included in the FD-122. After all initial investigation is completed the subject's case will be handled the same as those of other subjects of a similar status who are included in the Unavailable Section as out of the country.

Of course, if the subject is an alien who has been deported or has otherwise permanently departed from the United States he should not be included in the Security Index in keeping with instructions set forth above.

These instructions regarding individuals who are out of the country apply to subjects of security investigations in the San Juan, Honolulu and

Anchorage Offices as well as to the continental offices
of the Bureau.

Changes in Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions
necessitated by the above instructions are being prepared and will
be forwarded to you in the near future.


Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

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United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

(Typed April 21, 1953)

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INDEX - UNAVAILABLE SECTION

Dear Sir:


Missing Subjects

There are included in the Security Index several subjects whose whereabouts is unknown. These subjects have ostensibly divested themselves of any contact with their previously known associates and places of residence and employment to either engage in underground subversive activity or to deliberately avoid detection by representatives of the Federal Government. The Security Index cards of such missing subjects are now maintained either in the Geographical or Special Sections of your Security Index. Henceforth, the cards of such subjects will be placed in the Unavailable Section of your Security Index in accordance with the instructions set forth below.

Security Index Subjects Who Are Out Of The Country

Heretofore, we have cancelled Security Index cards of subjects who are citizens of the United States when it has been learned that they have departed from the United States for an extended period of time. So long as such individuals retain their United States citizenship they can be expected to return to this country at some time in the future. In fact, in the event of world-wide hostilities resulting in an actual state of war involving the United States such citizens of the United States might possibly be required to return to this country. Under such conditions those subjects returning to this country who were included in the Security Index at the time of their departure from the United States would, in many instances, constitute a threat to the internal security at the time of their arrival.

Send to all SAs, b7c & Super
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In view of this the Security Index cards of United States citizens will henceforth not be cancelled upon their departure from the United States regardless of the intended length of their stay abroad.

Henceforth, no Security Index card will be cancelled by reason of the subject having departed from this country unless that subject is an alien who has permanently departed either voluntarily or as a result of deportation proceedings. In such instances the Security Index cards will be cancelled only after the subject's departure has been verified as being permanent. If a United States citizen who is included in the Security Index and has been out of the country is found to have renounced his citizenship and taken citizenship of a foreign country his Security Index card may be cancelled only after it has been determined that he does not intend to return to the United States.

At the present time there are included in the Security Index numerous subjects who are outside the United States. Their cards are maintained in either the Geographical or Special Sections of the Security Index. Henceforth, their Security Index cards will be maintained in the Unavailable Section in accordance with the instructions set forth below.

Security Index Subjects Who Are Imprisoned

Heretofore, when a Security Index subject has been imprisoned for a relatively short period of time his Security Index card has been retained. If the period of confinement was for an extensive period of time you have been authorized to destroy the Security Index card without prior Bureau authority. In either case you have been required to advise the Bureau by memorandum of the details concerning the imprisonment of the subject and that arrangements have been made to be notified of the subject's release. Upon receipt of information reflecting the release of a subject who was included in the Security Index at the time of his confinement, you have been required to immediately advise the Bureau by memorandum of the release and of your recommendation as to whether the subject should be continued in the Security Index or a new Security Index card should be prepared for the subject.

Henceforth, no Security Index card will be cancelled by reason of a subject having been imprisoned regardless of

the length of time he will be incarcerated. Security Index cards of such subjects will be maintained in the Unavailable Section in accordance with the instructions set forth below.

Unavailable Section of the Security Index

Subjects who are missing, who are out of the country or are imprisoned at the time of an emergency would be unavailable for apprehension. In order that such subjects may be readily identified and no time will be wasted in handling their cases in the event of an emergency, each office is to set up and maintain an Unavailable Section in its Security Index in accordance with the following instructions.

1. The Unavailable Section will be maintained separate from but in conjunction with the Geographical and Special Sections of the Security Index behind a tab marked "Unavailable Section." This Section will be broken down into three subsections headed by tabs and marked "Missing," "Out of the Country," and "Imprisoned." The Security Index cards of subjects falling in any one of these categories will be filed alphabetically by the name of each subject behind the card designating the category of such subjects.

2. All Security Index cards now in the Geographical and Special Sections of your Security Index must be checked to determine the identities of subjects whose whereabouts is unknown, who are out of the country or who are imprisoned. Form FD-122 will be submitted on each subject. Each such Form FD-122 will have the words "Unavailable Section" typed in the upper right portion thereof.

If the subject is missing the word "Missing" will be typed in the space provided on the Form FD-122 behind the line marked "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." A cover memorandum will be submitted with each Form FD-122 submitted on a missing subject advising in detail of the steps that have been taken by your office to locate the subject. Thereafter, the case will be handled in accordance with instructions set forth under 6 below. It is not desired that a subject be listed as missing when the only action taken to locate him has been merely a determination that he is no longer located at his previously known residence or place of employment.

If the subject is out of the country the words "Out of the Country" will be typed in the space

provided on the Form FD-122 behind the line marked "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." If the foreign address is known this should be placed on the FD-122 in the space provided for the residence address. If the subject is only known to be in a certain foreign country and his residence there is not known or is only known to be traveling abroad this information should be very briefly included on the FD-122. If the subject's current employment abroad is known this should be included on the FD-122.

If the subject is in prison the word "Imprisoned" will be typed in the space provided on the Form FD-122 behind the line marked "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)." The identity of the institution in which the subject is incarcerated will be typed in the space provided for the residence address. The space for the business address will be left blank.

It is not desired that places of former residence or former employment be included on Security Index cards of subjects who are missing, who are out of the country or who are imprisoned inasmuch as such data serves no useful purpose on the card.

3. The action required under 1 and 2 above must be initiated immediately and completed as soon as possible. You are to advise the Bureau under the caption "Security Index - Unavailable Section" when you have completed the submission of Forms FD-122 on all of your Security Index subjects who should be included in the Unavailable Section at this time.

4. Upon receipt of the Forms FD-122 at the Bureau new Security Index cards will be prepared. Two cards for each subject will be sent to your office. Each card of a missing subject will bear the code letters "MI" in the upper right-hand corner. Each card of a subject who is out of the country will bear the code letters "OC" in the upper right-hand corner. Each card of a subject who is imprisoned will bear the code letters "PR" in the upper right-hand corner.

5. Upon receipt of the two cards in the field they must be checked for accuracy and the necessary data, field office file number, description and photograph (if available) will be placed on one of the cards. This card will then be filed in the Unavailable Section alphabetically behind the "Missing," "Out of the Country," or "Imprisoned" subdivisions. The other card will be filed in the Alphabetical Section of the Security Index. The old Geographical or Special Section card and the old Alphabetical card will be destroyed.

6. It is not desired that Security Index subjects be included in the Unavailable Section as missing immediately upon determination that they are no longer located at their previously known places of residence or employment. It will be necessary for Agents to whom such cases are assigned to ascertain any logical leads as to the subject's whereabouts and, if such leads are determined, to conduct the necessary investigation to locate the subjects. If it becomes obvious that the subject can actually be classified as a missing subject by reason of information developed indicating that he has deliberately absented himself from his previous environment and contacts to avoid detection by us, has gone into hiding, or is working clandestinely in an underground capacity, that subject should then be included in the Unavailable Section of the Security Index as a missing subject. At the time the Form FD-128 is submitted to the Bureau placing the subject in the Unavailable Section a cover memorandum must be submitted advising of the investigative steps already taken to locate him. 2

You have previously been instructed that the cases of missing Security Index subjects are to be retained in a pending status and are to be given preferential and continuous investigative attention. Every conceivable means must be utilized to locate such subjects in the least possible time. Investigations of missing subjects must be handled as thoroughly and promptly as any fugitive investigation. Close supervision of such cases must be maintained in the field at all times.

Henceforth, the Bureau must be advised each 45 days of the investigative steps which have been

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taken during the period to locate a subject who is designated as missing. It is not desired that investigative reports be submitted which merely set forth negative results of investigation conducted to locate a subject. Such data should be properly included in memoranda to the Bureau. The Bureau will closely follow your investigative action to locate missing Security Index subjects.

7. The case of any Security Index subject who is out of the country must be followed at least each six months for verification of the subject's address, the same as any other Security Index case, to determine if the subject has returned to this country.

8. When a Security Index subject is imprisoned it will be necessary to make arrangements with the confining institution to be informed of the subject's release in accordance with past instructions. An administrative tickler should be set up for a date shortly prior to the expected date of the subject's release to assure that you are informed of the subject's release. Upon receipt of advice of the release of the subject you should ascertain whether the subject should be continued in the Security Index. If so, Form FD-122 should be submitted per instructions set forth below.

9. In the future, if a subject who has been missing is located in your office, or a subject who has been out of the country has returned to your territory or an imprisoned subject has been released, Form FD-122 must be submitted reflecting the subject's current residence and place of employment. The words "Remove From Unavailable Section" should be typed in the space provided behind the words "MISCELLANEOUS (Specify)" which are on the Form FD-122. If the subject's card is to be placed in the Special Section, the statement "Place in Special Section - (language of foreign Government, etc., etc.)" should be typed in this space. When the new card is received from the Bureau they should be checked for accuracy and the file number, description and photograph (if available) should be placed on one of the two cards. This card

should then be filed in the Geographical or Special Section (where applicable) and the other card should then be filed in the Alphabetical Section of your Security Index. The old cards in the Unavailable and Alphabetical Sections should be destroyed.

10. In the future, if a subject who has been included in the Unavailable Section is located in another division, Form FD-126 should be submitted to the Bureau and the new office of origin with the pertinent data placed thereon including his current residence and business addresses. The notation "Removed From Unavailable Section" should be typed in the space to the right of the addresses. New Security Index cards will then be submitted to the new office of origin.

11. In the future, when a subject who is included in the Geographical or Special Sections of the Security Index is determined to be missing, out of the country or imprisoned, Form FD-126 will be submitted in accordance with instructions set forth under 2 above and the Security Index cards will thereafter be handled as set forth under 3 through 8 above.

Recommendation of Subjects for the Security Index who Are Missing or Are Out of the Country

Missing Subjects

It may sometimes be found that a subject of a pending security investigation who has not as yet been included in the Security Index has disappeared and efforts to locate him have met with negative results. That subject may have been found to be potentially dangerous even though his current whereabouts is not known and he is suitable for inclusion in the Security Index at that time. In such an instance the only factor which would preclude his prior inclusion in the Security Index is that his location is not known. In the past such subjects have not been recommended for the Security Index until they have been located.

Henceforth, such a subject should be recommended for inclusion in the Unavailable Section of the Security

Index at the time it is found that he fits the standards for inclusion regardless of the fact that his location is not known. At that time Form FD-128 should be submitted to the Bureau with the word "missing" appearing in the appropriate space. The Bureau should be advised at that time of the action taken to locate the subject. Security Index cards will be prepared and returned for appropriate filing in the Unavailable Section.

These instructions are issued to provide for appropriate early inclusion of persons in the Security Index who are dangerous to the internal security and who may be acting in an underground capacity but whose whereabouts is not known. The fact that such persons have been included in the Security Index must not be interpreted as license for casual handling of their cases thereafter. Such cases must be given continuous vigorous attention until the subject is located in accordance with previous instructions.

Of course, the determination as to whether a subject is actually missing must be judged by the extent and results of previous investigations to determine his whereabouts. If location of a subject merely involves the pursuit of leads already developed and there is a definite indication of the subject's location, recommendation for inclusion in the Security Index may be withheld until his location is verified.

If you have any pending cases in your office in which the subjects should be recommended for inclusion in the Security Index and the only factor precluding inclusion at this time is the fact that they are missing, you should recommend their inclusion in the Unavailable Section of your Security Index upon receipt of these instructions.

Subjects departing from the United States

In some instances a Security Index card on a subject not yet included in the Security Index may be in progress at the time that it is found that the subject has recently departed for a foreign country. If the evidence developed at that time warrants the inclusion of the subject in the Security Index, it is not for

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the fact that he is outside the United States, Form FD-122 should be submitted recommending his inclusion in the Unavailable Section of the Security Index. The words "Out of the Country" should be typed in the space provided in the FD-122 and if his foreign address and employment is known it should be included in the FD-122. After all initial investigation is completed the subject's case will be handled the same as those of other subjects of a similar status who are included in the Unavailable Section as out of the country.


Of course, if the subject is an alien who has been deported or has otherwise permanently departed from the United States he should not be included in the Security Index in keeping with instructions set forth above.

These instructions regarding individuals who are out of the country apply to subjects of security investigations in the San Juan, Honolulu, and Anchorage Offices as well as to the continental offices of the Bureau.

Changes in Section 270 of the Manual of Instructions necessitated by the above instructions are being prepared and will be forwarded to you in the near future.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SAC LETTER NO. 75
Series 1952

ATTENTION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

August 5, 1952

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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(1) SECURITY INDEX, SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND RELATED MATTERS --
The following instructions and suggestions are to be effective immediately:

SECURITY INDEX - VERIFICATION OF CHANGE
OF ADDRESSES BY AUXILIARY OFFICES

It has been noted that in certain instances there have been delays by auxiliary offices in verifying information that a Security Index subject has changed residence and is residing within the territory covered by the auxiliary office. Until the verification of the new address is made by the auxiliary office, the office of origin cannot forward the Security Index cards and pertinent information with Form FD-128 to change the office of origin and the Security Index cards are not maintained in the office within whose territory the subject presently resides.

Whenever an auxiliary office receives a request to verify an address of a Security Index subject who is reported to be residing within its jurisdiction, the request shall be assigned immediately and the matter shall receive expeditious attention. The results of the investigative efforts to verify the new address of the Security Index subject must be transmitted to the office of origin within two weeks of the receipt of the request. When the office of origin receives a verification of a new address for a Security Index subject, Form FD-128 should be prepared without delay in order to advise the Bureau and to transmit the Security Index cards and other pertinent information to the new office of origin.

SECURITY-TYPE CASES TRANSFERRED TO A
NEW OFFICE OF ORIGIN BY FORM FD-128

When a security-type case is transferred to a new office of origin by the use of Form FD-128, the new office of origin should review the pertinent material forwarded with the Form and any pertinent information in the files of the new office of origin and a determination should be made as to whether additional investigation is warranted at the time in that office. If so, the case should be maintained in a pending status and placed in line for investigation.

8/5/52
SAC LETTER NO. 75
Series 1952

If a determination is made that no additional investigation or other action is warranted at the time in the new office of origin, the Bureau should be advised by memorandum that no further investigation or other action is warranted and that the matter is being placed in a closed status. The memorandum should be submitted to the Bureau whether or not the name of the subject of the investigation is in the Security Index. If the subject's name is carried in the Security Index and the old office of origin has not brought the case up to date with a summary report but has indicated on the Form FD-128 that a summary report will be prepared, the new office of origin must in any event maintain the case in a pending status to follow the old office of origin to see that the summary report is prepared. Upon receipt of the summary report from the old office of origin, if no additional investigation is contemplated, the new office of origin should then advise the Bureau the case is being closed administratively in its office.

Of course, cases of subjects who are Key Figures or Top Functionaries should never be placed in a closed status in accordance with existing instructions. Cases of Security Index subjects employed in Key Facilities in the new office of origin should never be placed in a closed status in accordance with instructions set out hereinafter.

UNNECESSARY LEADS IN SECURITY MATTER CASES

It is called to your attention that in many cases leads are being set out requiring auxiliary offices to perform investigations unnecessarily. The needless leads have been noted particularly in security matter cases in which the primary purpose of the investigation is to develop sufficient derogatory data to warrant the subject's name being included in the Security Index. We must not lose sight of our objectives in that type of investigation and each Bureau official or Supervisor initialing outgoing correspondence or reports requiring investigation by an auxiliary office should review the leads to be certain that they are justified in line with the objective.

It is highly important that this phase of our work be closely supervised and that all Agents working on security-type cases be familiar with the objectives of the investigation.

8/5/52
SAC LETTER NO. 75
Series 1952

Before an auxiliary office is requested to conduct an investigation in a case, the office of origin should be certain that every effort has been made to obtain the desired information in the office of origin. It has been noted that in many instances it would have been unnecessary to request investigation in an auxiliary office if the office of origin had used ingenuity to obtain the desired information by its own investigative efforts.

Examples of unnecessary leads being directed to auxiliary offices in security matter cases are set out as follows:

Unnecessary investigations flowing from _____ or

Unnecessary verification of birth records and other vital statistics in cases in which no doubt or suspicion as to the truthfulness of the statistics at hand has been raised during the investigation.

Unnecessary verification of previous employment not pertinent to the period of the subject's Communist activity.

Unnecessary accumulative investigation when the objective of placing the subject's name in the Security Index has already been reached.

Unnecessary requests by the office of origin to check the reputation of a subject's relatives. Many times an indices check by the auxiliary office would be sufficient. In many instances even the indices check appears unnecessary.

It is not the purpose of these instructions to curtail in any way the office of origin in requesting investigations by auxiliary offices when there is a definite reason to conduct the investigations either to reach the objectives of the investigations or to obtain data necessary under Bureau instructions.

DOCUMENTATION IN REPORTS AND USE OF THUMBNAIL SKETCH FILES

It has come to the Bureau's attention that there is a possible misunderstanding in the field in regard to the extent of

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SAC LETTER NO. 75
Series 1952

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documentation necessary regarding the associates of the subject of an investigation and as to the types of security investigations in which complete documentation of information is necessary.

Your attention is directed to No Number SAC Letter I, dated March 14, 1952, which furnished detailed instructions in regard to documentation in summary and investigative reports. As pointed out in that SAC Letter, it will not be necessary to conduct extensive file reviews to document fully information appearing in these reports concerning persons who have associated with the subjects other than to identify the source of the information as you have in the past. If it is felt desirable to include in a report the identities of individuals who are known Communists and have been associates of the subject to lend weight to the evidence of the subject's potential dangerousness, the source of the information reflecting the associate to be a Communist should be identified, but it is not necessary to document such information further by conducting file reviews to determine the identity of the Agent receiving the information or the location of the original source in the files.

In most cases the desired information to identify associates or organizational affiliations of the subject can be readily obtained from case files in the office. In a very limited number of instances it may be necessary for you to secure a thumbnail sketch or characterization of an individual or an organization from another field office or the Bureau. Your attention is called to the fact that whenever a thumbnail sketch or characterization of an individual or an organization is received in your office the information should be placed in thumbnail sketch files in order that it will be available to and can be readily located by an Agent in the office needing the characterizations. By proper administrative handling of characterization material and by acquainting Agents with the location of such material, repeated requests emanating from the same field division for characterization material on the same individual or organization will be eliminated inasmuch as an Agent will be able to find the desired material in his own office.

Instructions regarding documentation of information in reports applies only to reports written on individuals and then only in those instances when (1) the investigating Agent has reason

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Series 1952

to believe the subject's name will be included in the Security Index in the future or (2) the subject's name is already included in the Security Index and the report, summary or investigative, is bringing the case up to date.

SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS EMPLOYED IN KEY FACILITIES

Under existing instructions a report must be submitted each six months in cases in which a Security Index subject in the usual course of his employment has access to facilities which have been designated key facilities by the Secretary of Defense. Pertinent portions of the current Key Facilities List, furnished by the Secretary of Defense, have been forwarded to the field. In SAC Letter #107, dated October 27, 1951, instructions were issued that the cases of all Security Index subjects employed in key facilities shall be closed upon the completion of required active investigation and shall, thereafter, be followed by administrative tickler for the required report due in six months.

This procedure is henceforth changed. After the completion of the required active investigation of Security Index subjects employed in key facilities, the case shall be placed in a pending inactive status in order that the case can be continually assigned to an Agent and that incoming material can be routed to the Agent to whom assigned. You should set up appropriate administrative procedure so that cases will be removed from the pending inactive status and reactivated periodically for the preparation of the six-months' report.

(J) SECURITY INDEX - PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS -- Documentation and Selection of Information To Be Included In Summary Reports.

At the recent Internal Security - Espionage Conference the question was raised as to whether it is necessary to document completely information in summary reports on important functionaries against whom a prima facie case can be made.

In this connection your attention is called to pages 15 through 17 of No Number SAC Letter I, dated March 14, 1952, which specifically set forth provisions for eliminating repetitions and cumulative items of information in summary reports. As stated therein it is not possible to specify a maximum or minimum number

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Series 1952

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of such items which should be included in each instance but that this would be dependent upon the preponderance of other evidence available for inclusion in the report. It was pointed out that our case against a subject must not be weakened by omitting such items. It was further stated that the selection of such items with regard to the period of time is dependent upon all facts developed against the subject.

The provisions in No Number SAC Letter I, were set forth for the purpose of cutting-down on the tremendous amount of Agent time necessary in preparing summary reports, particularly in those cases of important functionaries where the abundance of evidence makes such repetitious and cumulative items of little value when considered along with the amount and quality of other evidence available.

The Bureau believes that if evidence or intelligence information is of sufficient importance to be specifically set forth in summary reports we must be able to locate and produce such evidence should the necessity arise. Therefore, when such information is specifically set forth in reports it must be fully documented. Of course, it will not be necessary to document information appearing in general statements such as the example set forth on page 17 of No Number SAC Letter I.

It is not practical to specify a date prior to which it will not be necessary to report specifically items of information. It should be borne in mind that certain activities of one subject in the early 1940's or prior thereto may be of particular significance in presenting a clear picture of his importance to a subversive movement while activities of another subject at that time may be of such relative unimportance as to add little or nothing to the weight of our case against him. Each summary report must be prepared in light of the evidence we have on the particular subject in question and independent of other cases.

This letter and the instructions contained in pages 15 through 17 of No Number SAC Letter I, dated March 14, 1952, should be brought to the attention of all Agents engaged in security investigations to be certain that they are familiar with the instructions and observations set forth.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Attachments for (E) & (F)

8/5/52
SAC LETTER NO. 75
Series 1952

- 11 -

Director



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

(Typed July 29, 1952)

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INDEX -
PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS

Dear Sir:

Documentation and Selection of Information To Be Included
In Summary Reports

At the recent Internal Security - Espionage Conference the question was raised as to whether it is necessary to completely document information in summary reports on important functionaries against whom a prima facie case can be made.

In this connection your attention is called to pages 15 through 17 of No Number SAC Letter I, dated March 14, 1952, which specifically set forth provisions for eliminating repetitious and cumulative items of information in summary reports. As stated therein it is not possible to specify a maximum or minimum number of such items which should be included in each instance but that this would be dependent upon the preponderance of other evidence available for inclusion in the report. It was pointed out that our case against a subject must not be weakened by omitting such items. It was further stated that the selection of such items with regard to the period of time is dependent upon all facts developed against the subject.

The provisions in No Number SAC Letter I, were set forth for the purpose of cutting-down on the tremendous amount of Agent time necessary in preparing summary reports,

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
particularly in these cases of important functionaries where the abundance of evidence makes such repetitious and cumulative items of little value when considered along with the amount and quality of other evidence available.

The Bureau believes that if evidence or intelligence information is of sufficient importance to be specifically set forth in summary reports we must be able to locate and produce such evidence should the necessity arise. Therefore, when such information is specifically set forth in reports it must be fully documented. Of course, it will not be necessary to document information appearing in general statements such as the example set forth on page 17 of No Number SAC Letter I.

It is not practical to specify a date prior to which it will not be necessary to specifically report items of information. It should be borne in mind that certain activities of one subject in the early 1940's or prior thereto may be of particular significance in presenting a clear picture of his importance to a subversive movement while activities of another subject at that time may be of such relative unimportance as to add little or nothing to the weight of our case against him. Each summary report must be prepared in light of the evidence we have on the particular subject in question and independent of other cases.

This letter and the instructions contained in pages 15 through 17 of No Number SAC Letter I, dated March 14, 1952, should be brought to the attention of all Agents engaged in security investigations to be certain that they are familiar with the instructions and observations set forth.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
(Typed July 22, 1952)

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INDEX, SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
AND RELATED MATTERS

Dear Sir:

The following instructions and suggestions are
to be effective immediately:

SECURITY INDEX - VERIFICATION OF CHANGE OF
ADDRESSES BY AUXILIARY OFFICES

It has been noted that in certain instances there
have been delays by auxiliary offices in verifying
information that a Security Index subject has changed
residence and is residing within the territory covered
by the auxiliary office. Until the verification of the
new address is made by the auxiliary office, the office
of origin cannot forward the Security Index cards and
pertinent information with Form FD-128 to change the
office of origin and the Security Index cards are not
maintained in the office within whose territory the
subject presently resides.

Whenever an auxiliary office receives a request
to verify an address of a Security Index subject who is
reported to be residing within its jurisdiction, the
request shall be assigned immediately and the matter shall
receive expeditious attention. The results of the investi-
gative efforts to verify the new address of the Security
Index subject must be transmitted to the office of origin
within two weeks of the receipt of the request. When the
office of origin receives a verification of a new address
for a Security Index subject, Form FD-128 should be
prepared without delay in order to advise the Bureau and
to transmit the Security Index cards and other pertinent
information to the new office of origin.

68-107 (10/22/77)

SECURITY-TYPE CASES TRANSFERRED TO A NEW
OFFICE OF ORIGIN BY FORM FD-128

When a security-type case is transferred to a new office of origin by the use of Form FD-128, the new office of origin should review the pertinent material forwarded with the Form and any pertinent information in the files of the new office of origin and a determination should be made as to whether additional investigation is warranted at the time in that office. If so, the case should be maintained in a pending status and placed in line for investigation.

If a determination is made that no additional investigation or other action is warranted at the time in the new office of origin, the Bureau should be advised by memorandum that no further investigation or other action is warranted and that the matter is being placed in a closed status. The memorandum should be submitted to the Bureau whether or not the name of the subject of the investigation is in the Security Index. If the subject's name is carried in the Security Index and the old office of origin has not brought the case up to date with a summary report but has indicated on the Form FD-128 that a summary report will be prepared, the new office of origin must in any event maintain the case in a pending status to follow the old office of origin to see that the summary report is prepared. Upon receipt of the summary report from the old office of origin, if no additional investigation is contemplated, the new office of origin should then advise the Bureau the case is being closed administratively in its office.

Of course, cases of subjects who are Key Figures or Top Functionaries should never be placed in a closed status in accordance with existing instructions. Cases of Security Index subjects employed in Key Facilities in the new office of origin should never be placed in a closed status in accordance with instructions set out hereinafter.

UNNECESSARY LEADS IN SECURITY MATTER CASES

It is called to your attention that in many cases leads are being set out requiring auxiliary offices to perform investigations unnecessarily. The needless leads have been noted particularly in security matter cases in which the primary purpose of the investigation is to develop sufficient derogatory data to warrant the subject's name

66-11122
(Encl.)

being included in the Security Index. We must not lose sight of our objectives in that type of investigation and each Bureau official or Supervisor initialing outgoing correspondence or reports requiring investigation by an auxiliary office should review the leads to be certain that they are justified in line with the objective.

It is highly important that this phase of our work be closely supervised and that all Agents working on security-type cases be familiar with the objectives of the investigation.

Before an auxiliary office is requested to conduct an investigation in a case, the office of origin should be certain that every effort has been made to obtain the desired information in the office of origin. It has been noted that in many instances it would have been unnecessary to request investigation in an auxiliary office if the office of origin had used ingenuity to obtain the desired information by its own investigative efforts.

Examples of unnecessary leads being directed to auxiliary offices in security matter cases are set out as follows:

Unnecessary investigations flowing from
or

Unnecessary verification of birth records and other vital statistics in cases in which no doubt or suspicion as to the truthfulness of the statistics at hand has been raised during the investigation.

Unnecessary verification of previous employment not pertinent to the period of the subject's Communist activity.

Unnecessary accumulative investigation when the objective of placing the subject's name in the Security Index has already been reached.

Unnecessary requests by the office of origin to check the reputation of a subject's relatives. Many times an indices check by the auxiliary office would be sufficient. In many instances even the indices check appears unnecessary.

It is not the purpose of these instructions to in any way curtail the office of origin in requesting investigations by auxiliary offices when there is a definite reason to conduct the investigations either to reach the objectives of the investigations or to obtain data necessary under Bureau instructions.

DOCUMENTATION IN REPORTS AND USE OF THUMBMAIL SKETCH FILES

It has come to the Bureau's attention that there is a possible misunderstanding in the field in regard to the extent of documentation necessary regarding the associates of the subject of an investigation and as to the types of security investigations in which complete documentation of information is necessary.

Your attention is directed to No Number SAC Letter I, dated March 14, 1952, which furnished detailed instructions in regard to documentation in summary and investigative reports. As pointed out in that SAC Letter, it will not be necessary to conduct extensive file reviews to document fully information appearing in these reports concerning persons who have associated with the subjects other than to identify the source of the information as you have in the past. If it is felt desirable to include in a report the identities of individuals who are known Communists and have been associates of the subject to lend weight to the evidence of the subject's potential dangerousness, the source of the information reflecting the associate to be a Communist should be identified, but it is not necessary to document such information further by conducting file reviews to determine the identity of the Agent receiving the information or the location of the original source in the files.

In most cases the desired information to identify associates or organizational affiliations of the subject can be readily obtained from case files in the office. In a very limited number of instances it may be necessary for you to secure a thumbnail sketch or characterization of an individual or an organization from another field office or the Bureau. Your attention is called to the fact that whenever a thumbnail sketch or characterization of an individual or an organization is received in your office the information should be placed in thumbnail sketch

files in order that it will be available to and can be readily located by an Agent in the office needing the characterizations. By proper administrative handling of characterization material and by acquainting Agents with the location of such material, repeated requests emanating from the same field division for characterization material on the same individual or organization will be eliminated inasmuch as an Agent will be able to find the desired material in his own office.

Instructions regarding documentation of information in reports applies only to reports written on individuals and then only in those instances when (1) the investigating Agent has reason to believe the subject's name will be included in the Security Index in the future or (2) the subject's name is already included in the Security Index and the report, summary or investigative, is bringing the case up to date.

SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS EMPLOYED IN KEY FACILITIES

Under existing instructions a report must be submitted each six months in cases in which a Security Index subject in the usual course of his employment has access to facilities which have been designated key facilities by the Secretary of Defense. Pertinent portions of the current Key Facilities List, furnished by the Secretary of Defense, have been forwarded to the field. In SAC Letter #107, dated October 27, 1951, instructions were issued that the cases of all Security Index subjects employed in key facilities shall be closed upon the completion of required active investigation and shall, thereafter, be followed by administrative tickler for the required report due in six months.

This procedure is henceforth changed. After the completion of the required active investigation of Security Index subjects employed in key facilities, the case shall be placed in a pending inactive status in order that the case can be continually assigned to an Agent and that incoming material can be routed to the Agent to whom assigned. You should set up appropriate administrative procedure so that cases will be removed from the pending inactive status and reactivated periodically for the preparation of the six-months' report.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director



216 Copy

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

AL ATTENTION
BY CONFIDENTIAL

SAC LETTER NO. 53-12

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

February 3, 1953

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


SAC

ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
ANCHORAGE
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
DALLAS

DENVER
DETROIT
EL PASO
HONOLULU
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
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OMAHA
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PITTSBURGH

PORTLAND
RICHMOND
ST. LOUIS
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SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
QUANTICO



(N) ~~SECURITY INDEX - KEY FACILITIES - ADJUSTMENT TO 1953 KEY FACILITIES LIST~~ -- Inasmuch as the geographical reference numbers appearing in the 1953 KFL are completely different from the item numbers in the 1952 KFL and other changes are reflected therein, it will be necessary for you to institute the following procedures to adjust your Security Index to the new list. This project must be started immediately.

Check of Security Index Subjects Against 1953 KFL and Submission of Forms FD-122 to the Bureau.

1. All of your Security Index subjects must be checked against the 1953 KFL to determine if they are now employed in a Key Facility. This check shall not be restricted to the subjects now reflected in your Security Index as being employed in Key Facilities but will include all Security Index subjects.

2. In every instance where a Security Index subject is found to be employed in a facility appearing in the 1953 KFL you will submit Form FD-122 reflecting the proper information as indicated in the 1953 KFL in accordance with the following instructions.

If the Security Index subject is found to be employed in a Key Facility the FD-122 will reflect (1) the geographical reference number for the facility as reflected in the left column of the KFL, (2) the abbreviation for the agency having security responsibility as reflected in the column headed "RESP" and (3) the abbreviations of all of the agencies having an interest in the Key Facility. The

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interested agencies will appear on the FD-122 to assure proper dissemination in the field and at the Bureau. They will not appear on the Security Index Cards returned from the Bureau.

For example, if the geographical reference number is 14870, the security responsibility is with the Navy (N) and the interested agencies are shown as Navy, Army (A) and Air Force (AF), the data "Geo. Ref. #14870; Resp. N; Interested Agencies, N, A, AF" should be set forth on the FD-122.

It will be noted that the Key Facilities located in the states covered by several Bureau offices bear geographical reference numbers which are less than 10,000. In these instances the actual number is preceded by one, two, or three zeros. When setting forth the geographical reference number for such facilities, you are to use the actual number rather than that shown in the KFL. This is desired to simplify procedures at the Bureau in coding the data on the IBM machine. For example, if the geographical reference number appearing in the KFL is 00320, the security responsibility is with the Army and interested agencies are shown as the Army and the Research and Development Board (RDB), the data "Geo. Ref. #320; Resp. A; Interested Agencies A, RDB" should be set forth on the FD-122.

The alphabetical reference number should not be used by you under any circumstances.

It will be noted that in many instances an asterisk appears behind the abbreviation for the agency having security responsibility. As noted in the "Foreword" attached to the KFL, an asterisk indicates such assignment of responsibility is made without infringement on the Atomic Energy Commission's statutory responsibility. When it is determined that a Security Index subject is employed in such a facility the Form FD-122 recording such employment should bear the geographical reference number and the abbreviation for the agency having security responsibility followed by the letters AEC to reflect that the AEC is involved in the security responsibility. This should be followed by the identities of the interested agencies. For example, if the geographical reference number is 08690, the security responsibility is shown as A* and the interested agencies are A, RDB, and AEC, the data "Geo. Ref. #08690; Resp. A, AEC; Interested Agencies A, RDB, AEC" should be set forth on the FD-122.

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The Bureau is revising Form FD-122 to include the words "Geo. Ref. #," "Resp." and "Interested Agencies" thereon. These will be furnished to your office upon requisition when the present supply of Form FD-122 is exhausted. In the meantime it will be necessary to type these words on the Forms FD-122 now in your supply when including Key Facilities data thereon.

In any instance where a Security Index subject is employed in a Key Facility, his Security Index card should be tabbed for Consab and Detcom in accordance with previous instructions. If the subject's Security Index card does not already reflect this tabbing it should be indicated on the FD-122 submitted by you at this time.

3. In every instance where a subject is now reflected as being employed in a Key Facility in accordance with the 1952 KFL and his place of employment does not now appear on the 1953 KFL, Form FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau deleting the Key Facility employment status of the subject. If his removal from the Key Facility category requires that the Detcom and/or Consab tabbing be deleted, such deletion should be indicated on the FD-122.

4. If there is any doubt as to whether a Security Index subject is actually now employed in a Key Facility listed in the 1953 KFL such employment should be verified either by a check of his case file or through a check of his place of employment.

Action To Be Taken In Cases Not Previously Designated
As Key Facilities Cases

In those instances where a Security Index subject is found through this check to be employed in a Key Facility but he has not previously been listed in the Security Index as a Key Facility employee the following steps should be taken:

1. The residence address should be currently verified.
2. The Armed Services representative at the Key Facility or other reliable source should be contacted to determine whether the subject has access to classified or restricted material.
3. A report should be submitted at the earliest possible date bringing the case up to date, as well as including the information required for Key Facility reports. If the initial summary

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report in the case has not been submitted the report submitted at this time should be a summary report. Thereafter the case should be placed in a pending-inactive status and handled in accordance with existing instructions for Key Facilities cases.

Dissemination and Content of Reports

Henceforth the following instructions for dissemination shall apply to all Key Facilities cases. The office of origin shall disseminate copies of each report to the proper local representatives of the intelligence agencies of the Army (G-2), Navy (ONI), Air Force (OSI), or the Coast Guard in any instance where one or more of these agencies are reflected in the KFL as being the agencies interested in the Key Facility. In all instances where one of these agencies has security responsibility for the Key Facility that agency shall be furnished a copy of each report.


Reports on subjects employed in Key Facilities for which the Marine Corps has security responsibility or in which the Marine Corps has an interest should be disseminated to the proper local representative of ONI.

Dissemination to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Armed Forces Special Weapons (SWP), the Research and Development Board (RDB) and the Maritime Administration (MA) shall not be made in the field. Any direct dissemination to these agencies will be made at the Bureau.

Inasmuch as the 1953 KFL contains numerous changes, it is possible that in some cases past dissemination has not been made to the agencies which now have security responsibility or are now interested agencies. The case file of each Security Index subject found to be employed in a facility appearing in the 1953 KFL must be reviewed to determine whether proper dissemination has been made of information appearing in his file in accordance with the 1953 KFL. Where proper dissemination has not been made in the past it should be made at this time.

To facilitate proper supervision of Key Facilities cases in the field and at the Bureau and to assure proper dissemination, the administrative page of each report hereafter submitted on a subject employed in a Key Facility shall contain a statement identifying (1) the name of the Federal Agency having security responsibility

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for the Key Facility and (2) all of the interested agencies. The latter is a change of previous instructions to assure proper dissemination of all reports.

Instructions regarding the dissemination and content of reports concerning subjects of individual security investigations who are employed in Key Facilities shall apply to all such subjects whether they are or are not in the Security Index.

Handling Future Amendments To The 1953 KFI

As stated above, the Department of Defense will from time to time issue corrected pages to the KFI. At any time in the future that you receive amended pages to the KFI from the Bureau you should take the following steps to adjust your Security Index to the KFI.

1. If the amended pages reflect the addition of Key Facilities the place of employment of all subjects in your Security Index must be checked against those facilities to determine if any subjects are employed therein. If so, the steps outlined above regarding the submission of Form FD-122, submission of a current report, dissemination of reports and future handling of such cases shall be followed.

2. If the amended pages reflect the deletion of Key Facilities in your territory, the Security Index cards of all Key Facility subjects must be checked against those facilities to determine if any such subjects are employed therein. If so, Form FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau deleting the Key Facility designation for such subjects. If the Detcom and/or Comsab tabbing should be deleted, such deletion should be shown on the FD-122 submitted by you.

Advice to Bureau of Completion of Project

This project must be completed in all offices by March 1, 1953. You are to advise the Bureau on or before that date under the caption "Security Index - Key Facilities; Adjustment to 1953 KFI," that all Forms FD-122 necessitated by these instructions have been submitted to the Bureau. In the future all changes, additions, or deletions in the Security Index effected by the Key Facilities Program will be handled in accordance with the above instructions.

Appropriate changes in Section 8/C of the Manual of Instructions are being prepared and will be forwarded to you.

Attachments for (E), (L), (M) & (N)

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

2/3/53

SAC LETTER NO. 53-12

- 19 -

100-1007
ENC

(B) SECURITY INDEX - KEY FACILITIES
ADJUSTMENT TO 1953 KEY FACILITIES LIST

Inasmuch as the geographical reference numbers appearing in the 1953 KFL are completely different from the item numbers in the 1952 KFL and other changes are reflected therein, it will be necessary for you to institute the following procedures to adjust your Security Index to the new list. This project must be started immediately.

Check of Security Index Subjects Against 1953 KFL and Submission of Forms FD-122 to the Bureau.

1. All of your Security Index subjects must be checked against the 1953 KFL to determine if they are now employed in a Key Facility. This check shall not be restricted to the subjects now reflected in your Security Index as being employed in Key Facilities but will include all Security Index subjects.

2. In every instance where a Security Index subject is found to be employed in a facility appearing in the 1953 KFL you will submit Form FD-122 reflecting the proper information as indicated in the 1953 KFL in accordance with the following instructions.

If the Security Index subject is found to be employed in a Key Facility the FD-122 will reflect (1) the geographical reference number for the facility as reflected in the left column of the KFL, (2) the abbreviation for the agency having security responsibility as reflected in the column headed "RESP" and (3) the abbreviations of all of the agencies having an interest in the Key Facility. The interested agencies will appear on the FD-122 to assure proper dissemination in the field and at the Bureau. They will not appear on the Security Index Cards returned from the Bureau.

For example, if the geographical reference number is 14870, the security responsibility is with the Navy (N) and the interested agencies are shown as Navy, Army (A) and Air Force (A), the data "Geo. Ref. 14870; Resp. N; Interested Agencies N, A, A" should be set forth on the FD-122.

It will be noted that the Key Facilities located in the states covered by several Bureau offices bear geographical reference numbers which are less than 10,000. In these instances the actual number is preceded by one, two, or three zeros. When setting forth the geographical reference number

for such facilities, you are to use the actual number rather than that shown in the KFL. This is desired to simplify procedures at the Bureau in coding the data on the IBM machine. For example, if the geographical reference number appearing in the KFL is 00320, the security responsibility is with the Army and interested agencies are shown as the Army and the Research and Development Board (RDB), the data "Geo. Ref. #320; Resp. A; Interested Agencies A, RDB" should be set forth on the FD-122.

The alphabetical reference number should not be used by you under any circumstances.

It will be noted that in many instances an asterisk appears behind the abbreviation for the agency having security responsibility. As noted in the "Foreword" attached to the KFL, an asterisk indicates such assignment of responsibility is made without infringement on the Atomic Energy Commission's statutory responsibility. When it is determined that a Security Index subject is employed in such a facility the Form FD-122 recording such employment should bear the geographical reference number and the abbreviation for the agency having security responsibility followed by the letters AEC to reflect that the AEC is involved in the security responsibility. This should be followed by the identities of the interested agencies. For example, if the geographical reference number is 08690, the security responsibility is shown as A* and the interested agencies are A, RDB, and AEC, the data "Geo. Ref. #8690; Resp. A, AEC; Interested Agencies A, RDB, AEC" should be set forth on the FD-122.

The Bureau is revising Form FD-122 to include the words "Geo. Ref. #," "Resp." and "Interested Agencies" printed thereon. These will be furnished to your office upon requisition when the present supply of Form FD-122 is exhausted. In the meantime it will be necessary to type these words on the Forms FD-122 now in your supply when including Key Facilities data thereon.

In any instance where a Security Index subject is employed in a Key Facility, his Security Index card should be tabbed for Comsab and Detcom in accordance with previous instructions. If the subject's Security Index card does not already reflect this tabbing it should be indicated on the FD-122 submitted by you at this time.

3. In every instance where a subject is now reflected as being employed in a Key Facility in accordance with the 1952 KFL and his place of employment does not now appear on the 1953 KFL, Form FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau deleting the Key Facility employment status of the subject. If his removal from the Key Facility category requires that the Detcom and/or Comsab tabbing be deleted, such deletion should be indicated on the FD-122.

4. If there is any doubt as to whether a Security Index subject is actually now employed at a Key Facility listed in the 1953 KFL such employment should be verified either by a check of his case file or through a check of his place of employment.

Action To Be Taken In Cases Not Previously Designated
As Key Facilities Cases

In those instances where a Security Index subject is found through this check to be employed in a Key Facility but he has not previously been listed in the Security Index as a Key Facility employee the following steps should be taken:

1. The residence address should be currently verified.
2. The Armed Services representative at the Key Facility or other reliable source should be contacted to determine whether the subject has access to classified or restricted material.
3. A report should be submitted at the earliest possible date bringing the case up to date, as well as including the information required for Key Facility reports. If the initial summary report in the case has not been submitted the report submitted at this time should be a summary report. Thereafter the case should be placed in a pending-inactive status and handled in accordance with existing instructions for Key Facilities cases.

Dissemination and Content of Reports

Henceforth the following instructions for dissemination shall apply to all Key Facilities cases. The office of origin shall disseminate copies of each report to the proper local representatives of the intelligence agencies

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Enc

of the Army (G-2), Navy (ONI), Air Force (OSI), or the Coast Guard in any instance where one or more of these agencies are reflected in the KFL as being the agencies interested in the Key Facility. In all instances where one of these agencies has security responsibility for the Key Facility that agency shall be furnished a copy of each report.

Reports on subjects employed in Key Facilities for which the Marine Corps has security responsibility or in which the Marine Corps has an interest should be disseminated to the proper local representative of the.

Dissemination to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Armed Forces Special Operations (SAP), the Research and Development Board (RDB) and the Maritime Administration (MA) shall not be made in the field. Any direct dissemination to these agencies will be made at the Bureau.

Inasmuch as the 1953 KFL contains numerous changes, it is possible that in some cases past dissemination has not been made to the agencies which now have security responsibility or are now interested agencies. The case file of each Security Index subject found to be employed in a facility appearing in the 1953 KFL must be reviewed to determine whether proper dissemination has been made of information appearing in his file in accordance with the 1953 KFL. Where proper dissemination has not been made in the past it should be made at this time.

To facilitate proper supervision of Key Facilities cases in the field and at the Bureau and to assure proper dissemination, the administrative page of each report hereafter submitted on a subject employed in a Key Facility shall contain a statement identifying (1) the name of the Federal Agency having security responsibility for the Key Facility and (2) all of the interested agencies. The latter is a change of previous instructions to assure proper dissemination of all reports.

Instructions regarding the dissemination and content of reports concerning subjects of individual security investigations who are employed in Key Facilities shall apply to all such subjects whether they are or are not in the Security Index.

Handling Future Amendments To The 1953 KFL

As stated above, the Department of Defense will from time to time issue corrected pages to the KFL. At any time in the future that you receive amended pages to the KFL from the Bureau you should take the following steps to adjust your Security Index to the KFL.

1. If the amended pages reflect the addition of Key Facilities the place of employment of all subjects in your Security Index must be checked against those facilities to determine if any subjects are employed therein. If so, the steps outlined above regarding the submission of Form FD-122, submission of a current report, dissemination of reports and future handling of such cases shall be followed.

2. If the amended pages reflect the deletion of Key Facilities in your territory, the Security Index cards of all Key Facility subjects must be checked against those facilities to determine if any such subjects are employed therein. If so, Form FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau deleting the Key Facility designation for such subjects. If the Detcom and/or Comsab tabbing should be deleted, such deletion should be shown on the FD-122 submitted by you.

Advice To Bureau of Completion of Project

This project must be completed in all offices by March 1, 1953. You are to advise the Bureau on or before that date under the caption "Security Index - Key Facilities; Adjustment to 1953 KFL" that all Forms FD-122 necessitated by these instructions have been submitted to the Bureau. In the future all changes, additions, or deletions in the Security Index affected by the Key Facilities Program will be handled in accordance with the above instructions.

Appropriate changes in Section 370 of the Manual of Instructions are being prepared and will be forwarded to you.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 20, 1953

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
SAC LETTER NO. 53-69

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. TC

See Office Memorandum

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

66-04-
1904

furnished with this SAC Letter, a copy of the "Letter of Promulgation to Holders of the Department of Defense Key Facilities List" dated September 17, 1953, which refers to Change No. 1. All continental offices with the exception of the Albuquerque, Butte, Oklahoma City, Phoenix and Portland offices are being furnished with this SAC Letter, Change No. 1, to appropriate State Sections. No changes have been received affecting the facilities within the territories of the offices named.

The pages in the KFL (F) which have been replaced by Change No. 1 should be destroyed when they are no longer needed to assist you in making the necessary corrections and adjustments in connection with the Plant Informant and Security Index Program.

(M) ~~KEY FACILITIES~~ ~~PLANT INFORMANTS~~ ~~SECURITY INDEX~~ - ADJUSTMENT TO ~~KEY FACILITY LIST~~ -- Your attention is directed to paragraph M of SAC Letter Number 53-12 dated February 3, 1953, and to SAC Letter Number 53-51 dated July 21, 1953, with which all continental offices were furnished appropriate State Sections of the sixth edition of the Department of Defense Master Geographical Key Facilities List designated as KFL (F). Reference is also made to paragraph N of SAC Letter Number 53-12 dated February 3, 1953, containing instructions as to adjustments to be made in the Security Index necessitated by changes in the KFL. You have been advised that the Department of Defense would from time to time issue corrected pages to the KFL to reflect any deletions, additions or other changes.

The Department of Defense has now prepared change No. 1 dated September 10, 1953, to the KFL (F). You will note that each line in which a change has occurred has been appropriately marked. However, many of the changes will have no effect upon the operations of the Bureau.

Each change in the KFL (F) has been marked with the figure "1" in the column heading "CH. NO." and the bottom of such pages are marked "Change No. 1." If only one side of a page has been affected by changes, that side will be marked "Change No. 1" and the other side of the page will be marked "original." The symbol "#" appearing in the column heading "CH. NO." indicates that a change has been previously made and is not affected by Change No. 1. In other words, the symbol "#" appears opposite the changes made when the KFL (F) was re-printed in July 1953, copies of which were furnished to you with SAC Letter Number 53-51.


Any changes in the enclosed Change No. 1 to KFL (F) affecting the Plant Informant Program in your office must be handled in accordance with the instructions contained in paragraph M of SAC Letter Number 53-12.

Any changes in Change No. 1 which will affect the data appearing on Security Index cards of subjects employed in key facilities must carefully checked through your Security Index and corrected Form FD-122 submitted to the Bureau in accordance with the instructions contained in paragraph N of SAC Letter Number 53-12.

In order that all continental offices will have up-to-date data pertaining to the KFL (F) all such offices are being

10/20/53
SAC LETTER NO. 53-69

- 14 -



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

(Typed October 14, 1953)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents In Charge:


RE: KEY FACILITIES - PLANT INFORMANTS (M)
SECURITY INDEX - ADJUSTMENT TO KEY
FACILITY LIST

Dear Sir:

Your attention is directed to paragraph M of SAC Letter Number 53-12 dated February 3, 1953, and to SAC Letter Number 53-51 dated July 21, 1953, with which all continental offices were furnished appropriate State Sections of the sixth edition of the Department of Defense Master Geographical Key Facilities List designated as KFL (F). Reference is also made to paragraph N of SAC Letter Number 53-12 dated February 3, 1953, containing instructions as to adjustments to be made in the Security Index necessitated by changes in the KFL. You have been advised that the Department of Defense would from time to time issue corrected pages to the KFL to reflect any deletions, additions or other changes.

The Department of Defense has now prepared change No. 1 dated September 10, 1953, to the KFL (F). You will note that each line in which a change has occurred has been appropriately marked. However, many of the changes will have no effect upon the operations of the Bureau.

Each change in the KFL (F) has been marked with the figure "1" in the column heading "CH. NO." and the bottom of such pages are marked "Change No. 1." If only one side of a page has been affected by changes, that side will be marked "Change No. 1" and the other side of the page will be marked "original." The symbol "#" appearing in the column heading



"CH. NO." indicates that a change has been previously made and is not affected by Change No. 1. In other words, the symbol "#" appears opposite the changes made when the KFL (F) was re-printed in July 1953, copies of which were furnished to you with SAC Letter Number 53-51.


Any changes in the enclosed Change No. 1 to KFL (F) affecting the Plant Informant Program in your office must be handled in accordance with the instructions contained in paragraph M of SAC Letter Number 53-12.

Any changes in Change No. 1 which will affect the data appearing on Security Index cards of subjects employed in key facilities must be carefully checked through your Security Index and corrected Form FD-122 submitted to the Bureau in accordance with the instructions contained in paragraph N of SAC Letter Number 53-12.

In order that all continental offices will have up-to-date data pertaining to the KFL (F) all such offices are being furnished with this SAC Letter, a copy of the "Letter of Promulgation to Holders of the Department of Defense Key Facilities List" dated September 17, 1953, which refers to Change No. 1. All continental offices with the exception of the Albuquerque, Butte, Oklahoma City, Phoenix and Portland offices are being furnished with this SAC Letter, Change No. 1, to appropriate State Sections. No changes have been received affecting the facilities within the territories of the offices named.

The pages in the KFL (F) which have been replaced by Change No. 1 should be destroyed when they are no longer needed to assist you in making the necessary corrections and adjustments in connection with the Plant Informant and Security Index Program.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

(U) SECURITY INDEX - FD-186 - FBI FORM BOOK -- SAC Letter 54-241(L) dated May 11, 1954, requires that all Security Index subjects must be personally observed in order to aid in the reporting of accurate descriptions and to prevent mistaken identities. It is further provided that a notation or memorandum to the effect that the Security Index subjects have been personally observed shall appear in the case files of all Security Index subjects whose names are presently maintained in the Security Index. In most instances, such notations will already appear in those case files, having been recorded there at the time the Security Index subjects were personally observed by the Special Agents to whom the subjects were assigned for apprehension purposes. Many Security Index subjects have also been observed during direct or pretext interviews, surveillances and on other occasions.

Your attention is directed to Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions, 7b(5)(q), which notes that Form FD-186 has been provided for the purposes of compiling information to be posted on Security Index cards. It was stated that this Form can be filled in by the Agent handling the case by legible hand printing and forwarded to the clerical employee designated to post this information on the reverse side of the Security Index card. After the Security Index card has been prepared at the Bureau and submitted to the field, and the information appearing on the FD-186 has been posted on the reverse side of the geographical Security Index card, this Form is filed in the investigative case file of the subject.


As a result of a suggestion from the field, Form FD-186 is being amended to provide for the recording of the physical observation of Security Index subjects, pursuant to the instructions in the above SAC Letter. The amended Form will also provide for the posting of any additional descriptive data developed as a result of the personal observation of Security Index subjects.

Attached hereto is one copy of the revised Form FD-186 which should be placed in the FBI Form Book maintained by your office. Form FD-186 in its present form should be used until your supply is exhausted.

Appropriate Manual changes will be forwarded to your office at a later date.

7/20/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-37

- 17 -



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

(Typed July 8, 1954)

66-04-2060

Encl

PERSONAL ATTENTION
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INDEX - FD-186
FBI Form Book

Dear Sir:

SAC Letter 54-24 (L) dated May 11, 1954, requires that all Security Index subjects must be personally observed in order to aid in the reporting of accurate descriptions and to prevent mistaken identities. It is further provided that a notation or memorandum to the effect that the Security Index subjects have been personally observed shall appear in the case files of all Security Index subjects whose names are presently maintained in the Security Index. In most instances, such notations will already appear in those case files, having been recorded there at the time the Security Index subjects were personally observed by the Special Agents to whom the subjects were assigned for apprehension purposes. Many Security Index subjects have also been observed during direct or pretext interviews, surveillances and on other occasions.

Your attention is directed to Section 27C of the Manual of Instructions, 7b(5)(q), which notes that Form FD-186 has been provided for the purpose of compiling information to be posted on Security Index cards. It was stated that this Form can be filled in by the Agent handling the case by legible handprinting and forwarded to the clerical employee designated to post this information on the reverse side of the Security Index card. After the Security Index card has been prepared at the Bureau and submitted to the field, and the information appearing on the FD-186 has been posted on the reverse side of the geographical Security Index card, this Form is filed in

*Sent to all
SACs
Bureau
7-54
RS*


the investigative case file of the subject.

As a result of a suggestion from the field, Form FD-186 is being amended to provide for the recording of the physical observation of Security Index subjects, pursuant to the instructions in the above SAC Letter. The amended Form will also provide for the posting of any additional descriptive data developed as a result of the personal observation of Security Index subjects.

Attached hereto is one copy of the revised Form FD-186 which should be placed in the FBI Form Book maintained by your office. Form FD-186 in its present form should be used until your supply is exhausted.

Appropriate Manual changes will be forwarded to your office at a later date.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

Attachment



(170-34)

DATE: 6-24-1960

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

FILE NO:

Section 87C, 7b(5), Manual of Instructions, directs that the description and photograph should be placed on the reverse side of the Security Index card. In regard to the photograph, the most recent one should be used if there is a choice. A review of the subject's file reflects there (is ___ is not ___) a photograph of the above-captioned subject available for placing with the Security Index card. (If more than one photograph is available, the Agent handling the investigation should indicate the photograph to be used.)

Section 87C, 6b(1) (j), and 7b(7), Manual of Instructions, requires that Security Index subjects must be personally observed and such fact specifically noted in the subjects' case files. Has captioned subject been personally observed? Yes ___ No ___. If so, make appropriate entries in the following blanks:

- (1) Observed by SA _____
- (2) Date observed _____
- (3) Personal observation of subject is indicated in
serial _____

Following are descriptive data relating to the subject, which data should be placed on the reverse side of the Security Index card. If subject is already included in the Security Index only those entries necessitating changes in the data posted on the Security Index cards should be made in the blanks below. For example, if subject is personally observed subsequent to his designation for the Security Index, any additional descriptive data developed thereby should be noted in the appropriate spaces to allow their posting on the reverse side of the Security Index cards:


(1) Name and Aliases:

(2) Sex:

(3) Race:

(4) Age:

REPROCESSED FORM



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LETTER NO. 54-397
2065
1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

August 3, 1954

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



(L) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -- Evaluation of Potential Dangerousness

One of the purposes of security-type investigations is to determine the identities, whereabouts and activities of individuals who, because of their membership or activities in or association with subversive groups, are considered dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country and the consequent collection of sufficient information concerning their activities to justify inclusion in the Security Index and apprehension in the event of a national emergency.

To fulfill your responsibility for including in the Security Index the names of all potentially dangerous individuals,

8/3/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-39

- 10 -

66-04-2065
you must be alert at all times to evaluate each and every security investigation to be certain the case has been thoroughly investigated to resolve the question of the subject's dangerousness.

To fulfill your responsibility in connection with every case in which a subject's name is presently on the Security Index, you must be certain that the case receives appropriate re-evaluation so that at all times there is sufficient information developed to justify subject's detention in the event of an emergency.

On the other hand we have a definite responsibility to appraise cases fairly to be certain that names are either not added to the Security Index or are deleted therefrom when individuals no longer present a danger to the internal security of the country. Because of the underground operations of the Communist Party and the security measures adopted by the Party, it has become increasingly more difficult to evaluate certain cases because of the absence of open Party activity. Whenever doubts are raised for any reason as to whether a Security Index subject is still dangerous, additional positive, thorough and searching investigative action must be taken to resolve the question. In far too many instances you have failed to take such action and the Bureau has been forced to call individual cases to your attention. The Bureau desires to reiterate emphatically that it remains your responsibility to insure that your cases are properly evaluated and are investigated thoroughly without the necessity of repeating this basic instruction in correspondence in the individual cases.


An evaluation of dangerousness to decide whether or not a subject's name should be added to or retained in the Security Index must be made following every interview of a security subject. If a subject on interview denies in whole or in part pertinent derogatory information contained in our files and there is not incontrovertible proof in the files that the subject is untruthful in such denials, additional investigation must be conducted to resolve the matter. The investigation should include a reinterview of persons, confidential sources and security informants who originally furnished the subversive information regarding the subject in order to reaffirm the correctness of the information previously furnished and to determine if the individuals can recall any additional subversive information they failed to furnish or which has come to their attention subsequently. This is necessary in view of the subject's denial in these cases in which the evidence,

8/3/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-39

reasonably interpreted and analyzed, does not clearly establish the subject's dangerousness beyond doubt.

I cannot emphasize too strongly the absolute necessity that you be certain a subject has been properly identified as the person engaging in the subversive activities alleged. When there is any doubt on that point, particularly when on interview the subject denies the pertinent subversive allegations, the person, confidential source or security informant who is the source of the derogatory information should be thoroughly reinterviewed and exhibited a photograph of the subject, when available, to resolve the matter.

The above instructions are not intended to change existing policy and procedures in matters of this type but are to re-emphasize the necessity for logically resolving all questions pertaining to the dangerousness or potential dangerousness of the subject of each security investigation by reinterviewing sources and conducting additional investigation when warranted.



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
(Typed July 27, 1954)

166-54-125
(FOIA)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Dear Sir:

Evaluation of Potential Dangerousness

One of the purposes of security-type investigations is to determine the identities, whereabouts and activities of individuals who, because of their membership or activities in or association with subversive groups, are considered dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country and the consequent collection of sufficient information concerning their activities to justify inclusion in the Security Index and apprehension in the event of a national emergency.

To fulfill your responsibility for including in the Security Index the names of all potentially dangerous individuals, you must be alert at all times to evaluate each and every security investigation to be certain the case has been thoroughly investigated to resolve the question of the subject's dangerousness.

To fulfill your responsibility in connection with every case in which a subject's name is presently on the Security Index, you must be certain that the case receives appropriate re-evaluation so that at all times there is sufficient information developed to justify subject's detention in the event of an emergency.

On the other hand we have a definite responsibility to appraise cases fairly to be certain that names are either not added to the Security Index or are deleted therefrom when

66-4-505

individuals no longer present a danger to the internal security of the country. Because of the underground operations of the Communist Party and the security measures adopted by the Party, it has become increasingly more difficult to evaluate certain cases because of the absence of open Party activity. Whenever doubts are raised for any reason as to whether a Security Index subject is still dangerous, additional positive, thorough and searching investigative action must be taken to resolve the question. In far too many instances you have failed to take such action and the Bureau has been forced to call individual cases to your attention. The Bureau desires to reiterate emphatically that it remains your responsibility to insure that your cases are properly evaluated and are investigated thoroughly without the necessity of repeating this basic instruction in correspondence in the individual cases.

An evaluation of dangerousness to decide whether or not a subject's name should be added to or retained in the Security Index must be made following every interview of a security subject. If a subject on interview denies in whole or in part pertinent derogatory information contained in our files and there is not incontrovertible proof in the files that the subject is untruthful in such denials, additional investigation must be conducted to resolve the matter. The investigation should include a reinterview of persons, confidential sources and security informants who originally furnished the subversive information regarding the subject in order to reaffirm the correctness of the information previously furnished and to determine if the individuals can recall any additional subversive information they failed to furnish or which has come to their attention subsequently. This is necessary in view of the subject's denial in these cases in which the evidence, reasonably interpreted and analyzed, does not clearly establish the subject's dangerousness beyond doubt.

I cannot emphasize too strongly the absolute necessity that you be certain a subject has been properly identified as the person engaging in the subversive activities alleged. If there is any doubt on that point, particularly when on interview

the subject denies the pertinent subversive allegations, the person, confidential source or security informant who is the source of the derogatory information should be thoroughly re-interviewed and exhibited a photograph of the subject, when available, to resolve the matter.

The above instructions are not intended to change existing policy and procedures in matters of this type but are to re-emphasize the necessity for logically resolving all questions pertaining to the dangerousness or potential dangerousness of the subject of each security investigation by reinterviewing sources and conducting additional investigation when warranted.

Very truly yours, .

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director



PI CONAL TENTION 66-04-75
57-42

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

To all SACs

AUGUST 17, 1954

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(N) KEY FACILITIES - PLANT INFORMANTS -- Your attention is directed to paragraph M of SAC Letter 53-12 dated February 3, 1953, and SAC Letter 54-8 dated February 9, 1954, with which all continental offices were furnished appropriate State Sections of the Seventh Edition of the Department of Defense Master Geographical Key Facilities List designated as KFL(G). You were advised at that time that the Department of Defense would, from time to time, issue corrected pages to reflect additions, deletions and other changes.

Due to the many changes the Department of Defense has prepared the Eighth Edition of the Key Facilities List which is dated August 10, 1954, and referred to as KFL(H). You will note that each line in which a change has occurred has been appropriately marked; however, many of the changes recorded in the new KFL(H) will have no effect upon the operations of the Bureau.

The bottom of each page of this new edition of the KFL is marked "original." You will note a column on the extreme right of each page headed "CH. NO." The appearance of the letter "h" in this column represents a change in the line opposite that letter. For example, if the address of a facility was previously listed incorrectly and is now being corrected and no other changes with respect to that facility have been made, the symbol will appear only opposite the line reflecting the address of the facility. If a new facility has been added the symbol will appear opposite each line pertaining to the facility such as the name, address and products involved. In such latter case the letter "h" may appear three or more times with respect to the one facility. If a facility has been deleted the geographical reference number will appear in the KFL(H) with the word "deleted" followed by the letter "h." In such cases it will be necessary to refer to the KFL(G) now in your possession to determine the name of that facility. In such instances a notation should be made in your file covering this facility that the facility involved was deleted from the Key Facilities list by KFL(H).

It will also be noted that in a few instances the geographical reference number has been changed. This has occurred in those instances in which the facility was originally listed in your city or town and later determined to be located in another city or town. Due to its change in locality and its subsequent change of position in the Key Facilities List, the Department of Defense has assigned a different geographical reference number. All such changes are

8/17/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-42

66-04-2075

appropriately marked in the KFL(H). Any changes in the enclosed KFL(H) which will affect the data appearing on Security Index cards of subjects employed in Key Facilities must be carefully checked through your Security Index and corrected forms FD-122 submitted to the Bureau in accordance with the instructions contained in Paragraph N of SAC Letter 53-12.

Each office with the exception of the Anchorage, Honolulu and San Juan Offices is being furnished appropriate State Sections and forewords of the KFL(H) with this SAC Letter. Those offices covering only portions of a state will receive complete State Sections. KFL(G) furnished you with SAC Letter 54-8 should be destroyed when it is no longer needed to assist you in making the necessary corrections and adjustments in connection with the Plant Informant and Security Index Programs.

(O) SECURITY INDEX - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES -- Your attention is directed to Section 87C, 7b(5)(e), which relates to the designation on the Security Index cards of the organizational affiliation or nationalistic tendency of the subjects concerned.


Under existing procedure the Security Index cards of those individuals identified with the Muslim Cult of Islam, the Johnson-Forest Group and the Socialist Union of America, have been tabbed for the "Miscellaneous" category. The Muslim Cult of Islam is, of course, identified as a radical Negro organization, while the latter two groups represent factions which have split from the Socialist Workers Party to become independent and autonomous Trotskyite groups.

In order to identify more readily the members of the above organizations in the Security Index without the necessity of reviewing all the "Miscellaneous" cases, Bureau procedure is being amended to require that the organization affiliation of members of the Muslim Cult of Islam, the Johnson-Forest Group and the Socialist Union of America be specifically noted on the Security Index cards as "MCI," "JFG" and "SUA," respectively.

Procedure is being further amended to delete from the list of organizations and nationalistic tendencies under the Manual of Instructions heading cited previously, herein, the reference to the Independent Labor League and Revolutionary Workers League. It is to

8/17/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-42

- 10 -



be noted that these groups are no longer active and if in the future any Security Index cards are predicated upon prior affiliation or activity in behalf of these organizations they will be tabbed as "Miscellaneous."

The interested offices affected by these changes will be furnished separately with lists of those individuals whose Security Index cards are currently tabbed "Miscellaneous." Upon receipt of these lists they should be reviewed against the individual case files and Form FD-122 submitted in each case in which changes are necessary as a result of the above amendments in procedure.

Appropriate changes in the Manual of Instructions will be forwarded to you in the near future.

(P) SECURITY INDEX (REFERENCE TO SECURITY INDEX DATA IN REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE) -- It has been observed that correspondence and reports relating to Security Index subjects frequently will be received at the Bureau which contain information concerning the subject which differs from that appearing on his existing Security Index card. This is particularly true in those instances where the reports reflect a change of title or where the correspondence and reports reflect current places of residence and employment other than those which appear on the subject's Security Index card. In such instances, it has been frequently necessary to request that the field office submit Form FD-122 reflecting the current information to amend the existing Security Index card. As you are aware, it is imperative that the information appearing on a Security Index card be current and accurate at all times. In the future, to insure that the data included on a Security Index card is up to date, you are instructed in each letter and report which contains data affecting a subject's Security Index card to indicate in the letter or on the administrative pages of the reports the following information: (1) that the subject is included in the Security Index; (2) that the data appearing on the Security Index card is current and accurate or that the Security Index card should be amended; (3) if a change on the Security Index card is necessary that Form FD-122 to reflect the current data has been submitted.



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
(Typed August 10, 1954)

66-24-275
ENCLOSURE

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

PERSONNEL UNIT

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: KEY FACILITIES
PLANT-INDUSTRIAL

Dear Sir:

Your attention is directed to paragraph 1 of SAC Letter 53-12 dated February 3, 1953, and SAC Letter 54-2 dated February 9, 1954, with which all of your offices were furnished appropriate State Department. Seventeenth Edition of the Department of Defense Key Geographical Key Facilities List designated KFL(17). You were advised at that time that the Department of Defense would, from time to time, issue amendments to reflect additions, deletions and other changes.

Due to the many changes the Department of Defense has prepared the eighteenth edition of the Key Facilities List which is dated August 10, 1954, and referred to as KFL(18). You will note that in this list in which a change has occurred has been indicated by a mark; however, many of the changes recorded in the new KFL(18) will have no effect upon the operations of the Bureau.

The bottom of each page of this new edition of the KFL is marked "original." You will note that on the extreme right of each page marked "original" the appearance of the letter "a" in this column indicates a change in the line opposite that letter. If the addition of a facility was indicated, the line will appear only opposite the line marked "a" and the symbol will appear opposite each line pertaining to the facility such as the name, address and reference number. In such latter case the letter "a" will appear three or four times with respect to the one facility. If a facility was


deleted the geographical reference number will appear in the KFL(H) with the word "deleted" followed by the letter "h." In such cases it will be necessary to refer to the KFL(C) now in your possession to determine the name of that facility. In such instances a notation should be made in your file covering this facility that the facility involved was deleted from the Key Facilities list by KFL(H).

It will also be noted that in a few instances the geographical reference number has been changed. This has occurred in those instances in which the facility was originally listed in your city or town and later determined to be located in another city or town. Due to its change in locality and its subsequent change of position in the Key Facilities List, the Department of Defense has assigned a different geographical reference number. All such changes are appropriately marked in the KFL(H). Any changes in the enclosed KFL(H) which will affect the data appearing on Security Index cards of subjects employed in Key Facilities must be carefully checked through your Security Index and corrected forms FD-122 submitted to the Bureau in accordance with the instructions contained in Paragraph 4 of SAC Letter 53-12.

Each office with the exception of the Anchorage, Honolulu and San Juan Offices is being furnished appropriate State Sections and forewords of the KFL(H) with this SAC Letter. Those offices covering only portions of a state will receive complete State Sections. KFL(G) furnished you with SAC Letter 54-1 should be destroyed when it is no longer needed to assist you in making the necessary corrections and adjustments in connection with the Plant Informant and Security Index Programs.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

(Typed August 11, 1954)

FD-206 (Rev. 1-27-53)

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INDEX - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Dear Sir:

Your attention is directed to Bureau Circular 71(5) (7), which relates to the designation on the Security Index cards of the organizational affiliation or individual title of the subjects concerned.

Under existing procedure the listing of the names of those individuals identified with the Muslim Cult of Islam, the Johnson-Forest Group and the Socialist Union of America have been rabbed for the "Miscellaneous" category. The Muslim Cult of Islam is, of course, a political and religious Negro organization, while the latter two groups represent factions which have split from the Socialist Union of America to become independent and autonomous organizations.

In order to identify more readily the members of the above organizations in the Security Index, and in view of the necessity of reviewing all the "Miscellaneous" cards, Bureau procedure is being amended to require that the organizational affiliation of members of the Muslim Cult of Islam, the Johnson-Forest Group and the Socialist Union of America be specifically noted on the Security Index card as "MCI," "JFG" and "SUA," respectively.

Procedure is being further amended to delete from the list of organizations and faction titles the names of


the Manual of Instructions heading cited previously, herein, the reference to the Independent Labor League and Revolutionary Workers League. It is to be noted that these groups are no longer active and if in the future any Security Index cards are predicated upon prior affiliation or activity in behalf of these organizations they will be tabbed as "Miscellaneous."

The interested offices affected by these changes will be furnished separately with lists of those individuals whose Security Index cards are currently tabbed "Miscellaneous." Upon receipt of these lists they should be reviewed against the individual case files and Form FD-122 submitted in each case in which changes are necessary as a result of the above amendments in procedure.

Appropriate changes in the Manual of Instructions will be forwarded to you in the near future.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
(Type in full name of office)

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____


66-04-3075 (P)
(ENCLOSURE)

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INDEX
(Security Index and Confidentiality Index)
IN REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE

Dear Sir:

It has been observed that certain reports, particularly those dealing with Security Index cards, are being prepared at the Bureau which contain information which differs from that in reports prepared by the field office. This is particularly true in those cases where reports reflect a change of title or position of an individual and reports reflect a change of address of an individual other than those which have been on the Security Index card. In such instances, it has been requested that the field office submit a report to the Bureau containing the current information to ensure that the Security Index card is up to date. It is imperative that the Security Index card be current and accurate at all times. In the future, to insure that the Security Index card is up to date, you are instructed to submit a report which contains the following information: (1) The name of the individual; (2) The title or position of the individual; (3) The address of the individual; (4) The date of the report; (5) The name of the reporting officer. The report should be submitted to the Bureau as soon as possible after the change of information has been observed.



(M) KEY FACILITIES LIST - PLANT INFORMANTS -- SECURITY INDEX - AN
JUSTMENT TO KEY FACILITIES LIST -- Refer to SAC Letter 54-42 which
furnished all continental offices with appropriate state sections
the Eighth Edition of the Department of Defense Master Geographical

11/16/54

SAC LETTER NO. 54-65

- 8 -

Key Facilities List designated as KFL (H). Refer also to Paragraph M of SAC Letter 53-12 contained instructions as to the handling of the KFL in your office and to Paragraph N of the same SAC Letter containing instructions as to the adjustments to be made in the Security Index necessitated by changes in the KFL.

The Department of Defense has now prepared Change No. 1 dated November 1, 1954, to the KFL (H). Each line in which a change has occurred has been appropriately marked; however, many of the changes will have no effect upon the operations of the Bureau.

Each change in the KFL (H) has been marked with the symbol "H1" in the column headed "CH NO" and the bottoms of such pages are marked "Change No. 1." If only one side of a page has been affected by changes, that side of the page will be marked "Change No. 1" and the other side will be marked "Original." The letter "H" appearing in the column headed "CH NO" indicates a change made in the KFL (G) which was corrected when KFL (H) was issued. In other words, the only items in the attached Change No. 1 which change or alter the information in the KFL (H), now in your possession, are marked with the symbol "H1."

Any changes in the enclosed Change No. 1 to KFL (H) affecting the Plant Informant Program in your office must be handled in accordance with Paragraph M of SAC Letter 53-12.

Any changes in Change No. 1 which will affect the data appearing on Security Index cards of subjects employed in key facilities must be carefully checked through your Security Index and corrected Forms FD-122 submitted to the Bureau in accordance with Paragraph N of SAC Letter 53-12.

In order that all continental offices will have up-to-date data pertaining to the KFL (H), all such offices are being furnished with this SAC Letter a copy of the "Letter of Promulgation to Holders of the Department of Defense Key Facilities List" dated November 1, 1954, which refers to Change No. 1. All continental offices, with the exception of the Albuquerque, Butte, Charlotte, Denver, Little Rock, Miami, Norfolk, Oklahoma City, Phoenix, Portland, Richmond, Salt Lake City, and Washington Field Offices, are being furnished with this SAC Letter Change No. 1 to appropriate state sections. No changes have been received affecting the facilities within the territories of the thirteen offices named.

11/16/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-65

The pages in the KFL (H) which have been replaced by Change No. 1 should be destroyed when they are no longer needed to assist you in making the necessary corrections and adjustments in connection with the Plant Informant and Security Index Programs.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Attachments for (B), (H) & (M)

11/16/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-65

- 10 -



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(M)
66-54-2132
ENC

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

(Typed November 4, 1954)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: KEY FACILITIES LIST
PLANT INFORMATION
SECURITY INDEX - ADJUSTMENT
TO KEY FACILITIES LIST

Dear Sir:

Refer to SAC Letter 54-42 which furnished all continental offices with appropriate state sections of the Eighth Edition of the Department of Defense Master Geographical Key Facilities List designated as KFL (H). Refer also to Paragraph N of SAC Letter 53-12 containing instructions as to the handling of the KFL in your office and to Paragraph N of the same SAC Letter containing instructions as to the adjustments to be made in the Security Index necessitated by changes in the KFL.

The Department of Defense has now prepared Change No. 1 dated November 1, 1954, to the KFL (H). Each line in which a change has occurred has been appropriately marked; however, many of the changes will have no effect upon the operations of the Bureau.

Each change in the KFL (H) has been marked with the symbol "H1" in the column headed "CH NO" and the bottoms of such pages are marked "Change No. 1." If only one side of a page has been affected by changes, that side of the page will be marked "Change No. 1" and the other side will be marked "Original." The letter "H" appearing in the column headed "CH NO" indicates a change made in the KFL (G) which was corrected when KFL (H) was issued. In other words, the only items in the attached Change No. 1 which change or alter the information in the KFL (H), now in your possession, are marked with the symbol "H1."

Attachment

*Sent to all SACs,
Rem. off a days.*

Any changes in the enclosed Change No. 1 to KFL (H) affecting the Plant Informant Program in your office must be handled in accordance with Paragraph M of SAC Letter 53-12.


Any changes in Change No. 1 which will effect the data appearing on Security Index cards of subjects employed in key facilities must be carefully checked through your Security Index and corrected Forms FD-122 submitted to the Bureau in accordance with Paragraph M of SAC Letter 53-12.

In order that all continental offices will have up-to-date data pertaining to the KFL (H), all such offices are being furnished with this SAC Letter a copy of the "Letter of Promulgation to Holders of the Department of Defense Key Facilities List" dated November 1, 1954, which refers to Change No. 1. All continental offices, with the exception of the Albuquerque, Butte, Charlotte, Denver, Little Rock, Miami, Norfolk, Oklahoma City, Phoenix, Portland, Richmond, Salt Lake City, and Washington Field Offices, are being furnished with this SAC Letter Change No. 1 to appropriate state sections. No changes have been received affecting the facilities within the territories of the thirteen offices named.

The pages in the KFL (H) which have been replaced by Change No. 1 should be destroyed when they are no longer needed to assist you in making the necessary corrections and adjustments in connection with the Plant Informant and Security Index Programs.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.


PERSONAL ATTENTION
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~
SAC LETTER NO. 54-70
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 14, 1954 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(B) INSPECTIONS - DELINQUENCIES FOUND DURING -- In line with the Bureau's desire to assist you in improving operations of your office, there are being listed below for your guidance certain delinquencies noted frequently during recent inspections. Should you find similar delinquencies in your office, you should take prompt action to correct them.

12. Failure to have the residences and employments of all Security Index subjects.



(K) ~~SECURITY INDEX~~ COMSAB TABBING -- The Comsab classification has been set up within the priority apprehension program for the purpose of providing ready identification of those Security Index subjects who, because of special training, employment or past acts of violence, possess the potential of saboteurs in the event of a national emergency. The fact that the Security Index card for a subject has been tabbed Comsab is one of the reasons the subject is also tabbed Detcom to indicate the subject should be apprehended prior to other Security Index subjects whose cards are not so tabbed. As the number of Security Index subjects has increased there has been a corresponding increase in the number of subjects designated for priority of apprehension.

Under present instructions in Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions, one of the reasons for the Comsab tabbing is when a Security Index subject is a veteran of the military services of any country and particularly the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Henceforth, you should continue to tab for Comsab all veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Veterans of the military services of any country are no longer to be tabbed Comsab based on military service alone.

However, you should be certain all subjects of Security Index cards are considered under the Comsab program when the investigations have developed information concerning specific previous training or violent tendencies indicating the subjects possess the potential to be saboteurs. In that connection each case must be considered on the facts developed in the particular case.

The above amends the instruction relating to the basis for considering a subject under the Comsab program because of military service. There are no changes in the other reasons for considering the Comsab classification as outlined in the Manual of Instructions.

In order to adjust the Security Index cards tabbed Comsab in your office in accordance with the above instructions it will be necessary to review each case so tabbed in order to delete the tabbing when based on military service alone. Form FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau to delete any change necessary. Offices with a relatively small number of Security Index cards tabbed Comsab should review each case file for such subjects at this time. Offices with a large number of cards so tabbed may desire to review the case files at the time the residence addresses and places of employment are verified during the next six months. As soon as the reviews have been

12/14/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-70

completed you should advise the Bureau by a memorandum captioned as above indicating the appropriate adjustments have been made. In any event all offices must complete the review and advise the Bureau by June 15, 1955.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover


Director

Attachments for (E), (F), & (G)

12/14/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-70

- 10 -





IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
(typed December 3, 1954)

66-04-2148
(ENCL.)
B

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents In Charge:

Re: INSPECTIONS - DELINQUENCIES
FOUND DURING


Dear Sir:

In line with the Bureau's desire to assist you in improving operations of your office, there are being listed below for your guidance certain delinquencies noted frequently during recent inspections. Should you find similar delinquencies in your office, you should take prompt action to correct them.

66-11-211
100-11

12. Failure to have the residences and employments of all
Security Index subjects.





IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

(Typed December 8, 1954)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INDEX
COMSAB TABBING

Dear Sir:

The Comsab classification has been set up within the priority apprehension program for the purpose of providing ready identification of those Security Index subjects who, because of special training, employment or past acts of violence, possess the potential of saboteurs in the event of a national emergency. The fact that the Security Index card for a subject has been tabbed Comsab is one of the reasons the subject is also tabbed Detcom to indicate the subject should be apprehended prior to other Security Index subjects whose cards are not so tabbed. As the number of Security Index subjects has increased there has been a corresponding increase in the number of subjects designated for priority of apprehension.

Under present instructions in Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions, one of the reasons for the Comsab tabbing is when a Security Index subject is a veteran of the military services of any country and particularly the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Henceforth, you should continue to tab for Comsab all veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Veterans of the military services of any country are no longer to be tabbed Comsab based on military service alone.

However, you should be certain all subjects of Security Index cards are considered under the Comsab program when the investigations have developed information concerning


*Sent to
SAC's
Bureau of Investigation
12/13/54
JL*

specific previous training or violent tendencies indicating the subjects possess the potential to be saboteurs. In that connection each case must be considered on the facts developed in the particular case.

The above amends the instruction relating to the basis for considering a subject under the Comsab program because of military service. There are no changes in the other reasons for considering the Comsab classification as outlined in the Manual of Instructions.

In order to adjust the Security Index cards tabbed Comsab in your office in accordance with the above instructions it will be necessary to review each case so tabbed in order to delete the tabbings when based on military service alone. Form FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau to delete any change necessary. Offices with a relatively small number of Security Index cards tabbed Comsab should review each case file for such subjects at this time. Offices with a large number of cards so tabbed may desire to review the case files at the time the residence addresses and places of employment are verified during the next six months. As soon as the reviews have been completed you should advise the Bureau by a memorandum captioned as above indicating the appropriate adjustments have been made. In any event all offices must complete the review and advise the Bureau by June 15, 1955.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

February 2, 1955

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
SAC LEL. R. NO. 55-8

62-24-2160

(A) SECURITY INDEX -- Due to the present grave and tense international situation I am deeply concerned over our Security Index Program which in time of national emergency represents the Nation's most powerful weapon in combating espionage, sabotage and insurrection by preventing dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals from remaining at liberty.

I want you to know that the Attorney General has advised me that he does not have the funds or manpower to review the Security Index cases but that in an emergency he will direct that all persons whose names are then included in the Security Index be promptly apprehended. Therefore, the Bureau for all intents and purposes is responsible for the listing of all names included in the Security Index and for the arrests which will follow at the time of an emergency. We must be certain at all times that the listing of every name in the Security Index is supported and justified by sufficient information concerning subversive activities or revolutionary tendencies developed during thorough investigations to establish grounds for detention in the event of a national crisis.

The failure to have the names of all dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals in the Security Index at the time of an emergency means we have not fulfilled our responsibilities in the security field and we will not be in a position to prevent sabotage, espionage, sedition, insurrection and strikes or slowdowns directed by subversive elements. On the other hand it is essential that only dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals are listed for apprehension in an emergency.


In that connection I want to emphasize to you again the absolute necessity for bringing all pending security cases to a logical conclusion where investigation remains to be conducted before a determination can be made regarding inclusion in the Security Index.

In view of the importance of this matter I am holding each Special Agent in Charge personally responsible for each Security Index listing in his office to be certain that each listing is based on sound grounds.

RECORDED-91

The following instructions shall be placed into effect immediately:

INDEXED-91



6 FEB - 8 1955

1. Each Special Agent in Charge shall personally recommend the inclusion of each name for the Security Index and the removal of any name from the Security Index, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instances the recommendations must be made personally by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor.

2. An immediate review of the case file on each individual whose name is presently included in the Security Index shall be made at this time. Although the recommendations for inclusion of the names that are in the Security Index at this time have emanated from your office in most instances and under present requirements these cases are reviewed in connection with the preparation of annual supplemental investigative reports during which reviews you have been specifically instructed to evaluate each case to be certain the Security Index card is warranted, I am initiating this comprehensive review at this time to make absolutely certain that all factors in every case have been thoroughly considered by you to determine if the cases remain sound.

Each Special Agent in Charge shall personally approve or disapprove the retention of the names of all subjects in the Security Index at this time, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instances the approvals or disapprovals must be made personally by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor. The approval or disapproval shall be submitted to the Bureau in an individual memorandum for each Security Index case. Each memorandum shall be submitted under the title of the individual case and shall reference this SAC Letter. Each memorandum must set forth the reasons why the subject should be retained in or removed from the Security Index in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of your decision.

The reviews must be completed within 60 days from the receipt of this communication by all offices having less than 1,000 Security Index cases. All the remaining offices must complete the reviews within 90 days from the receipt of this letter with the exception of the New York Office where the reviews must be completed within 6 months.

For your information the following offices have more than 1,000 names on the Security Index at this time: Chicago, Detroit,

2/2/55


SAC LETTER NO. 55-8

- 2 -

66-04-2160

Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia and San Francisco. In connection with the above instructions both as to adding names to or deleting names from the Security Index and the review of all Security Index cases the Bureau is making the exception in offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects because of the volume of work in those offices. The Bureau instructs that the reviews and recommendations in these matters in such offices be shared proportionately by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge and Bureau-approved Security Supervisor.

Each Special Agent in Charge must keep an accurate record of the progress of the reviews. An airtel must be submitted to the Bureau each Friday after the receipt of this communication until the project is completed setting forth: (1) the total number of cases to be reviewed during this project and (2) the number of cases in which the required data has been forwarded to the Bureau. Each airtel is to be captioned "Security Index Review."



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

(Typed January 31, 1955)

66-04-5110

ENC

Sec.

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

Due to the present grave and tense international situation I am deeply concerned over our Security Index Program which in time of national emergency represents the Nation's most powerful weapon in combating espionage, sabotage and insurrection by preventing dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals from remaining at liberty.

I want you to know that the Attorney General has advised me that he does not have the funds or manpower to review the Security Index cases but that in an emergency he will direct that all persons whose names are then included in the Security Index be promptly apprehended. Therefore, the Bureau for all intents and purposes is responsible for the listing of all names included in the Security Index and for the arrests which will follow at the time of an emergency. We must be certain at all times that the listing of every name in the Security Index is supported and justified by sufficient information concerning subversive activities or revolutionary tendencies developed during thorough investigations to establish grounds for detention in the event of a national crisis.

The failure to have the names of all dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals in the Security Index at the time of an emergency means we have not fulfilled our responsibilities in the security field and we will not be in a position to prevent sabotage, espionage, sedition, insurrection and strikes or slowdowns directed by subversive elements. On the other hand it is essential that only

*Sent to all Sacs,
Bureau & Super.*

*2-2-55
CPS*

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dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals are listed for apprehension in an emergency.

In that connection I want to emphasize to you again the absolute necessity for bringing all pending security cases to a logical conclusion where investigation remains to be conducted before a determination can be made regarding inclusion in the Security Index.

In view of the importance of this matter I am holding each Special Agent in Charge personally responsible for each Security Index listing in his office to be certain that each listing is based on sound grounds.

The following instructions shall be placed into effect immediately:

1. Each Special Agent in Charge shall personally recommend the inclusion of each name for the Security Index and the removal of any name from the Security Index, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instances the recommendations must be made personally by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor.

2. An immediate review of the case file on each individual whose name is presently included in the Security Index shall be made at this time. Although the recommendations for inclusion of the names that are in the Security Index at this time have emanated from your office in most instances and under present requirements these cases are reviewed in connection with the preparation of annual supplemental investigative reports during which reviews you have been specifically instructed to evaluate each case to be certain the Security Index card is warranted, I am initiating this comprehensive review at this time to make absolutely certain that all factors in every case have been thoroughly considered by you to determine if the cases remain sound.

Each Special Agent in Charge shall personally approve or disapprove the retention of the names of all subjects in the Security Index at this time, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instances the approvals or disapprovals must be made personally by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant

Special Agent in Charge or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor. The approval or disapproval shall be submitted to the Bureau in an individual memorandum for each Security Index case. Each memorandum shall be submitted under the title of the individual case and shall reference this SAC Letter. Each memorandum must set forth the reasons why the subject should be retained in or removed from the Security Index in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of your decision.


The reviews must be completed within 60 days from the receipt of this communication by all offices having less than 1,000 Security Index cases. All the remaining offices must complete the reviews within 90 days from the receipt of this letter with the exception of the New York Office where the reviews must be completed within 6 months.

For your information the following offices have more than 1,000 names on the Security Index at this time: Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia and San Francisco. In connection with the above instructions both as to adding names to or deleting names from the Security Index and the review of all Security Index cases the Bureau is making the exception in offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects because of the volume of work in those offices. The Bureau instructs that the reviews and recommendations in these matters in such offices be shared proportionately by the Special Agent in Charge, Assistant Special Agent in Charge and Bureau-approved Security Supervisor.

Each Special Agent in Charge must keep an accurate record of the progress of the reviews. An airtel must be submitted to the Bureau each Friday after the receipt of this communication until the project is completed setting forth: (1) the total number of cases to be reviewed during this project and (2) the number of cases in which the required data has been forwarded to the Bureau. Each airtel is to be captioned "Security Index Review."

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STF - ~~PLY - CONFIDENTIAL~~
SAC - ~~FILE NO. 55-12~~

65-04-2168

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

February 10, 1955 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) SECURITY INDEX -- In view of recent developments in the international situation it has become necessary to re-evaluate the priority of arrest features of our Security Index Program. At the present time subjects who will be considered for priority of arrest at the time of an emergency are tabbed Detcom and the Detcom classification includes subjects who are tabbed Comsab.

Henceforth, it is planned that the individuals in the Security Index tabbed Detcom will be arrested first in the event of a limited but grave emergency. It is not anticipated at this time that the other subjects in the Security Index will be arrested under such a situation. (In the event of an all-out emergency all subjects whose names are included in the Security Index will be considered for immediate apprehension.)

In order that the most dangerous persons will be apprehended during a limited but grave emergency, there are set forth below the new standards to be used in deciding who should be listed for priority of apprehension and Detcom tabbing.

1. The Comsab tabbing is to be discontinued.
2. Each Security Index subject should be considered for Detcom tabbing (priority of arrest) who falls within one or more of the following categories:


a. All Top Functionaries and Key Figures.

b. Currently active Communists (active within the past year) or members of any basic revolutionary organization when there is evidence of one or more of the following:

- (1) Activity as local organizers or leaders in the organization.
- (2) Special training at the Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow.
- (3) Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men or active participation in violent strikes, riots or demonstrations.
- (4) Violent statements or strong revolutionary tendencies as shown by their activities.

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INDEXED-27



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- c. Persons active in the Communist Party underground.
- d. Any other Security Index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict the individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent or disruptionist in the event of an emergency.

Subjects who will be tabbed Detcom should comprise a hardcore of subversives. Each individual case should stand on its own and the decision to consider a subject for priority of apprehension should be based on the subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies. Employment in a key or vital facility will no longer be a reason alone for Detcom tabbing.

In evaluating each Security Index case it will be necessary to review each case file. This should be done in connection with the review of all Security Index cases in accordance with the instructions in SAC Letter Number 55-8 dated February 2, 1955. In submitting your personal recommendation for retaining a subject in the Security Index you should also submit your recommendation regarding the Detcom tabbing as indicated above along with your reasons why the subject meets the new Detcom standards in sufficient detail to justify your recommendation. If a subject is tabbed Detcom and Comsab at this time and you are not recommending the Detcom tabbing in accordance with the above instructions you should submit a Form FD-122 attached to your Security Index recommendation in order to delete the Detcom and Comsab tabbings. If you are recommending the Detcom tabbing in accordance with the above instructions and the subject is already tabbed Detcom, you should so advise the Bureau and Form FD-122 need not be submitted. In instances in which you are recommending the Detcom tabbing and the subject is already tabbed Detcom and Comsab you should attach a Form FD-122 in order that the Comsab tabbing can be deleted. Of course, if the subject is not already tabbed Detcom and you are recommending such tabbing under the new instructions, you should attach a Form FD-122 to your Security Index recommendation in order that the Detcom tabbing can be added to the Security Index card.

There will be instances in which you have already submitted your recommendations that a Security Index subject should be retained in the Security Index. In these instances it will be necessary for you to recheck the individual case files to determine whether a Detcom tabbing is necessary and to advise the Bureau in accordance

with the above instructions.

In order that the Security Index cards for the subjects who are to be tabbed Detcom for priority of apprehension, as indicated above, will be readily available for emergency action in your office you should be guided by the following instructions regarding the arrangement of your Security Index.

1. Each Security Index case should be considered for Detcom tabbing whether the subject's Security Index card is filed in the Geographical, Special or Unavailable Sections of your Security Index. However, there is no change being made in the instructions regarding the Security Index cards which are to be filed in those three sections.

2. The Geographical Section of your Security Index should be divided into two distinct parts. Part I of the Geographical Section shall include only the Security Index cards for subjects who are tabbed Detcom under the new instructions set out above. Part II of the Geographical Section will contain the Security Index cards for all subjects that are not tabbed Detcom.

3. In offices having a Geographical breakdown by residence and by employment it will be necessary to have two breakdowns for each of those categories in order that the cards tabbed Detcom will be separated and maintained apart from the cards not so tabbed.

4. You should continue to file one Security Index card for each subject in the Alphabetical Section in strict alphabetical order with no other breakdown whatsoever. To assist you in readily identifying Security Index cards in the Alphabetical Section that will be tabbed Detcom under the new instructions a colored metal tab shall be fastened to each such card.

For your information, in the future as Detcom tabblings are approved the Security Index cards forwarded to you will not only carry the code letters DC in the first line on the cards but each such card will be stamped Detcom in large red letters. This procedure will assist you in being absolutely certain that cards tabbed Detcom are properly filed.

2/10/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12

The Detcom tabbing of a Security Index subject should be afforded your personal consideration and you should submit your personal recommendations for such tabbing during this review and in the future. In handling this matter in connection with your review of all Security Index cases you should meet the deadlines as set forth in SAC Letter 55-3 dated February 2, 1955. Security Index cards presently tabbed Detcom should not be placed in the new Detcom portion of the Geographical Section of your Security Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations. There should be no changes made regarding the present Detcom tabbings in your Security Index until the Bureau has approved your recommendations under the new procedure. In this manner the entire Security Index will be reviewed and reconsideration given to Detcom tabbings by the periods indicated in SAC Letter Number 55-8.

In view of the new and separate breakdown in the Geographical Section of your Security Index for Detcom subjects it will no longer be necessary to place a separate tab on such cards as you have done in the past.


Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

2/10/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-12

- 4 -





IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
(Typed February 9, 1955)

55-04-1-57
C. C.
Sec. R

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

In view of recent developments in the international situation it has become necessary to re-evaluate the priority of arrest features of our Security Index Program. At the present time subjects who will be considered for priority of arrest at the time of an emergency are tabbed Detcom and the Detcom classification includes subjects who are tabbed Comsab.

Henceforth, it is planned that the individuals in the Security Index tabbed Detcom will be arrested first in the event of a limited but grave emergency. It is not anticipated at this time that the other subjects in the Security Index will be arrested under such a situation. (In the event of an all-out emergency all subjects whose names are included in the Security Index will be considered for immediate apprehension.)

In order that the most dangerous persons will be apprehended during a limited but grave emergency, there ARE set forth below the new standards to be used in deciding who should be listed for priority of apprehension and Detcom tabbing.

1. The Comsab tabbing is to be discontinued.
2. Each Security Index subject should be considered for Detcom tabbing (priority of arrest) who falls within one or more of the following categories:
 - a. All Top Functionaries and Key Figures.

b. Currently active Communists (active within the past year) or members of any basic revolutionary organization when there is evidence of one or more of the following:

- (1) Activity as local organizers or leaders in the organization.
- (2) Special training at the Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow.
- (3) Experience as picket captains, strong-arm men or active participation in violent strikes, riots or demonstrations.
- (4) Violent statements or strong revolutionary tendencies as shown by their activities.

c. Persons active in the Communist Party underground.

d. Any other Security Index subject whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary organization, clearly and unmistakably depict the individual as a potential saboteur, espionage agent or disruptionist in the event of an emergency.

Subjects who will be tabbed Detcom should comprise a hard-core of subversives. Each individual case should stand on its own and the decision to consider a subject for priority of apprehension should be based on the subject's subversive activities and revolutionary tendencies. Employment in a key or vital facility will no longer be a reason alone for Detcom tabbing.

In evaluating each Security Index case it will be necessary to review each case file. This should be done in connection with the review of all Security Index cases in accordance with the instructions in SAC Letter Number 55-8 dated February 2, 1955. In submitting your personal recommendation for retaining a subject in the Security Index you should also submit your recommendation regarding the Detcom tabbing as indicated above along with your reasons why the subject meets the new Detcom standards in sufficient detail to justify your recommendation. If a subject is tabbed Detcom and Comsab at this time and you are not recommending the Detcom tabbing in accordance with the above instructions you should

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submit a Form FD-122 attached to your Security Index recommendation in order to delete the Detcom and Comsab tabbings. If you are recommending the Detcom tabbing in accordance with the above instructions and the subject is already tabbed Detcom, you should so advise the Bureau and Form FD-122 need not be submitted. In instances in which you are recommending the Detcom tabbing and the subject is already tabbed Detcom and Comsab you should attach a Form FD-122 in order that the Comsab tabbing can be deleted. Of course, if the subject is not already tabbed Detcom and you are recommending such tabbing under the new instructions, you should attach a Form FD-122 to your Security Index recommendation in order that the Detcom tabbing can be added to the Security Index card.

There will be instances in which you have already submitted your recommendations that a Security Index subject should be retained in the Security Index. In those instances it will be necessary for you to recheck the individual case files to determine whether a Detcom tabbing is necessary and to advise the Bureau in accordance with the above instructions.

In order that the Security Index cards for the subjects who are to be tabbed Detcom for priority of apprehension, as indicated above, will be readily available for emergency action in your office you should be guided by the following instructions regarding the arrangement of your Security Index.

1. Each Security Index case should be considered for Detcom tabbing whether the subject's Security Index card is filed in the Geographical, Special or Unavailable Sections of your Security Index. However, there is no change being made in the instructions regarding the Security Index cards which are to be filed in those three sections.

2. The Geographical Section of your Security Index should be divided into two distinct parts. Part I of the Geographical Section shall include only the Security Index cards for subjects who are tabbed Detcom under the new instructions set out above. Part II of the Geographical Section will contain the Security Index cards for all subjects that are not tabbed Detcom.

3. In offices having a Geographical breakdown by residence and by employment it will be necessary to have two breakdowns for each of these categories in order that the cards tabbed Detcom will be separated and maintained apart from the cards not so tabbed.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SAC LETTER NO. 55-15


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

February 17, 1955 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) SECURITY INDEX -- In the future, at the time a Form FD-122 is submitted to the Bureau recommending the inclusion of a name in the Security Index, there must be attached to it an additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of the facts on which you have based your recommendation for including the name in the Security Index. These facts must be in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of your recommendation. Statements of conclusion are not enough and the sources from which the information came must be properly characterized as to reliability. The summary must also contain pertinent dates with respect to the activities of the subject.

In those instances when, at the conclusion of a security investigation, you are not recommending the inclusion of the subject's name in the Security Index, there shall be set forth on the administrative page of the closing report a brief summary statement which will reflect the reasons upon which you have based your decision.





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(Typed February 14, 1955) WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

In the future, at the time a Form ^{FD-}122 is submitted to the Bureau recommending the inclusion of a name in the Security Index, there must be attached to it an additional page or pages setting out a succinct summary of the facts on which you have based your recommendation for including the name in the Security Index. These facts must be in sufficient detail to clearly reflect the soundness of your recommendation. Statements of conclusion are not enough and the sources from which the information came must be properly characterized as to reliability. The summary must also contain pertinent dates with respect to the activities of the subject.

In those instances when, at the conclusion of a security investigation, you are not recommending the inclusion of the subject's name in the Security Index, there shall be set forth on the administrative page of the closing report a brief summary statement which will reflect the reasons upon which you have based your decision.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

ENCLOSURE

(O) SECURITY INDEX -- The Bureau has approved a suggestion made by a field employee that the descriptive data presently appearing on the back of Security Index cards (in geographical section of the Index) be placed instead on separate card which will be securely attached to the Security Index card by staples. When a revised Security Index card is received from the Bureau and no changes are necessary in the descriptive data, the separate card can be removed and attached to the back of the new Security Index card to be filed in the geographical section of the Index. This will eliminate the necessity for retyping the descriptive data each time the Security Index card is revised.

It is not desired that a project be undertaken to prepare separate cards for all Security Index cards. The change in procedure should be made at the time of the next revision in each card. As each card comes up for revision, the Security Index data appearing on the card being replaced should be carefully crossed out. The back of the card being replaced already contains the necessary descriptive data; therefore, if no change is required in it, the back of the card being replaced can serve as the separate card which is to be stapled to the new Security Index card. This will make it unnecessary to retype the descriptive data on another card.

Where a new Security Index card is received from the Bureau on a person not presently listed, or where a change is required in descriptive data on an existing card, the necessary descriptive data should be typed on a separate 5x8 card which will be attached by staples to the back of the Security Index card. For use in such instances, you should obtain from the Bureau an adequate supply of these cards on which have been printed the same descriptive items now appearing on the back of the Security Index card. The subject's photograph will, of course, be attached to the separate descriptive card.

It is intended that the separate card bearing the descriptive data continue to be filed with the copy of the Security Index card which is placed in the geographical section of the Index.

3/1/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-19

Appropriate manual changes will be made to reflect this new method of maintaining the descriptive data and photograph, but the procedure of using the replaced card as the separate card upon the inauguration of the new method will not be set out in the manual since eventually there will be no replaced Security Index cards useable in this manner.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

Attachment for (L)

3/1/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-19

- 11 -





IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

(Typed February 21, 1955)

66-04-2178

ENC

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Sec.
(P.)

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: Security Index

Dear Sir:

The Bureau has approved a suggestion made by a field employee that the descriptive data presently appearing on the back of Security Index cards (in geographical section of the Index) be placed instead on separate card which will be securely attached to the Security Index card by staples. When a revised Security Index card is received from the Bureau and no changes are necessary in the descriptive data, the separate card can be removed and attached to the back of the new Security Index card to be filed in the geographical section of the Index. This will eliminate the necessity for retyping the descriptive data each time the Security Index card is revised.

It is not desired that a project be undertaken to prepare separate cards for all Security Index cards. The change in procedure should be made at the time of the next revision in each card. As each card comes up for revision, the Security Index data appearing on the card being replaced should be carefully crossed out. The back of the card being replaced already contains the necessary descriptive data; therefore, if no change is required in it, the back of the card being replaced can serve as the separate card which is to be stapled to the new Security Index card. This will make it unnecessary to retype the descriptive data on another card.

Where a new Security Index card is received


W. H. Ladd

66-04-2178

from the Bureau on a person not presently listed, or where a change is required in descriptive data on an existing card, the necessary descriptive data should be typed on a separate 5x8 card which will be attached by staples to the back of the Security Index card. For use in such instances, you should obtain from the Bureau an adequate supply of these cards on which have been printed the same descriptive items now appearing on the back of the Security Index card. The subject's photograph will, of course, be attached to the separate descriptive card.

It is intended that the separate card bearing the descriptive data continue to be filed with the copy of the Security Index card which is placed in the geographical section of the Index. Appropriate manual changes will be made to reflect this new method of maintaining the descriptive data and photograph, but the procedure of using the replaced card as the separate card upon the inauguration of the new method will not be set out in the manual since eventually there will be no replaced Security Index cards usable in this manner.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

60-
PERSONAL ATTENTION
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~
SAC LETTER NO. 55-30
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

April 12, 1955

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RE: SECURITY INDEX

A. Review Project

As I pointed out in SAC Letter 55-8 of February 2, 1955, the Attorney General has advised me that he does not have the funds or manpower to review the Security Index cases. This means, of course, that the responsibility for the soundness of these cases rests entirely upon the FBI, placing us in the undesirable position of being both the investigator and prosecutor with respect to these subjects, most of whom are United States citizens. We must take every means at our disposal to insure that these cases are completely sound and that it is established beyond question that the subjects are potentially dangerous.

The general review of all Security Index cases in the field is being reinstituted, effective at once. This is not a continuation of the review initiated by the above SAC Letter. It is a complete restudy of each and every Security Index case in the light of newly-adopted criteria, set forth hereinafter. Be guided by these instructions:


1. Analyze thoroughly each Security Index case in your office in light of the new criteria, below.

2. Following analysis of each case, send a memorandum to the Bureau containing the following items and utilizing the following headings:

(a.) Under the heading "Reference," refer specifically to this communication.

(b.) Under the heading "Succinct Resume of Case," set out a clear concise picture of subject's activities. You must not attempt to incorporate by reference any data set out in a previous memorandum submitted in response to SAC Letter 55-8, above. The memoranda required herein must be entirely complete in themselves. I will not tolerate general statements or mere conclusions regarding the facts in these cases.

(c.) Under the heading "Recommendation," set out your recommendation in each case to either "Retain in Security Index" or "Remove from Security Index." Each recommendation must state specifically the basis for retaining subject in or removing subject from the Security Index. The specific activities bringing the subject within the revised



55 APR 15 1955

criteria and the fact that the information comes from reliable informants or sources must be shown.

(d.) Under the heading "Detcom Tabbing," set out these data:

(1) Present tabbing of subject.

(2) Whether or not subject has been approved for Detcom tabbing under the new criteria in SAC Letter 55-12 (A) of February 10, 1955, noting specifically whether or not Security Index cards have been received from the Bureau bearing the stamp "DETCOM" in large red letters.

(3) If not previously approved under the new criteria, set out your recommendation as to Detcom tabbing together with the specific basis for such recommendation.

Follow the procedure outlined in SAC Letter 55-12 (A), above, with regard to removal of Detcom and/or Comsab tabbings and designations for Detcom under the new standards.

3. Each SAC is being held personally responsible for each recommendation submitted. Each SAC must personally approve the recommendation submitted by his office with regard to Security Index status of each subject, excepting the larger offices under the conditions noted specifically in SAC Letter 55-8, above.

4. Submit an airtel captioned "Security Index Review" each Friday, beginning April 22, 1955, setting out (1) total number of cases to be reviewed, (2) number of cases in which data required herein have been forwarded to Bureau and (3) of the latter number, how many contain recommendations to remove subjects from the Security Index.

5. The reviews must be completed within 60 days from receipt of this communication by all offices with less than 1000 Security Index cases and within 90 days by the remaining offices excepting New York, which must complete the project within six months. All offices must start the review immediately.

4/12/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-30

6. I want you to discuss this matter fully with both Agent and Supervisory personnel and point out to them the vital necessity of studying the Security Index cases critically and objectively. Application of the new criteria to your cases will undoubtedly result in substantial reduction in the Security Index throughout the field.

7. Under the Security Index review project, each case must be analyzed as it stands. Do not request authority to interview or any other action of the Bureau in the memoranda submitted in the review project. Interviews already authorized should be conducted and the results considered under the review project, but they must not delay submission of recommendations regarding Security Index status by the deadline date.

B. Security Index Criteria

Effective at once, the addition to and retention of names in the Security Index shall be governed by the following criteria:

1. No name shall be added to or retained in the Security Index unless one or more of the following situations has been established through investigation:

(a.) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(b.) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(c.) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon

the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(d.) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the United States in time of emergency.

2. In evaluating interviews insofar as Security Index status is concerned you should be guided as follows:

(a.) Whenever a subject of a security investigation by a positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicates a continued adherence to the doctrines, aims or purposes of a revolutionary organization or a front organization, the positive statement shall be considered an overt act on the part of the subject in establishing continued adherence.

(b.) Other than as indicated above, interviews with Security Index subjects or potential Security Index subjects are not to be considered as factors requiring the placing or retaining of names of persons on the Security Index; for example, lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not to be regarded as such factors.

With regard to the new criteria, I want to make it exceedingly clear that item 1, (d), above, must be given strict interpretation. It is not to be construed as a "catchall" for cases not otherwise meeting Security Index standards, and there must be overwhelming evidence to support any Security Index case predicated upon the terms of item 1. (d). Further, during the Security Index review and on a continuing basis thereafter any recommendation for retention in or addition to the Security Index based upon item 1. (d) must note specifically those factors which bring the individual cases within its provisions.


Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

4/12/55

SAC LETTER NO. 55-30



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(Typed April 11, 1955)

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To All Special Agents in Charge

RE: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

A. Review Project

As I pointed out in SAC Letter 55-8 of February 2, 1955, the Attorney General has advised me that he does not have the funds or manpower to review the Security Index cases. This means, of course, that the responsibility for the soundness of these cases rests entirely upon the FBI, placing us in the undesirable position of being both the investigator and prosecutor with respect to these subjects, most of whom are United States citizens. We must take every means at our disposal to insure that these cases are completely sound and that it is established beyond question that the subjects are potentially dangerous.

The general review of all Security Index cases in the field is being reinstituted, effective at once. This is not a continuation of the review initiated by the above SAC Letter. It is a complete re-study of each and every Security Index case in the light of newly adopted criteria, set forth hereinafter. Be guided by these instructions:

1. Analyze thoroughly each Security Index case in your office in light of the new criteria, below.
2. Following analysis of each case, send a memorandum to the Bureau containing the following items and utilizing the following headings:
 - (a.) Under the heading "Reference," refer specifically to this communication.

See V to all Bureau off & Sup. & SAC's
4/17/55
WCE

44-3886-1001

(b.) Under the heading "Succinct Resume of Case," set out a clear concise picture of subject's activities. You must not attempt to incorporate by reference any data set out in a previous memorandum submitted in response to SAC Letter 55--8, above. The memoranda required herein must be entirely complete in themselves. I will not tolerate general statements or mere conclusions regarding the facts in these cases.

(c.) Under the heading "Recommendation," set out your recommendation in each case to either "Retain in Security Index" or "Remove from Security Index." Each recommendation must state specifically the basis for retaining subject in or removing subject from the Security Index. The specific activities bringing the subject within the revised criteria and the fact that the information comes from reliable informants or sources must be shown.

(d.) Under the heading "Detcom Tabbing," set out these data:

(1) Present tabbing of subject.

(2) Whether or not subject has been approved for Detcom tabbing under the new criteria in SAC Letter 55-12 (A) of February 10, 1955, noting specifically whether or not Security Index cards have been received from the Bureau bearing the stamp "DETCOM" in large red letters.

(3) If not previously approved under the new criteria, set out your recommendation as to Detcom tabbing together with the specific basis for such recommendation.

Follow the procedure outlined in SAC Letter 55-12 (A), above, with regard to removal of Detcom and/or Comsab tabbings and designations for Detcom under the new standards.

3. Each SAC is being held personally responsible for each recommendation submitted. Each SAC must personally approve the recommendation submitted by his office with regard to Security Index status of each subject, excepting the larger offices under the conditions noted specifically in SAC Letter 55-8, above.

4. Submit an airtel captioned "Security Index Review" each Friday, beginning April 22, 1955, setting out (1) total number of cases to be reviewed, (2) number of cases in which data required herein have been forwarded to Bureau and (3) the latter number, how many contain recommendations to remove subjects from the Security Index.

5. The reviews must be completed within 60 days from receipt of this communication by all offices with less than 1000 Security Index cases and within 90 days by the remaining offices excepting New York, which must complete the project within six months. All offices must start the review immediately.

6. I want you to discuss this matter fully with both Agent and Supervisory personnel and point out to them the vital necessity of studying the Security Index cases critically and objectively. Application of the new criteria to your cases will undoubtedly result in substantial reduction in the Security Index throughout the field.

7. Under the Security Index review project, each case must be analyzed as it stands. Do not request authority to inter or any other action of the Bureau in the memoranda submitted in the review project. Interviews already authorized should be conducted and the results considered under the review project, but they must not delay submission of recommendation regarding Security Index status by the deadline date.

B. Security Index Criteria

Effective at once, the addition to and retention of names in the Security Index shall be governed by the following criteria:

1. No name shall be added to or retained in the Security Index unless one or more of the following situations has been established through investigation:

(a.) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(b.) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organization within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(c.) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(d.) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the United States in time of emergency.

2. In evaluating interviews insofar as Security Index status is concerned you should be guided as follows:

(a.) Whenever a subject of a security investigation by a positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicates a continued adherence to the doctrines, aims or purposes of a revolutionary organization or a front organization, the positive statement shall be considered an overt act on the part of the subject in establishing continued adherence.

(b.) Other than as indicated above, interviews with Security Index subjects or potential Security Index subjects are not to be considered as factors requiring

the placing or retaining of names of persons on the Security Index; for example, lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not to be regarded as such factors.

With regard to the new criteria, I want to make it exceedingly clear that item 1. (d), above, must be given strict interpretation. It is not to be construed as a "catch-all" for cases not otherwise meeting Security Index standards, and there must be overwhelming evidence to support any Security Index case predicated upon the terms of item 1. (d). Further, during the Security Index review and on a continuing basis thereafter any recommendation for retention in or addition to the Security Index based upon item 1. (d) must note specifically those factors which bring the individual cases within its provisions.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

(O) ~~SECURITY INDEX~~ -- Refer to SAC Letter 55-30 of April 12, 1955. Application of the revised criteria will result in substantial reduction in Security Index cases. Some subjects will be removed from the Security Index even though there is no affirmative indication of defection from the Communist Party or other subversive groups. To allow for ready reference to such cases, the following procedure is to be followed:

1) When subjects are removed from the Security Index solely on the basis of application of the revised criteria, either during the Security Index review project or thereafter as cases

4/19/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-31

- 7 -

are reviewed in the field, retain the Security Index cards pertaining to such subjects previously filed in the alphabetical section.

2) Mark "CANCELLED" across the face of each such card.

3) File the cards together in the same manner as utilized for active Security Index cards, clearly labeling the box or other suitable repository: "CANCELLED SECURITY INDEX CARDS."

4) If the subject of any of these cancelled Security Index cards (a) is subsequently developed as a source (b) becomes an informant (c) otherwise indicates complete defection from subversive groups or (d) is redesignated for the Security Index under the revised criteria, remove and destroy the cancelled Security Index card.


Disposition of cancelled cards of subjects removed from the Security Index for other reasons is covered in the Manual of Instructions, 87C 7b (10) and remains unchanged.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

4/19/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-31



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

66-04-2223
ENC

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

April 13, 1955 (Typed)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

RE: SECURITY INDEX

(0.)

Dear Sir:

Refer to SAC Letter 55-30 of April 12, 1955.
Application of the revised criteria will result in substantial reduction in Security Index cases. Some subjects will be removed from the Security Index even though there is no affirmative indication of defection from the Communist Party or other subversive groups. To allow for ready reference to such cases, the following procedure is to be followed:

1) When subjects are removed from the Security Index solely on the basis of application of the revised criteria, either during the Security Index review project or thereafter as cases are reviewed in the field, retain the Security Index cards pertaining to such subjects previously filed in the alphabetical section.

2) Mark "CANCELLED" across the face of each such card.

3) File the cards together in the same manner as utilized for active Security Index cards, clearly labeling the box or other suitable repository: "CANCELLED SECURITY INDEX CARDS."

4) If the subject of any of these cancelled Security Index cards ~~is~~ (a) subsequently developed as a source (b) ~~is~~ becomes a informant (c) otherwise indicates complete defection from subversive groups or (d) is redesignated for the Security Index under the revised criteria, remove and destroy the cancelled Security Index card.

Disposition of cancelled cards of subjects removed from the Security Index for other reasons is covered in the Manual of Instructions, 87C 7b (10) and remains unchanged.

Very truly yours,

Sent to all SAs
Bus. by a Supv.
4-16-55

J. Edgar Hoover
Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
SAC LETTER NO. 55-33

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2718


UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

May 3, 1955

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



66-07
2218


(N) SECURITY INDEX -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 55-30 captioned as above dated April 12, 1955.

In connection with the Security Index review currently in progress, a number of offices have raised questions as to the weight to be given to membership and activities in the Labor Youth League over membership and activities in other Communist Party front organizations. It has been pointed out that the Labor Youth League is almost a basic revolutionary organization.

The Subversive Activities Control Board recently completed lengthy hearings in the case of the Labor Youth League and on February 15, 1955, issued an order that the Labor Youth League register as a Communist front organization under and pursuant to Section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.

Inasmuch as this organization has been held under the law as a Communist Party front organization, in considering a subject for the Security Index based on Activity or membership in the Labor Youth League, you should be guided by that portion of the instructions contained in SAC Letter 55-30 dealing with front organizations which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group.

5



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

(Typed April 25, 1955)

66-04-221
(ENCL.)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to SAC Letter 55-30 captioned as above dated April 12, 1955.

In connection with the Security Index review currently in progress, a number of offices have raised questions as to the weight to be given to membership and activities in the Labor Youth League over membership and activities in other Communist Party front organizations. It has been pointed out that the Labor Youth League is almost a basic revolutionary organization.

The Subversive Activities Control Board recently completed lengthy hearings in the case of the Labor Youth League and on February 15, 1955, issued an order that the Labor Youth League register as a Communist front organization under and pursuant to Section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.

Inasmuch as this organization has been held under the law as a Communist Party front organization, in considering a subject for the Security Index based on Activity or membership in the Labor Youth League, you should be guided by that portion of the instructions contained in SAC Letter 55-30 dealing with front organizations which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-221
ENCLOSURE



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

65-17-1007


PERS A ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
SAC LETTER NO. 55-55

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

May 17, 1955 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(N) SECURITY INDEX -- Refer to SAC Letter 55-31 (O) of April 19, 1955, regarding retention of cancelled Security Index cards. The procedure outlined therein is hereby amended to provide for retention of the cards previously filed in the Geographical, Special or Unavailable Sections of the Security Index. This will permit recourse to the data on the reverse sides of these cards for assistance in security investigations. The cards previously filed in the Alphabetical Section will be destroyed. Further, those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards under provisions of Manual of Instructions, Sec. 87C, 7b.(6)(b) I., page 30c, should, of course, retain but one card in each instance, destroying the second geographical card as well as the card previously filed in the Alphabetical Section. The cancelled cards retained under this procedure should be filed alphabetically. It will not be necessary to affix descriptive data to reverse sides of cancelled alphabetical cards filed under terms of referenced SAC Letter prior to receipt of this communication. It is imperative that the word "CANCELLED" be marked clearly on the face of each of the cards retained under this procedure.

P If the results of the inquiry fail to produce any positive indication that the contact offers any potential as an informant or double agent and the available information does not justify recommending him for the Security Index, the results of the inquiry are to be submitted in a closing report with appropriate comments on the administrative page as to why no interview or designation for the Security Index is being recommended. (C)



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington 25, D. C.

(Typed May 5, 1955)

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL


Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

Refer to SAC Letter 55-31 (0) of April 19, 1955, regarding retention of cancelled Security Index cards. The procedure outlined therein is hereby amended to provide for retention of the cards previously filed in the Geographical, Special or Unavailable Sections of the Security Index. This will permit recourse to the data on the reverse sides of these cards for assistance in security investigations. The cards previously filed in the Alphabetical Section will be destroyed. Further, those offices maintaining two sets of geographical cards under provisions of Manual of Instructions, 7b.(6) (b) I., page 30c, should, of course, retain but one card in each instance, destroying the second geographical card as well as the card previously filed in the Alphabetical Section. The cancelled cards retained under this procedure should be filed alphabetically. It will not be necessary to affix descriptive data to reverse sides of cancelled alphabetical cards filed under terms of referenced SAC Letter prior to receipt of this communication. It is imperative that the word "CANCELLED" be marked clearly on the face of each of the cards retained under this procedure.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

Sent to all SACs,
Bu. app. & supp.
5-7-55
Q32

ENCLOSURE

If the results of the inquiry fail to produce any positive indication that the contact offers any potential as an informant or double agent and the available information does not justify recommending him for the Security Index, the results of the inquiry are to be submitted in a closing report with appropriate comments on the administrative page as to why no interview or designation for the Security Index is being recommended.

ENC



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 8, 1957

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LETTER NO. 37-57

62-4-2681



66-07-268
(D) ~~SECURITY INDEX~~ RE-EVALUATION OF CASES -- Re SAC Letter
55-76 (O).

I want to again impress upon you the absolute necessity for a critical analysis of all Security Index cases to insure that the cases remaining in your Security Index are fully justified under the criteria for such inclusion.

Effective immediately, in addition to setting forth a statement to the effect that the case on a Security Index subject has been re-evaluated in the light of the Security Index criteria and that the case still fits those criteria, when submitting annual reports in these cases, you should also include a brief resume setting forth the basis for your recommendation.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

10/8/57
SAC LETTER NO. 57-57

- 2 -





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Typed October 3, 1957)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INDEX
RE-EVALUATION OF CASES

Dear Sir:

Re SAC Letter 55-76 (O), dated December 13,
1955.

I want to again impress upon you the absolute necessity for a critical analysis of all Security Index cases to insure that the cases remaining in your Security Index are fully justified under the criteria for such inclusion.

Effective immediately, in addition to setting forth a statement to the effect that the case on a Security Index subject has been re-evaluated in the light of the Security Index criteria and that the case still fits those criteria, when submitting annual reports in these cases, you should also include a brief resume setting forth the basis for your recommendation.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

(F) ~~SECURITY INDEX - CUBA~~ -- The possibility of a break in relations between the United States and Cuba or a limited emergency growing out of the Cuban situation requires that we plan now to meet any responsibilities arising from such an eventuality.

The Bureau desires to tabulate as "pro-Cuban" all individuals now on, and subsequently added to, the Security Index whose activities and sympathies have been such that they warrant special consideration in the event of a limited emergency involving Cuba and the U. S. This tabulation will include not only Cubans but also non-Cubans who have been engaged in substantial activities in furtherance of the aims and purposes of the Cuban Government, in support of pro-Castro groups or organizations or in furtherance of the communist or subversive infiltration of pro-Castro groups.

This tabulation will be effected at the Bureau based on recommendations from the field. With regard to individuals now on the Security Index who should be so tabbed, Form FD-122 should be submitted promptly with the notation "Pro-Cuban" typed directly opposite the words "Miscellaneous (specify)" in the space provided on the form. Attached to the Form FD-122 should be an additional page containing a concise summary of facts which prompt the recommendation for this tabbing. These instructions in no way affect the character of cases under which subjects are currently being investigated.

Careful consideration should be given at this time to recommending for inclusion in the Security Index those individuals who are not now on the Security Index but who, in the light of the clear and present identification of the Cuban Government as procommunist, pro-Soviet Bloc and anti-United States, would be deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the U. S. in the event of an emergency involving Cuba and the U. S.

In considering whether the facts clearly and unmistakably depict a subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety in such an eventuality, there should be a substantial showing of data within the following standards:

(a) An individual has served as a leader or officer or has substantially participated in the activities of a pro-Castro organization and has engaged in activities which have included either the preparation or distribution of pro-Cuban

11/22/60
SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

- 6 -

2980

or anti-U. S. propaganda; the active collection of funds for any agency or representative of the Cuban Government or for a pro-Castro group, which funds are not intended for the relief of human suffering or other charitable purposes; active participation in acts of violence against anti-Castro individuals or groups or against the United States; or the active collection of intelligence data regarding the national defense of the United States or which would serve the purposes of the Cuban Government as opposed to the interests of the United States, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that such data is to be or has been conveyed to any agency or representative of the Cuban Government.

(b) An individual, whether he has participated in organizational activity or not, has engaged in one or more activities specified in (a) above and it has been clearly established, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe the loyalty of the individual would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the Cuban Government and the United States.

(c) In connection with all individuals recommended for addition to the Security Index in consideration of these standards there must be a clear showing, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there has been a continuing sympathy for the aims and objectives of the Cuban Government since October 1, 1960. This is absolutely essential in view of the rising tide of disillusion with and defection from the Cuban Government.

When recommending additional subjects for the Security Index in consideration of the above factors sound judgment must be exercised in order to assure the weight of evidence justifies inclusion. The facts which form the basis for recommendation for inclusion must be established through reliable informants, sources or individuals or by physical evidence and must be concisely set forth in the succinct summary of facts appearing on the required additional page or pages attached to the Form FD-122. Since the courses of action which might be followed in the event of a limited emergency would, in all probability, be different for aliens as distinguished from U. S. citizens it is imperative that the citizenship status of these individuals be clearly established. The same procedure for tabbing these individuals as "Pro-Cuban" should be followed as set out hereinbefore.

11/22/60
SAC LETTER NO. 60-54

Each field office should institute an immediate review to identify those subjects who should be recommended for the Security Index on this basis. The submission of recommendations in this regard should be implemented immediately and must receive continuous and preferred attention. You are reminded that existing instructions require that a summary report containing all pertinent information must be in the possession of the Bureau when a subject is recommended for the Security Index.

When an individual is included on the Security Index and tabbed "Pro-Cuban" under this procedure, it is the continuing responsibility of the office of origin to recommend immediate removal of this tabbing or removal from the Security Index itself where specific information is received or acquired indicating such action is warranted.

11/22/60
SAC LETTER NO. 60-54



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

(Typed November 15, 1960)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INDEX - CUBA

Dear Sir:

The possibility of a break in relations between the United States and Cuba or a limited emergency growing out of the Cuban situation requires that we plan now to meet any responsibilities arising from such an eventuality.

The Bureau desires to tabulate as "Pro-Cuban" all individuals now on, and subsequently added to, the Security Index whose activities and sympathies have been such that they warrant special consideration in the event of a limited emergency involving Cuba and the U.S. This tabulation will include not only Cubans but also non-Cubans who have been engaged in substantial activities in furtherance of the aims and purposes of the Cuban Government, in support of pro-Castro groups or organizations or in furtherance of the communist or subversive infiltration of pro-Castro groups.


This tabulation will be effected at the Bureau based on recommendations from the field. With regard to individuals now on the Security Index who should be so tabbed, Form FD-122 should be submitted promptly with the notation "Pro-Cuban" typed directly opposite the words "Miscellaneous (specify)" in the space provided on the form. Attached to the Form FD-122 should be an additional page containing a concise summary of facts which prompt the recommendation for this tabbing. These instructions in no way affect the character of cases under which subjects are currently being investigated.

Careful consideration should be given at this time to recommending for inclusion in the Security Index those individuals who are not now on the Security Index but who, in

Let to Jago
Rev. 11-14-60
11-22-60 JAC

ENCLOSURE

66-04-2110



1-24-52 260
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Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Index - Cuba

the light of the clear and present identification of the Cuban Government as procommunist, pro-Soviet Bloc and anti-United States, would be deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the U.S. in the event of an emergency involving Cuba and the U.S.

In considering whether the facts clearly and unmistakably depict a subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety in such an eventuality, there should be a substantial showing of data within the following standards:

(a) An individual has served as a leader or officer or has substantially participated in the activities of a pro-Castro organization and has engaged in activities which have included either the preparation or distribution of pro-Cuban or anti-U.S. propaganda; the active collection of funds for any agency or representative of the Cuban Government or for a pro-Castro group, which funds are not intended for the relief of human suffering or other charitable purposes, active participation in acts of violence against anti-Castro individuals or groups or against the United States; or the active collection of intelligence data regarding the national defense of the United States or which would serve the purposes of the Cuban Government as opposed to the interests of the United States, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that such data is to be or has been conveyed to any agency or representative of the Cuban Government.

(b) An individual, whether he has participated in organizational activity or not, has engaged in one or more activities specified in (a) above and it has been clearly established, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe the loyalty of the individual would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the Cuban Government and the United States.

(c) In connection with all individuals recommended for addition to the Security Index in consideration of these

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Index - Cuba


standards there must be a clear showing, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there has been a continuing sympathy for the aims and objectives of the Cuban Government since October 1, 1960. This is absolutely essential in view of the rising tide of disillusion with and defection from the Cuban Government.

When recommending additional subjects for the Security Index in consideration of the above factors sound judgment must be exercised in order to assure the weight of evidence justifies inclusion. The facts which form the basis for recommendation for inclusion must be established through reliable informants, sources or individuals or by physical evidence and must be concisely set forth in the succinct summary of facts appearing on the required additional page or pages attached to the Form FD-122. Since the courses of action which might be followed in the event of a limited emergency would, in all probability, be different for aliens as distinguished from U.S. citizens it is imperative that the citizenship status of these individuals be clearly established. The same procedure for tabbing these individuals as "Pro-Cuban" should be followed as set out hereinbefore.

Each field office should institute an immediate review to identify those subjects who should be recommended for the Security Index on this basis. The submission of recommendations in this regard should be implemented immediately and must receive continuous and preferred attention. You are reminded that existing instructions require that a summary report containing all pertinent information must be in the possession of the Bureau when a subject is recommended for the Security Index.

When an individual is included on the Security Index and tabbed "Pro-Cuban" under this procedure, it is the continuing responsibility of the office of origin to recommend immediate removal of this tabbing or removal from the Security Index itself where specific information is received or acquired indicating such action is warranted.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

(G) SECURITY INDEX -- It has been suggested that in the case of Security Index (SI) subjects, the labor union affiliation, if any, be shown on the SI cards.

This matter was discussed at a recent Internal Security - Espionage Conference held at the Bureau and attended by representatives of 16 field offices. It was the opinion of the Conference that the listing of such information on the SI cards would materially facilitate any future surveys that need be conducted in connection with infiltration of subversives into labor unions.

This matter should be handled as the cases are opened for semiannual verification of residences and employments. If it is determined that a subject is affiliated as either a member or officer of a labor union, that information should be set out on Form FD-122 under the heading, "Employment" and submitted to the Bureau in order that such may be added to the SI cards.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

5/23/61
SAC LETTER NO. 61-28

- 7 -

7



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

66-04-3021

ENC

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-358086

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Typed May 15, 1961)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

It has been suggested that in the case of Security Index (SI) subjects the labor union affiliation, if any, be shown on the SI cards.

This matter was discussed at a recent Internal Security - Espionage Conference held at the Bureau and attended by representatives of 16 field offices. It was the opinion of the Conference that the listing of such information on the SI cards would materially facilitate any future surveys that need be conducted in connection with infiltration of subversives into labor unions.

This matter should be handled as the cases are opened for semiannual verification of residences and employments. If it is determined that a subject is affiliated as either a member or officer of a labor union, that information should be set out on Form FD-122 under the heading "Employment" and submitted to the Bureau in order that such may be added to the SI cards.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-3021

See also 100-358086





- 04-3134

PERSONAL ATTENTION
SA LETTER NO. 62-55
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 5, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

RE: SECURITY INDEX - CUBA

SAC letter Number 60-54 established criteria for inclusion of individuals on the Security Index based on their pro-Castro sympathies and for the tabbing as "pro-Cuban" of other individuals already on the Security Index. In recognition of the mounting tension between Cuba and the United States, additional standards for placing individuals on the Security Index based solely on their pro-Castro activities and sympathies have been established to complement the standards outlined in SAC letter 60-54.

Aliens of Cuban nationality and aliens holding Cuban citizenship should be considered for the Security Index when it is determined that one of these (1) is likely to foster, encourage, or promote the policies, programs, or objectives of the Cuban Government, or collaborate with the Cuban Government or (2) is likely to engage in or attempt to engage in acts of espionage, sabotage or other activities inimical or detrimental to the defense or public safety of the United States as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

Activities on a subject's part which should be considered in determining whether his name should be added to the Security Index under the above would include but should not be limited to (1) participation in organizations supporting the Castro regime, (2) participation in picket lines formed in support of the Cuban Government, (3) contacts with Cuban agents operating in this country on behalf of the Cuban Government or, (4) statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the United States and Cuba.

1 ENCLOSURE

REC

66-04-3134

There must be a showing of activities of the type described above subsequent to October 1, 1960, and this must be verified by investigation. In essence, these standards have been established to cover Cuban nationals who have definitely evidenced support of Castro or a communist regime in Cuba since October 1, 1960.

This move is being made to insure special consideration is given those potentially dangerous individuals who retain basic loyalties to the procommunist, pro-Soviet Bloc and anti-U. S. regime in Cuba but who have found it expedient not to engage in activities to an extent which would bring them within the previously proscribed standards.

Effective immediately no cases involving pro-Castro allegations against aliens of Cuban nationality and aliens holding Cuban citizenship are to be closed without consideration being given to whether the subjects thereof should be placed on the Security Index in keeping with this SAC letter. A statement showing why they do not qualify should be included on a cover page of the closing report or in other closing communication if the appropriate FD-122 recommending inclusion of the individual on the Security Index is not submitted. A systematic review of all Internal Security - Cuba and Registration Act - Cuba cases closed since October 1, 1960, should be conducted to select other potentially dangerous individuals who fall within these new criteria. Your 105-0 files and any other appropriate control files (such as those containing INS name check forms G-135a showing pro-Castro allegations have been made against Cuban aliens arriving in the U. S.) should also be reviewed.

Special consideration is to be given those individuals previously recommended for the Security Index but whose participation in organizational activities on behalf of Castro was not sufficient to come within the previously established criteria. Concerning those individuals whose investigative files show they clearly fall within the newly established criteria, it will only be necessary to verify their present employments and residences, submit a report containing this data and any unreported pertinent derogatory information, and forward FD-122 with accompanying succinct summary justifying recommendations for inclusion on the Security Index. In border-line cases where there are no concrete indications the individuals have clearly and unmistakably renounced their adherence to the policies of the present Cuban regime, their sympathies should be established by appropriate investigation, informant checks and/or checks with other reliable individuals in a position to know the individuals' true sympathies.

10/5/62
SAC LETTER NO. 62-55

65-24-7137

In order that special handling may be afforded "pro-Cuban" Security Index subjects in the event of a limited emergency, each office should at this time set up a new category of the Special Section of the Security Index designated "Cuban." Existing instructions applying to the handling of Special Section Security Index cards as set forth on pages 52 and 53, Section 87 D, Manual of Instructions, should be adhered to.

The new "Cuban" Special Section will include all Security Index cards containing the identification "CUB," indicating Cuban organization affiliation or nationalistic tendency. In the immediate future Bureau will forward to each interested office amended Security Index cards designated in the upper right-hand corner "CUB" for this Special Section.

SAC letter 60-54 (F) provided for "pro-Cuban" tabbing of individuals carried on the Security Index for reasons other than their Cuban organization affiliations or nationalistic tendencies. The Security Index cards on such subjects are not to be placed in the new "Cuban" Special Section. In order that they may be readily identified, however, these cards in the Alphabetical Section of the Security Index should be tabbed with a metal tab of a color different from that used to tab "DETCOM" subjects. In the immediate future Bureau will forward to each interested office a list of those subjects whose names should be so tabbed. For your information, cards on such subjects contain the capital letter "C" on the left side of the card at the beginning of the second line.

Upon receipt of the foregoing amended cards and lists, all offices are to immediately verify the residences and employments of those Security Index subjects placed thereon on the basis of their pro-Castro activities as well as those other Security Index subjects tabbed "pro-Cuban." FD-122 showing changes should be expedited. Be certain arrangements are made to assure you are advised of any subsequent changes in their residences and employments.

All offices except Miami and New York should complete this review and advise the Bureau by October 31, 1962, as follows:

- (1) Number of individuals being recommended for Security Index based on field office's evaluation that they positively fall within the newly established criteria;
- (2) Number of cases being opened or reopened to establish whether the individuals fit the new criteria;
- (3) Statement that residences and employments of all subjects placed on the Security Index based solely on their

10/5/62
SAC LETTER NO. 62-55

pro-Castro activities and all Security Index subjects tabbed "pro-Cuban" have been verified or a statement as to the number of such individuals whose residences and employments have not been verified and when this will be accomplished. Miami and New York should advise the Bureau by November 15, 1962.

With regard to the "pro-Cuban" tabbing of current Security Index subjects, the following procedure is to be effected immediately. During the annual review of all Security Index cases special attention must be given to each case and a determination made as to whether those who have in any manner demonstrated strong sympathies for the present Cuban regime have backgrounds, employments or special aptitudes which would make them potential threats to engage in sabotage or other disruptive activities should there be hostilities with Cuba. For example, those with certain specialized military training, those employed at key facilities, and those who have received training in police work or the use of explosives would warrant special consideration. FD-122 with succinct summary should accompany the annual report in each case where "pro-Cuban" tabbing is believed warranted.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

60-54-3000
ENC

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INDEX - CUBA

Dear Sir:

SAC letter Number 60-54 established criteria for inclusion of individuals on the Security Index based on their pro-Castro sympathies and for the tabbing as "pro-Cuban" of other individuals already on the Security Index. In recognition of the mounting tension between Cuba and the United States, additional standards for placing individuals on the Security Index based solely on their pro-Castro activities and sympathies have been established to complement the standards outlined in SAC letter 60-54.

Aliens of Cuban nationality and aliens holding Cuban citizenship should be considered for the Security Index when it is determined that one of these (1) is likely to foster, encourage, or promote the policies, programs, or objectives of the Cuban Government, or collaborate with the Cuban Government or (2) is likely to engage in or attempt to engage in acts of espionage, sabotage or other activities inimical or detrimental to the defense or public safety of the United States as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

Activities on a subject's part which should be considered in determining whether his name should be added to the Security Index under the above would include but should not be limited to (1) participation in organizations supporting the Castro regime, (2) participation in picket lines formed in support of the Cuban Government, (3) contacts with Cuban agents operating in this country on behalf of the Cuban Government or, (4) statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the United States and Cuba.

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Index - Cuba

There must be a showing of activities of the type described above subsequent to October 1, 1960, and this must be verified by investigation. In essence, these standards have been established to cover Cuban nationals who have definitely evidenced support of Castro or a communist regime in Cuba since October 1, 1960.

This move is being made to insure special consideration is given those potentially dangerous individuals who retain basic loyalties to the procommunist, pro-Soviet Bloc and anti-U. S. regime in Cuba but who have found it expedient not to engage in activities to an extent which would bring them within the previously proscribed standards.

Effective immediately no cases involving pro-Castro allegations against aliens of Cuban nationality and aliens holding Cuban citizenship are to be closed without consideration being given to whether the subjects thereof should be placed on the Security Index in keeping with this SAC letter. A statement showing why they do not qualify should be included on a cover page of the closing report or in other closing communication if the appropriate FD-122 recommending inclusion of the individual on the Security Index is not submitted. A systematic review of all Internal Security - Cuba and Registration Act - Cuba cases closed since October 1, 1960, should be conducted to select other potentially dangerous individuals who fall within these new criteria. Your 105-0 files and any other appropriate control files (such as those containing INS name check forms G-105a showing pro-Castro allegations have been made against Cuban aliens arriving in the U. S.) should also be reviewed.

Special consideration is to be given those individuals previously recommended for the Security Index but whose participation in organizational activities on behalf of Castro was not sufficient to come within the previously established criteria. Concerning those individuals whose investigative files show they clearly fell within the newly established criteria, it will only be necessary to verify their present employments and residences, submit a report containing this data and any unreported pertinent derogatory information, and forward FD-122 with accompanying succinct summary

66-04-3174

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Index - Cuba

justifying recommendations for inclusion on the Security Index. In border-line cases where there are no concrete indications the individuals have clearly and unmistakably renounced their adherence to the policies of the present Cuban regime, their sympathies should be established by appropriate investigation, informant checks and/or checks with other reliable individuals in a position to know the individuals' true sympathies.

In order that special handling may be afforded "pro-Cuban" Security Index subjects in the event of a limited emergency, each office should at this time set up a new category of the Special Section of the Security Index designated "Cuban." Existing instructions applying to the handling of Special Section Security Index cards as set forth on pages 52 and 53, Section 87 D, Manual of Instructions, should be adhered to.

The new "Cuban" Special Section will include all Security Index cards containing the identification "CUB," indicating Cuban organization affiliation or nationalistic tendency. In the immediate future Bureau will forward to each interested office amended Security Index cards designated in the upper right-hand corner "CUB" for this Special Section.

SAC letter 60-54 (F) provided for "pro-Cuban" tabbing of individuals carried on the Security Index for reasons other than their Cuban organization affiliations or nationalistic tendencies. The Security Index cards on such subjects are not to be placed in the new "Cuban" Special Section. In order that they may be readily identified, however, these cards in the Alphabetical Section of the Security Index should be tabbed with a metal tab of a color different from that used to tab "DETCON" subjects. In the immediate future Bureau will forward to each interested office a list of those subjects whose names should be so tabbed. For your information, cards on such subjects contain the capital letter "C" on the left side of the card at the beginning of the second line.

Upon receipt of the foregoing amended cards and lists, all offices are to immediately verify the residences and employments of those Security Index subjects placed thereon on the basis of their pro-Castro activities as well as those other Security Index subjects tabbed "pro-Cuban." FD-122 showing changes should

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Index - Cuba

be expedited. Be certain arrangements are made to assure you are advised of any subsequent changes in their residences and employments.

All offices except Miami and New York should complete this review and advise the Bureau by October 31, 1962, as follows: (1) Number of individuals being recommended for Security Index based on field office's evaluation that they positively fall within the newly established criteria; (2) Number of cases being opened or reopened to establish whether the individuals fit the new criteria; (3) Statement that residences and employments of all subjects placed on the Security Index based solely on their pro-Castro activities and all Security Index subjects tabbed "pro-Cuban" have been verified or a statement as to the number of such individuals whose residences and employments have not been verified and when this will be accomplished. Miami and New York should advise the Bureau by November 15, 1962.

With regard to the "pro-Cuban" tabbing of current Security Index subjects, the following procedure is to be effected immediately. During the annual review of all Security Index cases special attention must be given to each case and a determination made as to whether those who have in any manner demonstrated strong sympathies for the present Cuban regime have backgrounds, employments or special aptitudes which would make them potential threats to engage in sabotage or other disruptive activities should there be hostilities with Cuba. For example, those with certain specialized military training, those employed at key facilities, and those who have received training in police work or the use of explosives would warrant special consideration. FD-122 with succinct summary should accompany the annual report in each case where "pro-Cuban" tabbing is believed warranted.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

NOTE: See cover memo to re same subject,
dated 10/2/62, prepared by .

66-04-3153

PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LETTER NO. 62-70



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 11, 1962

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

(1) SECURITY INDEX -- Your attention is directed to Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions, page 78, in which is set forth a requirement that cover pages to reports relating to Security Index subjects must contain a statement as to whether or not the Security Index card in the case is tabbed DETCOM and a statement as to whether subject's activities do or do not warrant such tabbing.

Some instances have been noted recently in which no observations concerning this matter are contained in the cover pages.

The necessity of specifically commenting upon the DETCOM status of Security Index subjects in cover pages to reports should be reiterated at this time to all Agents engaged in security investigations. Destroy all outdated Forms FD-305.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (E)

12/11/62
SAC LETTER NO. 62-70

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31



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

100-358086

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Typed December 6, 1962)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

Your attention is directed to Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions, page 78, in which is set forth a requirement that cover pages to reports relating to Security Index subjects must contain a statement as to whether or not the Security Index card in the case is tabbed DETCOM and a statement as to whether subject's activities do or do not warrant such tabbing.

Some instances have been noted recently in which no observations concerning this matter are contained in the cover pages.

The necessity of specifically commenting upon the DETCOM status of Security Index subjects in cover pages to reports should be reiterated at this time to all Agents engaged in security investigations. Destroy all outdated Forms FD-305.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-3153

66-04-3232



*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC J TTER NO. 63-61
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 17, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12/17/63
SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

(F) ~~SECURITY INDEX~~ -- In connection with all security investigations in the case of individual subjects, the essential question for determination is whether the subject's activities are such as to depict him to be a potential danger to the national security of the United States in time of an emergency. In the event such a determination is made, his name should be included in the Security Index.

The Security Index criteria have been found to afford practical and workable guidelines in arriving at a conclusion as to whether a subject represents a potential danger and are sufficiently elastic so that when applied with the necessary judgment, the complex questions which may arise in connection with these cases can be resolved.

Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions contains a number of specific factors that must be taken into consideration when arriving

12/17/63
SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

at a conclusion as to whether a particular subject meets the Security Index criteria and represents a potential threat to the national security.

For your assistance, the assistance of your investigative personnel engaged in security work, and for the assistance of your supervisory staff, the following specific factors, in addition to the ones presently enumerated in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions, are set forth for consideration in arriving at a determination as to whether a security subject falls within the Security Index criteria, represents a potential danger in time of an emergency, and thus should be included in the Security Index.

- (1)
- (2)
- (3) Individuals who have defected, revoked or sought revocation of their United States citizenship in favor of a Sino-Soviet-bloc country, who have returned to the United States, and who have taken no positive steps to counteract such action.
- (4) Statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with a Sino-Soviet-bloc country in the event of armed conflict between the United States and a Sino-Soviet-bloc country.
- (5) Training and/or participation in espionage, sabotage, or intelligence activities.
- (6) A history of emotional instability or irrational behavior on the part of an individual with a subversive background whose prior acts depict a propensity for violence and hatred against organized government.

12/17/63
SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

382

66-11-2558

The above factors, including the various factors presently set forth in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions, are not all inclusive but are set forth for the purpose of providing a more detailed guideline and all must be considered in evaluating the facts developed during the course of the investigation.

In view of our responsibilities in the internal security field, most careful attention must be afforded this aspect of our operations and all security cases should be closely examined for the purpose of determining whether sufficient facts are available to depict the subject as a dangerous person whose activities warrant the inclusion of his name in the Security Index. When such a determination is made, appropriate recommendation to include his name in the Security Index should be made promptly.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover

Director

12/17/63
SAC LETTER NO. 63-61

- 7 -

2



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

In Reply, Please Refer to

File No. 100-358086

(Typed December 13, 1963)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

See

(F)

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

In connection with all security investigations in the case of individual subjects, the essential question for determination is whether the subject's activities are such as to depict him to be a potential danger to the national security of the United States in time of an emergency. In the event such a determination is made, his name should be included in the Security Index.

The Security Index criteria have been found to afford practical and workable guidelines in arriving at a conclusion as to whether a subject represents a potential danger and are sufficiently elastic so that when applied with the necessary judgment, the complex questions which may arise in connection with these cases can be resolved.

Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions contains a number of specific factors that must be taken into consideration when arriving at a conclusion as to whether a particular subject meets the Security Index criteria and represents a potential threat to the national security.

For your assistance, the assistance of your investigative personnel engaged in security work, and for the assistance of your supervisory staff, the following specific factors, in addition to the ones presently enumerated in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions, are set forth for consideration in arriving at a determination as to whether a security subject falls within the Security Index criteria, represents a potential danger in time of an emergency, and thus should be included in the Security Index

66-04 32

ENCLOSURE

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Index
100-358086

- (1)
- (2)
- (3) Individuals who have defected, revoked or sought revocation of their United States citizenship in favor of a Sino-Soviet-bloc country, who have returned to the United States, and who have taken no positive steps to counteract such action.
- (4) Statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that his loyalty would lie with a Sino-Soviet-bloc country in the event of armed conflict between the United States and a Sino-Soviet-bloc country.
- (5) Training and/or participation in espionage, sabotage, or intelligence activities.
- (6) A history of emotional instability or irrational behavior on the part of an individual with a subversive background whose prior acts depict a propensity for violence and hatred against organized government.


The above factors, including the various factors presently set forth in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions, are not all inclusive but are set forth for the purpose of providing a more detailed guideline and all must be considered in evaluating the facts developed during the course of the investigation.

(ENCL.)

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Index
100-358086

In view of our responsibilities in the internal security field, most careful attention must be afforded this aspect of our operations and all security cases should be closely examined for the purpose of determining whether sufficient facts are available to depict the subject as a dangerous person whose activities warrant the inclusion of his name in the Security Index. When such a determination is made, appropriate recommendation to include his name in the Security Index should be made promptly.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

60-04-777
PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LETTER 70-64

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

November 10, 1970

(D) ~~AGITATOR INDEX~~ -- As result of discussion by field racial supervisors at recent Bureau conference, the Agitator Index (AI) is being revised to delete those agitators who are also included on Security Index (SI). AI will, henceforth, include individuals who qualify for inclusion thereon but who do not meet criteria for inclusion on SI. Manual changes follow.

Promptly submit FD-397 under individual captions concerning deletion from AI of those subjects who are also included on SI.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

11/10/70
SAC LETTER 70-64

- 3 -

3774



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

66-04-377
(ENCL.)

(Typed November 3, 1970)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Security

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: AGITATOR INDEX (D)

Dear Sir:

As result of discussion by field racial supervisors at recent Bureau conference, the Agitator Index (AI) is being revised to delete those agitators who are also included on Security Index (SI). AI will, henceforth, include individuals who qualify for inclusion thereon but who do not meet criteria for inclusion on SI. Manual changes follow.

Promptly submit FD-397 under individual captions concerning deletion from AI of those subjects who are also included on SI.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-377

66-243-775
July 24, 1963

MANUAL CHANGE
SECTION 10
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

0
REPORT

The third paragraph on page 72 beginning "If no subversive information is available..." should be deleted.

Item (C), I, (A), appearing at the top of page 74 should have added as a second sentence the following: "If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and the only available information consists of verification or non-use and employment of negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and Form FD-350 properly executed."

NOTED

Above manual changes necessitated by SAC Letter Number 63-36 (C) captioned "Security Investigations of Individuals" dated July 1, 1963. This SAC Letter discontinued submission of periodic reports in Security Index cards, which included verification of residence and employment of negative contacts with informants.

Security Index

66-243-
NOT RECORDED
12 AUG 2 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

THE DIRECTOR

May 13, 1949

THE EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE

SECURITY INDEX

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

At the Executive Conference on May 12, 1949, attended by Messrs.

, it was recommended that the security index be placed on IBM punch cards. This recommendation was made because it was believed that within a very short period of time a considerable savings in personnel man days would be effected. To prepare at any one time an over-all list of the security index requires expenditure of from 20 to 30 man days, and there is a continuous expenditure of man days in keeping the Department advised of additions and deletions which occur at the rate of about 150 per week. Instead of making the lists, the card could be utilized and the 150 changes per week could be handled with a minimum of effort. Further, the information would permit a breakdown mechanically in a number of ways, permitting, for example, listing of index subjects by field divisions, listing of security index subjects who are aliens, and the preparation of lists which will permit verification of the security index, both at the Seat of Government and in any or all of the field offices.

The Conference was of the unanimous opinion that the recommendation should be adopted. If you approve, necessary steps will be taken to place the entire security index on IBM punch cards.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

166-2554-7255
F B I
23 MAY 18 1949

THE DIRECTOR

July 18, 1950

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

fm
~~SECURITY INDEX~~

On July 18, 1950, in view of the fact that the conversion of the Security Index to the IEM has been completed and the new system will very shortly go into operation, the attached SAC Letter was prepared, advising the field of the procedure to be followed and at the same time to point out certain errors which have been committed by the field in handling the Security Index.

The Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. , recommended that the letter be approved and sent out to the field.

In the event you approve, the letter will be disseminated.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

[Signature]
Clyde Tolson

Attachment

AHB:tlc *cl*

RECORDED - 71
1-710

THE DIRECTOR.

December 21, 1950

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SECURITY INDEX

On December 20, 1950, the Executives' Conference,
consisting of Messrs.

for and for
considered a proposed SAC Letter
instructing the field, beginning January 15, 1951, and each six
months thereafter to advise the Bureau by letter as to whether all
Security Index cards are in an up-to-date status and whether addresses
for all Security Index subjects have been checked within the last six
months.

It was pointed out to the Conference that the field has
been under instructions for some time to keep the Security Index
cards in an up-to-date status and to check the addresses of Security
Index subjects at least once every six months. While this is a
definite outstanding order, the Bureau is not in a position to be
sure that these instructions are complied with. Therefore, it is
proposed that the field offices be required each six months to advise
the Bureau that this condition does exist in connection with the
Security Index. This will have the effect of requiring the field to
thoroughly check the Security Index at least once every six months
prior to sending the letter to the Bureau. It will also allow the
Bureau to follow up closely any instances wherein the field offices
do not make a positive statement that the Security Index is up-to-
date.

The Conference unanimously recommended that the proposed
letter be sent to the field as it provides an additional control to
insure that the highly important Security Index program is being kept
in a current status. In the event you approve, it will be sent.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

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86 1217

THE DIRECTOR

May 11, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

On May 11, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs.

considered a proposed memorandum to the Department, requesting the Department's views on the standards we are utilizing to place persons on the Security Index and requesting the Department's views on our policy which led to the selection of those standards.

The attached memorandum sets forth the history of the development of the Security Index Program between the Department and the Bureau.

It was pointed out to the Conference that although we have furnished to the Department on September 16, 1949, and again on July 27, 1950, the standards under which we place individuals on the Security Index, we have not been advised in writing that the Department approves these standards. It is true that we have had a number of conferences with Departmental representatives, at which times they have raised no objection to these standards, and by the failure of the Department to object, either orally or in writing, approval might be assumed; however, it is felt that a definite expression of approval from the Department on these standards should be received. The proposed memorandum asks for a definite expression of opinion in this respect.

It was pointed out further that there are many persons in this country today who are or in the past have been in sympathy with the aims and purposes of the Communist Party or other subversive groups. We have investigated thousands of these individuals on the basis of specific allegations made against them. There are many concerning whom non-specific allegations have been made which did not warrant investigation in the past. From those persons investigated we have selected in excess of 18,000 individuals as potentially dangerous. These persons comprise the Security Index.

INDEXED - 129 RECORDED - 129
In compiling the list of names now included in the Security Index, we have sought to restrict the Security Index to individuals whose past or present activities and training show them to be a definite potential danger to this country in time of emergency. Our efforts have been directed toward keeping this list to the minimum number which will afford this country the necessary protection from sabotage, espionage and subversive activities in time of emergency, rather than any effort on our part to place on the list all persons who have been affiliated with the Communist Party or other subversive groups in the past.

Attachment 5 MAY 21 1951
AHR:lla

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

We feel this is a sound procedure. To include in this list all persons coming to our attention who are or have been sympathetic to subversive organizations, of course, would further reduce the possibility of activities inimical to the best interests of the United States. However, as many such persons may have foolishly or mistakenly entered such association, this procedure would cause injustice, would not be in keeping with the American concept of justice, and would unquestionably leave indelible marks on the record of law enforcement in this country for years to come.

It is felt, however, that the Department should express its opinion on this policy which governs the making up of our Security Index. This is necessary because any one of these sympathizers or former members of these subversive groups or fronts could commit sabotage and the question would logically follow as to why was he not on the Security Index. This question could be raised on any individual against whom we have any allegation of possible subversive sympathies or connection, regardless of how remote the possibility that such an individual is dangerous.

The proposed memorandum sets forth our policy in this respect and requests the views of the Department.

Executives' Conference
Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that the attached memorandum be sent to the Department. If you agree, it will be sent.



Respectfully,
For the Conference

65-2554-8767
May 1, 1951

THE DIRECTOR
THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE
SECURITY INDEX

On May 1, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted], considered problems in connection with the Security Index, as follows:

- (1) Should the field be required to submit current reports on all Security Index subjects at this time?

It was pointed out that the question of submitting current reports on all Security Index subjects was taken up recently at the Internal Security Conference held April 2-3, 1951, at which time it was strongly recommended that the Bureau not require the submission of current reports because of the more pressing problem of investigating pending cases for possible inclusion in the Security Index. To this, the Executives' Conference agreed, but recommended that the condition of the security work be re-surveyed on September 1, 1951, for the purpose of seeing whether we could require the submission of reports at that time.

This matter was also considered by the Executives' Conference on May 1, 1951. A survey of the pending work reflects that the number of pending cases in the classifications, 65, 100 and 105, have increased each month during December, 1950, and January, February and March, 1951. Likewise, the number of delinquent cases in these three categories has increased at the end of each of these four months. As an example, at the end of December, there were 28,202 pending cases, which increased to 30,857 at the end of March. At the end of December, there were 15,072 delinquent cases which increased to 16,873 at the end of March. This would reflect an increase in this type of work and consequently indicate that we cannot cut down on the investigative effort applied to this type of case.

In addition, it was noted that many of the field offices had written current reports, particularly the smaller offices. In addition:

- | | |
|---|-------|
| (1) The field submits reports on key figures each six months - approximately | 1,500 |
| (2) Over 3,600 Security Index subjects have been added since June, 1950. Consequently, there are current reports on this number - | 3,600 |
| (3) The field has been instructed to submit reports on all SI subjects in vital facilities. This is approximately 2,000 (estimate) Total: | 2,000 |
| | 7,100 |

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Thus, it will be seen that of the 15,284 Security Index subjects, we have or are requiring current reports on a large percentage. The problem of delinquent reports lies in the large offices where there is a heavy backlog of security cases to be worked.

Executives' Conference
Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that we not require the field to submit current reports on all Security Index subjects in view of the fact that the more pressing problem at this time is to work the pending cases and place on the Security Index those individuals who are potentially dangerous. The Conference recommended that we re-survey this matter again on September 1, 1951.

* * * * *

(2) Should we retain persons on the Security Index where no activity has been shown for several years?

It was pointed out that because the Communist Party has ceased issuing membership cards and ceased maintaining membership lists since 1948; because of instructions by the Party that many members should go underground or divorce themselves from open participation in Party activities; and because of the conspiratorial nature of the Party, it has not been possible to develop positive evidence of current Communist Party activity on the part of a number of Security Index subjects who were placed on the Security Index several years ago. As a result, we have on the Security Index today a considerable number of subjects on whom current Party activities are not reflected. These subjects, however, were placed on the Security Index on a sound basis, that is, in keeping with the standards which had been set up by the Bureau for Security Index subjects.

It was pointed out that if an emergency occurs, it will not be possible to present to the hearing boards evidence of current activity on the part of some of these subjects. It was pointed out that these subjects have been retained on the Security Index as potentially dangerous because of their history of Communist Party activity and no evidence to the effect that they are no longer dangerous exists other than the mere passage of time. It was also pointed out that if one of these subjects were removed from the list and he committed sabotage during an emergency, it would be very difficult to justify our position in having removed him from the Index.

Executives' Conference
Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference was of the unanimous opinion that the removal of these subjects from the Security Index would present a far greater risk than their retention despite the lack of evidence of current Communist Party activities. The Conference, therefore, recommended that they be retained on the Index.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

- (3) Should we refer to the Department cases for specific decisions where we do not have evidence of activity for several years?

It was pointed out that the question had arisen as to whether the Department should be asked to pass on the desirability of retaining on the Security Index those individuals on whom we have not developed current activities in the Party during a several year period, such as for the last three years or the last five years. The thought behind this would be to have the Department share the responsibility for keeping these people on the Security Index.

Executives' Conference
Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended against referring these cases specifically to the Department. The Conference felt that we have referred all cases to the Department and the Department is in a position to raise an issue on any case. The Conference further felt that we would not be relieved of any responsibility by any decision on the part of the Department.

- (4) Should we interview individuals carried on the Security Index on whom we have developed no current activities?

It was pointed out that at the present time before an individual can be removed from the Security Index, he must be interviewed or a valid reason to the contrary given. In addition, where the field or the Bureau concludes that an interview with a subject may be productive, a recommendation is made to interview the subject and the interview is conducted if the Bureau approves.

The question here is should we, because of the mere passage of time for a period such as three years or five years without evidence of any Party activity, instruct that the Security Index subject be interviewed. The purpose would be to ascertain the attitude of the subject as a standard to determine whether he should be continued on the Index.

Executives' Conference
Recommendation:

The Conference unanimously recommended against interviews based on the mere passage of time. The Conference felt that if a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

solid basis existed for placing the individual on the Index, he should remain thereon unless a strong reason to the contrary existed. The Conference felt that unless the subject takes positive action to remove himself from the Party and to so indicate, the Bureau is justified in retaining him on the Index regardless of the passage of time.

* * * * *

- (5) As a result of current investigations we develop information of past Communist activity but not current activity by individuals. Such individuals are not placed on the Security Index because they do not meet our standards for the Index. Should we interview them to determine their present attitude?

It was pointed out that during current investigations many times we develop information showing routine Communist Party activities of several years ago on the part of individuals. However, we are unable to develop any information reflecting current activities on the part of these individuals. Such a person is not placed on the Security Index because we have not developed current activity. The question is should we interview such individuals with a view to developing information to justify their inclusion or exception from the Security Index.

It was pointed out that by this interview we are in effect bringing up the subject's activities to the present time. If he is uncooperative and indicates that he still adheres to the Party line, we should consider him a potential danger and place him on the Security Index.

Executives' Conference
Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that in instances where we develop that a subject engaged in routine Communist activities several years ago but we do not develop evidence of current Party activities, we should interview the subject with a view to determining whether he is potentially dangerous and should be considered for the Security Index.

* * * * *

- (6) Should we advise the Department of each instance wherein we remove a subject from the Security Index?

It was pointed out that we remove an average of six to eight subjects from the Security Index each week. No subject is removed

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

from the Security Index unless a very strong reason therefor exists, such as death, deportation, arrest and incarceration for several years, enrollment in the U. S. Armed Forces, and defection coupled with complete cooperation. Each month the up-to-date list of Security Index subjects is hand-carried to the Department and the previous list is secured from the Department. The deletions are not specifically called to the attention of the Department. It was pointed out that during the contemplated review of Security Index cases by the Department, the Department may pass on an individual for retention and the Bureau may remove this individual based on additional information received. The question is should we notify the Department of each instance where we remove a subject from the Security Index and the reason therefor.

It was pointed out that over the years since we started to maintain the Security Index, the Bureau has decided who shall be on the list and who shall come off the list on the premise that we are better able to judge the potential dangerousness of the subject. Any deletions from the list on the part of the Bureau are based on the fact that the subject no longer meets the standards set up by the Bureau and, therefore, no longer is considered dangerous.

On the other hand, any action taken by the Department to remove a subject as a result of its review of these cases will be the entire responsibility of the Department.

It was also pointed out that as a result of our interview program, ~~for which reason the~~ subjects have been removed from the Security Index. If we advise the Department of the identities of persons removed and the reason therefor, we will necessarily disclose ~~the reason~~.

Executives' Conference
Recommendation:


The Conference unanimously recommended that we should not advise the Department of the deletions made from the list inasmuch as we keep the Department advised on a monthly basis of the identities of those persons whom we consider potentially dangerous. The Conference recommended that we continue our present procedure of removing subjects from the Security Index where sufficient cause is shown reflecting that a subject is no longer potentially dangerous.

878

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

In the event you agree with the recommendations of the Executives' Conference, we will be governed accordingly in the handling of the Security Index, and an appropriate SAC Letter will be prepared for the field.

Respectfully,
For the Conference



The Director

May 22, 1951

The Executives Conference

SECURITY INDEX -
GENERAL POLICY AND PROCEDURES

2550A

The Executives Conference on May 22, 1951 with Messrs.

being present considered the following additional matters concerning the Security Index.

1. Re summary reports on Security Index subjects. There are over 15,000 names in the Security Index. Summary reports have been prepared or instructions have been issued for them to be prepared on: Prominent Individuals 33; Espionage subjects 62; subjects of possible prosecution 77; total 172. In addition, a number of offices such as Miami have sent in summary reports on their Security Index subjects. There are some additional cases on top functionaries on which several summary reports have been prepared although the requirement for these summaries was discontinued in December, 1950. Some of the more complicated cases and most of the voluminous cases have summary reports in them.

The Security Index cards do not contain a summary of the substantive information concerning the subjects. The field recommends that a subject be placed in the Security Index by use of a form which usually accompanies a report which contains enough substantive data to justify the recommendation. A number of files, selected at random, were examined and a majority, based on this sampling, appeared to be files of 1 to 3 reports containing substantive data with additional miscellaneous serials therein. The percentage of all the Security Index subject files which contain summaries was described as "negligible."

HANDLED BY
STOP DESK

It is the Department's plan that after the arrest of Security Index subjects, the presentation of the facts to any administrative board will be made by the U. S. Attorney. U. S. Attorneys do not now receive copies of the Bureau's reports on these cases. The task of submitting the individual reports to the U. S. Attorney after these thousands of subjects have been apprehended will in itself entail a great deal of work and a summarization or compilation of pertinent data from these reports by the U. S. Attorney will also be a heavy task for them. The preparation of summary reports in each instance would entail considerable file reviews, dictation and transcription to such an extent that it would probably slow down appreciably the practice of submitting recommendations of names for the Security Index.

EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

3554

The Executives Conference was of the opinion that nothing should be done to appreciably slow down the present rate of production. It recognized that there were perhaps many cases where summary reports would be advantageous. A summary report prepared at this time might have to be supplemented if subsequent, substantive information is received. It was therefore unanimously recommended that since on Saturday, May 26, SAC's of New York, of Newark and of San Francisco will be in Washington at the Joint Committee meeting that this matter be considered by them with a view to submitting recommendations that would not slow down production in the field and yet keep the Bureau's interests adequately protected with summary reports where good judgment indicates they are advisable. This will be reconsidered by the Executives Conference after the Joint Committee has made its recommendations.

2. It was unanimously recommended in view of the large number of New Agents who have recently gone to the field that the SAC of each office review with all Agents the procedures and plans in connection with the Detcom Program; that the Inspector be requested to check into the adequacy of the instruction to all the Agents of the office during each inspection and that the Security Index Detcom Program be listed on the agenda for the Regional SAC Conferences.

The following recommendations set forth in the attached Executives Conference Memorandum prepared by and which have not otherwise been disposed of are recommended.

3. Should the field be required to submit current reports on all Security Index subjects at this time?

EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

Since the field is now submitting reports on 1,500 key figures each six months; since 3,600 subjects have been added to the Security Index since June, 1950; and since the field has been instructed to submit reports on 2,000 SI subjects in vital facilities; in order to avoid slowing down the Security Index Program it was unanimously recommended that we not require the field to submit current reports on all Security Index Subjects but that this matter be re-surveyed on September 1, 1951.

4. Should we retain persons on the Security Index where no activity has been shown for several years?

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

Since it has not been possible to develop positive evidence of current Communist Party activity on the part of a number of Security Index subjects who were placed on the list several years ago and as it was the opinion that it would be a greater risk to remove the names than to retain them on the list as many of them may be "sleepers", it was recommended that the names be retained on the list unless there was some positive development justifying contrary action.

5. Should we refer to the Department cases for specific decisions where we do not have evidence of activity for several years?

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

Since the Bureau has called upon the Department to review the reports on all Security Index subjects it was felt unnecessary to refer these cases specifically to the Department.

6. Should we interview individuals carried on the Security Index on whom we have developed no current activities?

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

The Conference unanimously recommended against automatically interviewing these individuals merely because of the passage of time. If a justifiable reason exists for interviewing a subject it should be done but not automatically on this basis.

7. As a result of current investigations we develop information of past Communist activity but not current activity by individuals. Such individuals are not placed on the Security Index because they do not meet our standards for the Index. Should we interview them to determine their present attitude?

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION

It was unanimously recommended that in instances where the Bureau develops information that a subject engaged in routine Communist activities several years ago but there is no evidence of current CP activities, we should interview the subject with a view to developing pertinent information as to attitude, cooperativeness and potential responsiveness of this subject who would then be considered for the Security Index.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

OK
3

THE DIRECTOR

June 30, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

~~SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS~~; SECURITY INDEX

On June 28, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. _____ for _____ and _____

considered whether we should open security investigations on the basis of complaints received now alleging Communist activities some years ago; on the basis of allegations in our files which were not investigated at the time under the Redirection Program; and, on the basis of anonymous complaints.

In order that a clear understanding may be had concerning the background of Bureau policy in opening security investigations, there is attached a memorandum reflecting the various SAC Letters since April 18, 1945, instructing the field as to what individuals should be investigated in security matter investigations.

Bureau Instructions to the Field:

Briefly, prior to April 18, 1945, the Bureau attempted to secure complete coverage in the Communist field. On April 18, 1945, the field was told to place emphasis on the more important individuals and organizations; that Communist cases should be opened on a selective basis and the number of security cases could be reduced by limiting investigations to subjects regarded as dangerous or potentially dangerous; that mere membership or occasional attendance at meetings was not sufficient to indicate potential dangerousness.

On April 17, 1947, the Redirection Program was put into effect and the field was told to reevaluate investigations in the Communist field because of shortage of personnel. Party membership alone was not sufficient basis for investigation; investigations should be restricted to dangerous or potentially dangerous Party members whose statements or acts indicate dangerousness.

On April 10, 1948, the field was instructed to take stock of its state of preparedness for a detention program in the event of an emergency; to review security files and open investigations on dangerous and potentially dangerous persons, based on activity or affiliation with subversive organizations, plus certain standards,

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

such as position in the Party, training, involvement in espionage, employment in vital industry, military training, etc. In effect, this set the basis for the field as to who should be considered dangerous or potentially dangerous and resulted in opening or re-opening thousands of cases not investigated under the Redirection Program.

On July 25, 1950, because of the Korean situation and the international tension, the field was instructed to open cases on all individuals reported as present or alleged members of, or affiliated with the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups. The basis for this change was that because the Communist Party and related subversive groups came out strongly for Soviet Russia and North Korea in the Korean incident, any persons continuing as members of these groups or espousing their line should be considered as dangerous or potentially dangerous.

Observations:

From the information set out above, it is apparent that from April 12, 1945, until July 25, 1950, membership alone in a subversive organization, without additional information indicating dangerousness, was not sufficient to warrant the opening of a security investigation, according to Bureau policy in effect during that period.

Undoubtedly, there are thousands of individuals reported as Party members during 1945 through 1949 who have never been investigated from a security standpoint because their cases did not meet the standards for opening a case during that period and information concerning their subversive activities ceased sometime before the standards were changed on July 25, 1950. The exception would be where investigations have been initiated for special reasons, as present employment in the Federal Government, special requests from other Government agencies, or other information prompting an investigation such as employment in vital facilities. As indicated above, SAC Letter No. 40, dated July 25, 1950, instructed the field to open investigations on individuals, who were present, active, participating members of the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups or were affiliated or espoused the lines of those groups.

It is fully realized that each case must be considered on its own set of facts and that many factors are involved; however, it is believed that this matter should be fully considered to determine whether our present procedures for conducting investigations are sound, taking into consideration the present work load on the field in investigating and considering for the Security Index persons presently active or affiliated with subversive groups.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

It is pointed out that any individual who is ever reported a member of a subversive group, in the absence of specific evidence of disaffection, has the potential to be dangerous and may commit sabotage and espionage if the circumstances dictate; however, we must direct our investigative efforts towards completing investigations in cases where the potential of dangerousness is greatest, as we see it, before opening cases on all subversive complaints received through the years.

Standards for Security Cases
Presently Being Opened:

(1) SAC Letter #48 dated July 25, 1950, is the basis for the opening of security cases on all individuals reported as present members of or affiliated with Communist Party or other revolutionary groups. The field does not open cases on allegations received today alleging membership or affiliation with these groups prior to July 25, 1950 unless the information furnished alleges more than mere membership or affiliation with the groups, that is, the allegation includes activities, training, etc., which coupled with membership indicates the subject is dangerous or potentially dangerous.

(2) Security cases are opened on all persons who, prior to the Korean situation, were members of or affiliated with the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups if there are additional factors which indicate that these persons are dangerous or potentially dangerous. In determining whether a person is potentially dangerous, the field has been furnished a number of factors such as: position in a subversive organization, special training, involvement in espionage, membership in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, Armed Forces training, employment in vital industry, public utilities or government etc.

Observations:

The field considers each case on its own facts in determining whether an investigation should be initiated to ascertain whether the subject's activities warrant placing him on the Security Index. The ideal situation would be to conduct a security investigation on every derogatory subversive complaint now received by the Bureau. We do not have the manpower to do this. We must work now on the cases where the most dangerousness exists, namely, active participation in subversive affairs since the Korean situation or past activity plus employment or training, as mentioned above.

We must face the fact that the Redirection Program which was in effect until July 20, 1950, de-emphasized the investigation

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

of individuals and when there was an allegation of mere membership in subversive groups, we did not investigate the complaint in the absence of some other specific reason.

We must bear in mind that since we broadened the basis for opening security investigations by SAC Letter No. 48 dated July 25, 1950, we have opened 52,693 security matters in classification 100 and closed 37,345 matters, or a net increase of 15,348 pending matters. The total pending classification 100 matters as of August 1, 1950, was 12,251 as compared with 27,789 pending matters in that classification as of May 1, 1951. SAC Letter No. 48 purposely set out additional basis for investigation of "Present or alleged members of or affiliated with the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups," thus not requiring the field to open cases on persons who were routine members in the past. To have done otherwise would have placed a burden on the field which could not have been handled. The number of pending security matters continues to increase under our present instructions. Therefore, it does not appear sensible to instruct the field to review their files and open cases on the basis of routine membership or affiliation information received during the period of the Redirection Program and not investigated then. We may come to this later, although it would be a highly inefficient method of determining persons now potentially dangerous.

Employment in Key Vital Facilities:

During the period between April 1, 1949 and July 25, 1950, there was no definite designation or identification as to basic, strategic or vital industries. Today, key vital facilities have been designated by the Secretary of Defense. The possibility exists that individuals against whom subversive allegations were received or who were identified as mere Party members but not investigated during the above years, may today be employed in facilities listed by the Secretary of Defense. Likewise, subjects of security cases who were investigated but not placed on the Security Index, unknown to us, may now be employed in vital facilities.

Name checks on all persons employed in key vital facilities would be the most practical way to ascertain whether persons on whom we have derogatory security information are so employed because such checks would disclose all information regardless of whether we had conducted investigations or not. This would be a continuing job due to the millions of persons now in industry and the turnover of labor. The proposed Munitions Board Name Check program of two million names would be partially effective.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Anonymous Complaints:

Anonymous complaints alleging subversive activity have been treated in the same manner as any other complaint, with the exception that because the complainant refuses to sign his name, we do not place the same credence in the complaint as we do in those cases where we can go back to the complainant for more detail and for leads to prove or disprove the complaint. In addition, many anonymous complaints are the result of spite and the fact that the complainant does not sign his name indicates that he will not back up his complaint with facts. Where the anonymous complaint is sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight to warrant investigation, an investigation is opened, but we do not place the same weight on an anonymous complaint as we do when a complainant makes his identity known.

Executives' Conference Recommendations:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended:

(1) that we do not attempt to go back through our files to resurrect complaints received prior to the Korean situation for the purpose of opening investigative cases. To do so would result in the opening of thousands of cases which the conference felt is not warranted, particularly as we have conducted investigation on those persons whose activities were such as to cause them to be considered dangerous or potentially dangerous;

(2) that we should not open a case on information currently received, alleging subversive activities prior to the Korean situation, unless the allegations go beyond mere membership or association with the Communist Party or related groups and include information such as training, employment in vital industry, government position, etc., which warrant the investigation on the basis of a potential dangerousness. This policy is in effect at the present time;

(3) that we do open investigations on allegations currently received reflecting membership in subversive or organizations subsequent to January 1, 1950. This would be an exception to the general rule under number 2, above, and is warranted because the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 call for action in an emergency against individuals who were members of the Communist Party subsequent to January 1, 1950. The Conference felt that as Congress set the date January 1, 1950, in the Internal Security Act of 1950, we should conduct investigations based on allegations of mere membership subsequent to that date, but we are warranted in not going back beyond that date on the basis that Congressional intent is reflected in the Act. Instructions are under preparation for the field in this respect.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

(4) that in the instructions to the field the matter of anonymous complaints be covered, namely, to the effect that merely because a complaint is anonymous the complaint should not be disregarded, but the facts of the complaint should be considered and if they are sufficiently specific, an investigation should be opened.

If you approve the Executives' Conference recommendations, we will be so governed.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

60-5704-70
September 12, 1951

SECURITY INDEX

PURPOSE

To submit a proposed SAC Letter.

53125

DETAILS:

There is attached hereto a proposed SAC Letter requiring the Field to institute a program of preparing summary reports in all Security Index cases. Because of the tremendous burden placed on the Field by these instructions, the preparation will be made on a selected and staggered basis.

There is also included in this SAC Letter instructions that following the preparation of the summary report each case will be opened one year thereafter for review and the preparation of an additional summary report, if warranted.

At the time each summary report is prepared each case will be brought up-to-date and reevaluated to be certain we are on sound ground for retaining the subject's name in the Security Index. By these instructions summary reports will eventually be prepared in all Security Index cases and thereafter cases will be reopened and brought up-to-date on a yearly basis.

ACTION

The proposed SAC Letter is attached for consideration.

Attachment

PLC:mjt

On September 17, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs; _____ for

and _____ unanimously recommended that the attached letter be sent to the field. Amb:tlc

DIRECTOR'S NOTATION: "OK.H."

THE DIRECTOR

October 19, 1951

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SECURITY INDEX

On October 19, 1951, the Executives' Conference consisting of Messrs.

considered the question of whether closed Security Index cases should be reopened at such time as summary type reports and the subsequent yearly reports are rendered by the Field, or whether they should remain in a closed status and be followed by administrative tickler.

Inspector [redacted] during the inspection of the Minneapolis Division, advised that there is some confusion in the field as to whether cases on Security Index subjects employed in vital facilities should be reopened each six months at the time that the employment in the vital facility is verified and the appropriate Armed Forces agency is advised of the correct status of the subject by investigative report. [redacted] recommended that the cases be reopened each six months for the purpose of verification and thereafter closed when the investigative report is written.

We have recently instructed the field to submit summary type reports on all Security Index subjects, regardless of whether they are employed in a vital facility, and to submit yearly reports thereafter. Therefore, the problem pointed out by Inspector [redacted] exists in connection with all Security Index subjects and not just those employed in vital facilities. Heretofore, we have instructed the field that when they verify the current address and employment of Security Index subjects each six months, the case should be followed by administrative tickler and not be reopened or carried in a pending inactive status unless it falls in a specialized group, such as Key Figures. However, by SAC Letter [redacted] dated September 22, 1951, the field was instructed to follow cases for the yearly summary reports by administrative ticklers. They were instructed that these cases should be reopened when the summary reports become due, re-evaluated in light of existing instructions and brought up-to-date to determine the subject's current activities.

166-3294-1175

Executives' Conference
Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference was of the unanimous opinion that as it is necessary to conduct research, and in many instances investigation, prior to preparing the required reports, and further to insure the proper administrative handling and following of these cases, it is desirable to reopen these cases at the appropriate time and assign them to Agent personnel for handling. After the required reports are submitted, the cases should again be closed and subsequently followed by administrative tickler.

We will continue to follow our past procedure of maintaining specialized cases such as Key Figures, Top Functionaries, etc., in a pending-inactive status, as there is need for continued investigative attention in those cases.

In order that we can be sure that the field is following Bureau instructions requiring the submission of summary type and investigative reports in Security Index cases, the Conference recommended that during both official inspections by Bureau inspectors and self-inspections in the field, the inspector be required to check the files on all Security Index subjects for the purpose of ascertaining whether reports are being submitted at the required intervals.

In the event you agree, the attached SAC Letter advises the field that this procedure is to be followed and the Training and Inspection Division will issue appropriate instructions to Inspectors.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

...of less cost. The work on this should be done as soon as possible and should be done in a way that it is a logical step. It was observed that the experiment is particularly important in cases at this time. This review will be given to the submission of current ordinary reports through the institution of the project.

If you approve, there is attached hereto a proposed letter instructing all offices to proceed with the project and to complete the initial report within one year.

9/25/53

The Executives Conference**SUGGESTION #436-53**

Present at the Executives Conference of September 24, 1953, were Messrs.

Special Agent [redacted], Chicago, suggested that three forms which must under Bureau Rules be submitted by registered mail have the words "Registered Mail" printed on the forms whenever new supplies of these forms are printed in the future.

Rules require the submission by registered mail of the following forms: FD-122 (Recommendation for inclusion in the Security Index or a change in the Security Index status of a subject), Form FD-125 (Security Index notice), Form FD-126 (Change of office of origin of a Security Index subject).

The Conference of September 24 unanimously favors this proposal and believes that a certain amount of typing time will be saved since it will be unnecessary to type Registered Mail on these forms in the future.

If you approve, there is attached an appropriate letter of appreciation to Agent [redacted]. The Manuals Desk of the Training and Inspection Division will arrange for an appropriate revision of the forms at the next printing.

66-254-

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: April 22, 1951

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: ~~SECURITY INDEX -~~
~~PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS~~

SYNOPSIS:

Under present instructions reports are submitted each six months on Security Index subjects employed in Key Facilities and on Key Figure subjects and at three-month intervals in Top Functionary cases. In addition, after initial report is submitted in those cases, a supplemental summary report is submitted annually if sufficient information is available; otherwise, an investigative report is submitted each year. In cases where yearly report is a summary, it must summarize data in the preceding three-months or six-months reports, a duplication of work.

In all other Security Index cases we require an annual supplemental summary report. If in the interim investigative reports have been submitted by either the office of origin or an auxiliary office, their contents must be re-stated and included in the supplemental summaries. This, too, is a duplication of work under those circumstances.

Under present requirements all reports, investigative and summary reports alike, are prepared under the same instructions--i.e., the data therein must be fully documented and utilizing the same headings. Result: investigative reports are (1) suitable for dissemination and (2) subject to effective use in the event the Detention Program is placed in operation.

It may be noted that once the initial summary report is submitted in these cases, the defects in the old reports are remedied--i.e., from that point forward all the pertinent data is in form suitable for dissemination and fully documented. Thus, if the Detention Program were placed in operation, the initial summary and the subsequent investigative reports could be utilized.

While supplemental summary reports would be of assistance to the U.S. Attorney in the event the Detention Program were placed in operation in that there would be fewer reports to review in the individual cases, it is believed that our duplication of work in these

66-2554-

cases is not warranted at this time in view of our over-all commitment in the security field. Recent Security Espionage Conference concurs in foregoing, particularly with respect to Key Facility, Key Figure, and Top Functionary cases in which the interim investigative reports are specifically required under our present instructions.

PROPOSED:

That supplemental summary reports in all security Index cases be discontinued since (1) investigative reports are equally suitable for dissemination and possible use in connection with the Detention Program and (2) all duplication of reporting can thus be eliminated. We would continue to require the periodic investigative reports in Key Facility, Key Figure, and Top Functionary cases. Further, we would require an annual investigative report in all other security Index cases (instead of the presently required supplemental summary reports) in order that these cases can be reviewed and brought up-to-date. This is believed to be indispensable to insure that the cases are sound and warrant retention in the security Index.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you agree, there is attached a proposed letter which (1) discontinues supplemental summary reports in all security Index cases (2) requires semiannual investigative reports in Key Facility and Key Figure cases and quarterly investigative reports in Top Functionary cases and (3) requires an annual investigative report in all other security Index cases. Appropriate Manual changes are also attached.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

The Executive Conference, on 1/27/61, approved the above.

Enclosed are the proposed letter and the Manual changes. The letter is being sent to the field.

DETAILS:Key Facility, Key Figure, and Top Functionary Cases

Under existing instructions as contained in the Manual of Instructions, Section 87-C, investigative reports are required semiannually on Key Figure subjects and those Security Index subjects employed in Key Facilities. Further, after the submission of initial summary reports, supplemental summary reports are required in those cases annually, the latter thus incorporating data developed in the preceding six months as well as summarizing the material in the most recent investigative report submitted six months previously.

In Top Functionary cases we require reports quarterly, with a supplemental summary report annually. The latter report sets out data developed in the three months immediately preceding its submission, together with summarization of the three previous quarterly investigative reports.

As indicated above, our present instructions in these three types of cases involve duplication of reporting in that each supplemental summary includes data previously reported in investigative reports, including any such reports submitted by auxiliary offices.

All Other Security Index Cases

In all other Security Index cases we require an annual supplemental summary report. It is felt that a review of these cases at least once a year is indispensable to insure that they are sound and warrant retention in the Security Index.

It may be noted that if in the interim an investigative report is submitted by either the office of origin or an auxiliary office, the contents would have to be re-stated in the required annual supplemental summary. In those instances a duplication of reporting is also presented.

Duplication of Work

Thus, (1) in the Key Facility, Key Figure, and Top Functionary cases duplication of reporting is inevitable under our present instructions and (2) in other Security Index cases duplication of reporting is entailed if in the interim any investigative reports are submitted by the office of origin or an auxiliary office.

Summary Report Program

One of the factors considered in requiring the annual supplemental summary reports was that in the event the Detention Program should be placed in operation, the initial and subsequent summary reports would be utilized in connection with the administrative handling of the Security Index cases. A minimum of reports would be entailed by requiring the annual preparation of the supplemental summaries. This procedure would, of course, be of assistance to the U.S. Attorney in analyzing these cases.

The question thus presented is whether the attempt to keep our Security Index reports to a minimum can justify the additional work and duplication of reporting entailed in our present procedure. Our conclusion is that it is not justified.

PROPOSED:

Elimination of Supplemental Summary Reports

This problem has been given analysis in this Section and was discussed with the field during the recent Security Espionage Conference. The consensus was that the duplication of reporting should be eliminated in the Security Index cases, particularly in the Key Facility, Key Figure, and Top Functionary cases, in which the interim investigative reports are specifically required under our present instructions.

It is proposed that the supplemental summary reports be eliminated in all the above types of Security Index cases for reasons indicated previously and re-stated specifically hereinafter:

- (1) Duplication of work would be definitely obviated in the Key Facility, Key Figure, and Top Functionary cases.
- (2) Duplication of work would be avoided in the other Security Index cases in which interim investigative reports were submitted by either the office of origin or an auxiliary office.
- (3) Our investigative reports are prepared under the same instructions as the summary reports in the matter of documentation and handling, rendering them suitable for dissemination and for use in possible Detention Program proceedings.

- (h) with the initial summary report prepared, incorporating data in the old reports in the files, no other material need be had to any reports prior to the initial summary. Thus, the initial summary report and any subsequent investigative reports in the cases contain all the pertinent material in the files in identical form and fully document it.

We would thus require the submission of semiannual investigative reports in Key Facility and Key Figure cases and quarterly investigative reports in Top Functionary cases. Further, we would require an investigative report annually in all other Security Index cases. This latter requirement, as stated previously, is indispensable in insuring on a continuing basis that our cases are sound. The opening of these cases annually allows for them to be analyzed periodically to determine if the inclusion of these subjects in the Security Index is justified.

Attached for approval is a proposed SAC letter (1) eliminating the requirement of supplemental summary reports in all Security Index cases and (2) requiring semiannual investigative reports in Key Facility and Key Figure cases, quarterly investigative reports in Top Functionary cases and annual investigative reports in other Security Index cases.

Also attached are appropriate changes in the Manual of Instructions.

7/6/54

Executives ConferenceSUGGESTION NO. 231-54MADE BY SANEW YORK OFFICESECURITY INDEX - FORM FD-186(MEMORANDUM FOR POSTING INFORMATION
ON SECURITY INDEX CARD)THE SUGGESTION:

That Form FD-186 (Memorandum for posting information on Security Index Card) be revised to show the Security Index subject has been personally observed. (Samples attached.)

PRESENT PROCEDURE:

By SAC Letter S4-24 (L) dated 5/11/54, the field was instructed to personally observe their Security Index subjects, if this had not already been done, to aid in the reporting of accurate descriptions and to prevent mistaken identities. In addition, it was further provided that "a notation or memorandum to the effect that the Security Index subject has been personally observed shall appear in the case file of every Security Index subject whose name is presently maintained in the Security Index. In most instances such a notation will already appear in those case files, having been recorded there at the time the Security Index subject was personally observed by the Special Agent to whom the subject was assigned for apprehension purposes."

-ENCL.

ADVANTAGES OF THE SUGGESTION:

Domestic Intelligence Division, JUL 11 1954
states that the recommended changes in Form FD-186 embody references to the personal observation and provides for necessary modifications to the data previously posted on the Security Index cards. With the proposed amendments, FD-186 may be used to (1) summarize descriptive data derived from all sources, including physical observations, for posting on the reverse side of the Security Index cards at the time they are originally approved and received in the field and (2) to provide for the subsequent amendments in the data carried on the reverse side of the Security Index cards which may be derived from both physical observations and other sources. He believes Form FD-186 can well be utilized for the dual purposes as suggested and notes that two amendments to Form FD-186 have been approved previously but no additional copies of the form have been run since their approval and there are presently 72,300 copies of the form on hand.

Attachments cc: Messrs.
atn

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Attached for approval are appropriate Manual changes and a letter to the SAC, New York, advising of the adoption of the suggestion. Also attached is an SAC Letter advising of the amendments to be made in Form FD-186 and pointing out the purposes for which it may thus be utilized.

DISADVANTAGES OF THE SUGGESTION: EDM:dmb 7/6/54

None apparent.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

Present at the Executives Conference on July 2, 1954, were Messrs.

The Conference unanimously favored suggestion. There are attached an appropriate letter to New York, an SAC Letter and changes for the Manual of Rules and Regulations. There is also attached a letter to SA

11/8/54

66-2537-12558

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUGGESTION #949-54
MADE BY SPECIAL AGENTS
AND
NEW YORK OFFICE
SECURITY INDEX

SUGGESTION

(1) It is suggested that consideration be given to the enlargement of the Security Index in the following manner:

International Business Machine cards be prepared on all Security Index subjects codifying them as to physical description in such a manner that they may be collated on a descriptive basis similar to the manner in which fingerprint cards are collated.

The cards contain a complete description of the individual sufficiently generalized to incorporate persons falling within certain physical categories, i.e., 5' 7" to 5' 9" tall, weight 140 to 150 pounds, different color hair, eyes, whether or not glasses are worn, identifying scars and marks, et cetera, and whether or not photograph is available. Additional identifying data such as places of residence or occupation may also be included.

(2) If feasible, after a trial period of the above suggestion, it is suggested this system be extended similarly to encompass known criminals and the cards could be punched with known identifying data, such as modus operandi, peculiarities, et cetera.

ADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTION

The suggesting employees feel that adoption of this idea would assist in identifying individuals encountered on surveillances or who are included in informant reports, but whose identities are unknown to surveilling agents or the informants concerned. At present, the suggesters point out that such persons are identified in many instances by a tedious process of reviewing available photographs on Security Index cards or photographs of missing Communists. This process does not preclude the possibility or probability that the individual in question may be from outside the confines of the field office territory; therefore, a photograph of this individual is not even available to the office conducting the investigation.

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Under the proposed system, a description of an individual can be furnished to the Bureau and within a short period of time the Bureau would be able to advise the interested field office of the identity of persons who might most logically be identical. The field office possibilities would be narrowed quickly and conclusively; in addition, when photographs of these individuals are available it will be possible to furnish copies of them to the interested field office in order that they may eliminate possible suspects and effect an identification. The suggesters believe a system of this nature would enhance the possibilities of identifying individuals who have gone completely underground and who have changed their identities, places of residence, employment, and who have abandoned their past life. Recent experience indicates their number is increasing and at the same time the necessity of speedily identifying these individuals has become of increasing importance. Any impending legislation to outlaw the Communist Party will, if adopted, drive the Party completely underground. Of necessity, the Bureau should be in a position to identify Communist Party members in order to check on their activity. In addition to the above, it is believed a considerable saving of Agent time would be effected.

DISADVANTAGES TO SUGGESTION

The Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division is opposed to the adoption of this suggestion for the reasons set out below: (1) Preparation of IBM cards for 23,000 Security Index subjects on hand as of 10/15/54, would be an imposing task; (2) Bureau does not presently maintain physical descriptions on the reverse side of Security Index cards, as required in the field, and for this reason complete descriptive data would have to be procured from the field for preparation of the IBM cards; (duplicate set of Security Index cards to be maintained at Quantico, Virginia, under War Plans will, however, contain descriptive data); (3) Physical descriptions are subject to change, and there have been numerous instances in which Security Index subjects have altered their appearances drastically. This would seriously limit the use of codified physical descriptive data unless augmented by photographs. (4) SAC, New York, who states he agrees with the suggestion, believes the work involved in following out the suggestion would not merit the end results. If a person did show up in any one field office territory indicating he might under the circumstances be a Security Index subject from another field division territory, it would be necessary for the Bureau to check the individual by description through the IBM cards and thereafter write various offices having Security Index subjects answering such description. These offices would then have to check to determine whether these individuals were still in the territory if they were not already known to be

missing. Mr. Kelly does not recommend putting the suggestion into effect. (b) It is not believed the type of individual included in the Security Index is amenable to physical codification on the same basis as criminal subjects. Criminal subjects may be classed according to specific acts of violence committed, establishing modus operandi, with physical characteristics as auxiliary features. With regard to Security Index subjects, reliance must be placed exclusively upon the physical descriptions obtained in most instances under less than ideal conditions.

RECOMMENDATION

is opposed to adoption of this suggestion and recommends it be considered unfavorably for the reasons set out above.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

The Conference of 11/8/54, composed of Messrs. recommends unanimously unfavorable.

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ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

66-2554-12146
December 14,
1954

The Executives Conference

SECURITY INDEX

The Executives Conference on December 14, 1954, consisting of Messrs. considered two problems connected with the Security Index.

1. We have interviewed a great many Security Index subjects both for the purpose of developing informants and for the purpose of evaluating the present potential dangerousness of the subjects. There is no requirement, however, that Security Index subjects must be interviewed after an extensive period of inactivity. There are, therefore, relative small number of Security Index subjects concerning whom we have not developed information reflecting Communist or subversive activities for a number of years. They remain on the Index, subject to annual reports bringing their activities up to date. The Domestic Intelligence Division recommends that any subjects concerning whom we have been unable to develop subversive activities subsequent to January 1, 1949, should be required to be interviewed for the purpose of determining their present attitude, to provide a further basis for evaluation as to whether they should continue to be retained on the Security Index. The date, January 1, 1949, is based on the fact that the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 refer only to persons connected with subversive activities subsequent to that date.

Executives Conference Recommendations:

The Executives Conference unanimously recommended that instructions be sent to the field requiring that persons on the Security Index on whom we have not developed subversive activities since January 1, 1949, must be interviewed. If you approve, these instructions will be included in an SAC letter.

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12176

2. During the interviews with both persons on the Security Index and persons being considered for the Security Index, we have no difficulty in arriving at a decision when the persons interviewed completely cooperate with the Government or when he makes it very plain that he is still a Communist. However, three types of interviews have presented a problem as follows:

A. In interviews where the subject is entirely uncooperative such as refusing to even talk to the interviewing agents;

B. Interviews where the subject cooperates partly by admitting his own past Communist activities but refusing to identify his associates in the Communist Party and refusing to discuss other information in his possession concerning the Communist Party;

C. Interviews wherein subjects pretend to cooperate by lying to the interviewing agents as borne out by definite information in our files.

In all three of these instances, the Domestic Intelligence Division has followed the policy of retaining subjects on the Security Index. In addition, when a subject is being considered for inclusion on the Security Index, and other factors develop during the investigation when considered with the results of these interviews appear to warrant, the subject is placed on the Security Index. In other words, interviews such as the above are considered as factors to be weighed in the placing of a subject on the Security Index.

In following this policy, the Domestic Intelligence Division has borne in mind the fact that the Communist Party has issued "sleeper" instructions to its members whereby certain members are instructed to refrain from open Communist Party activities but rather to remain in a "sleeper" status. In addition, the Communist Party has instructed its members to feign cooperation with interviewing agents (SAC Letter 43-43, dated July 14, 1953, and SAC Letter 53-73, dated November 3, 1953). In these letters, it was pointed out to the field that by feigning cooperation, the Party hoped to discover FBI informants. Also the Party instructed that members should appear cooperative and admit past Party membership and consequently, they would no longer be bothered by the FBI.

Executives Conference Recommendation:

The Executives Conference unanimously recommended that the policy presently being followed of retaining or placing persons on the Security Index when subjects respond to interviews other than by

completely giving cooperation to the Government should be continued. The Conference recommended that during the pending discussions with the Department on the criteria utilized by the Department in reviewing Security Index cases, the policy followed by the Bureau regarding these interviews should be fully explained to secure the Department's views. Thereafter, the discussions with the Department on this point should be set forth in writing in order that we may have in writing from the Department its approval of this procedure. If you agree, this will be done.

OK.
H.

THE DIRECTOR

January 25,
1955

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SECURITY INDEX

On January 25, 1955, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs.

certain problems raised by
the Security Index.

considered
in connection with

(1) The Manual of Instructions, Volume III, Section 87C, page 28b, where the purpose of the Security Index is set forth, states in part "In preparing and maintaining the Security Index, the Bureau is acting only in the capacity of assembling the facts concerning the individuals involved for referral to the appropriate officials of the Department of Justice for their consideration and decision as to action to be taken at a time of national emergency."

Executives' Conference Recommendation (Unanimous):

That inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised the Bureau that he does not have the funds or the manpower to review cases on the Security Index, to all practical effects, the decision rests with the FBI as to who will be apprehended in an emergency. Therefore, the above phraseology should be changed to read as follows: "However, in preparing and maintaining the Security Index, to all practical effects, the Bureau is making the decision as to those persons who will be apprehended in the event of an emergency, inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised the Bureau that he does not have the funds or manpower to review the Security Index cases."

(2) Section 87C (2) lists a number of factors which should be considered in assisting in a determination as to an individual's potential dangerousness. Among these factors felt that the following were very weak: subscription to publications of a subversive organization; contributions to or collection of funds for the organization; and refusal to furnish information or to testify regarding membership or activities in a subversive movement.

In the instructions following the listing of these and other factors, the Manual states "It is not intended

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

"that an individual shall be deemed dangerous merely because one or more of the foregoing factors are applicable in his case. However, these factors should be considered as indicating loyalty to a subversive organization, thereby assisting in determination of the dangerousness or potential dangerousness of an individual subject and whether he should be included in the Security Index under the standards set forth below." Thereafter the standards utilized by the Bureau for consideration for inclusion in the Security Index are set forth in detail. It is felt that the Manual should more clearly state that the factors listed in Section 87C (2), and particularly the three factors set forth above, do not of themselves constitute a basis for inclusion in the Security Index.

Executives' Conference Recommendation (Unanimous):

That following the title under Section 87C (2), "Determination of Dangerousness of an Individual," the following be set forth in order that these factors will not be confused with the standards under which we place persons on the Security Index: "The following is a list of factors which will be of assistance in determining the dangerousness of an individual. However, they are not to be considered as standards for placing on the Security Index, as such standards are listed in Section 87C (3)."

(3) At the present time although by SAC Letters the field has been instructed that the SAC is responsible for proper investigation and evaluation of Security Index cases, there is no specific requirement that the SAC shall personally review and approve the recommendation that a person be included in the Security Index. Further, while there is a requirement that cases be brought up to date, analyzed and evaluated, at least annually, by the submission of a field report (except in the case of the New York Office), there is no specific requirement for a renewed recommendation from the field at any time for the continuance of the subject on the Security Index.

Executives' Conference Recommendation (Unanimous):

That an SAC Letter be sent to the field, cautioning the field as to the seriousness of inclusions of names of persons on the Security Index and pointing out that the Bureau is, in effect, making the decisions for arrests, since the

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Department of Justice has not and apparently will not arrange for attorneys to review and approve such inclusions. Also, that this SAC Letter make it the personal responsibility of the SAC to make recommendations to include or cancel subjects for the Security Index, except in those offices having more than 1,000 Security Index subjects in which instance the recommendations must be made by the SAC, ASAC, or Bureau-approved Security Supervisor. (This would include Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia and San Francisco.)

This SAC Letter will further require that an immediate review be made by the field of all cases on the Security Index at this time and that the SACs (except as indicated in the above six offices) personally approve or disapprove the retention of the present subjects in the Security Index, this approval or disapproval to be set forth in individual memoranda on each case to the Bureau setting forth the reasons why the subject should be retained in or removed from the Security Index.

The Executives' Conference recommended that this review be completed within sixty days by all offices having less than 1,000 cases; all the remaining offices within 90 days, with the exception of New York which will have a deadline of six months.

If you agree with the above, an appropriate SAC Letter will be prepared.

(4) Relative to approval of cases for inclusion in the Security Index, the present system is that the individual Supervisor handling the substantive case reviews the file and either approves or disapproves recommendations from the field as to inclusion of a subject in the Security Index. The recommendations of the individual Supervisors then flow through one experienced Supervisor who likewise reviews the file and makes his recommendation. If there is any disagreement at this point, or if there is not a clear showing as to the action to be taken, the case is referred to Section Chief and if necessary to Assistant Director for a decision.

Executives' Conference Recommendation: (Unanimous)

The Executives' Conference unanimously felt that an additional step is desirable at this time to insure that

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

the placing of individuals on the Security Index is approved at a high level. Therefore, the Conference recommended that in the future the review and approval of the inclusion of the names of individuals be personally handled by Supervisor the Supervisor in Charge of this work; the Chief of the Internal Security Section or Inspector who is in charge of the Internal Security-Liaison Branch of the Domestic Intelligence Division. In cases of disagreement the case will come to Assistant Director noted that this will throw an additional burden on representatives of the Division already handling a very heavy assignment. However, it will be worked out.

The Conference further noted that as the results of the field review of the current Security Index subjects are received at the Seat of Government, the cases will be reviewed by the Domestic Intelligence Division.

(5) further recommended that a group of five specially qualified Agents be brought in from the field for the purpose of instituting an independent and continuous review of the Security Index and to act in the role of "devil's advocate" in making such a review. The remainder of the Conference recommended that this not be done, as it was felt that the steps outlined above were a more desirable approach to the problem.

If you agree, we will be guided by the recommendation of the majority in this instance.

1. Agree with majority

Respectfully,
For the Conference

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2 - what concerns me is that defects in the procedure, as I have expressed concerns about the project and if I recall correctly recently made a re-evaluation of it + came up with a completely favorable report.



February 9, 1955

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCESECURITY INDEX

The Executives' Conference on February 8, 1955,
consisting of Messrs.

considered problems affecting the Security Index including the concept of dividing the Index into two categories: the first group tabbed for priority apprehensions in the event of a limited but grave emergency and the second group to be arrested in the event of an all-out emergency.

BACKGROUND:

As of February 4, 1955, we had listed on the Security Index for detention, in the event the Attorney General's Emergency Detention Program goes into effect, a total of 28,705 individuals. Of these, 10,820 (as of January 14, 1955) were listed for priority apprehension based on leadership in subversive organizations such as the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, et cetera; past training in espionage or sabotage; information reflecting past or current activities indicating that the individual may be violent; or persons on the Security Index employed in or having access to Key Facilities.

The extent and type of activities of the individuals on the Security Index varies and consequently the potential dangerousness of these individuals varies accordingly. In the event of a limited but grave emergency, such as war with Soviet Russia wherein the fighting took place outside the continental limits of the United States, it is suggested that apprehensions under the Emergency Detention Program be limited to those persons having a strong potential for espionage, sabotage, or disruptive activities, leaving the remainder of the Security Index for apprehension in the event the emergency assumes such proportions that the security of the nation demands extension of the arrests to all persons potentially dangerous to the country. This latter situation will exist in the event of imminent invasion or attack on the continental United States itself.

66-2554-

MEMORANDUM FOR

In order to implement this concept of the Emergency Detention Program it will be necessary to change our priority classification in the Security Index to include only those individuals who would clearly constitute an immediate and strong danger to the country as potential saboteurs, espionage agents, and disruptionists. This group would be confined to the following, all of whom could be shown to be engaged in strong subversive activities, current or during the recent past:

- 1) All top functionaries and key figures (These are the leaders of subversive organizations who implement and carry out the policy of the organizations.)
- 2) Currently active Communists (active within the past year) or members of any basic revolutionary organization when there is evidence of one or more of the following:
 - (a) local organizers or leaders;
 - (b) special training at the Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow; (These were special Marxist-Leninist schools held in Russia for picked individuals.)
 - (c) experience as picket captains, strong-arm men, or active participation in violent strikes, riots, or demonstrations;
 - (d) persons who have made violent statements or who are known to have strong revolutionary tendencies as evidenced by their activities.
- 3) Persons active in the Communist Party underground;
- 4) Any other individual whose activities, past or present, regardless of membership in a revolutionary group, clearly and unmistakably depict that he is a potential saboteur, espionage agent, or disruptionist in the event of an emergency.

In each of the above categories the individual case will stand on its own merits. It is estimated that this group tabbed for priority apprehension will be less than 5000.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The remainder of the individuals on the Security Index will be listed for apprehension in the event of an all-out emergency wherein the country is faced with the necessity of taking complete security measures. Each of these individuals will, nevertheless, present a potential danger to the security of this country and there will be a calculated risk in holding up his apprehension at the time of an emergency which would require the apprehension of the priority group. There are, however, certain definite advantages to this procedure, such as:

1) The Bureau would concentrate immediately on those individuals labelled most dangerous during the first few days of an emergency.

2) In the event the war or emergency did not develop to the point of actual invasion or devastation of the United States itself, the normal police controls may be sufficient to control the activities of the remaining individuals on the Security Index. It is a fundamental principle that the liberties of citizens should not be infringed upon unless absolutely necessary and thus, unless arrests are absolutely necessary of all persons on the Index, this procedure should be avoided. The Bureau would be showing its continued observance of respecting the rights of individual citizens to the greatest extent possible consistent with the security of the nation and would thus avoid criticism for stern restrictions subject to criticism at a later date.

3) It is felt that under this procedure the Bureau would be in a position to answer possible criticism in the future by pointing out that it sought to avoid apprehensions of the full Security Index until the overriding considerations of security based on the all-out emergency demanded that this be done.

We should take cognizance of certain disadvantages to this procedure:

1) As all persons on the Security Index are considered potentially dangerous, there is a risk that those individuals not arrested, if arrests are restricted to a priority group, will commit acts of sabotage, espionage, et cetera, detrimental to the security of the country.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

2) If the apprehensions are restricted to a priority group, the remaining subjects are very likely to flee or go into hiding, making their ultimate arrest, if necessary, most difficult.

3) The subjects who will be tabbed for priority apprehension are, to a large extent, subjects who will be most difficult to locate in the event of an emergency. Many of them are in the underground now or at least have experience in underground activities. Therefore, our percentage of apprehensions in this group will logically be smaller than it would be in the over-all group.

If this breakdown for priority apprehension is put into effect, the field should be advised immediately in order that the field may include in its current review of Security Index subjects a recommendation as to those persons who should be included for priority apprehension.

Executives' Conference Recommendation (Unanimous):

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that the above procedure be put into effect at once; that is, the Security Index be split into two groups; one designated for apprehension in a limited but grave emergency short of actual invasion or imminent attack on the continental United States, and the other listed for apprehension in the event of all-out emergency which would require this country to put into effect the most stringent security measures for self-preservation purposes.

If you agree, an SAC Letter implementing this is attached.

OK. But there must be careful
screening of all cases to go on
either listing.
H

February 14,
1955

EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SECURITY INDEX

The Executives' Conference on February 8, 1955,
consisting of Messrs.

for
the mechanics to be used by
of the Security Index Unit;
Internal Security Section; or Inspector
charge of the Internal Security-Liaison Branch of the Domestic
Intelligence Division, in reviewing for approval, the names of
individuals for inclusion in our Security Index.

considered
Supervisor in charge
, Chief of the
Inspector in

BACKGROUND:

On January 25, 1955, the Executives' Conference recommended
and the Director approved that Messrs. or would
have to personally approve the inclusion of all names of individuals
which are placed in our Security Index and in case of disagreement
the case will be referred to Assistant Director for decision.

In order that this additional work, which will be considerable
in volume, can be handled by Messrs. and the
following administrative procedures were presented to the Executives'
Conference on February 8, 1955:

SUGGESTED PROCEDURE:

The Supervisors assigned to the Security Index Unit, after
they have completed their review of a case and have decided that
the name of the subject should be included in the Security Index,
will prepare a memorandum which will set forth briefly and succinctly
the facts on which they based their conclusion. The case will then
be forwarded, as is now done, to one experienced Supervisor who
reviews all cases before the subject's name can be considered for
inclusion in the Security Index. He will review the case, as in
the past, and from that point an equal division will be made of the
cases for review by Messrs. and the memo-
randum will assist them in their review in that the cases which are
clear-cut can be handled in a minimum of time from a review of the
memorandum. They will rely completely on the facts set forth in
the memoranda in reaching their decisions. In controversial cases
they, of course, will review the reports in order to reach a decision.

wd
vrd
1.

Attachment (1)

66-2554

The Supervisors in the Internal Security Section cannot, for any sustained period, prepare these summary-type memoranda and still keep their work in a current status. They are receiving a large volume of mail and this extra work of having to prepare a memorandum in each case they review will create a delinquency in the Security Index Unit which will be most undesirable. Therefore, in the future, the investigating Agent at the conclusion of his investigation will attach to the Form 122 (this is the form used to recommend the inclusion of a name in the Security Index) a succinct summary of the facts on which he based his recommendation for including the name of the subject in the Security Index. In line with existing instructions, the Special Agent in Charge will personally approve each case wherein a recommendation is made to include the subject's name in our Security Index.

When the report and the Form 122 are received at the Seat of Government, the Supervisors in the Security Index Unit will review the case file as they have done in the past. They will then put an addendum on the summary attached to the Form 122 in which they will indicate any other pertinent factors not listed and indicate their agreement or disagreement with the recommendation from the field. The case will then be sent to the experienced supervisor in the Security Index Unit who reviews all cases before the names of the subjects can be considered for inclusion in the Security Index and from his desk the cases will be sent to Messrs. [redacted] for review and approval.

EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION (Unanimous):

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that the above-outlined procedure be put into effect.

If you agree, there is attached an SAC letter which sets forth instructions to the field with respect to the portions of this procedure which will be implemented by the field.

V.

OK
H

July 24, 1963

MANUAL CHANGE
SECTION 87D
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

0
REPORTS

The third paragraph on page 72 beginning "If no subversive information is available..." should be deleted.

Item (d), I, (A), appearing at the top of page 74 should have added as a second sentence the following: If, following investigation, no subversive data is developed and the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources, submit in lieu of a report a letter to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, and Form FD-305 properly executed.

NOTE

Above manual changes necessitated by SAC Letter Number 63-36 (C) captioned "Security Investigations of Individuals" dated July 23, 1963. This SAC Letter discontinued submission of periodic reports in Security Index cases in those instances in which the only information to report was verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with informants.

Security INDEX

66-2435-
NOT RECORDED

66-2554-12237
March 3, 1955

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SECURITY INDEX

On March 1, 1955, the Executives' Conference
consisting of Messrs.

and considered additional for
proposed guides to assist the field in its current review of
Security Index cases and also concerning individuals to be placed
on the Index in the future.

In connection with the current review of Security
Index cases in the field and in connection with the placing of
persons on the Security Index in the future, from discussions
with field representatives there is an apparent need to give
the field guidance in order that those persons retained on
or placed on the Security Index will be restricted to individuals
against whom a clear case of potential dangerousness in the
event of emergency can be proved. To assist the field in this
respect, the Domestic Intelligence Division proposed that an
SAC Letter be sent to the field instructing that in evaluating
these cases, in addition to the criteria presently listed in
the Manual of Instructions, two additional factors must be
considered, as follows:

(1) The investigation must show:

- (a) Subject has had membership or participation in
the activities of a basic revolutionary organiza-
tion within the last 5 years as shown by overt
acts or statements established through reliable
sources, informants or individuals;
- (b) Subject has had membership or participation in
the affairs of one or more front organizations,
which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a
revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or
by active substantial participation in the
furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front
organization within the last 3 years as shown by
overt acts or statements established through
reliable sources, informants, or individuals;
- 66-2554-12237

4/26/55

66-7604-
18272

SUGGESTION #202-55
MADE BY
BALTIMORE OFFICE

SUGGESTION: That Security Index cards not show the name, race, sex, date, and nationality of the subject on the reverse side inasmuch as this same information appears on the front of the card.

_____ is a clerk, Grade GS-4, in the Baltimore Office. This suggestion is deemed to be within the purview of her duties because it relates to filing and clerical work. Her supervisor is SAC

PRESENT PROCEDURE: The data under consideration is printed on the front of all Security Index cards at SOG. Copies of these cards are kept in an alphabetical index at SOG and additional copies are broken into an alphabetical and a geographical index in the field offices. The geographical index cards (but not the alphabetical index cards) kept in the field office duplicate the referenced data on the back of the card where a complete description of the subject is set out.

ADVANTAGES STATED: Would provide more space on the reverse side of the card for information concerning relatives, precautionary measures and other facts of possible assistance to the apprehending agent.

DISADVANTAGES STATED: None.

SAVINGS: None estimated. Would be extremely small.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC _____ Honolulu, recommends adoption of the suggestion, stating that there is no necessity for this information appearing on both sides of the card and particularly so since the back side of the card is already congested. SACs _____, Little Rock, and _____ Memphis, agree with SAC _____. SAC _____ Baltimore, does not specifically recommend adoption but stated that additional space would be made available on the back side of the card. Assistant Director _____ recommends against adoption, stating that the limited descriptive data which appears on the front of the card is absolutely necessary for use

11-25-55
11-25-55

at 100 and in the alphabetical files in the field offices, as a reference to distinguish one subject from another and to group the subjects by sex, nationality and other pertinent characteristics. Information is duplicated on the back side of the card only in the case of those cards in the geographical index kept by the field offices. Those cards contain a complete description of subject on the back side. Since that descriptive data would become quite important in the event of an apprehension program, the Domestic Intelligence Division believes that we should continue to list the complete description on the reverse side of the geographical index cards so that it would never be necessary for an agent to flip the card from one side to the other in order to get a full description.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the suggestion not be adopted.
2. That, if the suggestion is adopted, no financial award be made because the contribution is a small one and it comes within the purview of the suggester's duties.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

4/26/55

The Executives Conference, consisting of Messrs. [redacted] on 4/26/55 were unanimously opposed to the suggestion.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: August 26, 1955

TO :

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: WAR PLANS -
FIELD RELOCATION

FOR INFORMATION
TO DISSEMINATION
SEE FILE 46-17374-(7-18-52)

On 8/24/55 the Executive's Conference, consisting of Messrs. considered problems involving field relocation.

It was pointed out to the Conference that most Bureau field offices will be facing the same problem of relocation as to the Bureau, in that Civil Defense in most headquarters cities is planning a general exodus of the city in an emergency, in which event there will be no cross-town traffic and all traffic will flow out of town. The basic problem for the field is having sufficient communications facilities and records with which to operate at the relocation site. The Conference was advised that from a practical standpoint field offices, being comprised of trained personnel, in an emergency are capable of temporarily operating without Bureau records except for the programs calling for the protective custody of diplomats of enemy nations (Prodis) and the program calling for the detention of individuals dangerous to the security of the United States (Detcon). These programs require specific records to insure their efficient operation.

The Conference was advised that 72% of the Security Index subjects are in the New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Washington Field, and Newark Offices, which offices are believed to be the main points for prospective espionage and sabotage activities, and, therefore, would have need for at least basic communications facilities.

CEI:EI

12375

Executives Conference Memorandum to

A laboratory survey of the relocation sites of the above eight offices has disclosed that CW (code) radio facilities could be installed at the relocation sites of these offices for an estimated cost of \$22,350.00 plus an estimated 84 man days of engineering time and the necessary per diem. It was brought out to the Conference that to insure maximum security of radio communications, and to speed up encoding and decoding time AFSAM 7 coding machines, costing an estimated \$2,500.00 each, would be needed for relocation use at each of the above eight offices.

Executives Conference Recommendation

The Executives Conference was unanimous in its recommendation on each of the following points:

(1) That there be prepared by the Bureau and made available to each field office an additional set of the Security Index cards pertaining to the subjects residing in each field office. This set of Security Index cards is to be placed in the personal custody of the Senior Resident Agent in the Resident Agency wherein the best security is available near the field office relocation site. This index is to be kept current by the field office, forwarding to the Resident Agent in question, through the mail, revised or changed cards as they are received by the field office from the Bureau. In the event of field relocation, the Senior Resident Agent, with appropriate guard, is to transport this index to the field relocation site, it being contemplated that the office will have insufficient time and inadequate guard force to transport the Security Index now at headquarters city to their relocation site in an emergency.

OK

(2) Inasmuch as only the New York and Washington Field Offices are primarily concerned with the program calling for the protective custody of diplomats of enemy nations (Prodip), the New York Office be instructed to make available to the Senior Resident Agent having custody of the above Security Index one set of instructions for carrying out this program together with a list of individuals to be taken into custody under the program. This material would be kept current on a monthly basis. The Washington Field Office will place similar information as well as their additional copy of the Security Index pertaining to their office in the confidential records repository at the Bureau relocation site.

Executives Conference Memorandum for

(3) That during the next fiscal year, funds being available, there be installed at the New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Washington Field Office, and Newark Office relocation sites a CW (code) radio station and that there be placed in the custody of the Senior Resident Agent having the emergency copy of the Security Index for each of these offices, AFSAM 7 cryptographic materials. It is estimated that these radio and cryptographic systems for these eight offices will cost \$42,350.00.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the attached SAC letter, advising the field that a set of Security Index cards will be made available to each office in the near future. This index to be placed in the personal custody of the Senior Resident Agent in a Resident Agency affording utmost security and instructing the field that no confidential records should be transported from the field office to the relocation site even in an emergency without maximum security in the form of an appropriate guard force.

(2) That the attached letter to the New York office, copy to Washington Field, go forth instructing the New York Office to place in the personal custody of a Senior Resident Agent at a Secure Resident Agency one copy of the instructions pertaining to, and lists of individuals to be apprehended in connection with, the program calling for the protecting custody of diplomats of enemy nations. Washington Field is to send similar records to the Bureau relocation site. Both offices are to keep these records current monthly as is done with similar records now at the Bureau relocation site.

May 3, 1956

The Executives Conference

SECURITY INDEX -
VERIFICATION OF ADDRESSES
Bufile 100-358086

PLANT INFORMANT PROGRAM
Bufile 66-2542-2

AMERICAN LEGION CONTACT PROGRAM
Bufile 66-9330

On May 2, 1956, the Executives Conference, consisting of Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] considered the question of whether Security Index cases should be opened and assigned for the purpose of verifying addresses of subjects and closed upon such verification.

Present instructions call for verifications of addresses to be handled through administrative ticklers with cases opened only when the subject has moved to an address in another division or his present whereabouts is unknown. This means of handling verifications was inaugurated in 1951, it being felt at that time that a considerable administrative burden would be placed on the field by opening and closing twice a year the then 15,000-plus Security Index cases. Since that time, the Security Index has been reduced to approximately 12,900 names, of which more than 1,000 are key figures and approximately 600 are employed in key facilities. Key-figure and key-facility cases are maintained in a pending inactive status and reports are submitted quarterly and semiannually, respectively. An annual report is now required in all other Security Index cases (approximately 11,300) so that these cases are now opened once a year and verifications of addresses are made at that time. Consequently, the proposal to open cases for verification purposes would mean that approximately 11,300 additional cases will be opened per year as compared to approximately 30,000 which would have been necessary in 1951.

Enclosures

66-2542-16

Memorandum for Mr. ~~XXXXXX~~

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION:

The Executives Conference was unanimous in feeling that, under present conditions, the Security Index cases should be opened for the purpose of verifying addresses of the subjects and closed upon such verifications being accomplished. The administrative burden of opening these cases under today's conditions would be relatively light. It is noted that, in many instances, accomplishment of verifications requires intensive investigation, sometimes even physical surveillances. Therefore, the opening of the cases would more truly reflect the work necessarily being handled by Agents and would present a truer picture of the work load pending in an office.

An SAC Letter and appropriate Manual changes are attached.

The Executives Conference also considered the question of whether files on plants in which plant informants are developed should be opened when recontacts are necessary. These recontacts must be made each six months.

The present procedure requires the development of complete plant informant coverage in plants designated as "Class A" by the Atomic Energy Commission and plants designated as "Category A" in the Key Facilities List. The number of such plants totals approximately 150 and plant informants therein must be recontacted each six months. In all other plants (approximately 8,000), only the security officer of the plant is recontacted and such contacts must be made once each year. Plant informant files are not presently reopened for the purpose of making these recontacts. Such recontacts are made where possible by telephone.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION:

The Executives Conference was unanimous in feeling that the present practice is preferable with respect to the cases in which only the security officer of the plant is recontacted.

Memorandum for [REDACTED]

However, in the plants where complete informant coverage is developed (the approximately 150 plants referred to above), it was felt that these cases should be opened at the time recontacts are necessary and closed by a memorandum reflecting that all necessary recontacts have been completed. In such plants, numerous recontacts are required, many of which cannot be made by telephone, and in numerous instances plant informants have moved or resigned and it is necessary to develop additional informant coverage. Opening the cases will more correctly reflect the work necessary to accomplish these recontacts.

An SAC Letter is attached.

The Executives Conference further considered whether cases should be opened under the American Legion Contact Program. Present instructions require that the SAC or ASAC annually contact national officers, state officers and members of the American Legion Americanism Commission, advising the Bureau annually that these contacts have been made.

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION:

The Executives Conference unanimously felt that, in the interest of economy and good administration, these files should not be opened on these American Legion contacts, approximately 100 in number. Contacts must be made personally by the SAC or ASAC when the individual officials are available and to open a file would require that the file be maintained in a pending status until all contacts are complete. In some instances, the SAC might have to make a special trip to contact the Legion official to prevent the file from becoming delinquent.

11-483-891
DATE: 10/25/47

THE DIRECTOR

JOINT COMMITTEE

SUGGESTION NO. 660
EMPLOYEE: SAC, SEATTLE

SAVINGS: NONE
AWARD: NONE

MEMBERS PRESENT:

SUGGESTION: That the attached form be approved for Agents to list the verified information as to the address and employment of subjects listed in the security index.

JOINT COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION:

This matter was previously considered by the Joint Committee and copies of the form were sent to a number of SACs to obtain their ideas as to the adequacy and desirability of the form. The following SACs have approved the form and have requested a supply of the same: SAC [redacted] and SAC [redacted] recommended that the suggestion be adopted and suggested further that there be an additional notation on the form to the effect that the file be reviewed to determine whether or not the subject should be dropped or retained on the Security Index List, or whether, perhaps, he should now be placed on the Key Figure List. [redacted] stated that in an office the size of New Orleans such a form was not necessary but that it would not be a handicap.

SAC [redacted] recommended against the adoption of the form for the following reasons: (1) It was unnecessary. (2) The security hazard if the form was lost. (3) Employees making the verification could more simply and expeditiously handle by making a simple notation in the file.

SAC [redacted] is opposed to the suggestion for the reasons set forth by SAC [redacted] with particular stress upon the security hazard.

Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] recommended that the form be adopted as was submitted. They do not favor the proposed modification by SAC [redacted] feeling that it has no proper place in the form inasmuch as the form itself relates to the routine checking of addresses and information whereas this item has to do with the execution of the material contained in the file.

EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:


The Executive Conference of 10/27/47, consisting of Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted]

NUM:MM


avored the suggestion and recommended that the form be
adopted.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Q.
D.



cc:



Form sent to mechanical for printing &
SAC Letter & Bureau Bulletin
Typed 11-6-47
Jill: NB



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Boston, Massachusetts

September 2, 1947

Director, FBI

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your memorandum dated August 21, 1947, in connection with a suggested form to be used in verifying addresses and employment of subjects listed in the Security Index in a field office.

The proposed form has been carefully studied by those employees who have been handling matters of verification on past occasions as well as the supervisory staff of this office, and it is felt that no additions need be made to the proposed form. It appears to satisfactorily provide the necessary information for the completion of our files and it is recommended it be adopted as designed.

This office was about to commence the verification of information contained on the Security Index Cards maintained here, as is our practice every six months, and it is accordingly requested that a supply of five hundred of the new forms be sent to this office as soon as possible. If for any reason it is anticipated the form will not be prepared in the near future I will appreciate being advised in order that a similar one may be run off in this office for our use at this time.

Very truly yours,

A. PURPOSE:

To inform you of the results of my inquiry into the possibility of (1) making marginal notations on letters of inquiry and returning the original letter to the addressor; (2) answering letters of inquiry without permanently retaining the incoming letter and a copy of the reply. This survey was made pursuant to your instructions and included inquiry at the Seat of Government, the Honolulu, Seattle, Portland and Minneapolis Offices.

B. RESULTS:

(1) Seat of Government.

As to Item #1 above, marginal notations are used within the SOG but not between the SOG and the field. Doing this has not been overlooked, however, and where applicable something similar has been applied. At one time a copy of the request for approval to place an individual in the security index was marked approved and returned as the reply. The Identification Division returns the form requesting an identification record with the record attached.

(2) As to Item #2 above, this is done in many respects now in the Crime Records Section. Only when there is a typed reply is a yellow made and the incoming permanently retained. Typed letters in reply are prepared because either no form letter is applicable or the position of the inquirer warrants a typed reply. When forms are used, no yellow is made and the incoming letter is kept for a specific period and destroyed as of no permanent record value. Also, in the Administrative Division in connection with supplies and equipment and applicant inquiries, considerable material is not permanently retained. Often

ORIGINAL COPIES FILED IN

66-3665-1

71

52 10:52

Requests for application blanks are handled by merely placing them in an envelope and placing the envelope in the mail.

B. RESULTS:

(1) Field.

As to Item #1 above, I could not find this system to be applicable for use in the field.

(2) As to Item #2 above, two suggestions were made:

(a) Provide a form letter for use in replying to incoming communications that are being referred to another agency, where no copy would be kept of the incoming letter or the reply - the original of the incoming, of course, going to the agency to which it is referred. The Minneapolis Office does not now keep a copy of such replies.

(b) Handle requests for application blanks by form letter with no copy and place a notation on the incoming letter or handle by merely placing an application blank in an envelope and mailing it and not retaining the incoming letter.

C. CONCLUSIONS:

Nothing substantial can be accomplished in applying the two suggested procedures as to marginal notations and retention of material. This is certainly true as to investigative case matters and it narrows down to non-investigative matters. Even here there have been many instances where the failure to have a permanent record of a telephone call or inquiries in other forms have placed the Bureau in an awkward position, not being able to intelligently handle the matter. There are isolated instances where such systems are applicable and inquiry shows that they have been applied. Requests for application blanks in the field by letter could be handled merely by mailing such a blank and not keeping the incoming letter or any record thereof.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the field be instructed to handle inquiries for application blanks by merely mailing same with no letter and not retaining the incoming letter.

SAC, Albuquerque

Dec 17, 1950

Director, FBI

AIR MAIL - SPECIAL DELIVERY

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

LIAISON WITH INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
PROTECTION OF VITAL INSTALLATIONS

Reurlet dated December 16, 1950, requesting advice as to whether the subject of preparation and use of the Security Index in the El Paso and Albuquerque areas should be discussed on a strictly confidential basis and if the monthly intelligence conferences with representatives of OSI, G-2, Fourth Army, Armed Forces Control Council, and Sandia Case; the Atomic Energy Commission and Division of Los Alamos and Sandia Case; and the Special Agent in Charge of the Air Force at Kirtland AFB.

Subject matter mentioned above should not be discussed at monthly intelligence conferences. In the event a specific inquiry regarding the Security Index is received from any of the intelligence services, you should advise the appropriate agency that he should direct such inquiry to the appropriate quarters at the point of contact of such agency. It should be discussed on a liaison basis with the Bureau's representative in such city, D. C. Of course, you will continue to handle inquiries of this nature in a diplomatic manner.

cc:

El Paso
Phoenix
San Antonio

AIR MAIL - SPECIAL DELIVERY
" " "

66-8603-62-2
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 12-16-50

FROM : SAC, ALBUQUERQUE

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY - USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
LIAISON WITH INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
PROTECTION OF VITAL INSTALLATIONS

100-3-63-284
Rebulet 10-28-50, entitled Office of Special Investigations, 17th District Headquarters, Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, which is in answer to mylet 10-17-50, captioned COMMUNIST PARTY - USA, Membership, District 19, Albuquerque Office, INTERNAL SECURITY - C.

Reference is also made to San Francisco teletype dated 12-4-50 concerning Western Area Commanders Conference set for December 14, 1950, requesting information concerning the security index and other matters in the Western states.

As anticipated, Captain [redacted] of the 17th District Headquarters, OSI, Kirtland AFB, Albuquerque, New Mexico, has stated that he desired to get his files in shape by knowing all of the known Communist Party members in New Mexico and in the vicinity of El Paso, Texas. Captain MORRILL was advised that no list was available of known Communist Party members, and that he should direct such an inquiry to the Bureau through his headquarters station at the Seat of Government, so that it might be discussed on a liaison basis with the Bureau's representative in Washington, D.C. This satisfied Captain MORRILL and it is not known for sure whether or not such a request will be made by Captain MORRILL through his headquarters station at the Seat of Government.

As the Bureau is aware, the El Paso Office and this office participate in monthly intelligence conferences with representatives of OSI, G-2 Fourth Army, Armed Forces Special Weapons Command at Sandia Base, the Atomic Energy Commission installations at Los Alamos and Sandia Base, and the Special Weapons Command of the Air Force at Kirtland AFB. From time to time during the recent international crisis, questions are asked of the Bureau representatives present concerning the individuals who might be detained or arrested in the event of a national emergency. Questions are asked as to the estimate of the number of individuals who will be apprehended in the territory covered by this office and the other offices in the area. Questions are asked as to whether or not the Bureau has the "tipped for pick-up", and in certain instances, individual names are brought up with the question as to whether or not they will be picked up. All of these

JFC:AGG
100-00

cc: El Paso
Phoenix

100-355

Director, FBI
12-14-50

CP-USA, IS-C; Liaison with
Intel. Agency; or Section
of Title III, etc.

questions have been answered in such a manner that is obviously unsatisfactory to those requesting the information, and at all times have matters connected with the preparation and maintenance of the security index been protected and not divulged.

In view of this situation, it is anticipated that these questions are to continue to be asked of the Bureau representatives because of the intelligence representatives' interest in this area's security, by visits to the Air Force, Army, Navy, installations, the Armed Forces Special Weapons installations, and the vital Air Force installations in this location.

It is not known to what extent the matters pertaining to the preparation and maintenance of the security index is going to be discussed at the conference of Western Area Commanders in San Francisco on December 11, 1950; however, it is believed that in the event it is discussed that information will undoubtedly be disseminated to the areas covered by this office. In the event that information is disseminated to the intelligence representatives in New Mexico, they will probably request information concerning the preparation and maintenance of the security index in this office.

I am aware of the contents of Section 678 of the Manual of Instructions, particularly under "1(1)", page 63, wherein it states all matters connected with the preparation and maintenance of the security index must be considered strictly confidential and should at no time be mentioned to agencies or individuals outside of the Bureau, other than duly authorized representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, G-2 of the Army, and the Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force, and then only on a strictly confidential basis.

It is desired that the Bureau inform the areas and advise whether or not the information is to be discussed on a strictly confidential basis and the Bureau will maintain the security index in this office and will be able to advise at one of the above mentioned monthly intelligence conferences.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :


DATE: July 13, 1961

FROM :

SUBJECT: U. S. INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

fication and investigation of [The report discusses the identi-
the U.S. and includes the fact that potentially dangerous persons in
are listed on the Security Index.] approximately 12,000 individuals

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

D R A F T

July 13, 1961

66-8603-
2722
(ENC.)

I. IDENTIFICATION AND INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIALLY
DANGEROUS PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES

The FBI maintains a current list of individuals, both citizens and aliens, to be considered for apprehension and detention, if necessary, in a period of emergency. Approximately 12,000 individuals are listed at this time. This list is kept current on a daily basis by the addition of new individuals whose activities make them potentially dangerous to the United States, and by the deletion of individuals who are no longer engaged in subversive activities.

D R A F T

Included on the list of potentially dangerous individuals are nearly 200 persons who are engaged in pre-Castro Cuban activities or who sympathize strongly with such activities.

In addition to members of the Communist Party, it also includes certain members of such organizations as the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, the Nation of Islam, and the Socialist Workers Party.

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, Pittsburgh
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

DATE: 2/3/50 564

Please be advised that the original and duplicate security index boxes, heretofore maintained in the vault in the Chief Clerk's Office, are now being maintained, under lock and key, in a metal fire proof filing cabinet located in the office of the ASAC. This change was effected in order to make the boxes more readily accessible to the agent responsible for the maintenance of the security index of the Pittsburgh Office as well as those agents working on security index cases.

It is anticipated that it will be necessary to prepare a tickler system to insure the prompt reopening of security index cases at least every six months, for the purpose of verifying the residence and employment addresses of security index subjects.

Unless otherwise advised by the Bureau, this office will institute a tickler system to aid in the handling of security index cases.

100-16200-564

66-17380-997

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ~~██████████~~

DATE: August 26, 1955

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: ⁰WAR PLANS - Summary - General
~~FIELD RELOCATION~~

On 8/24/55 the Executive's Conference, consisting of Messrs. Boardman, Belmont, Harbo, Mohr, Parsons, Rosen, McGuire, Trotter, and Sizoo, considered problems involving field relocation.

It was pointed out to the Conference that most Bureau field offices will be facing the same problem of relocation as is the Bureau, in that Civil Defence in most headquarters cities is planning a general exodus of the city in an emergency, in which event there will be no cross-town traffic and all traffic will flow out of town. The basic problem for the field is having sufficient communications facilities and records with which to operate at the relocation site. The Conference was advised that from a practical standpoint field offices, being comprised of trained personnel, in an emergency are capable of temporarily operating without Bureau records except for the programs calling for the protective custody of diplomats of enemy nations (radio) and the program calling for the detention of individuals dangerous to the security of the United States (radio). These programs require specific records to insure their efficient operation.

The Conference was advised that 72% of the Security Index subjects are in the New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Washington Field, and Newark Offices, which offices are also believed to be the focal points for prospective espionage and sabotage activities, and, therefore, would have need for at least basic communications facilities.

Executives Conference Memorandum to [REDACTED]

Executives Conference Recommendation

The Executives Conference was unanimous in its recommendation on each of the following points:

(1) That there be prepared by the Bureau and made available to each field office an additional set of the Security Index cards pertaining to the subjects residing in each field office. This set of Security Index cards is to be placed in the personal custody of the Senior Resident Agent in the Resident Agency wherein the best security is available near the field office relocation site. This index is to be kept current by the field office, forwarding to the Resident Agent in question, through the mail, revised or changed cards as they are received by the field office from the Bureau. In the event of field relocation, the Senior Resident Agent, with appropriate guard, is to transport this index to the field relocation site, it being contemplated that the office will have insufficient time and inadequate guard force to transport the Security Index now at headquarters city to their relocation site in an emergency.

(2) Inasmuch as only the New York and Washington Field Offices are primarily concerned with the program calling for the protective custody of diplomats of enemy nations (Prodip), the New York Office be instructed to make available to the Senior Resident Agent having custody of the above Security Index one set of instructions for carrying out this program together with a list of individuals to be taken into custody under the program. This material would be kept current on a monthly basis. The Washington Field Office will place similar information as well as their additional copy of the Security Index pertaining to their office in the confidential records repository at the Bureau relocation site.

Executives Conference Memorandum for

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the attached SAC letter, advising the field that a set of Security Index cards will be made available to each office in the near future. This index to be placed in the personal custody of the Senior Resident Agent in a Resident Agency affording utmost security and instructing the field that no confidential records should be transported from the field office to the relocation site even in an emergency without maximum security in the form of an appropriate guard force.

OK.
PS.

(2) That the attached letter to the New York office, copy to Washington Field, go forth instructing the New York Office to place in the personal custody of a Senior Resident Agent at a secure Resident Agency one copy of the instructions pertaining to, and lists of individuals to be apprehended in connection with, the program calling for the protective custody of diplomats of enemy nations. Washington Field is to send similar records to the Bureau relocation site. Both offices are to keep these records current monthly as is done with similar records now at the Bureau relocation site.

OK

- 3 -

mlp

SAC, Miami

June 23, 1955

Director, FBI (66-17380)

BUPLANS - FIELD INVESTIGATION,
SECURITY INDEX, AND TRANSPORTATION
OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIALS

Your defense plans continue to reflect that an extra set of Security Index cards and other material stored outside headquarters city are located in Jacksonville. Your plans should be amended to reflect the exact location of these documents at this time.

Jacksonville Office is instructed to advise the Bureau of its plans for the storage outside headquarters city of an extra copy of the Security Index and related material. In this connection, the attention of the Jacksonville Office is directed to SAC Letters 55-57 (), 56-9 (), and to Bureau Letter 55-8 dated October 3, 1955, all dealing with the above subject.

This matter should be handled promptly.

2 - Jacksonville

- 1 - 66-17380 Sub 29 (Buplans - Miami)
- 1 - 66-17380 Sub 63 (Buplans - Jacksonville)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

66-17380-176

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

Date: 4/12/55

To: Director, FBI

From: SAC, Norfolk

Division of assignment: Norfolk

SUGGESTION: Re: FD-186

Description should be revised to correspond with the description printed on the back of Security Index cards.

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts):

The description of the subject is filled in on Form FD-186, which is placed on the reverse side of the Security Index card.

Advantages of suggestion:

By revising this description so that it will be uniform with the form on which it is to be copied, considerable time will be saved in copying this description.

Disadvantages of suggestion:

None.

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

referred to Domestic
Intelligence Div
for review 4/28/55 - hae

☒ Mr.
☐ Mrs.
☐ Miss

(Signature of Suggester)

Recommendations and comments of Division Head:

(4) 15 1955

(Signature & Title)

67-050-508

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: August 19, 1949

FROM :

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED CHANGES OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING THE SECURITY INDEX AND RELATED MATTERS

The Internal Security Section has in the recent past extensively studied the operations and procedures relative to the handling of investigations of individuals under consideration for the Security Index Program. The study has been directed toward more efficient handling of the program to better insure the Bureau's coverage in the Internal Security Field. With a view toward more efficient and thorough handling it has been possible to simplify and uniform procedures, eliminate two form letters, eliminate administrative steps, and yet still more thoroughly establish continuous coverage of all individuals on the Security Index and to establish in each office a central repository of all individuals of interest to the national defense.

In line with this study a monthly self-inspection was prepared for the field on the Security Index. These self-inspection memoranda have been thoroughly reviewed and the material analyzed in conjunction with Inspector

As a result of this review and analysis of these matters by supervisors in the Internal Security Section new instructions relative to the whole program have been prepared and are attached hereto in the form of an SAC Letter.

Security Index Monthly Self Inspection

An itemization is being made of the various suggestions and problems presenting themselves in the monthly inspection. They are hereafter taken up individually.

Suggestions

(1) That the Bureau set up a uniform system, authorizing the Field to prepare its Security Index Card at the time the recommendation is made. This card would be filed under a separate section in the Index under a tab entitled, "Recommended." The purpose of this is to insure at the time of an emergency that the field office would be alert to individuals who had been recommended for the Security Index but who had, at that time, not yet been authorized by the Bureau.

Comment: This procedure is believed to be undesirable in that it is felt such recommended cards could well be confused with authorized cards which would result in a discrepancy of the cards maintained by the Bureau and the particular field office. It is appreciated that these individuals do represent a gap of coverage in the event of a national emergency. However,

Attachment

12-00121

FILED

a separate provision, providing coverage of such individuals, is set forth in the attached suggested SAC Letter. It will involve the use of the field office case tickler.

(2) That a uniform system of posting on the Security Index Card the last date, the residence and business addresses were checked:

Comment: This is believed to be a valuable suggestion and it is covered in the attached SAC Letter.

(3) From the field office geographical Section of the Security Index Card the breakdowns as to organizational affiliation, that is, the Communist Party, Socialist Workers' Party, etc., be deleted and that the cards be maintained in a straight alphabetical order according to the geographical needs of the office.

Comment: This appears to be a valuable suggestion. Informal inquiries of other larger offices as to the elimination of this breakdown have met with favorable response. The organizational breakdown is a historical development from the old custodial detention card when not only present breakdowns were needed but also German, Japanese, and Italian. In view of the present breakdown of such information on the IBM card permitting rapid and accurate listings and compilations for each field office it no longer appears to serve a useful purpose. It will simplify the arrangement and handling of the Security Index in the field and reduce the opportunity for errors. The manual provision governing the arrangement of the Security Index is being rewritten in the attached letter accordingly.

(4) That descriptive information and the license numbers of the automobiles owned and operated by key figures and top functionaries be posted on the Security Index Card. Also, that it be posted on the Communist Index Cards.

Comment: This is believed to be undesirable inasmuch as such information appears to be of limited value and primarily for surveillance purposes. Such information it is believed could be posted on the Communist Index Card if desired in accordance with the authority set forth in the attached proposed SAC Letter. It is not, however, believed desirable to clutter the Security Index Card with such information.

(5) That when making a recommendation for the preparation of a Security Index Card on Form FD-122 it be mandatory upon the Agent to take some positive step concerning recommendations as to tabbing toward Detcom or Comsab.

Comment: This is believed to be a valuable suggestion and appropriate space for such action has been made on the new Form FD-122.

(6) That a system of checking the addresses on Security Index Cards be adopted throughout the field requiring that the Security Index be broken down into 6 groups requiring each group to have its addresses checked every 6 months. It was suggested that this would do away with administrative ticklers in the handling of checking addresses.

Comment: It is believed that the responsibility and the method used in checking the addresses on Security Index Cards is wholly upon the SAC. This is an administrative matter for which he is held responsible. The method suggested by this office is undoubtedly a workable method and for some offices it appears to be adequate. On the other hand for other offices it would be inadequate and again for still other offices it would be entirely too cumbersome and unnecessary. It is lastly believed the Bureau should not go on record indicating a satisfaction with checking addresses on exactly a 6 months basis. It is the field's responsibility always to maintain current information on residence and business addresses and they must be checked at least every 6 months. It is believed that the method used should be left to the discretion of the SAC.

(7) That on the photograph appearing on the Security Index Card the date subject's photograph was taken be noted.

Comment: This would probably be of some value. However, it is questionable if it is worth putting the field to a project of posting such dates. It might additionally be noted that the general Bureau instructions at the present time require that where available the date a photograph was taken should be noted on the back side of such photograph. Your attention is directed to the uniform stamp used throughout the field to be imprinted on the back side of all photographs.

(8) That information concerning the subject of Security Index Cards, relative to his possession of firearms, unusual strength, or other items of like nature, reflecting upon his dangerousness be posted on each Security Index Cards.

Comment: It is not believed desirable that those items be removed separately and posted on the front side of the card again cluttering the card with such information. However, if such information is available it obviously and properly belongs as a part of the description which goes on the back side of the Security Index Card maintained in the Geographical Section.

(9) That auxiliary Security Index Cards maintained in auxiliary offices be destroyed. This arises where a subject resides at one address covered by one field division and is employed in an area covered by another field division.

Comment: It is believed that this suggestion fails to recognize the purpose of the Security Index as an apprehension list. It is believed not only desirable but absolutely necessary in order to insure coverage in the event of an emergency that in such instances Security Index Cards not only be filed in the office of origin but also in the auxiliary office. This item is being elaborated in the attached SAC Letterlet.

(10) That the following items be noted on the Security Index Card: The presence of children in the home; Serious illness on the part of the subject; point of temporary ^{detention}; and law enforcement agency to assist in apprehension.

Comment: It is not believed desirable at the present time to clutter the Security Index Card with such information. The first two items obviously can be placed on the back side of the Security Index Card under the caption description. Relative to the point of temporary detention and the law enforcement agency to assist in apprehension it is believed that these things are subject to too much change and it would be impracticable to institute a program of including this information on the card.

(11) That the Security Index Card be destroyed rather than transferred upon the change of the office of origin.

Comment: This suggestion was made apparently without the knowledge that the Bureau was contemplating working out more uniform practices relative to the makeup and handling of the Security Index Card. It is definitely believed that the Security Index Card should not be destroyed and that it be regarded as a portion of the Bureau files. Present instructions call for its transfer and no change is contemplated in this procedure.

(12) Include on the new revised form FD-122 space to indicate the date and place of birth of the subject's parents, spouse or spouse's parents.

Comment: Inasmuch as this information is no longer compiled in a statistical form it is not believed desirable to include it on the new form FD-122 which recommends the preparation of a Security Index Card.

(13) That the form FD-119, which was used to alter or revise a Security Index Card especially as to addresses within a field division, be retained by both the field office and by the Seat of Government. This form has in the past been destroyed after the appropriate action has been taken.

Comment: This is believed to be a very valuable suggestion and since Form FD-119 is being discontinued the revised form FD-122, which will be used not only to recommend new Security Index Cards, but also to correct or change existing cards, will be required to be filed not only by the Bureau but by the field office as well. This will leave a record in the case file of all action taken effecting the Security Index Card. This is being covered in the attached SAC Letterlet.

67-030-1508

(14) The New York Office has requested authority to maintain its Security Index in the condition in which it presently maintains it. It appears that it desires authority for the following: (a) Maintain a provision for the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico; (b) Maintain a provision for the United Nations Secretariat; (c) Maintain its provision for a breakdown according to the squad handling the investigation; (d) Maintain blue cards for key figures in lieu of tabs; (e) Maintain salmon colored cards for Comsab subjects in lieu of tabs.

Comment: It appears that the physical arrangement of the Security Index in the New York Office is far more detailed and complicated than in any other office. At the present time this does not appear warranted in that as of the date of the monthly inspection New York then had 1,842 Security Index Cards. One office had close to 1,000 Security Index Cards, another office had close to 1,800 cards. Both these offices, however, appeared to be following the Bureau uniform practice and procedures. New York has requested Bureau authority to maintain its present setup.

While it is realized that the New York Office is confronted with special problems due to its large number of cases, it is not believed desirable for that office to continue the maintenance of its Security Index in its present condition. In view of the special problems which prevail, however, it is suggested that Section Chief who is fully conversant with the Bureau's policies regarding Security Index matters, make a personal visit to the New York Office in the near future for the purpose of reviewing the Security Index in that office and making recommendations which will bring its maintenance more in line with that of the Field in general.

COMMUNIST INDEX

All the suggestions submitted concerning the Communist Index will not be taken up individually for the reason that the complete rules and regulations covering the Communist Index have been rewritten. It should be noted, however, that five offices have called for general instructions on the Communist Index. In addition, six offices in their inspection memorandum by their handling of the matter reflect a complete confusion as to the understanding and the purpose of the Index.

A review of the inspection memoranda has reflected that the Field has not followed any uniformity as to its use or as to its setup. It is expected that the new instructions will establish a uniformity in all the aspects of handling this Index.

In connection with the Index it might be pointed out here that SAC Letter No. 57, Series 1948, instructed that all known Party members be included in the Index. No other provisions or instructions regarding the Index were furnished. Therefore today if the index is actually being maintained as it should be according to instructions it would reflect only at best a list of party members as of the date of the preparation of the index. Experience had shown that the limitation of the Index to Party members appears to be one of its greatest weaknesses in that information of a Party membership of an individual is a poor criterion standing alone of individuals to be borne in mind in the event of a national emergency. This weakness is pointed out in that individuals such as many of the prominent and important Communist attorneys, etc., could not be included on the Communist Index under its present provisions.

Among the other weaknesses of the present set up are the failures to understand the purposes of the Index, the manner in which it is kept current, the standard of currency required, and the physical arrangement.

Typical of the suggestions submitted concerning this Index are:

- (a) Destroy the Communist Index Card when an individual is transferred to another district.
- (b) Mount photographs on the Communist Index Cards.
- (c) Prepare a "fellow traveller" Index to supplement the Communist Index.
- (d) Separate the Index as to individuals presently within the district and those transferred out.
- (e) Require the card to be of the same size as the Security Index Card.
- (f) Retain the card in the event of a change of office of origin.
- (g) Indicate by the color of a card whether or not the subject is the subject of a Security Index Card, the former subject of a Security Index Card or has never been on the Security Index.
- (h) Include the description on the back side of the card.
- (i) Separate the Index according to the individuals who are presently active and those who are no longer active.

These suggestions are not going to be taken up individually inasmuch as it is believed all the questions will be taken up and answered by a new provision in the Manual covering the Security Index which is attached hereto in the form of a SAC Letter.

One specific suggestion is being taken up namely that in cases where an individual is the subject of a Communist Index Card a top memorandum be prepared for the file which will at all times reflect that the individual does appear on the Communist Index.

Comment: This is believed to be unnecessary in that the original instructions permitted the use of a mimeographed form in the review of case files to determine if an individual should have been considered for the Communist Index. This memorandum should, therefore, be in the file and any subsequent cases can be handled by an appropriate notation in the file. It is not believed desirable that special provision be made for a top memorandum to appear in the field office files merely because an individual is the subject of a Communist Index Card.

MISCELLANEOUS AND GENERAL SUGGESTIONS

(1) The inspection has reflected that 10 offices have not properly understood the instructions governing the tabbing of individuals under the Detcom and Comsab Programs.

Comment: In view of the apparent confusion of the field concerning these two programs, the instructions governing these programs will be briefly reiterated in the attached SAC Letter.

(3) That a form be developed and authority be granted to the field to change office of origin without prior Bureau approval in security cases on individuals where there is not a Security Index Card the same as the field may presently do where there is a Security Index Card.

Comment: This is believed to be a valuable suggestion and Form FD-128, which has been used in the past for this procedure, is being revised to include not only Security Index Card subjects but also non-Security Index Card subjects in the security field. Appropriate instructions will also be furnished to the field to authorize this procedure.

(4) The St. Paul Office has requested that a named agent of that office be designated as a full time Communist Squad Supervisor.

Comment: This matter has been given attention by the Administrative Division.

(5) That the key figures of each office be arbitrarily broken down into six groups and that reports in these cases be submitted on a staggered basis throughout the year.

Comment: It is believed that the office submitting this suggestion has misconstrued the instructions regarding key figures. You will recall that each office is required to submit a list of the key figures in its office every 6 months on April 1 and again on October 1. You will also recall that the new instructions require that reports must be submitted in key figure cases every six months. These two instructions have apparently been confused in that the reports required will normally stagger themselves throughout the year and are not required to be submitted on April and October 1.

(6) That cases on all individuals tabbed under Comsab be kept in a pending inactive status.

Comment: This is not believed desirable. If an individual is important or active enough to warrant reports on a regular basis or being kept in a pending inactive status the obligation is, of course, on the field to submit such reports and further if he fits the requirements described for key figures he should, of course, be so designated. However, the designation Comsab does not reflect upon the individual's importance to the movement or the extent of his activities therein but rather his potentiality as a Communist saboteur due to his training or his present relationship to a vital facility.

VITAL AND STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES CLASSIFICATIONS ON THE SECURITY INDEX CARDS

The Bureau is in possession of the list of Vital and Strategic Industries List prepared by the Munitions Board. This Board in turn prepared the listing on the basis of information obtained from the Armed Services.

In conjunction with the Training and Inspection Division the Espionage and Internal Security Sections have attempted to classify these various industries in an effort to get the information in a workable order from the standpoint of the Security Index Cards. It has been found, however, that after a diligent study it has been impossible to work out a basic industries classification of the material submitted by the Munitions Board due to the inconsistency of the classifications or the listings and the obvious omissions from the listing.

67-1557508

It is interesting to note that the vital industries list omitted such industries as the coal industry and the food and the food processing industry. Also, industries which appear to be identical are often described in a manner capable of various classifications. This fact has resulted in the necessity of going back to the Munitions Board and the Armed Forces in an effort to determine from them a basis for a proper basic industry classification in order that at some subsequent time, when the Bureau is called upon to furnish information concerning a basic group we will be in a position, along with the Munitions Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Securities Resources Board to be speaking, so as to say, of the same thing.

When the proper basic classifications and basic groups are obtained from the above agencies they will, of course, be supplemented by certain other activities considered by the Bureau to be vital such as Government employees, Atomic Energy Commission, United Nations Secretariat, Espionage subjects, etc. This will, of course, include separate classifications for individuals who appear in the Special Section of the Security Index.

A code will be developed which will appear on each Security Index Card as well as the IBM cards so that at any given time the Bureau will be in a position to obtain a listing or a tabulation of any particular type of industry or of any of the groups which we consider in our special classifications

RECOMMENDATIONS

If you approve, it is recommended that the following action be taken:

1. That the attached memorandum to all Bureau supervisors be presented to the Executive Conference.
2. That the attached SAC Letter and its enclosures be presented to the Executive Conference for its approval.
3. That consideration be given to the suggestion that Bureau representatives fully conversant with the Security Index Program personally go to the New York Office in an effort to survey the Security Index arrangements of that office and make positive recommendations in order to have that index conform with the uniform Bureau procedure with due allowance for necessary exceptions to the New York Office.
4. That letters be sent to all offices offering suggestions in the monthly self-inspection and to all offices reflecting confusion of procedure where the suggestions or procedures are not specifically covered by the attached Bulletin.

*Correct
97*
*By J. J. Bureau
H.*

Done H.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

67-753-
3176

TO :

DATE: 9/29/64

FROM :

SUBJECT:

INTERNAL SECURITY - R - CUBA

has requested to be advised as to who decides when an individual's name should be included in the Security Index.

Upon receipt of a recommendation from the field office that the subject's name be included in the Security Index, the facts in the case are reviewed by the substantive supervisor, the supervisor in charge of the particular unit, the section chief, inspector in charge of the branch, assistant director or person acting in his behalf with the final decision being made in office.

The same evaluation of the facts involved is made in certain cases in which the field does not recommend the subject's name for inclusion in the Security Index but from a review of the facts at the Bureau such action appears desirable.

In submitting a closing report in a security case in which the field does not recommend the subject's name for the Security Index, the Manual of Instructions requires the field to specifically state their reason for not so recommending. This field action is subject to review by the Special Agent investigating the case, the field supervisor and/or SAC approving the report as well as the substantive supervisor at the Seat of Government. If the facts in the matter appear to be borderline, it is the responsibility of the substantive supervisor at the Seat of Government to call the case to the attention of his superior for evaluation of Security Index status.

The Security Index criteria, which was adopted in April, 1955, is attached. In addition to the criteria, the Manual of Instructions, Section 87D, contains for field guidance as well as guidance of supervisory personnel at the Seat of Government 23 specific factors which must be taken into consideration in arriving at a determination as to whether the subject's name should be included in the Security Index as having met one or more of the Security Index criteria.

SECURITY INDEX CRITERIA

- (A) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- (B) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organizations within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- (C) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- (D) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the U.S. in time of emergency.

SAC, SAN JUAN

October 31, 1947

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX

RECORDED

98-6187-3

Reference is made to your letter in the above captioned matter dated October 25, 1947, in which you revealed a discussion had with Captain [REDACTED], G-2, San Juan, relative to activities anticipated by the FBI in the event of an emergency. You indicate that you intend to discuss briefly, generally and in strict confidence with representatives of G-2 and ONI the Bureau's work in connection with the Security Index.

This is to advise that there is no objection to your carrying on such a discussion if it is in general terms and there is no one present other than the representatives of G-2, A-2, and ONI. For your information, the Bureau intends to discreetly discuss with the Intelligence Division of the Army information appearing in the first paragraph of referenced letter that the Army Headquarters have warned against an incipient campaign of sabotage throughout the United States and its territories by Communists at Soviet inspiration. This matter will be discussed discreetly for the purpose of ascertaining the source.

This matter is brought to your attention pursuant to your request that you be advised if any of the information appearing in the referenced letter is discussed with the Intelligence Division of the Army at Washington.

223
52 NOV 17 1947

Box 4312, San Juan 21, Puerto Rico
October 25, 1947

98-6187-3
(ENC)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI

Re: SECURITY INDEX

Dear Sir:

On October 20, 1947 Captain [redacted], G-2, San Juan, called at the office and stated that they had received a highly confidential radio-gram addressed to the local Commander from Army Headquarters warning against an incipient campaign of sabotage throughout the United States and its territories by Communists at Soviet inspiration.

In taking stock of the situation, Captain [redacted] stated, local Army authorities felt it necessary to consider the detention of Communist leaders. Accordingly, G-2 desired appropriate information from the FBI which would enable them to estimate what facilities for detention purposes would be required. Specifically, Captain [redacted] asked for an estimate of the number of Communist leaders and agitators who might be subject to arrest and detention in the event of an emergency.

He also suggested that we furnish a list of names of the most prominent individuals in this category in order that the Army could search its files and make certain that all data in their possession had been furnished to us, and if not, that it could be.

In regard to his first request for an estimate of the number of people subject to detention I replied that the FBI was not unaware of the possibility of an emergency situation arising that might require the detention of individuals considered dangerous to be at liberty, just as this problem had been anticipated and cared for prior to the participation of the United States in World War II.

I spoke in general terms about the Security Index program and assured him we would cooperate in furnishing data necessary for a coordinated plan of activity.

Concerning his second request I informed him we would naturally welcome any data in possession of G-2 which we did not now have and would try to work out a program to check with G-2 on various individuals under investigation, although I felt certain this had been done wherever appropriate at the time of individual investigations. I have in mind, and so

Communist Sabotage

RECORDED
92-1187-3
73 NOV 1947

10/25/47

Letter to the Director
Re: Security Index

indicated to Captain [REDACTED], that the principal deficiency might exist in regard to those persons on whom our investigation had ceased when they were inducted into the Army, and of whose subsequent discharge we may not have been informed.

In discussing generally the question of any restrictive action against dangerous Communists, I pointed out that being citizens a warrant would be necessary for arrests. Captain [REDACTED] appeared to be ignorant of the fact that even during the war citizens could not be arrested and detained under the type of executive warrant that was applied to aliens. He appeared to be under the impression that the President was empowered to declare a state of emergency under which authority for the detention of individuals such as Communist leaders would not depend on evidence of criminal acts. It was made clear that should any individual or group of individuals attempt to, or commit, sabotage they could be arrested under existing statutes.

G-2 has recently given evidence of increased concern about general intelligence and also that it may be anxious to assure itself of the adequacy of FBI intelligence in the field allotted to it under the Delimitation Agreement.

Captain [REDACTED] remarked casually at the end of our conversation that he was extremely busy because of a censorship plan on which he was working. I inquired if the Army was setting up a censorship operation. He replied that the plan was island-wide in preparation for a possible emergency, adding, "We have to do it, (i.e., work out a plan), nobody else is." He then commented that prior to World War II the Army and Navy had organized a censorship plan for operation in the event of war.

In a subsequent conversation, Colonel [REDACTED] mentioned his desire to extend his sources of information, and stated he has been considering methods of enlisting the aid of all Military Intelligence Reserve officers and the National Guard.

Concerning my action in this regard, I believe it would be desirable to discuss briefly, generally, and in strict confidence with G-2, A-2, and ONI the Bureau's work with the Security Index. This will place all agencies on notice of our continued sense of responsibility in the intelligence field allocated to us, and reassure them regarding our activity and of our intention to preserve our jurisdiction. I will bring this matter up at our next meeting on October 29, in view of the seriousness with which the Army is regarding the current situation.

Letter to the Director
Re: Security Index

98-573-2
(Enc)
10/25/47

As to informing Army of the number of persons for which detention facilities should be provided, I think this, too, should be handled on general terms. Obviously, conditions under which disloyal and dangerous citizens may be detained will dictate not only the number of persons so affected, but the nature of restrictions imposed on them.

The Bureau is asked to furnish any special instructions for guidance in this matter if my action and proposed action are not approved.

I am submitting a separate communication suggesting discussion of Intelligence matters at the SAC conference I am scheduled to attend at the Bureau on November 10, 1947.

If the Bureau considers any of the above information a matter for discussion with G-2 in Washington it is requested that I be advised in order that I may be aware beforehand of any reference G-2 locally may, in turn, receive from its headquarters.

Very truly yours


SAC

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 10/31/47

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

32452 ✓

It will be recalled that the SAC, San Juan advised by letter dated October 25, 1947, that he had had a discussion with Captain [redacted], G-2, San Juan, relative to activities anticipated by the FBI in the event of an emergency. The SAC indicated that he intended to discuss briefly, generally and in strict confidence the Bureau's work in connection with the Security Index with representatives of G-2 and ONI.

We advised the SAC, San Juan by letter dated October 31, 1947, that [redacted] has no objection to carrying on such a discussion if it is in general and if there is no one present other than representatives of G-2, A-2 and ONI.

This matter has been discussed by Mr. [redacted] with the Headquarters Intelligence Division, which knew nothing about the matter and suggested it had originated with the Headquarters of the Caribbean Command.

Efforts are continuing towards securing complete details from Military Intelligence regarding this situation.

95-1117-1
21 OCT 1947

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT



TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: November 5, 1947

FROM : 

32451

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

You will recall that the Special Agent in Charge at San Juan advised by letter dated October 25, 1947, that he had had a discussion with Captain , G-2, San Juan, relative to activities anticipated by the FBI in the event of an emergency.  had advised that they had received a highly confidential radiogram addressed to the local Commander from Army Headquarters warning against an incipient campaign of sabotage throughout the United States and its territories by Communists at Soviet inspiration.

The Liaison Section has contacted the Intelligence Division of the Army and they have conducted an exhaustive search and have now stated that they cannot locate any communication to any of the G-2's of the Armies making any such allegations. They have advised that they intend to check into this matter in order to ascertain from the Caribbean Defense Command their source of such statements.

You might want to discuss this matter further with Special Agent in Charge Schlenker.

S. Schlenker

RECORDED

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32450

SAC, San Juan

November 17, 1947

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX

Reference is made to my letter in the above captioned matter dated October 31, 1947, relating to discussions with Captain [REDACTED], C-2, San Juan. You were advised that the Bureau intended to discreetly discuss with the Intelligence Division of the Army information which appeared in your letter of October 15, 1947, that the Army Headquarters had learned against an incipient campaign of sabotage throughout the United States and its territories by Communists at Soviet instigation. It was indicated that the Bureau intended to discuss this matter for the purpose of ascertaining the source.

The results of these discussions now indicate that there is no record of the Intelligence Division of the Army at Washington having advised any of the Army Areas of this information. The Bureau has been advised that the Intelligence Division of the Army intends to contact the Caribbean Defense Command in order to ascertain their source.

You should also follow this matter with Captain [REDACTED] and obtain from him any information regarding the source of his statement and advise the Bureau.

MAILED 2

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
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August 14, 1943

NO. 336
SERIES 1943

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	DENVER	LOS ANGELES	PITTSBURGH	SPRINGFIELD
	DES MOINES	LOUISVILLE	PORTLAND	WASHINGTON, D. C.
				QUANTICO

Re: DANGEROUSNESS CLASSIFICATION
CHANGE OF CHARACTER
CUSTODIAL DETENTION

Effective immediately, the character of investigations of individuals (other than alien enemies) who may be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the public safety or internal security of the United States shall be "Security Matter" and not "Custodial Detention." The phraseology, "Custodial Detention," shall no longer be used to designate the character of any investigation, nor shall it be used for any purpose in reports or other communications. Investigations involving organizations or "key figures" in the Communist Party will continue to bear the character, "Internal Security," as in the past, but the dual character of "Custodial Detention" will be eliminated.

Henceforth, the cards previously known as Custodial Detention Cards will be known and referred to as Security Index Cards, and the list composed of such cards will be known as the Security Index.


For your information, the Attorney General, on July 16, 1943, ordered that the dangerousness classifications previously made by the Special Defense Unit be succeeded by the Special War Policies Unit, be not used in the future for purpose whatsoever.

The Bureau will continue to investigate dangerous and potentially dangerous individuals other than alien enemies under the characters of Security Matter and Internal Security. It will also continue to prepare and maintain Security Index cards. The fact that the Security Index and Security Index Cards are prepared and maintained should be considered as strictly confidential.

confidential, and should at no time be mentioned or alluded to in investigative reports, or discussed with agencies or individuals outside the Bureau other than duly authorized representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Service, and then only on a strictly confidential basis.

A revised Section of the National Defense Manual to replace the present Section 16 is being prepared and will be available in the immediate future. It is desired that you discuss the contents of this letter with all investigative personnel under your supervision.

Very truly yours,



John Edgar Hoover
Director

100-00-434

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
SYRACUSE 2, NEW YORK

March 28, 1944

Director, FBI

Dear Sir:

There is transmitted herewith a memorandum prepared by [redacted] Principal Stenographer, in which she offers a suggestion with reference to files on subjects of the Security Index card file for the Bureau's consideration.

Very truly yours,

[redacted]
[redacted], SAC

Enclosure - 1



Op. 317

Syracuse, New York
March 28, 1944

MEMORANDUM, SAC:

Re: ~~SECURITY INDEX~~


I desire to make the following suggestion for the consideration of the Bureau with respect to the handling of cases on subjects on whom Security Index cards have been prepared:

It is suggested that, as soon as a Security Index card is prepared on a subject, the notation "S.I." be made immediately following the file number on the file cover of the particular investigative file. This notation will indicate to the Agent handling the case that, in the event the title of the case is changed, as for example where additional aliases are listed for the subject, or in the event subject's address is changed, the Bureau should immediately be advised by the appropriate form letter (FD-119), which letter advises that the copy of the Security Index card in the field office has been revised and suggests that the Security Index card maintained at the Seat of Government be revised accordingly.

It is thought that such a procedure would save considerable time on the part of an Agent reviewing the file for the purpose of determining if the Security Index card is up-to-date and would insure immediate notification being forwarded to the Bureau in case of any revision in the Security Index card. At the present time, in many instances the Bureau letter instructing that a Security Index card be prepared on a subject is followed by numerous serials and it is only after a very thorough review of the file that it can be determined that a Security Index card is maintained on the subject.

Principal Steno.

ENCLOSURE



JKM:md

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

May 1, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The Executives Conference, with Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] gave final consideration on April 27, 1944, to the advisability of permitting Field Offices to maintain a 3 by 5 card straight alphabetical index as a supplement to the regular Security Index card file. You will recall that the Security Index card file was broken down geographically by States and major cities in all offices and then, in early 1943, was broken down in all Coastal offices to geographical areas as small as counties, townships, and even police precincts. This latter action was taken almost solely to forestall a "grid plan" contemplated by ONI. Since then, ONI has practically withdrawn from this field into its own jurisdiction and the Bureau's action, therefore, has accomplished its purpose.

The Philadelphia Field Office raised the question of the use of the straight alphabetical index along with the Security Index file and, therefore, the matter was held to await the recommendation of the Inspectors who recently visited the Philadelphia Office. They expressed the opinion that under the present system of geographical breakdown to small areas, the 3 by 5 index aided materially to the ease and efficiency of handling the Security Index and, therefore, strongly recommended that the authorization be granted for its use. A check was made with the New York Office, which has the same problem, but it was found it is also using such an index as it feels is required to avoid the necessity of lengthy searches to find a card where the exact address is not known.

The Executive Conference felt, however, that there is now no necessity for the geographical breakdown of the Security Index into the small areas which were chosen because of ONI's project. It is the unanimous opinion of the conference that the Bureau can materially simplify this entire project by returning the index to the old system of having it divided only as to nationalistic tendencies by States in each Field Office. Such action would entirely obviate the need for a second index. This opinion is based on the belief that there is no longer any possibility of invasion of this country which was the only justification for the "grid plan" system promulgated by the Navy. It is felt that if there is ever need for the Security Index, it will be general as to all persons of a particular ideological or nationalistic tendency throughout the country rather than any particular small geographical area.

It is therefore recommended that all offices be instructed to revise their Security Index on a straight alphabetical basis by nationalistic tendencies with those offices covering more than one State permitted to have the single geographical division be States. A bulletin to this effect is attached for your approval if you concur with the Conference.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Chairman

Secretary

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO [REDACTED]

DATE: May 19, 1945

FROM [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SPECIAL AGENT
SUGGESTION

During an In-Service interview, this Special Agent suggested that the Bureau break down key figures and other Communist case subjects by the place of birth and extraction. He pointed out that this breakdown would:

1. Be of statistical value to the Bureau.
2. Be of interest and assistance in investigating these cases.
3. Might be valuable information to furnish Congress in the event they called for it in connection with immigration and naturalization rules and regulations.

It is not believed that the work which would be required to set up our files as suggested would be commensurate with the results obtained. With reference to the first suggestion, it is felt that the statistics compiled might be of interest but that they would be of no particular value. With reference to the second point, assistance to investigations, it is difficult to see how the statistics would serve such a purpose. With reference to the third point, furnishing figures to Congress, it is felt that this does have merit but that the same objective could be accomplished at any time it is necessary by examining the Bureau files, which could be done in a reasonably short time.

As of April, 1945, the Security Index contained cards relative to 14,512 Communists, of whom 3,293 are naturalized citizens and 448 are aliens. The balance are native born. Thus it will be seen that by examining 3,741 files, it would be possible to make a report to Congress on the number of foreign born Communists against whom action might be taken, under the routine procedure adopted at the outbreak of the war, and also for the purpose of establishing rules and regulation for immigration.

RECOMMENDATION: It is suggested that this plan not be adopted in view of its limited value.

ACTION: Pursuant to [REDACTED] suggestion, there is attached a recommended letter to Special Agent Pepple.

Attachment

[REDACTED]

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Original cannot be located and is not on record. When original is received in File Division it will be filed with this copy or may be given a new serial.

February 27, 1946

The Director

SUMMARY
INVESTIGATIONS OF COMMUNISTS

4/22/46 CFS

Serial 477X

As a result of the international situation and as a part of its program of preparation for an emergency, the Bureau in June, 1940, began the preparation of a list of individuals who might be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the United States in the event of war or some other serious national emergency.

It will be recalled that on August 24, 1939, a Nonaggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. was signed in Moscow by the terms of which each of the signatories was bound to refrain from any act of force against the other and agreed not to support warlike acts against either by a third power. About a week later, on September 1, 1939, the armed forces of Germany invaded Poland. On September 3, 1939, Great Britain and France declared war on the German Reich. The United States declared itself neutral on September 5, 1939.

As a result of these developments, the President of the United States on September 8, 1939, proclaimed a national emergency "to the extent necessary for the proper observance, safeguarding and insuring of the neutrality of the United States and the strengthening of our national defense within the limits of peacetime authorizations."

By November, 1939, plans for assembling information on potentially dangerous persons were being formulated at the Bureau and on December 6, 1939, all Special Agents in Charge were advised that the Bureau was preparing a list of persons concerning whom there was information available indicating they would be dangerous in time of war or other emergencies; that in most instances the information was incomplete; and that in the near future, the Bureau would begin requesting investigations to complete the information, the investigations to be conducted under authority of the Registration Act requiring agents of foreign principals to register with the Secretary of State.

As above noted, the preparation of the list of dangerous persons was begun in June, 1940. Since the original idea of the list was to provide a record of persons who should be taken into custodial detention pending investigation in the event of an emergency, the list came to be known as the Custodial Detention List.

DESCRIPTION OF LIST

The Custodial Detention List consisted of 5 X 8 cards. Two duplicate cards were prepared with respect to each individual listed. One of the cards placed in an alphabetical sequence file and the other in a geographical file down primarily by field offices and secondarily by nationalistic tendencies sympathies.

MAY 23 1946

DATA ON CARDS

Each card contained the name and aliases of the subject, his citizenship status where known, his nationalistic tendency or sympathy, such as German, Communist, et cetera, and a summary of the information available with respect to his activities, including the source of the information and the file and serial number where it was recorded. The summaries of information on the cards were kept up to date by the addition of material subsequently received. After July 23, 1941, the summaries of information were placed on only one of the cards.

PERSONS LISTED

An effort was made to include in the list all persons who might constitute a danger in the event of war or other serious emergency, including Communists, Nazis or pro-Germans, Italian Fascists or pro-Italians, pro-Japanese, members of American Fascist-type organizations such as the Silver Shirts and the Knights of the White Camellia, espionage and sabotage suspects, et cetera.

As a result of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact above mentioned, the threat to the internal security of the United States consisted more or less of a coalition of Communists, Nazis, Italian Fascists and pro-Japanese elements in the United States.

The Communists and Nazis appeared to have particularly close relations and to cooperate most effectively. At that time, the Communists presented perhaps the greatest danger to the internal security because of the fact that they were the best organized and had had more experience in agitational propaganda and disruptive tactics. Prior to the German attack on Russia in violation of the Nonaggression Pact, the Communists in this country did everything within their power to hinder the war preparations of the United States. They denounced the European War as imperialistic. They opposed the Selective Service and Training Act. They formed peace organizations everywhere and popularized the slogan, "The Yanks Are Not Coming." They fomented and promoted industrial unrest and strikes, culminating in the strike at the North American Aviation Company which was broken up by armed troops. When Germany attacked Russia in violation of the Nonaggression Pact on June 22, 1941, the Communist Party immediately revised its tactics and demanded all-out aid to Russia and Britain.

A great portion of the danger facing this country internally was removed by the German attack on Russia. The policy of the Communist Party then became one of national unity and of collaboration with all forces fighting Nazism and Fascism. Even under these conditions, however, the Communists in this country supported the interests of Russia in every instance in which they conflicted with those of the other Allied powers. For example, they campaigned continuously for a second front in Europe without regard to whether the United States and Britain were prepared to institute such a front. There was also, during this period even, the possibility of a separate peace between Russia and Germany. Had such a peace been consummated, the war would undoubtedly have acquired its original character of "an imperialistic war."

The preparation of Custodial Detention Cards on Communists was not discontinued after the German attack on Russia inasmuch as it was realized that the danger from this source was not terminated but was merely temporarily in abeyance.

REFERRAL OF INFORMATION TO DEPARTMENT

On March 18, 1941, after the facts in a few preliminary cases had been transmitted, a plan was worked out for the submission of information on all subjects of Custodial Detention Cards to the Special Defense Unit of the Department of Justice. The Custodial Detention Cards containing summaries of the information available were photostated and photostatic copies transmitted to the Special Defense Unit. As a result of requests from that Unit, supplemental information was furnished in a large number of cases.

The Special Defense Unit analyzed the facts and classified each individual listed as to dangerousness. In that connection, two classifications were made, one being based on the dangerousness of the individual and the other on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the dangerousness classification. In Group A were placed those believed to be most dangerous and who in all probability should be interned in the event of war. In Group B were placed those believed to be somewhat less dangerous but whose activities should be restricted and in Group C were placed those believed to be least dangerous and who need not be restricted in the absence of additional information, but should be subjected to general surveillance. The numeral I placed after the letters A, B, or C indicated that the evidence was sufficient to establish the charges upon which the dangerousness classification was made whereas the numeral II indicated that the evidence was not considered satisfactory and further investigation might be necessary.

FORMULATION OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES

On June 26, 1940, the Attorney General was advised that the Bureau was maintaining a "suspect list" of individuals whose arrest was considered necessary in the event the United States became involved in war. After extensive efforts by the Bureau to obtain a statement of policy from the Department with respect to the action to be taken upon this list in the event of war, a conference was held on April 5, 1941, between Assistant Directors [redacted] and [redacted] and on April 25, 1941, a memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Assistant to the Attorney General, authorizing the procedure to be followed in the event of war. The instructions provided for a committee to study the case of each individual on whom a dossier was transmitted by the FBI. "If the subject would be an enemy alien in the event of war, the committee will consider whether his immediate internment should be ordered in case of a declaration of war. If he would not be an enemy alien and, therefore, not subject to internment, the committee will consider whether he should be promptly arrested upon a declaration of war on complaint filed before a United States Commissioner on a charge of violating Title I, Section II, Paragraph III

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of the Smith Act (Act of June 28, 1940, Public No. 670, 76th Congress) or some other appropriate statute. The committee was to notify the FBI of its decision in each case and on the basis of the decisions, the FBI was to prepare confidential lists of all persons against whom action was to be taken. In the event of a declaration of war, "those persons on such lists who are alien enemies will be immediately arrested and Attorney General's warrants will be forthwith prepared by the Special Defense Unit, which will be charged with the duty of securing signatures thereto and forwarding them to the FBI. As to those persons who are to be taken into custody on criminal charges, the Bureau will be charged with the duty of cooperating with the United States Attorneys in filing complaints and securing Commissioners' warrants." It is significant, and should be noted, that, although these instructions were issued prior to the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. and during the existence of the Nonaggression Pact when the Communists presented perhaps the greatest threat to our internal security, they contained no authorization for the arrest of Communists other than alien enemies except through utilization of the usual criminal procedures.

This was pointed out to [redacted] of the Special Defense Unit by memorandum of April 21, 1941, at which time [redacted] was requested to advise the Bureau as to the identity of the statutes, in addition to the [redacted] Act, under which complaints would be filed. The possibility of utilizing denaturalization proceedings was also pointed out to [redacted]. In reply, [redacted] advised that there had been prepared by the Special Defense Unit various studies of the statutes for citizens on the "suspect list" and on September 12, 1941, there was obtained from [redacted] considerable material consisting of a study of the control of citizens suspected of subversive activities. The study of possible new legislation was confined principally to possible amendments and extensions of existing laws although it was pointed out, in this material, that the great need was for a federal over-all plan of legislation to control suspected citizens, rather than isolated statutes which would care for particular citizens. It was suggested, in the material, that it might be advisable to incorporate an omnibus statute to the general effect that any hindrance to the defense activities with the intent of injuring the national defense would constitute a crime, this type of statute permitting prosecution of almost any action injurious to the national defense. It was pointed out that the British system of defense legislation had been to enact a general enabling statute under which the executive authority is permitted to promulgate rules and regulations having the effect of law, and it was suggested that, if this country entered the war, a similar type of statute should be enacted which would enable the President to set up a system of regulations subject to immediate change and addition as the need arose.

The urgency of the problem of proceeding against members of the Communist Party was, of course, postponed by the German attack on Russia and a complete solution of this problem was not reached prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

On February 19, 1942, the preparation of Custodial Retention Cards in their original form was discontinued and the procedure was adopted of forwarding copies of investigative reports to the Special Defense Unit rather than photostatic copies of the Custodial Retention Cards. An appropriate record of the

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transmittal was maintained on the Custodial Detention Cards. Summaries of the available information were no longer placed on the cards.

Under date of July 16, 1943, Attorney General [redacted] advised that he was satisfied that the dangerousness classifications served no useful purpose and had been a mistake which should be rectified for the future. He directed that the classifications previously made should be used for no purpose whatsoever.

DISCONTINUANCE OF CUSTODIAL DETENTION CARDS

In his memorandum of July 16, 1943, the Attorney General also advised that there was no statutory or other present justification for "Custodial Detention" lists of citizens and that the Department fulfilled its functions by investigating the activities of individuals who may have violated the law.

PRESENT POLICY CONCERNING SECURITY INDEX

There is presently being maintained a Security Index which is an index to the investigative files of persons considered dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security. For each individual listed, there are prepared two 5 x 8 cards, one of which is filed alphabetically and the other geographically by field offices.

These cards contain the names, aliases, residence and business addresses, citizenship status and nationalistic tendencies or sympathies of the subjects listed.

By Bureau Bulletin No. 55, Series 1945, dated September 12, 1945, the Field was advised that all Security Index Cards had been cancelled at the Bureau with the exception of cards relating to Communists, Russians, individuals whose nationalistic tendencies result from ideological or organizational affiliations with Marxist groups, such as the Socialist Workers Party, the Workers Party, the Revolutionary Workers League or other groups of similar character, and members of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.

There are presently maintained only cards on Communists and members of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico in accordance with the foregoing instructions.

Copies of investigative reports are transmitted to the Division of Records of the Department of Justice except in a few instances where it is deemed necessary to maintain the information in absolute confidence.

The Security Index Cards are prepared upon the recommendation of the field offices. Each recommendation is, however, considered in the light of the reported facts and a determination is made as to whether the recommendation is justified.

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The cards being maintained at the present time are limited to individuals of great importance and such cards are not prepared with respect to rank and file members of the Communist Party. The field offices have been instructed to review their Security Index and recommend cancellation of Security Index Cards, the maintenance of which is not justified under present policies. As a result, the number of cards maintained is steadily decreasing.

Cards are also being prepared at the present time on Russian espionage suspects.

It has not been the practice to prepare cards on individuals who are prominent politically or otherwise but the identity of such persons is known to this division. It might be desirable to prepare cards on such persons.

STATISTICS

As of February 26, 1946, there are in the Security Index, cards relating to 10,763 Communists. This figure includes not only members of the Communist Party, U.S.A. but also Communists belonging to other organizations such as above mentioned.

Of the 10,763 cards, 329 relate to aliens, 2,473 to naturalized citizens and 7,945 to native born citizens. The citizenship status of 16 subjects is unknown.

EVOLUTION OF BUREAU POLICY CONCERNING
INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNISTS

The Bureau's policy with respect to investigating individual Communists was first crystallized in Bureau Bulletin No. 54, Second Series, 1943, dated October 20, 1943, which instructed the Field to conduct investigation with respect to all known members of the Communist Political Association. The Field was instructed, however, that before a case might be opened, the Field Office must have reliable and specific information that the individual was an actual member of the CPA or engaged in activities of such a nature as to constitute in and of themselves strong and substantial evidence of actual membership. The instructions were clear that it was not desired that cases be opened on the mere possibility that the individual was a member of the CPA or upon mere suspicion or bare charges, rumors or allegations of membership unsupported by specific information, facts or details.

The types of investigation to be performed were divided into those relating first, to key figures, second, to active members of the CPA, third, to inactive members of the CPA. The Field was also instructed that preference should be given to the investigations relating to the individuals considered most dangerous or of the greatest importance to the Communist movement and that the investigations in each Field Office should receive attention in the order of their importance.

This policy was modified by Bureau Bulletin No. 40, Series 1944, dated July 13, 1944, which instructed the Field to confine its investigations of individual Communists to those who were key figures in the national or regional units of the CPA. At the same time, however, the Field was advised that the Bureau would hold each Agent in charge responsible for the proper investigation of all persons potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country. The instructions contained in this Bulletin received widely varying interpretations from the SACs, a number of whom felt that the only way they could determine whether a known member of the CPA was dangerous or not was to conduct an investigation. Many SACs, therefore, continued to open cases on the basis of membership alone.

On April 18, 1945, there was issued SAC letter No. 40, Series 1945, which was intended to restrict the investigations of individual Communists to a minimum. The purpose of the letter was to restrict the investigations of key figures to individuals of the utmost importance to the Communist movement and to restrict investigations of individuals other than key figures to persons who might be considered as potential key figures in the Communist movement.

The present investigative policy is, therefore, one of extreme selectiveness with the number of investigations held to a minimum.

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The policy with respect to the preparation of security index cards has, of course, been governed by the investigative policy. During the time when it was the policy to investigate all known members of the Party, security index cards were prepared on all known members investigated and at the present time security index cards are prepared only on those individuals of the greatest importance to the Communist movement.

ADEQUACY OF PRESENT POLICIES

It will be noted that the most recent statement of Bureau policy concerning Communist investigations is that contained in SAC letter No. 40 dated April 18, 1945.

On the very next day, April 19, 1945, there was published in "Les Cahiers de Communisme," official theoretical organ of the Communist Party of France, an article by the French Communist leader, ~~Henri Loevy~~, attacking ~~the American Communist Party~~ and the American Communist Party for the dissolution of the Communist Party, USA and the formation of the Communist Political Association. ~~and the American Communist Party~~ were criticized for abandoning strict Marxism and for cooperating or collaborating with Capitalism. The Duclos article was republished in the New York World Telegram of May 22, 1945, and, thereafter, appeared in the Daily Worker of May 24, 1945. Within a few months thereafter the Communist Party, USA, had been reconstituted with ~~the Duclos article~~ at the helm and ~~the Duclos article~~ was deprived of all official status and was eventually expelled from the Party.

The publication of the Duclos article signaled the end of the strange interlude of cooperation between the Communist Party, USA and "Progressive Capitalism" and other forces in the United States. The Communist Party was reconstituted as a Marxist Party to act as the "vanguard" of the proletarian movement. The signal for the change in Communist world policy was given by Duclos even before final victory over Germany was secured although it was then obviously within reach. The Duclos article was first published on April 19, 1945, and the German surrender came on May 7, 1945.

It is likely that the Communist movement now presents a greater danger to the internal security of this country than it ever has in the past and that the danger from this source will not decrease but will increase in proportion as the Soviet Union grows in power, influence and geographical extent.

It is, therefore, felt that the present policy should be re-examined for the purpose of determining whether the base of these investigations should be broadened.

The Soviet Union is obviously endeavoring to extend its power and influence in every direction and the history of the Communist movement in this country clearly shows that the Communist Party, USA has consistently acted as an instrumentality in support of the foreign policy of the USSR.

The Communist Party has succeeded in gaining control of, or extensively infiltrating a large number of trade unions, many of which operate in industries vital to the national defense. Among these are the American Communications Association, the National Maritime Union, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union and the Transport Workers Union in the field of transportation and communications, which facilities, of course, are of the utmost importance to the security of this country.

In other fields there are the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, the United Farm Equipment and Machinery Workers of America, some of the locals of the United Automobile Workers Union, particularly those located in the aircraft manufacturing industry, the United Office and Professional Workers of America, and many others.

In a wartime economy all the various phases of industry are important and it is hard to say that one industry is more strategic than another inasmuch as all must work as a cohesive whole.

In the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union, it would not be sufficient to disrupt the normal operations of the Communist Party by apprehending only its leaders or more important figures. Any member of the Party occupied in any industry would be in a position to hamper the efforts of the United States by individual action and undoubtedly the great majority of them would do so.

Unless drastic action were taken at the outset, an armed conflict between this country and the USSR would give the Communist Party in this country the opportunity they have long awaited, and unless the Party and its members were effectively dealt with at the outset, they would undoubtedly seize the opportunity to assist the Soviet Union in every way in order that the United States might be defeated and a Communist regime set up in this country as one of the conditions of peace.

It is felt that serious consideration should be given to re-establishing the original policy of investigation; all known members of the Communist Party. It is not intended that cases be opened simultaneously on all known members of the Party, but that sound judgment be used, based on the potential dangerousness of the members and that each office open monthly only the number of cases that can be handled by its personnel. This does not, of course, mean that a thorough and complete investigation would be made in every instance, but that at least a preliminary investigation would be conducted to obtain background information and proof of Communist Party membership. In the event such action were taken, the policy of

preparing security index cards on all members of the Party should also be reinstated.

It is also pointed out that the Russian Government has sent and is sending to this country a number of individuals without proper credentials or travel documents and that in the event of a breach of diplomatic relations there would undoubtedly be a considerable number of these people in the United States.

POSSIBILITIES OF ACTION

In the event of hostilities with the USSR, it would be extremely important to apprehend all members of the Communist Party who are to be apprehended simultaneously with the commencement of hostilities, if such arrests can possibly be effected. If there is any appreciable lapse of time between the commencement of hostilities and the arrest of members of the Party, an opportunity will be afforded the Party to perfect and put into execution an underground apparatus to circulate propaganda and to sabotage the efforts of this country.

The greatest difficulty in carrying out such a program would perhaps be the necessity of finding legal authorization and justification therefor.

The statistics above cited disclose that only a negligible percentage of the members of the Communist Party, USA are aliens and of that percentage some are of nationalities other than Russian. Aliens of Russian nationality could, of course, be interned in the event of hostilities as dangerous alien enemies.

With respect to naturalized citizens, there might exist some possibility of utilizing the denaturalization process followed by internment. The process of denaturalization is, however, too slow and uncertain.

Members of the Communist Party violating individual statutes, such as the Espionage and Sabotage Statutes, could, of course, be proceeded against by criminal process.

There is, however, needed some broad general authority under which all members of the Party could be apprehended and detained in the event of hostilities with the Soviet Union. Perhaps the best general authority on the statute books at this time is the Act of June 28, 1940 (Section 10, Title 18, U. S. Code), sometimes referred to as the Smith Act. This law provides that:

"A. It shall be unlawful for any person:

- "(1) to knowingly or wilfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government;
- "(2) with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States, to print, publish, edit, issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence;
- "(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States by force or violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof.

"B. For the purposes of this section, the term 'government in the United States' means the Government of the United States, the government of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, the government of the District of Columbia, or the government of any political subdivision of any of them."

This law has been held Constitutional by the Supreme Court in connection with the Trotskyite Communists who were tried and convicted in Minnesota. Although the Attorney General ruled in the Bridges case "That the Communist Party of the U.S.A., from the time of its inception in 1919 to the present time, is an organization that believes in, advises, advocates, and teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the United States," the Supreme Court of the United States has never ruled upon

100-01-001

the question as to whether the Communist Party advocates overthrow of the Government by force and violence. It has indicated, however, in the Schneiderman case that knowledge of the purposes of the Communist Party cannot be imputed to an individual merely by reason of membership in the Party. In the event of an emergency it might be extremely difficult to prove that the members of the Party knew the purpose of the Party to overthrow the Government by force and violence.

In addition to the foregoing statute, there are also Sections 4 and 6 of Title 18, U. S. Code, providing respectively:

"Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be imprisoned not more than ten years, or fined not more than \$10,000 or both; and shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any office under the United States."

and

"If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more than \$5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both."

It is likely, however, that some overt act would be necessary before these statutes could be invoked.

It is believed that the difficulties that might occur should be pointed out to the Attorney General and that it should be suggested to him that it might be desirable to make a study as to the action which could be taken in the event of an emergency. Such a memorandum has been prepared and is attached hereto for your suggested approval.

Apart from the legal problems involved, another difficulty of considerable proportions which would probably be encountered in the event of

100-504

extensive arrests of Communists would be a flood of propaganda from Leftist and so-called Liberal sources.

It is believed that an effort should be made now to prepare educational material which can be released through available channels so that in the event of an emergency we will have an informed public opinion.

To a large extent the power and influence of the Communist Party in this country, which is out of all proportion to the actual size of the Party, derives from the support which the Party receives from "Liberal" sources and from its connections in the labor unions. The Party earns its support from Liberals by championing individual causes which are also sponsored by the Liberal elements. It is believed, however, that, in truth, Communism is the most reactionary, intolerant and bigoted force in existence and that it would be possible to assemble educational material which would incontrovertibly establish the truth.

If the Communist Party could by this means be divorced from the Liberal movement, it would lose practically all of its strength and influence.

It is also believed that considerable material could be assembled to show that labor unions would be abolished or reduced to impotence should Communism come into power in this country. Such material would assist in dislodging the Party from its position of influence in the labor unions.

It is also a fact that the Party receives much support from ministers and other persons prominent in religious circles. It is believed that it would be possible to assemble considerable material showing that Communism, if established in this country, would abolish the church or reduce it to a position of complete subjugation. It is felt that consideration should be given to the possibility of preparing educational material along the foregoing lines.

It should also be possible to assemble considerable material indicating the basically Russian nature of the Communist Party in this country. There are two approaches to this problem. In the first place, the history of the Party in this country clearly shows that the Party has at all times acted in effect as an instrumentality of the Russian Foreign Office and Russian foreign policy and has at all times supported the interests of the Soviet Union.

A preliminary survey of 1009 cases in the Los Angeles Field Office has indicated that in approximately 70% of the cases either the subject or the

100-11-
subject's spouse, or at least one parent of either was born in Russia or in a country adjacent to Russia. A complete survey of the known members of the Communist Party would probably produce substantially the same statistics.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that all Special Agents in Charge be instructed to review all security index cards relating to Communists maintained in their Offices and to review all the investigations related thereto. They should be instructed to make certain that cards are maintained on all individuals whose apprehension would be necessary and that the investigations in all cases be brought up to date.

In this connection your attention is also directed to the suggestion made above that the policy with respect to the investigation of Communists be reconsidered and instructions be issued for the investigation of all known members of the Communist Party.

It is recommended that the instructions issued to the SAC's include instructions to investigate all known members of the Communist Party, USA, and that the SAC's be instructed not to open cases simultaneously on all known members of the Party, but to use sound judgment based on the potential dangerousness of the known members, opening each month only the number of cases that can be handled by the personnel assigned to them.

It is also recommended in this connection that the Special Agents in Charge be instructed to obtain the following data in reviewing these files in their offices:

1. The subject's race
2. Date and place of subject's birth
3. If the subject is born in any country other than Russia:
 - a. Date and place of birth of both of subject's parents
 - b. If subject is married:
 - (1.) Date and place of spouse's birth
 - (2.) Date and place of birth of both parents of spouse

In the event such information is not available in the files, it should be obtained if readily available elsewhere.

These data should be furnished to the Bureau by the Field Offices in order that statistics may be prepared and so that it may be possible, if necessary, to apprehend all Communists having connections with Russia through birth, marriage or marriage. There is attached hereto for your suggested approval a letter to all SAC's embodying these instructions.


100-33
501

2. It is recommended that six Agents be assigned to supervisory duties at the Seat of Government for the purpose of reviewing the files relating to the investigation of Communists in the security index and reviewing likewise the security index cards in order that the cards and investigations may be brought completely up to date and every effort made to see to it that there is available legal evidence of Communist Party membership and knowledge of the purposes of the Communist Party on the part of those individuals listed in the index.

3. It is recommended that the Attorney General be advised of the difficulties which may be encountered and requested to make a study as to the action which could be taken in the event of an emergency. There is attached a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General. It is suggested that this memorandum be delivered personally to the Attorney General by a Bureau official so that he may be verbally informed of the potentialities and dangers inherent in this project.

4. It is recommended that arrangements be made to bring to the Seat of Government for a two-day training period the Communist Supervisors from each of the approximately 18 or 20 key offices in which this work will be of particular significance. This will permit a complete understanding on the part of these Field Supervisors of the Bureau's policies and desires and they can then return to their respective offices to there effect the necessary reviews of the files and carrying out of the program. A proposed schedule for such a two-day school for these Supervisors will be submitted to you immediately if you concur in the suggestion.

Attachment.



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

100-00-540X
United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

305 Realty Building
Savannah, Georgia
February 26, 1947



Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Re: Suggestions

Dear Sir:

Special Agent [redacted] would like to make the following suggestion concerning the Key Figure List and Security Index:

A review of the Manual of Instructions concerning Key Figures and subjects of Security Index cards reflects that the administrative procedures in both of these programs are similar. It is noted that under the present circumstances Key Figures pertain only to members of the Communist Party, while Security Index pertains to anyone who may be potentially dangerous to the security of the United States.

It is believed that in practical application everyone who is a Key Figure would also be the subject of a Security Index card. Therefore, assimilation of the Key Figure program into the Security Index program would eliminate duplication in administrative operations and the same results would be achieved.

Very truly yours,

[redacted]
Special Agent in Charge

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100-100
715
SAC, SAN JUAN

October 31, 1947

66-1200-100-715
Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX

Reference is made to your letter in the above captioned matter dated October 25, 1947, in which you revealed a discussion had with Captain G-2, San Juan, relative to activities anticipated by the FBI in the event of an emergency. You indicate that you intend to discuss briefly, generally and in strict confidence with representatives of G-2 and ONI the Bureau's work in connection with the Security Index.

This is to advise that there is no objection to your carrying on such a discussion if it is in general terms and there is no one present other than the representatives of G-2, A-2, and ONI. For your information, the Bureau intends to discreetly discuss with the Intelligence Division of the Army information appearing in the first paragraph of referenced letter that the Army Headquarters have warned against an insidious campaign of subversion throughout the United States and its territories by Communists at Soviet inspiration. This matter will be discussed discreetly for the purpose of ascertaining the source.

This matter is brought to your attention pursuant to your request that you be advised if any of the information appearing in the referenced letter is discussed with the Intelligence Division of the Army at Washington.

100-5715
(ENCLOSURE)

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Box 4312, San Juan 21, Puerto Rico
October 25, 1947**

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

Director, FBI

Re: ~~SECURITY INDEX~~

Dear Sir:

On October 20, 1947 Captain [redacted], G-2, San Juan, called at the office and stated that they had received a highly confidential radio-gram addressed to the local Commander from Army Headquarters warning against an incipient campaign of sabotage throughout the United States and its territories by Communists at Soviet inspiration.

In taking stock of the situation, Captain [redacted] stated, local Army authorities felt it necessary to consider the detention of Communist leaders. Accordingly, G-2 desired appropriate information from the FBI which would enable them to estimate what facilities for detention purposes would be required. Specifically, Captain [redacted] asked for an estimate of the number of Communist leaders and agitators who might be subject to arrest and detention in the event of an emergency.

He also suggested that we furnish a list of names of the most prominent individuals in this category in order that the Army could search its files and make certain that all data in their possession had been furnished to us, and if not, that it could be.

In regard to his first request for an estimate of the number of people subject to detention I replied that the FBI was not unaware of the possibility of an emergency situation arising that might require the detention of individuals considered dangerous to be at liberty, just as this problem had been anticipated and cared for prior to the participation of the United States in World War II.

I spoke in general terms about the Security Index program and assured him we would cooperate in furnishing data necessary for a coordinated plan of activity.

Concerning his second request I informed him we would naturally welcome any data in possession of G-2 which we did not now have and would try to work out a program to check with G-2 on various individuals under investigation, although I felt certain this had been done wherever appropriate at the time of individual investigations. I have in mind, and so

Letter to the Director
Re: Security Index

100-5-715
(ENCL.)
10/25/47

indicated to Captain that the principal deficiency might exist in regard to those persons on whom our investigation had ceased when they were inducted into the Army, and of whose subsequent discharge we may not have been informed.

In discussing generally the question of any restrictive action against dangerous Communists, I pointed out that being citizens a warrant would be necessary for arrests. Captain appeared to be ignorant of the fact that even during the war citizens could not be arrested and detained under the type of executive warrant that was applied to aliens. He appeared to be under the impression that the President was empowered to declare a state of emergency under which authority for the detention of individuals such as Communist leaders would not depend on evidence of criminal acts. It was made clear that should any individual or group of individuals attempt to, or commit, sabotage they could be arrested under existing statutes.

G-2 has recently given evidence of increased concern about general intelligence and also that it may be anxious to assure itself of the adequacy of FBI intelligence in the field allotted to it under the Delimitation Agreement.

Captain remarked casually at the end of our conversation that he was extremely busy because of a censorship plan on which he was working. I inquired if the Army was setting up a censorship operation. He replied that the plan was island-wide in preparation for a possible emergency, adding, "We have to do it, (i.e., work out a plan), nobody else is." He then commented that prior to World War II the Army and Navy had organized a censorship plan for operation in the event of war.

In a subsequent conversation, Colonel mentioned his desire to extend his sources of information, and stated he has been considering methods of enlisting the aid of all Military Intelligence Reserve officers and the National Guard.

Concerning my action in this regard, I believe it would be desirable to discuss briefly, generally, and in strict confidence with G-2, A-2, and ONI the Bureau's work with the Security Index. This will place all agencies on notice of our continued sense of responsibility in the intelligence field allocated to us, and reassure them regarding our activity and of our intention to preserve our jurisdiction. I will bring this matter up at our next meeting on October 29, in view of the seriousness with which the Army is regarding the current situation.

Letter to the Director
Re: Security Index

10/25/47

As to informing Army of the number of persons for which detention facilities should be provided, I think this, too, should be handled on general terms. Obviously, conditions under which disloyal and dangerous citizens may be detained will dictate not only the number of persons so affected, but the nature of restrictions imposed on them.

The Bureau is asked to furnish any special instructions for guidance in this matter if my action and proposed action are not approved.

I am submitting a separate communication suggesting discussion of Intelligence matters at the SAC conference I am scheduled to attend at the Bureau on November 10, 1947.

If the Bureau considers any of the above information a matter for discussion with G-2 in Washington it is requested that I be advised in order that I may be aware beforehand of any reference G-2 locally may, in turn, receive from its headquarters.

Very truly yours

ACS:GHH

SAC

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: November 25, 1947

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

In accordance with your request, there follows brief information concerning, as well as a description of, the Security Index presently maintained by the Bureau.

The purpose of the Security Index is to include in one place the identity of and correlative pertinent data concerning all persons in the United States who are considered dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security or public safety. In compiling the Index, the FBI is, of course, merely assembling a key to the facts concerning the individuals involved for referral of these facts to the appropriate officials of the Department of Justice for their consideration and decision as to appropriate action.

We have advised our respective field offices that all matters connected with the preparation and maintenance of the Security Index must be considered as strictly confidential and should at no time be mentioned or alluded to in investigative reports or discussed with agencies or individuals outside the Bureau other than duly qualified representatives of ONI, and MIS and then only on a strictly confidential basis.

In each instance in which the dangerousness or potential dangerousness of a given individual is substantiated by the information known or developed by investigation, the field offices must direct a letter to the Bureau recommending the preparation of a Security Index card. In order that these cards which go to make up the Index may be prepared on a uniform basis, the letters from the field must state the name and aliases of the subject, his nationalistic or other tendency, his correct current residence and business addresses, and complete data relative to his citizenship status (including the date and place of his birth; the date, place, and vessel or other means of entry into the United States if he is an alien or a naturalized citizen.)

At the Bureau we have a three way breakdown in our index: (1) American born citizens, (2) naturalized citizens and (3) aliens.

While the vast majority of the individuals on the Index are Communist Party members or sympathizers, we likewise maintain index cards on individuals considered to be dangerous or potentially dangerous who are identified with the Socialist Workers Party, the Workers Party and the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.

We continually review this Index in order to make certain that it is kept in a current and accurate fashion and to insure, as much as possible, the fact that we will have on the Index only those people considered actually or potentially dangerous to the security of the country. Upon the death or permanent disaffection from the Bureau's jurisdiction of the subject of a Security Index card, the card

SUPERVISOR - INTERNAL SECURITY

The Director

is removed. In the event investigation discloses that the subject of a card is not considered dangerous or potentially dangerous, the card on that subject is cancelled. The induction into the armed forces of the United States of any subject of a Security Index card must be reported to the Bureau and we, in turn, thereupon advise the interested military installation through the medium of MID or ONI, furnishing them with pertinent information concerning him and requesting advice in the event of his discharge from the service. At the Bureau we inactivate the Security Index card on such an individual when he enters the armed services. Upon receipt of information reflecting the discharge of the subject from the armed forces, we immediately advise our field offices in order that it may then be determined as to whether or not a new Security Index card should be prepared.

For your information the Attorney General has been informed that the Bureau is pursuing a policy of listing certain individuals who are considered to be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the United States and the Attorney General has advised that this policy and procedure meets with his full approval.

INDEX CONTAINS
ABOUT 8507 ACTIVE CARDS.

5/5/49
DATE MAY 1, 1949
8
SUBJECT: ~~SECURITY INDEX~~
LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

PURPOSE:

To advise you of the results of a conference regarding the Security Index project of the Internal Security Section and criteria for referral of LGE cases to the Internal Security Section.

BACKGROUND:

You will recall that it has been determined that the Case Review Supervisors of the Loyalty Section shall categorize cases read, in order that proper statistics may be maintained, and that at the same time the cases shall be screened before routing disloyal cases to the Internal Security Section for consideration as to their inclusion in the Security Index file with a view towards eliminating a duplication of reading of those cases which obviously are not fit subjects for inclusion in that file.

To that end, a conference was held April 19, 1949, between Inspector [redacted] of the Training and Inspection Division, Supervisor [redacted] of the Internal Security Section, and Supervisors [redacted] and the writer of the Loyalty Section. The Manual of Instructions relating to the Security Index was reviewed and it was decided that each individual case would have to be decided upon by the Loyalty Reviewing Supervisor, based upon the merits of each case.

In cases of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of a referral.

It was pointed out by you at your conference with Loyalty Supervisors April 25, 1949, that it would be the responsibility of the Case Review Supervisors to refer supplemental reports and of the substantive Case Review Supervisors to refer discontinued cases.

Cases are to be so referred by marking [redacted] name on the yellow of the [redacted] letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

66-6200-100-1

FROM: SAC, Atlanta

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST INDEX MATTERS

Supervision - Internal Security C

Re Paragraph (A), SAC Letter No. 97, Series 1949, dated 10-19-49.

The Bureau's permission is requested to add to the Communist index cards in Atlanta, in addition to the information already obtained thereon, the following:

- (a) Whether or not handwriting specimens are contained in the file;
- (b) Whether or not a photograph is available in the file;
- (c) Whether or not subject had military service in World War I or World War II;
- (d) Complete physical description of subject on back of instant card.

The above suggestions are being made, as this would not place an undue burden on the personnel in the Atlanta Office at this time, because of the small number of index cards maintained, and in the future if there was any great increase, the handling of and the placing of this information on the cards on a day-to-day basis would incur no more time than is already incurred in the making of index cards. The reason permission is requested for the inclusion of this information on the card is because it is felt that these subjects may at some future date become persons concerning whom immediate action should be taken in the event there is any National emergency, and as always in times of a National emergency the speed and accuracy with which any field office can accomplish the work cut out for it in such emergency is of prime importance. In the event of such a National emergency the information mentioned above, if contained on the index card, would greatly expedite the handling of individual subject cases.

66-730

100-11113
113/4
Director, FBI

COMMUNIST INDEX MATTERS

Reurlet March 13, 1950.

Your reference communication requests authority to include on the Communist Index Card four additional items of information.

(a) Whether or not handwriting specimens are contained in the file.

The Bureau does not desire that this information be included on the Communist Index Card. This information is, of course, subject to change and if the change does occur, it will require that the Communist Index Card be changed accordingly.

(b) Whether or not a photograph is available in the file.

Again the Bureau does not desire that this information be placed on the Communist Index Card for the same reason that the Bureau does not desire the handwriting information.

(c) Whether or not the subject had military service in World War I or World War II.

The Bureau does not perceive the purpose of such data. The Communist Index Card should not be viewed as a brief of information concerning the subject.

(d) Complete physical description of the subject.

The Bureau does not desire that this information be incorporated on the Communist Index Card. Again the Bureau does not perceive the value or purpose of including such data.

The Communist Index should not be viewed as an authoritative source for data concerning the individuals included therein but rather as a source for the names of individuals who have been connected with the Communist movement, and a quick reference to the file wherein the full data concerning the individual does appear. Additionally, the Communist Index should not be viewed as a possible apprehension index to be used in the event of an emergency. You will recall that the security index is the apprehension index, and as set forth in SAC letter No. 77, the Communist Index is merely a central collection of the individuals who should, in the event of an emergency, be given additional attention. The type of attention is to be determined after a review of the file or additional investigation.

HT:kmb

DATE: February 11, 1944
100-21117
SUBJECT: ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE
LIST OF DISAFFECTED AND
SUBVERSIVE PERSONNEL

In connection with this program, you will recall that we are advising the particular Armed Service in each instance whether or not each individual subject on their list is being maintained in our security index. In each and every case, therefore, there will be a letter making mention of the fact that this Bureau does have an apprehension list for use in the event of an emergency. The letter will either indicate that the Army subject is on the list or he has not been included. This presents a problem of security insofar as the security index is concerned, knowing that reference to our security index will appear in every case file maintained by the Intelligence Services. Every individual of the Intelligence Service who has opportunity to review the file will be cognizant of our security index. If possible, therefore, it is believed desirable that appropriate steps be taken in order to effect some security to the many letters which will be transmitted to the Intelligence Services not only in their transmission but also in their maintenance.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, it is recommended that the Liaison Section contact each of the three Intelligence Services and request that the following steps be taken in connection with the letters making reference to the security index:

- (1) That these letters captioned in the individual case not be filed in the individual case file by the military authorities but on the contrary be kept in a central file.
- (2) That this central file be given utmost security and that only limited personnel have access thereto.
- (3) That letters to the three intelligence services concerning these individuals all be captioned Personal and Confidential and be sent via liaison in order that we may insure their proper handling.

There is attached hereto a letter to the Intelligence Division of the Army concerning just such a case and reflecting the manner in which it should be set up.

4/13/50

DA

4-12-50

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

As you know, the Security Index is being transferred to this Section. We already have on tabulating cards the names of all persons in the file but we will shortly begin the complete change-over of all data on the 5 x 8 cards to tabulating cards and these tabulating cards will be in this Section. The regular 5 x 8 cards thereafter will remain in the Security Division.

We have set aside a room consisting of one-half bay of Room 6222 for use in connection with the Security Index. Most of the work will be handled in this room and all of the files will be maintained there. We have had the door locks re-keyed and so arranged that they cannot be opened from the outside without a key and the locks are not keyed to work on the master key for the building. All cabinets housing Security Index material of any sort are locked when no one is in the Section and when anyone is working on the material the doors to the room are locked.

In addition to locking the cabinets, it is believed desirable to leave the room locked at night and as I understand, the customary procedure in such cases is to place a key to the room in a sealed envelope and furnish it to the Captain of the Guard with instructions that it is to be used only in case of fire or on your instructions or mine, and in the event the key is used, I should be notified so that the envelope may be resealed. Then, of course, I would have to set a tickler to examine the envelope each month.

RECOMMENDED PROCEDURE:

This room has one entrance to the hall and one entrance to my office. The latter is a glass partition door and it seems that in the event of fire, which is of course unlikely, the glass in this door could be broken and access to the room obtained in that manner.

I recommend that we not furnish the Captain of the Guard a key in a sealed envelope, thus calling his attention and the other guards' to the fact that the room does contain highly confidential material and in the future we leave the room locked without saying anything. Then in the event the question is raised by the Captain of the Guard we explain to him that the room contains confidential information and in the event of fire it may be broken into.

In the event you approve, it is suggested that Mr. Belmont and Mr. Tracy be notified.

ORIGINAL TO BE FILED IN 62-100000-100000

62-100-1191
SAC, Los Angeles

August 31, 1950

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX

Reference is made to your letter dated August 15, 1950, in which you set out two problems with regard to handling the Security Index cards which will be prepared by the Bureau when the IBM system is initiated.

1) You pointed out that three Security Index cards were necessary for your office due to your Security Index breakdown.

Three Security Index cards will be prepared for your office and you may continue to maintain your Security Index under the breakdown system you now have in effect.

2) You point out that during the interim between the submission by the field of a change in the information appearing on the Security Index card and the receipt of the revised card from the Bureau, the Security Index card in your office will not reflect up-to-date information.

When a request for a change in the information appearing on the Security Index card has been sent to the Bureau, the appropriate change should immediately be made on the Security Index card in your office. This card, of course, will be destroyed when the corrected Security Index card has been received from the Bureau.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: December 12, 1950


FROM : SAC, Richmond

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST INDEX
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

4
Reference is made to Volume III of the Manual of Instructions, 87-C, Section 3, Subsection a., Paragraph 5, pertaining to transfers, removals and deletions of Communist Index cards.

In view of the present international situation and consequent emphasis on security investigations, permission is requested to delete those Communist Index cards of subjects who are no longer under the jurisdiction of this office. This is intended to include only those instances which arise in the future, although it is felt this will eventually bring this index to a current status. It is believed that thereby there will be an up-to-date list of the individuals who have evidenced sympathy for the Communist ideology but who are not proper subjects for the Security Index. It is further felt that this could be accomplished with a minimum of time being expended due to the relatively small size of this index in this office.

Upon removal of the card, it could be placed in the exhibit folder of the subject's case file or destroyed, as the circumstances dictate.



*Let Richmond
1-22-51*

100-00-1161

12-11-50
8/10/50
SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

PURPOSE

To inform you of my views regarding the suggestion of ASAC ~~XXXXXX~~, that the Bureau revise its present requirements for investigation of Security Index subjects.

DETAILS

In the attached suggestion of ASAC ~~XXXXXX~~ submitted August 11, 1950, he recommends that where proof of present Communist Party membership is available no other investigation be required except to ascertain subject's residence and employment and obtain a description. He stated that proof of membership in the Communist Party or related groups should be sufficient to warrant the approval of a Security Index card and should obviate the necessity for submitting background and other information.

Inasmuch as the Bureau does not know at the present time the amount of proof or evidence which will be required by hearing boards for internment, it is felt that investigations of Security Index subjects should be thorough and complete. In addition to showing membership, information as to the extent of subject's activities should be reflected. While there is a possibility that hearing boards may in some instances be willing to intern individuals where the only available information is proof of Communist Party membership, they would be in a much better position to determine an individual's dangerousness if information concerning his activities as well as membership is available. We should be in a position to give the hearing boards all possible information on each subject.

In addition to information on subject's activities we should have sufficient background information to classify the individuals as to dangerousness. For example, we should know if he has had military training and should be aware of his citizenship status. This is especially true since aliens and citizens may be treated differently in the event of an emergency. As you are aware, it is not necessary for the Field

Enclosure

21 FEB 23 1951

Committee

memo to Director
Mr. Clegg
10-30-50
H.H.

NOV 10

100-60-1,78
9/2/50

to have information relative to a subject's birth date and citizenship status before recommending a Security Index card but leads may be set out to develop this information at a later date.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that ASAC ~~_____~~ suggestion not be approved.

SAC, Richmond

January 22, 1951

Director, FBI

COMMUNIST INDEX
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet December 12, 1950.

Referenced letter requests authorization to bring the Communist Index into a Current Status.

You are advised to comply with the Bureau's instructions pertaining to the maintenance of the Communist Index and no effort should be expended by your office to keep the Index in a Current Status.

Your office should, of course, continue to place additional names in the Communist Index in accordance with instructions set forth in Section 87, Manual of Instructions.

The instructions set forth in this regard do not preclude your office from reviewing the information in the Communist Index and determining whether the information pertaining to any individual in the Index warrants a detailed investigation in order to determine the individual's present activities and whether he should be placed in the Security Index.

66-6200-100

12/12/50

Director, FBI





Richmond

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reference is made to Volume III of the Manual of Instructions, 87-C, Section 3, Subsection a., Paragraph 5, pertaining to transfers, removals and deletions of Communist Index cards.

In view of the present international situation and consequent emphasis on security investigations, permission is requested to delete those Communist Index cards of subjects who are no longer under the jurisdiction of this office. This is intended to include only those instances which arise in the future, although it is felt this will eventually bring this index to a current status. It is believed that thereby there will be an up-to-date list of the individuals who have evidenced sympathy for the Communist ideology but who are not proper subjects for the Security Index. It is further felt that this could be accomplished with a minimum of time being expended due to the relatively small size of this index in this office.

Upon removal of the card, it could be placed in the exhibit folder of the subject's case file or destroyed, as the circumstances dictate.



2-1-22-51

100-8041301
100-8041301
SAC, Washington

December 16, 1950

Director, FBI

REQUIREMENTS FOR INCLUSION OF
INDIVIDUALS IN SECURITY INDEX
Your File CC-5104

Reurlet December 13, 1950.

Referenced letter raised a question concerning the standards set forth in the Manual of Instructions relative to individuals who will be placed in the Security Index and advised that in almost every instance Bureau instructions used the phrase "Party members."

Your office raised a specific question with regard to Sub-section j on page 53 of Section 57-C of the Manual of Instructions and requested that the Bureau advise whether the phrase "Party members" necessarily means individuals who can be shown to be present members of the Communist Party or whether individuals who were formerly members of the Communist Party but who also have the additional qualification of being active in a labor union or a radio station, etc., will meet the requirements of these standards.

The purpose of the Security Index is to have a ready record of all individuals who are considered dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the United States. In response to your specific inquiry, you are advised that the phrase "Party member" does not necessarily mean that before an individual can be considered for the Security Index it must be shown that such individual is a member of either the Communist Party or related subversive groups. Party membership cannot be a controlling factor since each case must be considered individually to determine the potential dangerousness of an individual to the security of this country. In Section 57-C of the Manual of Instructions the Bureau has set forth the criteria for inclusion of individuals in the Security Index. Whether an individual properly belongs in the Security Index. No definite set of standards can be set by the Bureau and it remains the responsibility of each field office to determine the potential dangerousness of an individual.

In connection with the case cited in your communication, it is noted that the individual in question is a member of the Communist Party and is also a member of the National Labor Union. The Bureau has advised that the phrase "Party member" does not necessarily mean that before an individual can be considered for the Security Index it must be shown that such individual is a member of either the Communist Party or related subversive groups. Party membership cannot be a controlling factor since each case must be considered individually to determine the potential dangerousness of an individual to the security of this country. In Section 57-C of the Manual of Instructions the Bureau has set forth the criteria for inclusion of individuals in the Security Index. Whether an individual properly belongs in the Security Index. No definite set of standards can be set by the Bureau and it remains the responsibility of each field office to determine the potential dangerousness of an individual.

gested that your office submit a detailed report with your recommendations and the case will then be considered when it is received at the Bureau.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: December 13, 1950

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : GUY HOTTEL, SAC, Washington Field

SUBJECT: ~~REQUIREMENTS FOR INCLUSION OF~~
~~INDIVIDUALS IN SECURITY INDEX~~

Supervision

On page 33 of Section 87-C of the Manual of Instructions, there are set forth a number of standards which are suggested as to the general types of individuals whose dangerousness is more or less apparent and who should therefore be included in the Security Index in the absence of countervailing factors. It is noted that these standards used the phrase "party members" almost without fail. The question has arisen as to whether "party members" is limited to the individuals who, at the time of the submission of the recommendation for Security Index, are presently members of the Communist Party according to reliable informants or whether the phrase can refer to prior Communist Party members.

Specifically, this office has under consideration at the present time a case involving an individual who would fall under the Sub-Section j on page 33 of Section 87-C of the Manual of Instructions. The individual in question is at present employed in an official capacity by a local labor union. He was formerly an active member of the Communist Party, according to reliable informants, however, no party membership can be specifically proved since 1947.

The Bureau is therefore requested to advise whether the phrase "party members" necessarily means individuals who can be shown to be present members of the Communist Party or whether individuals who were formerly members of the Communist Party but who also have the additional qualification of being active in a labor union or a radio station, etc., will meet the requirements of these standards.

*new info
12/16/50*

66-2194

DEC 14 1950

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND
PRIVACY ACTS**

**SUBJECT: CUSTODIAL DETENTION
SECURITY INDEX
(INTERNAL SECURITY) "SEE
REFERENCES"**

SECTIONS: 6 - 10



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

NOTICE

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: July 2, 1952

FROM :

SUBJECT:

INTERNAL SECURITY-ESPIONAGE CONFERENCE
June 26 and 27, 1952PURPOSE

To advise you of the results of the Internal Security-Espionage Conference held at the Bureau on June 26 and 27, 1952.

DETAILS

The Internal Security-Espionage Conference was held at the Bureau as scheduled on June 26 and 27, 1952, attended by key personnel of 22 field offices in addition to appropriate representatives from the Domestic Intelligence Division. Supervisor. represented the Training Section of the Bureau. Laboratory representatives also attended.

As in the past, the Conference was run on a forum basis with the stage being set as to current developments and policy by the Bureau representatives and thereafter a full and free discussion ensuing concerning each subject matter. The field representatives participated very freely throughout the Conference.

The nature of the discussions concerning each item of the Conference's agenda and the recommendations submitted by the Conference are set forth below:

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALSA. Delinquency in Security Investigations

The Conference was brought up to date on the delinquency in the field in 100 classification matters. The absolute necessity of cutting down on the delinquency and backlog of work was stressed. The Conference was advised that each office was being followed on a monthly basis and that the trend had started downwards after a steady rise since Korea. The Conference was advised of the steps taken by the Bureau to assist the field in overcoming the backlog.

1-14-503

1. Security Index Cases Coming to New
Office of Origin by Form FD-128

The Conference was advised that in those instances when the new office of origin is conducting no further investigation and the summary report has been received from the former office of origin, that the new office should advise the Bureau that the case is being closed.

RECOMMENDATION

In connection with the preparation of summary reports on security cases, the Conference felt that there is a need for clarification of the extent of information or documentation necessary to explain the importance of associates of the subject and other subversive individuals listed in the report. The Conference felt it would be desirable for the Bureau to send a Bureau Bulletin to the field giving guidance to the field as to the extent of information necessary to set forth under such circumstances. The Conference felt there is a possible misunderstanding as to whether investigation of individuals other than those being considered for the Security Index will require documentation in investigative reports. It was suggested that this be clarified to show that documentation is not necessary in espionage and nationality cases unless the individual is being considered for the Security Index. The Conference felt that it would be desirable to encourage the establishment of thumbnail sketch files in each office reflecting the necessary information on individuals whose names frequently come up and when such a thumbnail sketch is requested and received from other offices, that this sketch be added to the office file for future reference.

Approved SAC L. G. H.
7/12/62
P. C.

RECOMMENDATION

In connection with the Security Index Summary Report Program, the Conference felt that we could well consider whether it is necessary to completely document information on important Communist functionaries against whom a prima facie case can be made. Keeping in mind that one of the major problems in the preparation of these summary reports is the documentation required and particularly documentation on activities running back through the years, the Conference felt that a tremendous amount of work can be avoided and yet the objective attained by limiting documentation on prominent functionaries to sufficient current activities to make a prima facie case. The report would, of course, contain information concerning all the subject's activities but only that necessary to make a solid case would be documented. The Conference recommended that we afford this matter further study.

SAC letter
being prepared
P.C.

6. Security Index Subjects Employed in Key Facilities

The Conference discussed the cases involving Security Index subjects employed in key facilities (totaling approximately 1600) particularly as to whether these cases should be carried in a closed status as is the present policy, or whether or not they should be carried in a pending inactive status between the six months reports.

RECOMMENDATION

In connection with the required preparation of reports on all Security Index subjects in vital facilities every six months, the current procedure is to open the case for the preparation of the report and thereafter close it again. The

Prepared SAC letter
Typed 2/15/52
P.C.

Conference felt that it would be more desirable to carry these cases in a pending inactive status in order that it would be constantly assigned to an Agent and the incoming material could be routed to the Agent for handling. The cases would become reactivated periodically for the preparation of the six months report.

B. Emergency Detention Program

The Conference was brought up to date on changes in the Emergency Detention Program since the last Conference held in November, 1951. It was pointed out that the administrative functions must be kept up to date in each office so that the program can go into operation at a moments notice. The problems of the handling of assignments to police where the officers will make arrests without Agents being present were raised and discussed. Likewise, the handling of the forms to be used under the program and the adequacy of jail facilities was brought before the Conference.

RECOMMENDATION

The field offices are presently under obligation to keep their Emergency Detention plans continuously up to date. The Conference felt that it would be desirable to institute a systematic checkup on this program by having the field offices report to the Bureau each six months that the program has been checked and brought up to date. To assist the field in this respect, it was recommended that the Bureau so instruct the field and provide a list of those major items on which specific advice should be received.

1500
7/18/52
P.L.C.



66-4-1762
PE. ONAL ATTENTION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SAC LETTER NO. 70

Series 1951

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 18, 1951

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	PORTLAND
	ALBUQUERQUE	DETROIT	MINNEAPOLIS	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	EL PASO	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BALTIMORE	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BIRMINGHAM	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BOSTON	KANSAS CITY	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUFFALO	KNOXVILLE	NORFOLK	SAN JUAN
	BUTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CHARLOTTE	LOS ANGELES	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CHICAGO	LOUISVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SPRINGFIELD
	CINCINNATI	MEMPHIS	PHOENIX	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	CLEVELAND	MIAMI	PITTSBURGH	QUANTICO
	DALLAS			

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF
INDIVIDUALS --PHOTOGRAPHS OF
SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS

You are reminded of the provisions of Section 87-C, pages 34 and 35 of the Manual of Instructions, which require that a photograph be placed on the reverse side of the original Security Index card maintained in the field office..

The Bureau recently had occasion to issue eight Identification Orders on subjects of security investigations and it was found that in some cases current reproducible photographs were not immediately available. While it is not desired that an investigation be maintained in a pending status merely for the purpose of obtaining a photograph, you are instructed to intensify your efforts and exhaust all logical leads in an attempt to obtain pictures during the course of your investigation. After a photograph has been obtained you should continue to be alert for the existence of more recent pictures which may become available.



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

(Typed July 13, 1951)

66-04-1362
(ENCL.)

#70

PERSONAL ATTENTION


LETTER TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

Re: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF
INDIVIDUALS - PHOTOGRAPHS OF
SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS

Dear Sir:

You are reminded of the provisions of Section 87-C, pages 34 and 35 of the Manual of Instructions, which require that a photograph be placed on the reverse side of the original Security Index card maintained in the field office.

The Bureau recently had occasion to issue eight Identification Orders on subjects of security investigations and it was found that in some cases current reproducible photographs were not immediately available. While it is not desired that an investigation be maintained in a pending status merely for the purpose of obtaining a photograph, you are instructed to intensify your efforts and exhaust all logical leads in an attempt to obtain pictures during the course of your investigation. After a photograph has been obtained you should continue to be alert for the existence of more recent pictures which may become available.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SAC LETTER NO. 72
Series 1951

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 21, 1951

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

File Series

SAC

ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
ANCHORAGE
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
DALLAS

DENVER
DETROIT
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HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE
MEMPHIS
MIAMI

MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
MOBILE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
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SALT LAKE CITY
SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
QUANTICO

PERS. FILES

PERS. FILES

6-21-51

RE: SECURITY INDEX - TABBING FOR DETCOM AND COMSAB

In the past, the Field has been submitting Forms FD-122 appropriately marked for Detcom and/or Comsab when it is desired that subjects receive priority designation for apprehension. These forms often carry a notation in the space provided thereon reflecting that the reason for so tabbing the Security Index Card is due to the employment of the subject in a vital facility. However, in many instances these forms have been received at the Bureau in cases where the subject is not strategically employed and no reason for the priority tabbing of the Security Index Card is apparent on the Form FD-122. This often necessitates a review of the subject's file at the Bureau before the Security Index Card can be appropriately tabbed.

Effective upon receipt of these instructions the following action should be taken when Forms FD-122 are submitted designating subjects for Detcom and/or Comsab.

A brief statement shall be typed on the lower portion of the Form FD-122 giving the reason for the tabbing of the Security Index Card. It is not necessary that this be a lengthy statement. For example, if the Security Index Card on a subject is being tabbed because the subject fought in the Spanish Civil War or is a Veteran of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, you may merely state: "Fought in the Spanish Civil War" or "Member of Abraham Lincoln Brigade." Other examples might be: "Member of the armed forces World War II;" "Has received training in sabotage;" "Has stated will sabotage American defense effort in event of hostilities with Russia;" and so forth.

This procedure also applies when a subject's Security Index Card is being tabbed for priority apprehension because that subject is employed by a firm included in the Procli List. An appropriate statement in this instance would be: "Employed by firm on Procli List."

Henceforth, when you desire to delete the subject of a Security Index Card from the Detcom and/or Comsab classifications the word "delete" shall be typed in the appropriate spaces on the Form FD-122 following the words Detcom and/or Comsab which are

7-21-51
SAC LETTER NO. 72
Series 1951

66-04-1316
printed on the FD-122. A brief statement shall be made at the bottom of the Form FD-122 giving your reason for the deletion. This statement should be brief. For example: "Subject no longer strategically employed."


Re: SECURITY INDEX - TRANSFERS OF SECURITY INDEX CARDS
TABBED DETCOM AND COMSAB

In the past, when the office of origin has been changed in those instances where subject of Security Index Cards have been tabbed for Detcom and/or Comsab in the old office of origin, the tabbing has been deleted from the Security Index Card at the Seat of Government and, in the absence of Form FD-122 from the new office of origin reinstating the priority designation, the Security Index Cards have remained untapped.

Upon receipt of these instructions the following action will be taken in cases of this nature.

Upon the transfer of the office of origin of a subject who has been tabbed for Detcom and/or Comsab, the Security Index Card will remain tabbed in the new office of origin as it was in the old office of origin. This shall apply in all instances including cases concerning Key Figures and Top Functionaries as well as cases carried under the Security Matter - C classification or cases carried under any other character such as Espionage - R or Internal Security - R. The Security Index Card shall continue to be tabbed for priority apprehension in the new office of origin until such time as it is determined by that office that the priority designation is not warranted.

In those instances where the subjects were tabbed for priority apprehension in the old office of origin solely because of strategic employment and the subjects are no longer strategically employed in the new office of origin, it will be necessary for the new office of origin to submit Form FD-122 reflecting the deletion of the Detcom and/or Comsab classifications. This, of course, shall apply only in those instances where no other reasons are existent for continuing the subject under the priority designation.



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.
(Typed July 11, 1951)

66-04-1360
(ENCL.)



PERSONAL ATTENTION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: SECURITY INDEX - TABBING FOR DETCOM AND COMSAB

In the past, the Field has been submitting Forms FD-122 appropriately marked for Detcom and/or Comsab when it is desired that subjects receive priority designation for apprehension. These forms often carry a notation in the space provided thereon reflecting that the reason for so tabbing the Security Index Card is due to the employment of the subject in a vital facility. However, in many instances these forms have been received at the Bureau in cases where the subject is not strategically employed and no reason for the priority tabbing of the Security Index Card is apparent on the Form FD-122. This often necessitates a review of the subject's file at the Bureau before the Security Index Card can be appropriately tabbed.

Effective upon receipt of these instructions the following action should be taken when Forms FD-122 are submitted designating subjects for Detcom and/or Comsab.

A brief statement shall be typed on the lower portion of the Form FD-122 giving the reason for the tabbing of the Security Index Card. It is not necessary that this be a lengthy statement. For example, if the Security Index Card on a subject is being tabbed because the subject fought in the Spanish Civil War or is a Veteran of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, you may merely state: "Fought in the Spanish Civil War" or "Member of Abraham Lincoln Brigade." Other examples might be: "Member of the armed forces World War II;" "Has received training in sabotage;" "Has stated will sabotage American defense effort in event of hostilities with Russia;" and so forth.

This procedure also applies when a subject's Security Index Card is being tabbed for priority apprehension because that subject is employed by a firm included in the Procli List. An appropriate statement in this instance would be: "Employed by firm on Procli List."

Henceforth, when you desire to delete the subject of a Security Index Card from the Detcom and/or Comsab classifications the word "delete" shall be typed in the appropriate spaces on the Form FD-122 following the words Detcom and/or Comsab which are printed on the FD-122. A brief statement shall be made at the bottom of the Form FD-122 giving your reason for the deletion. This statement should be brief. For example: "Subject no longer strategically employed."

Re: SECURITY INDEX - TRANSFERS OF SECURITY INDEX
CARDS TABBED DETCOM AND COMSAB


In the past, when the office of origin has been changed in those instances where subjects of Security Index Cards have been tabbed for Detcom and/or Comsab in the old office of origin, the tabbing has been deleted from the Security Index Card at the Seat of Government and, in the absence of Form FD-122 from the new office of origin reinstating the priority designation, the Security Index Cards have remained untapped.


Upon receipt of these instructions the following action will be taken in cases of this nature.

Upon the transfer of the office of origin of a subject who has been tabbed for Detcom and/or Comsab, the Security Index Card will remain tabbed in the new office of origin as it was in the old office of origin. This shall apply in all instances including cases concerning Key Figures and Top Functionaries as well as cases carried under the Security Matter - C classification or cases carried under any other character such as Espionage - R or Internal Security - R. The Security Index Card shall continue to be tabbed for priority apprehension in the new office of origin until such time as it is determined by that office that the priority designation is not warranted.

In those instances where the subjects were tabbed for priority apprehension in the old office of origin solely because of strategic employment and the subjects are no longer strategically employed in the new office of origin, it will be necessary for the new office of origin to submit Form FD-122 reflecting the deletion of the Detcom and/or Comsab classifications. This, of course, shall apply only in those instances where no other reasons are existent for continuing the subject under the priority designation.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 66-04-
SAC LETTER NO. 53-32 811
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

May 12, 1953

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SAC

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CLEVELAND
DALLAS

DENVER
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SALT LAKE CITY
SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
QUANTICO

(c) ~~INFILTRATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS BY SUBVERSIVE AMERICAN CITIZENS; LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS - INTERNAL SECURITY - R; ESPIONAGE - R; SECURITY MATTER - C~~ -- Under Executive Order #10422, all American employees of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other public international organizations are required to complete Loyalty forms.

Upon receipt of instructions to open a Loyalty case, on an employee concerning whom there is a pending security-type case, you are to close the security-type case unless there are unresolved substantial allegations of espionage. In such cases you are to advise the Bureau of your reasons for continuing the investigations.

It is expected that all pertinent results of investigation and outstanding leads in the security case will be covered in connection with the investigation of the Loyalty case. When the closing report and your recommendation for placing on, or removing the person involved from, the Security Index are received in the Loyalty case, the Bureau will determine whether additional investigation is warranted and, where necessary, issue appropriate instructions. In cases where additional information indicating subversive activity is received in the Field subsequent to the submission of a closing report in the Loyalty case, and where it appears that the person involved is still an employee of the United Nations, you will, of course, submit the additional information under the dual caption "Loyalty of Employees of the United Nations and Other Public International Organizations," and "Security Matter - C," or "Espionage - R." Such reports should contain only information which may be disseminated.

The field has suggested that no action be taken with regard to investigations of the employees of the United Nations in security cases in view of the fact that it is anticipated that such investigations will be covered by Executive Order #10422. The Bureau has not yet received Loyalty forms covering all employees of the United Nations. For your information, some American employees, particularly in the specialized agencies, have refused to complete Loyalty forms. The Bureau is aware of the identities of some of these recalcitrants and some are the subjects of pending security investigations. These persons may be refusing to comply with their obligations under the Loyalty Program because of their present or past subversive activities. The Bureau is being called upon to make

5/12/53
SAC LETTER NO. 53-32

available to appropriate authorities all information regarding the disloyal activities of such persons. It is not possible for us to defer action in these cases pending the institution of Loyalty investigations.

The security-type investigations of United Nations employees must receive prompt and continuous attention until they are completed or closed upon receipt of instructions to open Loyalty investigations. This may cause limited duplication of reporting, but you will appreciate that it is our responsibility to obtain fullest possible knowledge of subversive activities on the part of American employees of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other public international organizations. The investigation conducted under the security character will invariably be necessary in a Loyalty case, and where such investigation is completed, the Bureau's performance under the Loyalty Program will be more efficient. The security-type cases involving such employees must be reported promptly and must not be permitted to become delinquent.



United States Department of
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

(ENCL.)

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

(Typed May 1, 1953)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: INFILTRATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
BY SUBVERSIVE AMERICAN CITIZENS;
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AND OTHER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R;
ESPIONAGE - R;
SECURITY MATTER - C

Dear Sir:

Under Executive Order #10422, all American employees of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other public international organizations are required to complete Loyalty forms.

Upon receipt of instructions to open a Loyalty case, on an employee concerning whom there is a pending security-type case, you are to close the security-type case unless there are unresolved substantial allegations of espionage. In such cases you are to advise the Bureau of your reasons for continuing the investigations.

It is expected that all pertinent results of investigation and outstanding leads in the security case will be covered in connection with the investigation of the Loyalty case. When the closing report and your recommendation for placing on, or removing the person involved from, the Security Index are received in the Loyalty case, the Bureau will determine whether additional investigation is warranted and, where necessary, issue appropriate instructions. In cases where additional information indicating subversive activity is received in the Field subsequent to the submission of a closing report in the Loyalty case, and where it appears that the person involved is still an employee of the United Nations, you will, of course, submit the additional information under the dual caption "Loyalty of Employees of the United Nations and Other Public International Organizations," and "Security Matter - C," or "Espionage - R." Such reports should contain only information which may be disseminated.

*Letter sent to all places,
in office, and Super. 5/12/53
ENCLOSURE 11-64-1341*

The Field has suggested that no action be taken with regard to investigations of the employees of the United Nations in security cases in view of the fact that it is anticipated that such investigations will be covered by Executive Order #10422. The Bureau has not yet received Loyalty forms covering all employees of the United Nations. For your information, some American employees, particularly in the specialized agencies, have refused to complete Loyalty forms. The Bureau is aware of the identities of some of these recalcitrants and some are the subjects of pending security investigations. These persons may be refusing to comply with their obligations under the Loyalty Program because of their present or past subversive activities. The Bureau is being called upon to make available to appropriate authorities all information regarding the disloyal activities of such persons. It is not possible for us to defer action in these cases pending the institution of Loyalty investigations.

The security-type investigations of United Nations employees must receive prompt and continuous attention until they are completed or closed upon receipt of instructions to open Loyalty investigations. This may cause limited duplication of reporting, but you will appreciate that it is our responsibility to obtain fullest possible knowledge of subversive activities on the part of American employees of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other public international organizations. The investigation conducted under the security character will invariably be necessary in a Loyalty case, and where such investigation is completed, the Bureau's performance under the Loyalty Program will be more efficient. The security-type cases involving such employees must be reported promptly and must not be permitted to become delinquent.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

-2-
Attached memo returned to Mr. McShane by Miss
H. L. Rogers Rm. 6524
mm3. 2



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
SAC LETTER NO. 54-14 66-04-175
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

March 16, 1954

WASHINGTON, D. C.

(O) ~~NAME~~ CHECKS AND FINGERPRINT REQUESTS FROM MUNICIPALITIES --
Recently a field office was contacted by a local city official who discussed the feasibility of submitting name and fingerprint checks on municipal employees and applicants. As you know, under the Responsibilities Program certain information is furnished to governors concerning Security Index subjects who are employed by public and semipublic works including employees of State and municipal governments or certain public utilities. Further, the Bureau presently processes fingerprints of applicants for certain police departments and fingerprints submitted by municipal governments pursuant to specific state statutes or municipal ordinances. It is desired that the afore-mentioned policy not be extended in any manner and should you be contacted by a local official relative to this matter, you should point out that the Bureau's files are confidential in nature and the handling of name or fingerprint checks on municipal employees and applicants in instances other than those heretofore mentioned is not possible.



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

(ENCL.)

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

March 12, 1954

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to all Special Agents in Charge

Re: NAME CHECKS AND FINGERPRINT
REQUESTS FROM MUNICIPALITIES

Dear Sir:

Recently a field office was contacted by a local city official who discussed the feasibility of submitting name and fingerprint checks on municipal employees and applicants. As you know, under the Responsibilities Program certain information is furnished to governors concerning Security Index subjects who are employed by public and semipublic works including employees of State and municipal governments or certain public utilities. Further, the Bureau presently processes fingerprints of applicants for certain police departments and fingerprints submitted by municipal governments pursuant to specific state statutes or municipal ordinances. It is desired that the afore-mentioned policy not be extended in any manner and should you be contacted by a local official relative to this matter, you should point out that the Bureau's files are confidential in nature and the handling of name or fingerprint checks on municipal employees and applicants in instances other than those heretofore mentioned is not possible.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-1975


66-04-2028

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
SAC LETTER NO. 54-24

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

File Copy



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

May 11, 1954

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



(I) ~~INSPECTIONS - DELINQUENCIES FOUND DURING~~ -- It is the desire of the Bureau to bring to the attention of all Special Agents in Charge, from time to time, delinquencies discovered during recent inspections of field offices. The purpose of this procedure is to put all SACs on notice as to weaknesses found in the past in order that they may check their operations to see if such delinquencies exist in their offices and, if so, promptly take corrective action.

Some of the delinquencies which have been noted recently are:

5/11/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-24

Subjects. 3. Photographs not obtained of all Security Index

(L) ~~SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS --~~

(A) PERSONAL OBSERVATION OF SUBJECTS

The Bureau desires that the physical characteristics of all Security Index subjects be determined through personal observation during the course of each investigation. Such a procedure is necessary in order to aid in the reporting of accurate descriptions and to prevent mistaken identities. Up to this time this determination has been made by Agents to whom Security Index subjects have been assigned for apprehension purposes; however, by separate instructions Security Index subjects will no longer be assigned to Agents for apprehension purposes prior to an emergency.

In order to be certain that the physical characteristics and description of each subject of a security-type case under investigation or included in the Security Index have been determined by personal observation the following procedure should be placed in operation immediately in all offices:

1. In the future during the course of the Initial investigation in any security-type case, including Espionage and nationalistic tendency cases, the physical characteristics and description

5/11/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-24

of the subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation.

It will not be necessary to personally observe the subject in any case where preliminary investigation determines the basis for opening the case is unfounded. The above instructions are to be applicable only when a complete security-type investigation is conducted.

The subject should be personally observed, if possible, early in the investigation after it is determined that a complete investigation is warranted to develop the extent of the subject's activities and to determine whether a Security Index card is warranted. This action should be taken early in the course of developing complete background information regarding the subject (1) to determine the true identity and existence of the subject and (2) to assist in establishing that the subject of the investigation is the person against whom the subversive allegations have been made.

This instruction is applicable if a complete security investigation is conducted even though a Security Index card is not being recommended at the completion thereof.

The fact that for any reason it has not been possible to personally observe the subject during the investigation shall not be reason for delaying the submission of a Form FD-122 recommending the addition of the subject's name to the Security Index when it has been determined through the investigation that the subject is dangerous or potentially dangerous.

If a Security Index card is not being recommended after all logical investigation has been conducted and it has not been possible to personally observe the subject during the investigation, the case may be closed even though this has not been done. It is not desired that cases of this type remain open solely for the purpose of personally observing the subject.

If a Security Index card has been recommended and prepared and it has not been possible to personally observe the subject during the investigation, the case should remain open until such time as the subject is personally observed except where it has been determined that the subject is residing outside the continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, or Puerto Rico, in which event the case shall be closed if there is no other pending investigation and the matter shall be followed administratively to be certain the subject is personally observed upon his return to this country.

When setting out a description in a report of a subject that has been personally observed, a statement to that effect shall be included among the sources of the description.

2. A notation or memorandum to the effect that the Security Index subject has been personally observed shall appear in the case file of every Security Index subject whose name is presently maintained in the Security Index. In most instances such a notation will already appear in those case files having been recorded there at the time the Security Index subject was personally observed by the Special Agent to whom the subject was assigned for apprehension purposes.

The Bureau does not desire that the check of all Security Index subject case files be made a project to determine whether all Security Index subjects have been personally observed. Each case file should be reviewed for this purpose at the time of the next six-months verification of employment and residence. If a review of the case file of a Security Index subject fails to reflect that the subject has been personally observed, this should be done the next time the employment and residence are verified and an appropriate notation or memorandum should then be placed in the individual case file.

5/11/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-24

- 11 -

(B) SECURITY INDEX - GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION

Present instructions require that each Security Index card in the Geographical Section of your Security Index be filed geographically by residence address in accordance with the needs of your office, the cards to be filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown.

The question has been raised recently regarding authority being granted for field offices to set up an additional Geographical Section of the Security Index with cards filed under appropriate geographical breakdowns by employment addresses to be used if arrests are started at the time of day when employed subjects are at their places of employment.

The Bureau has considered this problem previously at which time a survey in ten field offices indicated that the offices believed the residence address is a more permanent address than the employment address of a subject and that there would be a considerable increase in administrative and investigative time to keep an employment breakdown up to date. In smaller cities or in cities in which there are only a few Security Index subjects, it was felt that little or no benefit would be derived from having an additional geographical breakdown by employment and the administrative burden in keeping such an administrative device up to date far offsets any benefits to be derived.

This matter has been carefully reconsidered at the Bureau and you should be guided in the matter by the following instructions:

1. The Bureau will continue to forward to you two copies of each Security Index card. One of the copies shall be filed in the Alphabetical Section of the Security Index and the other copy will be filed in either the Geographical Section, Special Section, or Unavailable Section, depending on the facts in each case. The card which is received from the Bureau that is filed in the Geographical Section shall be filed by residence breakdown geographically in accordance with the needs of your office, the cards to be filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown. The above restates existing instructions.

2. If you believe the size of your Security Index and the needs of your office warrant an additional Geographical Section in which cards will be filed by employment addresses and that such a procedure will materially assist you in making the apprehensions, you should request Bureau authority to maintain this additional Geographical Section.

If the authority is granted it will mean that you will have (1) a Geographical Section in which all Geographical Section Security Index cards are filed geographically by residence addresses and (2) a Geographical Section in which the Security Index cards are filed geographically by employment addresses.

In connection with the filing of cards in the additional Geographical Section by employment, it will be necessary also to include, in that additional Section, Security Index cards for individuals who are unemployed or whose employment is not known filed by residence addresses since each of the two Geographical Sections must contain copies of the cards for all Geographical Section subjects.

In this manner you have two complete Geographical Sections, the only difference being that in the additional Section the cards of individuals whose employment is known will be filed by employment addresses rather than by residence addresses. This will permit you to use the appropriate Geographical Section depending on the time of day the arrests are started.

If the additional Geographical Section by employment is authorized both Geographical Sections shall have the same geographical breakdowns. For example, the Security Index card for an unemployed housewife will be filed under the same geographical breakdowns in the Geographical Section by residence and the Geographical Section by employment. In view of the great number of amended Security Index cards prepared daily, the Bureau will continue to send only two Security Index cards for each subject

5/11/54
SAC LETTER NO. 54-24

- 13 -

to a field office even though the additional Geographical Section is authorized. This uniform practice is necessary to save clerical and administrative time at the Bureau. To set up and maintain the additional Geographical Section by employment, it will be necessary for you to prepare a duplicate of each Security Index card maintained in the Geographical Section of your Security Index by residence including the data on both sides of each card. Photographs should also be attached to the cards prepared in your office.

The corresponding cards for a Security Index subject in the Geographical Section by residence and the Geographical Section by employment will each contain the exact data at all times and appropriate adjustments must be made in each Section on a continuing basis as cards are added, deleted or changed.

Authority to maintain a third Security Index card for a subject will apply only in those cases where Security Index cards are maintained in the Geographical Section of your Security Index and it will have no application to cards tabbed for the Unavailable or Special Sections in which instances only two Security Index cards shall be maintained for each subject.

In submitting your request for authority to maintain a Geographical Section by employment for your Security Index you should fully explain the reasons in support and justification of the recommendation.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover


Director

Attachment for (E)

5/11/54

SAC LETTER NO. 54-24

- 14 -



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

66-04-2028
(ENCL.)

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

(Typed May 5, 1954)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge

~~INSPECTIONS -~~
Re: DELINQUENCIES FOUND DURING ~~INSPECTIONS~~ (I)

Dear Sir:

It is the desire of the Bureau to bring to the attention of all Special Agents in Charge, from time to time, delinquencies discovered during recent inspections of field offices. The purpose of this procedure is to put all SACs on notice as to weaknesses found in the past in order that they may check their operations to see if such delinquencies exist in their offices and, if so, promptly take corrective action.

Some of the delinquencies which have been noted recently are:

Subjects. 3. Photographs not obtained of all Security Index

66-04-2028



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
(Typed April 29, 1954)

66-04-2028
ENCL.)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS (L)

Dear Sir:

(A) PERSONAL OBSERVATION OF SUBJECTS

The Bureau desires that the physical characteristics of all Security Index subjects be determined through personal observation during the course of each investigation. Such a procedure is necessary in order to aid in the reporting of accurate descriptions and to prevent mistaken identities. Up to this time this determination has been made by Agents to whom Security Index subjects have been assigned for apprehension purposes; however, by separate instructions Security Index subjects will no longer be assigned to Agents for apprehension purposes prior to an emergency.

In order to be certain that the physical characteristics and description of each subject of a security-type case under investigation or included in the Security Index have been determined by personal observation the following procedure should be placed in operation immediately in all offices:

1. In the future during the course of the initial investigation in any security-type case, including Espionage and nationalistic tendency cases, the physical characteristics and description of the subject shall be determined or verified by personal observation.

It will not be necessary to personally observe the subject in any case where preliminary investigation determines the basis for opening the case is unfounded. and The above instructions are to be applicable only when a complete security-type investigation is conducted.

66-04-2028
wjt

The subject should be personally observed, if possible, early in the investigation after it is determined that a complete investigation is warranted to develop the extent of the subject's activities and to determine whether a Security Index card is warranted. This action should be taken early in the course of developing complete background information regarding the subject (1) to determine the true identity and existence of the subject and (2) to assist in establishing that the subject of the investigation is the person against whom the subversive allegations have been made.

This instruction is applicable if a complete security investigation is conducted even though a Security Index card is not being recommended at the completion thereof.

The fact that for any reason it has not been possible to personally observe the subject during the investigation shall not be reason for delaying the submission of a Form FD-122 recommending the addition of the subject's name to the Security Index when it has been determined through the investigation that the subject is dangerous or potentially dangerous.

If a Security Index card is not being recommended after all logical investigation has been conducted and it has not been possible to personally observe the subject during the investigation, the case may be closed even though this has not been done. It is not desired that cases of that type remain open solely for the purpose of personally observing the subject.

Completed

If a Security Index card has been recommended and prepared and it has not been possible to personally observe the subject during the investigation, the case should remain open until such time as the subject is personally observed except where it has been determined that the subject is residing outside of the continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, or Puerto Rico, in which event the case shall be closed if there is no other pending investigation and the matter shall be followed administratively to be certain the subject is personally observed upon his return to this country.

When setting out a description in a report of a subject that has been personally observed, a statement to that effect shall be included among the sources of the description.

2. A notation or memorandum to the effect that the Security Index subject has been personally observed shall appear in the case file of every Security Index subject whose name is presently maintained in the Security Index. In most instances such a notation will already appear in those case files having been recorded there at the time the Security Index subject was personally observed by the Special Agent to whom the subject was assigned for apprehension purposes.

The Bureau does not desire that the check of all Security Index subject case files be made a project to determine whether all Security Index subjects have been personally observed. Each case file should be reviewed for this purpose at the time of the next six-months verification of employment and residence. If a review of the case file of a Security Index subject fails to reflect that the subject has been personally observed, this should be done the next time the employment and residence are verified and an appropriate notation or memorandum should then be placed in the individual case file.

(B) SECURITY INDEX - GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION

Present instructions require that each Security Index card in the Geographical Section of your Security Index be filed geographically by residence address in accordance with the needs of your office. The cards to be filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown.

The question has been raised recently regarding authority being granted for field offices to set up an additional Geographical Section of the Security Index with cards filed under appropriate geographical breakdowns by employment addresses to be used if arrests are started at the time of day when employed subjects are at their places of employment.

The Bureau has considered this problem previously at which time a survey in ten field offices indicated that the offices believed the residence address is a more permanent address than the employment address of a subject and that there would be a considerable increase in administrative and investigative time to keep an employment breakdown up to date. In smaller cities or in cities in which there are only a few Security Index subjects, it was felt that little or no benefit would be derived from having an additional geographical breakdown by employment and the administrative burden in keeping such an administrative device up to date far offsets any benefits to be derived.

Completed.

This matter has been carefully reconsidered at the Bureau and you should be guided in the matter by the following instructions:

1. The Bureau will continue to forward to you two copies of each Security Index card. One of the copies shall be filed in the Alphabetical Section of the Security Index and the other copy will be filed in either the Geographical Section, Special Section, or Unavailable Section, depending on the facts in each case. The card which is received from the Bureau that is filed in the Geographical Section shall be filed by residence breakdown geographically in accordance with the needs of your office, the cards to be filed alphabetically under each geographical breakdown. The above restates existing instructions.

2. If you believe the size of your Security Index and the needs of your office warrant an additional Geographical Section in which cards will be filed by employment addresses and that such a procedure will materially assist you in making the apprehensions, you should request Bureau authority to maintain this additional Geographical Section.

If the authority is granted it will mean that you will have (1) a Geographical Section in which all Geographical Section Security Index cards are filed geographically by residence addresses and (2) a Geographical Section in which the Security Index cards are filed geographically by employment addresses.

In connection with the filing of cards in the additional Geographical Section by employment, it will be necessary to also include, in that additional Section, Security Index cards for individuals who are unemployed or whose employment is not known filed by residence addresses since each of the two Geographical Sections must contain copies of the cards for all Geographical Section subjects.

Completed. In this manner you have two complete Geographical Sections, the only difference being that in the additional Section the cards of individuals whose employment is known will be filed by employment

addresses rather than by residence addresses. This will permit you to use the appropriate Geographical Section depending on the time of day the arrests are started.

If the additional Geographical Section by employment is authorized both Geographical Sections shall have the same geographical breakdowns. For example, the Security Index card for an unemployed housewife will be filed under the same geographical breakdowns in the Geographical Section by residence and the Geographical Section by employment. In view of the great number of amended Security Index cards prepared daily, the Bureau will continue to send only two Security Index cards for each subject to a field office even though the additional Geographical Section is authorized. This uniform practice is necessary to save clerical and administrative time at the Bureau. To set up and maintain the additional Geographical Section by employment, it will be necessary for you to prepare a duplicate of each Security Index card maintained in the Geographical Section (by residence) of your Security Index, including the data on both sides of each card. Photographs should also be attached to the cards prepared in your office.

The corresponding cards for a Security Index subject in the Geographical Section by residence and the Geographical Section by employment will each contain the exact data at all times and appropriate adjustments must be made in each Section on a continuing basis as cards are added, deleted or changed.

Authority to maintain a third Security Index card for a subject will apply only in those cases where Security Index cards are maintained in the Geographical Section of your Security Index and it will have no application to cards tabbed for the Unavailable or Special Sections in which instances only two Security Index cards shall be maintained for each subject.

Completed.

In submitting your request for authority to maintain a Geographical Section by employment for your Security Index you should fully explain the reasons in support and justification of the recommendation.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

Completed.




In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 21, 1958

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

66-04-
2773
SAC
TER NO. 58-66



(H) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -- The Independent Socialist League (ISL), a revolutionary socialist organization based on the theories of Marx, Engels and Lenin as interpreted by Leon Trotsky, and its youth counterpart, the Young Socialist League (YSL), formally dissolved and merged with the Socialist Party - Socialist Democratic Federation (SP-SDF) and its youth counterpart, the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL), respectively, on or about September 15, 1958. Former members of the ISL and YSL were urged to join the SP-SDF and the YPSL, respectively. These latter two organizations are not under investigation by this Bureau.

There are included in the Security Index the names of individuals formerly affiliated with the ISL. Their names are included therein because of evidence developed indicating that they represent a potential threat to the internal security of the country in the event of an emergency. The fact that these individuals have lost their organizational affiliation with the ISL does not necessarily indicate that they present less of a potential threat to the internal security of the nation. Therefore, active investigation of those individuals whose names are included in the Security Index because of past affiliation with the ISL should be continued as in the past until a determination is made as to whether they present a potential threat to the internal security of the country.

In continuing the investigation of these individuals, report fully any information developed concerning a subject's activities that would have a bearing on his Security Index status. If facts are developed that would warrant deletion of his name from the Security Index, such a recommendation should be submitted. Conversely, if facts are developed that would justify the continued retention of his name in the Security Index, such facts should be reported in detail. Particular emphasis should be given to the development and reporting of revolutionary statements and activities on the subject's part indicating that he continues to present a potential threat to the internal security.

Inasmuch as the SP-SDF is not under investigation, care should be taken to insure that continued investigation of these individuals does not result in unfounded charges that the Bureau is investigating that organization.

10/21/58

SAC LETTER NO. 58-66

- 5 -



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Typed October 14, 1958)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Sec

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Dear Sir:

The Independent Socialist League (ISL), a revolutionary socialist organization based on the theories of Marx, Engels and Lenin as interpreted by Leon Trotsky, and its youth counterpart, the Young Socialist League (YSL), formally dissolved and merged with the Socialist Party - Socialist Democratic Federation (SP-SDF) and its youth counterpart, the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL), respectively, on or about September 15, 1958. Former members of the ISL and YSL were urged to join the SP-SDF and the YPSL, respectively. These latter two organizations are not under investigation by this Bureau.

There are included in the Security Index the names of individuals formerly affiliated with the ISL. Their names are included therein because of evidence developed indicating that they represent a potential threat to the internal security of the country in the event of an emergency. The fact that these individuals have lost their organizational affiliation with the ISL does not necessarily indicate that they present less of a potential threat to the internal security of the nation. Therefore, active investigation of those individuals whose names are included in the Security Index because of past affiliation with the ISL should be continued as in the past until a determination is made as to whether they present a potential threat to the internal security of the country.

ENCLOSURE

66-04-2193

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge

In continuing the investigation of these individuals, report fully any information developed concerning a subject's activities that would have a bearing on his Security Index status. If facts are developed that would warrant deletion of his name from the Security Index, such a recommendation should be submitted. Conversely, if facts are developed that would justify the continued retention of his name in the Security Index, such facts should be reported in detail. Particular emphasis should be given to the development and reporting of revolutionary statements and activities on the subject's part indicating that he continues to present a potential threat to the internal security.

Inasmuch as the SP-SDF is not under investigation, care should be taken to insure that continued investigation of these individuals does not result in unfounded charges that the Bureau is investigating that organization.


Reports in these cases should continue to be submitted under the "Internal Security - ISL" or "Security Matter - ISL" character, as the case may be.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-2797

PERSONAL ATTENTION
SA LETTER NO. 58-70



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

November 4, 1958

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

06-04-2117
(I) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -- In reviewing organizational reports in internal security matters, the Bureau has noted a tendency on the part of some field offices to fail to open for immediate investigation some individual cases in which allegations of current membership or activity in subversive organizations exists.

It is a fundamental FBI responsibility to open immediately cases on individuals concerning whom information is received indicating current membership and activity in a basic revolutionary organization or active participation or leadership in front groups. Indications to this effect developed in the course of investigation of subversive organizations as such must be promptly resolved by investigation so that the questions of potential dangerousness and Security Index status can be resolved as soon as possible.

This matter will be followed closely at the Bureau to assure that cases in this category are promptly opened and investigated.

11



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Typed October 27, 1958.

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS


Dear Sir:

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It is a fundamental FBI responsibility to open immediately cases on individuals concerning whom information is received indicating current membership and activity in a basic revolutionary organization or active participation or leadership in front groups. Indications to this effect developed in the course of investigation of subversive organizations as such must be promptly resolved by investigation so that the questions of potential dangerousness and Security Index status can be resolved as soon as possible.

This matter will be followed closely at the Bureau to assure that cases in this category are promptly opened and investigated.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

ENCLOSURE

66-04-2797



STATES DEPARTMENT
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

66-04-
ATTENTION 2972
SER NO. 60-46
ICE

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

October 4, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

60-4-
2972

(F) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - RESERVE INDEX --
Re SAC Letter 60-30 (C) dated June 21, 1960.

Stamp file covers of Reserve Index cases RI-A in
Section A cases and RI-B in Section B cases.

Stamps for this purpose should be purchased locally.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (B)

10/4/60
SAC LETTER NO. 60-46

- 5 -

2972



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Typed September 27, 1960)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF
INDIVIDUALS - RESERVE INDEX

Dear Sir:

Re SAC Letter 60-30 (C) dated June 21, 1960.

Stamp file covers of Reserve Index cases RI-A
in Section A cases and RI-B in Section E cases.

Stamps for this purpose should be purchased
locally.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-2772



U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LETTER NO. 61-25

May 2, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

SAC LETTER

(E) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS --

A. Semiannual Status Letters re Verification of Addresses

It will no longer be necessary to submit letters on January 15 and July 15 of each year advising that all Security Index cards are in an up-to-date status and whether addresses for all Security Index subjects have been verified within the preceding six months. The residence and employment of these subjects must continue to be verified at least once each six months in accordance with current Bureau instructions.

B. Semiannual Letters re Status of Annual Report Program

Discontinue the submission of semiannual letters on September 1 and March 1 of each year advising of the status of this Program. Insure, however, that the reports in Security Index cases are submitted in accordance with the schedule set forth in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions.

C. Transmittal of Key Figure Lists to the Bureau

Discontinue the submission of lists of key figures presently required to be submitted on April 1 and October 1 of each year. Continue to maintain current lists of key figures, including top functionaries, in your office as required by Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions.

D. Security Index Subjects Employed in Key Facilities

Submit reports on Security Index subjects employed in key facilities on an annual basis in the future unless, of course, such subjects are key figures or top functionaries. If such be the case, reports should be submitted in accordance with the instructions pertaining to submission of reports in key figure and top functionary cases. Although it will no longer be necessary to submit semiannual reports in the routine key facility case, you should insure that if pertinent information is developed of particular and immediate interest, such must be promptly furnished the interested agency.

E. Submission of Summary Reports in Security Index Cases

Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions specifies that a summary report must be in possession of the Bureau when a subject is recommended for the Security Index. This rule

5/2/61
SAC LETTER NO. 61-25

still applies if the report is the initial report in the case. However, in those cases in which previous investigative reports have been submitted and which are documented in accordance with the practices established by SAC Letter 121 (H) dated December 20, 1951, as amended, a summary report need not be submitted when recommending a subject's name for inclusion in the Security Index. Such recommendations should, however, be accompanied by a current investigative report.

Appropriate manual changes are being prepared.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-358086

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Typed April 5, 1961)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Dear Sir:

A. Semiannual Status Letters re Verification of Addresses

It will no longer be necessary to submit letters on January 15 and July 15 of each year advising that all Security Index cards are in an up-to-date status and whether addresses for all Security Index subjects have been verified within the preceding six months. The residence and employment of these subjects must continue to be verified at least once each six months in accordance with current Bureau instructions.

B. Semiannual Letters re Status of Annual Report Program

Discontinue the submission of semiannual letters on September 1 and March 1 of each year advising of the status of this Program. Insure, however, that the reports in Security Index cases are submitted in accordance with the schedule set forth in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions.

C. Transmittal of Key Figure Lists to the Bureau

Discontinue the submission of lists of key figures presently required to be submitted on April 1 and October 1 of each year. Continue to maintain current lists of key figures, including top functionaries, in your office as required by Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions.

D. Security Index Subjects Employed in Key Facilities

Submit reports on Security Index subjects employed in key facilities on an annual basis in the future unless, of course, such subjects are key figures or top functionaries. If

66-04-3018
ENCLOSURE

3018
(ENCL.)

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Investigations of Individuals
100-358086

such be the case, reports should be submitted in accordance with the instructions pertaining to submission of reports in key figure and top functionary cases. Although it will no longer be necessary to submit semiannual reports in the routine key facility case, you should insure that if pertinent information is developed of particular and immediate interest, such must be promptly furnished the interested agency.

E. Submission of Summary Reports in Security Index Cases

Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions specifies that a summary report must be in possession of the Bureau when a subject is recommended for the Security Index. This rule still applies if the report is the initial report in the case. However, in those cases in which previous investigative reports have been submitted and which are documented in accordance with the practices established by SAC Letter 121 (H) dated December 20, 1951, as amended, a summary report need not be submitted when recommending a subject's name for inclusion in the Security Index. Such recommendations should, however, be accompanied by a current investigative report.

Appropriate manual changes are being prepared.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director



PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LETTER NO. 63-36
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to

July 23, 1963

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



66-04-3203
(c) ~~✓~~ SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -- Discontinue the submission of periodic reports in Security Index cases in those instances in which the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources. In lieu thereof, submit a letter to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted in connection with the investigation, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, as well as Form FD-305 properly executed.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

7-23-63
SAC LETTER NO. 63-36

- 4 -

3



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

66-04-3203-1
(ENCL.)

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

(SC) 100-358086

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Typed July 15, 1963)

PERSONAL ATTENTION



Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Dear Sir:

Discontinue the submission of periodic reports in Security Index cases in those instances in which the only available information consists of verification of residence and employment and negative contacts with security informants and sources. In lieu thereof, submit a letter to the Bureau setting forth identities of informants and sources contacted in connection with the investigation, any additional administrative data deemed necessary, as well as Form FD-305 properly executed.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

ENCLOSURE

66-04-3203




In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

66-04-301
PEI D.A. ATTENTION
SAC LETTER NO. 64-53
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

November 3, 1964

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

66-1934
1-43
F) 100-35-8086



11/3/64

SAC LETTER NO. 64-53

(E) DISSEMINATION TO SECRET SERVICE -- Re SAC letters 64-35 (B)
and 64-49 (D) (E) (F).

As you were instructed in SAC Letter 64-35 (B), the caption "Tropus" (Travel of the President in the U. S. and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) should be used only in correspondence concerning the dissemination resulting from instructions in Bureau teletype to all Special Agents in Charge, December 10, 1963, and Bureau airtel to all Special Agents in Charge, April 13, 1964. The caption "Tropus" should not be used when reporting actual threats against the President. In other words, this caption should be used only when discussing dissemination of data concerning security index subjects, and other subversives, ultra-rightists, racists and fascists who meet the criteria set out in Section 83K2 of the Manual of Instructions. Such correspondence should be designated for Bureau file 62-109119.

(F) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - RESERVE INDEX, SECTION B - REVIEW OF CASES -- At the recently held Internal Security - Espionage Conference, the suggestion was made and approved that Reserve Index, Section B cases should be reviewed every two years on a continuing basis beginning in January, 1965. Establish the necessary administrative procedures so the cases falling within this category will be thoroughly reviewed and analyzed from an investigative viewpoint at least once every two years. As a minimum this review should include verification of residence and employment and contact with logical sources and informants. Be alert to selecting logical subjects for interview as means of developing potential sources, informants and witnesses. Also be alert for recommending individuals for inclusion in Section A of the Reserve Index or the Security Index if warranted. Form FD-154 can be adapted for use in cases in this category. Appropriate Manual changes will be forwarded.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

11/3/64
SAC LETTER NO. 64-53

- 6 -

3297
277



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(Typed October 27, 1964)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Sec.

(ENCL.)

66-04-397
(ENCL.)

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Dissemination to Secret Service

As you were instructed in SAC Letter 64-35(B), the caption "Tropus" (Travel of the President in the U. S. and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) should be used only in correspondence concerning the dissemination resulting from instructions in Bureau teletype to all Special Agents in Charge, December 10, 1963, and Bureau airtel to all Special Agents in Charge, April 13, 1964. The caption "Tropus" should not be used when reporting actual threats against the President. In other words, this caption should be used only when discussing dissemination of data concerning security index subjects, and other subversives, ultra-rightists, racists and fascists who meet the criteria set out in Section 83K2 of the Manual of Instructions. Such correspondence should be designated for Bureau file 62-109119.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 66-04

(Typed October 29, 1964)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
RESERVE INDEX, SECTION B -
REVIEW OF CASES

Dear Sir:

At the recently held Internal Security - Espionage Conference, the suggestion was made and approved that Reserve Index, Section B cases should be reviewed every two years on a continuing basis beginning in January, 1965. Establish the necessary administrative procedures so the cases falling within this category will be thoroughly reviewed and analyzed from an investigative viewpoint at least once every two years. As a minimum this review should include verification of residence and employment and contact with logical sources and informants. Be alert to selecting logical subjects for interview as means of developing potential sources, informants and witnesses. Also be alert for recommending individuals for inclusion in Section A of the Reserve Index or the Security Index if warranted. Form FD-154 can be adapted for use in cases in this category. Appropriate Manual changes will be forwarded.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-3297

ENCLOSURE

all SACs, Bureau, 11-3-64, modified



PERSONAL ATTENTION 66-
LETTER 67-13 348
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 21, 1967

ST
BT
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

(G) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -- In reviewing organizational reports in internal security matters, the Bureau has noted a tendency on the part of some field offices to fail to open for immediate investigation some individual cases in which allegations of current membership or activity in subversive organizations exist.

It is a fundamental FBI responsibility to open immediately cases on individuals concerning whom information is received indicating current membership and activity in a basic revolutionary organization or active participation or leadership in front groups. Indications to this effect developed in the course of investigation of subversive organizations as such must be promptly resolved by investigation so that the questions of potential dangerousness and Security Index status can be resolved as soon as possible.

This matter will be followed closely at the Bureau to assure that cases in this category are promptly opened and investigated.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(Typed February 16, 1967)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Sec

(E)

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Dear Sir:

In reviewing organizational reports in internal security matters, the Bureau has noted a tendency on the part of some field offices to fail to open for immediate investigation some individual cases in which allegations of current membership or activity in subversive organizations exist.

It is a fundamental FBI responsibility to open immediately cases on individuals concerning whom information is received indicating current membership and activity in a basic revolutionary organization or active participation or leadership in front groups. Indications to this effect developed in the course of investigation of subversive organizations as such must be promptly resolved by investigation so that the questions of potential dangerousness and Security Index status can be resolved as soon as possible.

This matter will be followed closely at the Bureau to assure that cases in this category are promptly opened and investigated.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-3483
ENCLOSURE





In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

66-07 375
PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC 1 LITER 68-21
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 2, 1968

66-04-3275

(C) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -- The emergence of the new left movement as a subversive force dedicated to the complete destruction of the traditional values of our democratic society presents the Bureau with an unprecedented challenge in the security field. Although the new left has no definable ideology of its own, it does have strong Marxist, existentialist, nihilist and anarchist overtones. While mere membership in a new left group is not sufficient to establish that an individual is a potential threat to the internal security of the United States, it must be recognized that many individuals affiliated with the new left movement do, in fact, engage in violence or unlawful activities, and their potential dangerousness is clearly demonstrated by their statements, conduct and actions.

The Bureau has recently noted that in many instances security investigations of these individuals are not being initiated. In some cases, subjects are not being recommended for inclusion on the Security Index merely because no membership in a basic revolutionary organization could be established. Since the new left is basically anarchist, many of the leading activists in it are not members of any basic revolutionary group. It should be borne in mind that even if a subject's membership in a subversive organization cannot be proven, his inclusion on the Security Index may often be justified because of activities which establish his anarchistic tendencies. In this regard, you should constantly bear in mind that the public statements, the writings and the leadership activities of subjects of security investigations which establish them as anarchists are proper areas of inquiry. Such activity should be actively pursued through investigation with the ultimate view of including them on the Security Index. It is entirely possible, therefore, that a subject without any organizational affiliation can qualify for the Security Index by virtue of his public pronouncements and activities which establish his rejection of law and order and reveal him to be a potential threat to the security of the United States.

It is equally important to understand that mere dissent and opposition to Governmental policies pursued in a legal constitutional manner are not sufficient to warrant inclusion in the Security Index. You are reminded that one of the four criteria in Section 87D, Manual of Instructions, must apply. Further, in those cases requiring Bureau

4-2-68
SAC LETTER 68-21

- 5 -

authority to initiate investigations, your requests must summarize information available to show the potential threat and not merely show anti-Vietnam or peace group sentiments without also revealing advocacy of violence or unlawful action which would justify an investigation.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosures for (B)

4-2-68
SAC LETTER 68-21

- 6 -



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-358086

(Typed March 28, 1968)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Dear Sir:

The emergence of the new left movement as a subversive force dedicated to the complete destruction of the traditional values of our democratic society presents the Bureau with an unprecedented challenge in the security field. Although the new left has no definable ideology of its own, it does have strong Marxist, existentialist, nihilist and anarchist overtones. While mere membership in a new left group is not sufficient to establish that an individual is a potential threat to the internal security of the United States, it must be recognized that many individuals affiliated with the new left movement do, in fact, engage in violence or unlawful activities, and their potential dangerousness is clearly demonstrated by their statements, conduct and actions.

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
(ENCL.)


Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Investigations of Individuals
100-358086

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It is equally important to understand that mere dissent and opposition to Governmental policies pursued in a legal constitutional manner are not sufficient to warrant inclusion in the Security Index. You are reminded that one of the four criteria in Section 87D, Manual of Instructions, must apply. Further, in those cases requiring Bureau authority to initiate investigations, your requests must summarize information available to show the potential threat and not merely show anti-Vietnam or peace group sentiments without also revealing advocacy of violence or unlawful action which would justify an investigation.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535


October 15, 1968

PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LETT 68-59

3615

Sac letter

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66-07-3615


(F) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -- Effective immediately, revised Security Index criteria are as follows: (Underscoring indicates new or changed wording.)

- (A) Subject has had membership in, or participation in the activities of, a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- (B) Subject has had membership in, or participation in the affairs of, one or more front organizations which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a basic revolutionary organization, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of those aims and purposes of the front organization which coincide with those of a basic revolutionary organization, within the last three years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.
- (C) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member of or a participant in the activities of a basic revolutionary or front organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to commit acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of the national, state and local governments and of the defense effort.
- (D) Although investigation has failed to establish the facts required by (A), (B) or (C) above, either as to the substance of those criteria or because there have been no overt acts or statements within the time limits prescribed, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts of the kind described in (C) above.

10-15-68
SAC LETTER 68-59

With the increasingly greater number of individuals active in the New Left and other protest groups, our investigations must be thorough, penetrating and complete. We must develop and report not only membership, leadership and activity in New Left or dissident organizations, but also whether the individual has engaged in or professed violence or other unlawful methods to gain his objectives. An individual's propensity for violence must be determined.

Your investigation must clearly show that individuals recommended for inclusion on the Security Index come within the required criteria, are fully justified, and retention of such individuals on the Security Index could withstand judicial inquiry.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

66-04-3615
(ENCL.)

(Typed October 1, 1968)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

Dear Sir:

Effective immediately, revised Security Index
criteria are as follows: (Underscoring indicates new or
changed wording.)

in,

- (A) Subject has had membership/or participation
in the activities of, a basic revolutionary
organization within the last 5 years as shown
by overt acts or statements established
through reliable sources, informants, or
individuals.

in,

- (B) Subject has had membership/or participation
in the affairs of, one or more front organi-
zations which adhere to the policies and
doctrines of a basic revolutionary organiza-
tion, in a leadership capacity or by active
substantial participation in the furtherance
of those aims and purposes of the front
organization which coincide with those of
a basic revolutionary organization, within
the last three years as shown by overt acts
or statements established through reliable
sources, informants, or individuals.

66-04-3615

ENCLOSURE


Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Investigations of Individuals


- (C) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member of or a participant in the activities of a basic revolutionary or front organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to commit acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of the national, state and local governments and of the defense effort.
- (D) Although investigation has failed to establish the facts required by (A), (B) or (C) above, either as to the substance of those criteria or because there have been no overt acts or statements within the time limits prescribed, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts of the kind described in (C) above.

With the increasingly greater number of individuals active in the New Left and other protest groups, our investigations must be thorough, penetrating and complete. We must develop and report not only membership, leadership and activity in New Left or dissident organizations, but also whether the individual has engaged in or professed violence or other unlawful methods to gain his objectives. An individual's propensity for violence must be determined.

Your investigation must clearly show that individuals recommended for inclusion on the Security Index come within the required criteria, are fully justified, and retention of such individuals on the Security Index could withstand judicial inquiry.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535


June 2, 1970

PERSONNEL ATTENTION
SAC LETTER 70-30

377a

A. A. C. Letter-70-30

1



(D) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - MORATORIUM ON SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST (SM - C) INVESTIGATIONS -- Recent field inspection shows need to reiterate prior instructions regarding current moratorium on SM - C investigations. Moratorium was initiated by Bureau letter to all offices dated February 27, 1969, and extended by letters dated September 17, 1969, and May 4, 1970, captioned "Security Investigations of Individuals." Moratorium will be reevaluated January 1, 1971.

Routine SM - C investigations are not to be conducted during moratorium. Do not open cases for verification of residence and employment of subjects in SM - C cases which have been placed in Priority II or III of Security Index where cases were closed in line with existing instructions. Note these instructions apply only to routine communist investigations. Due to extreme radical, anti-United States and violent nature of Marxists, anarchists and pro-Chinese revolutionaries who largely make up such organizations as Progressive Labor Party, Weatherman faction of Students for a Democratic Society, and Socialist Workers Party and its extremist youth group, Young Socialist Alliance, moratorium does not apply to investigations of these individuals. Further, you must remain aware of whereabouts of these extremists under Emergency Detention Program.

Discuss above with appropriate personnel to be certain routine SM - C cases are not investigated during moratorium. Equally insure your responsibilities are met in the more violent and revolutionary cases in security investigations of individuals.

6/2/70
SAC LETTER 70-30

66-04-517a
(E) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - INDIVIDUALS TRAVELING ABROAD --
Reference is made to Section 87D, 6b (4), Manual of Instructions,
"Individuals Traveling Abroad," which specifies action to be taken when
we have subversive derogatory information on any individual who intends
to travel abroad or has already left this country for foreign travel.

Effective immediately, limit action concerning foreign travel
by subjects of security investigations to the following instances:

- (1) Subjects of current security investigations
- (2) Subjects whose names are included in Agitator
Index or Priorities I and II of Security Index
- (3) Other past security subjects who may be "sleepers"
or in an underground capacity, or where current
information otherwise indicates a need for foreign
coverage of individual

Above instructions likewise apply in the case of individuals
traveling in foreign countries as members of organized tours.

Appropriate Manual changes are being prepared.

6/2/70
SAC LETTER 70-30



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

66-04-3742
(ENCL.)

(Typed May 26, 1970)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -
MORATORIUM ON SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST
(SM - C) INVESTIGATIONS

Dear Sir:

Recent field inspection shows need to reiterate prior instructions regarding current moratorium on SM - C investigations. Moratorium was initiated by Bureau letter to all offices dated February 27, 1969, and extended by letters dated September 17, 1969, and May 4, 1970, captioned "Security Investigations of Individuals." moratorium will be reevaluated January 1, 1971.

Routine SM - C investigations are not to be conducted during moratorium. Do not open cases for verification of residence and employment of subjects in SM - C cases which have been placed in Priority II or III of Security Index where cases were closed in line with existing instructions. Note these instructions apply only to routine communist investigations. Due to extreme radical, anti-United States and violent nature of Marxists, anarchists and pro-Chinese revolutionaries who largely make up such organizations as Progressive Labor Party, Weatherman faction of Students for a Democratic Society, and Socialist Workers Party and its extremist youth group, Young Socialist Alliance, moratorium does not apply to investigations of these individuals. Further, you must remain aware of whereabouts of those extremists under Emergency Detention Program.

66-04-3742

ENCLOSURE

66-01-01
(ENCL.)

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:
RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -
MORATORIUM ON SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST
(SM - C) INVESTIGATIONS

Discuss above with appropriate personnel to be certain routine SM - C cases are not investigated during moratorium. Equally insure your responsibilities are met in the more violent and revolutionary cases in security investigations of individuals.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(Typed May 25, 1970)

PERSONAL ATTENTION



Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

(5)


RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -
INDIVIDUALS TRAVELING ABROAD

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Section 87D, 6b (4), Manual of Instructions, "Individuals Traveling Abroad," which specifies action to be taken when we have subversive derogatory information on any individual who intends to travel abroad or has already left this country for foreign travel.

Effective immediately, limit action concerning foreign travel by subjects of security investigations to the following instances:

- (1) Subjects of current security investigations
- (2) Subjects whose names are included in Agitator Index or Priorities I and II of Security Index
- (3) Other past security subjects who may be "sleepers" or in an underground capacity, or where current information otherwise indicates a need for foreign coverage of individual



66-04-37412




Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -
INDIVIDUALS TRAVELING ABROAD

Above instructions likewise apply in the case
of individuals traveling in foreign countries as members
of organized tours.

Appropriate Manual changes are being prepared.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director




60-07 575
PERSONNEL ATTENTION
SAC LETTER 70-44
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

August 18, 1970

SAC LETTER



(C) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - YOUNG WORKERS
LIBERATION LEAGUE -- By SAC Letter 70-21, dated April 21, 1970,
you were advised of the formation of the Young Workers Liberation
League (YWLL) by the Communist Party. You were instructed to
institute investigation of the organization and to identify its local
chapters.

Primary purposes of the YWLL are to educate youth in the
revolutionary ideology of the Communist Party and to foment dissent
among youth. Therefore, promptly identify all members of the YWLL
and institute security investigations of its officers and leading
activists. Determine subversive sympathies, revolutionary aims and
activities and propensity for violence in each investigation and furnish
your evaluation concerning inclusion of the individual on the Security
Index. In submitting reports, utilize the character "Security Matter -
YWLL."

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (B)

8/18/70
SAC LETTER 70-44

- 3 -

3753

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(Typed August 11, 1970)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -
YOUNG WORKERS LIBERATION LEAGUE

Dear Sir:

By SAC Letter 70-21, dated April 21, 1970, you were advised of the formation of the Young Workers Liberation League (YWLL) by the Communist Party. You were instructed to institute investigation of the organization and to identify its local chapters.

Primary purposes of the YWLL are to educate youth in the revolutionary ideology of the Communist Party and to foment dissent among youth. Therefore, promptly identify all members of the YWLL and institute security investigations of its officers and leading activists. Determine subversive sympathies, revolutionary aims and activities and propensity for violence in each investigation and furnish your evaluation concerning inclusion of the individual on the Security Index. In submitting reports, utilize the character "Security Matter - YWLL."

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

ENCLOSURE

66-04-3253



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

PERSONNEL ATTENTION
MEMORANDUM 25-72
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

October 10, 1972

66-04-3895

100-35 10 10
1 100-30

(C) ~~ADEX~~ SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS --

The revision of ADEX initiated by Memorandum to All SACs 21-72, dated September 12, 1972, should not be construed as a reduction in this Bureau's efforts in the national security field. While the ADEX is now to contain only individuals determined by investigation to be "dangerous now," there has been no change or relaxation in our responsibilities to identify on a continuing basis through appropriate investigations those individuals who may be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the national security. It is important also to keep in mind that to obtain vital information relating to national security matters, we must not relax our efforts to develop and maintain a strong security informant program. The continued maintenance of a strong informant program will enable us to identify those who represent a current threat to the national security and who should be included in ADEX. Additionally, a good informant program makes it possible to redirect manpower resources to other high priority matters in the internal security field.

Insofar as policy of instituting security investigations of individuals is concerned, there has been no change in the policy set forth in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions. The same is true regarding dissemination of information developed during security investigations of individuals. Aside from the provisions set forth in SAC Memorandum 21-72 (D) streamlining reporting procedures, policy on dissemination of data developed in security investigations of individuals outlined in Section 87H of the Manual of Instructions continues to apply. Agents and supervisors handling security investigations should be thoroughly familiar with these two sections of the Manual of Instructions.

For your information, a system of listing subversive and extremist individuals for future identification and reference aside from those included in ADEX is presently being formulated at the Bureau.

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

10/10/72
MEMORANDUM 25-72

- 3 -

(100-353086)

(Typed October 2, 1972)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Memorandum to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: ADEX - SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

The revision of ADEX initiated by Memorandum to All SACs 21-72, dated September 12, 1972, should not be construed as a reduction in this Bureau's efforts in the national security field. While the ADEX is now to contain only individuals determined by investigation to be "dangerous now," there has been no change or relaxation in our responsibilities to identify on a continuing basis through appropriate investigations those individuals who may be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the national security. It is important also to keep in mind that to obtain vital information relating to national security matters, we must not relax our efforts to develop and maintain a strong security informant program. The continued maintenance of a strong informant program will enable us to identify those who represent a current threat to the national security and who should be included in ADEX. Additionally, a good informant program makes it possible to redirect manpower resources to other high priority matters in the internal security field.

Insofar as policy of instituting security investigations of individuals is concerned, there has been no change in the policy set forth in Section 67D of the Manual of Instructions. The same is true regarding dissemination of information developed during security investigations of individuals. Aside from the provisions set forth in SAC Memorandum 21-72 (D) streamlining reporting procedures, policy on dissemination of data developed in security investigations of individuals outlined in Section 67H of the Manual of Instructions continues to apply. Agents and supervisors handling security investigations should be thoroughly familiar with these two sections of the Manual of Instructions.

Memorandum to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: ADEX - Security Investigations of Individuals
100-358086

For your information, a system of listing subversive and extremist individuals for future identification and reference aside from those included in ADEX is presently being formulated at the Bureau.

L. P. Gray, III
L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

NOTE:

See memorandum to , dated
10/2/72, captioned "Administrative Index (ADEX), Research Matter,"
prepared by No manual changes necessary.



66-1855-S-1633

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: July 6, 1959

FROM :

SUBJECT: SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTION
PROGRAM EVALUATION

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

1. Origin

Presidential directives, the initial one being issued in 9-39 and since repeated on several occasions. These directives charge the Bureau with the responsibility for investigation of individuals in the internal security field. It is the collecting agency of the entire executive branch for subversive information and has the responsibility of seeing that such information is distributed to those Government agencies having a legitimate interest therein.

2. Purpose

The identification and investigation of individuals who, because of affiliation with subversive organizations, may present a potential threat to the internal security in the event of an emergency and the development of evidence of violations of Federal statutes on the part of these individuals. If, during the course of a security investigation, it is determined that a subject does pose a potential threat to the internal security, he is scheduled for apprehension under the Emergency Detention Program (EDP) by the inclusion of his name in the Security Index.

3. Scope

Field wide.

66-1855-S-1633
JUL 8 1959

4. Tie in With Other Programs

Closely related is the EDP, which deals with plans for the handling of individuals included in the Security Index in the event of an emergency. Also closely related are the various security programs of other Government agencies, such programs depending to a large extent on information developed by us and disseminated to such agencies.

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

1633

Memorandum for [REDACTED]
RE: SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTION
PROGRAM EVALUATION
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
66-1855-S

5. Case Load

Basically, these cases fall in security classifications 65, 100 and 105. As of 5-31-59 there were 18,658 pending active matters in these classifications throughout the field representing 22.9% of the entire pending active case load in all classifications throughout the field.

The Subversive Control Section is primarily responsible for investigations of individuals under the 100 classification although we do have cases on individuals under the 105 classification such as affiliates of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico and the Nation of Islam. During the period January - May, 1959, there was a monthly average of 13,300 pending active matters in classification 100 throughout the field. For comparative purposes, during the same period of 1958 the field averaged 10,508 such pending active matters per month. Thus, during the first five months in 1959, the average percentage of increase in cases in 100 classification has been 26.6%.

6. Magnitude

As can be seen from the above figures, this program is major from the standpoint of manpower and costs and as such is referred to in budget material.

7. Past or Present Weaknesses

Close attention is given our entire operations in this field in efforts to insure that we are fully discharging our responsibilities thereunder. We are continually striving to streamline our operations if such can be done without injuring our coverage of subversive activities.

8. Administrative Controls

The field is followed closely on its over-all delinquency in the three security classifications mentioned previously. This is handled on a monthly basis. In addition, we follow the field by tickler on pending matters in the field of which we have knowledge and we follow the field for submission of periodic reports in Security Index cases to insure that such are submitted when due.

Memorandum for [REDACTED]
RE: SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTION
PROGRAM EVALUATION
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
66-1855-S

9. Adequacy and Currentness of Instructions

Instructions dealing with security investigations of individuals are contained in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions and are in a current status.

10. Over-all Value

Determination of identities of individuals who should be apprehended in the event of an emergency in order to minimize possibilities of espionage, sabotage and subversion, at the time when this country would, in effect, be fighting for its very existence. Dissemination of information of intelligence value to other Government agencies concerning individuals and matters in which they have a legitimate interest. It is noted that essentially, all Government security programs are based upon information developed by the Bureau in this field. Budget purposes.

OTHER PROGRAMS ENCOMPASSED IN AND/OR ARISING OUT OF
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS

INTERVIEWS

In connection with security investigations

In Security Index cases we considered reinterviews with each on an annual basis.

SECURITY INDEX

As noted previously herein one of the purposes of security investigations is to determine the identities of individuals who because of affiliation with subversive organizations may be considered

Memorandum for [REDACTED]
RE: SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTION
PROGRAM EVALUATION
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
66-1855-S

a potential threat to the internal security in the event of an emergency. When such information is developed the name of the individual concerned is included in the Security Index.

We presently have included in the Security Index names of 12,704. Each Security Index case is thoroughly re-evaluated at least once annually at the Bureau and in the field to insure that the cases are sound in every respect should it be necessary to invoke the EDP. If it is found that the subject's activities no longer justify the retention of his name in the Security Index immediate steps are taken to insure that his name is removed therefrom.

Recommendation for inclusion to the Security Index are finally passed on at the Section Chief level or higher. For example, in a complicated case the final decision is made by the Assistant Director.

In addition to the review of Security Index cases continually being made in the Subversive Control Section, the Department is continuing a review of a sampling of these cases and as of 6-15-59 the Security Index contained the names of 1,654 individuals whose cases had been reviewed by the Department and approved for the Security Index. This is a continuing review by the Department.

June 12, 1952

SAC, New York

Director, FBI

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
OF INDIVIDUALS

SUPERVISION - INTERNAL SECURITY

During the course of the recent survey conducted by Bureau representatives of a portion of your pending unassigned Security Matter cases it was noted that there were a number of cases involving subjects presently included in the Security Index which are in a pending status. The identities of the cases falling in this category are set forth in the attachment.

Since these subjects are presently included in the Security Index and no leads are outstanding it appears that these cases may be closed without further action at this time and be placed in line for the preparation of summary reports based upon the schedule for the preparation of such reports by your office. Prior to the closing of each individual case, however, you should be certain that there is no additional action warranted to bring the Security Index card to a current status. It is observed that these cases should not be opened, of course, solely for the purpose of verifying the current residence and business addresses of these subjects. If the subject of a Security Index card is determined to be missing and his present whereabouts unknown such cases should be assigned for active investigation and should never be left in a pending unassigned status.

Since in a number of the cases listed on the attachment the Bureau's file may be in a pending status, you should, of course, advise the Bureau by memorandum of the closing of such cases by your office. This will be true in those cases wherein you have been designated office of origin by another office on Form FD-128 and you contemplate no additional investigation at this time.

Enclosure

SAC, New York

June 12, 1952

Director, FBI


**SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
OF INDIVIDUALS**
SUPERVISION - INTERNAL SECURITY

As a result of the recent analysis of a number of the pending unassigned Security Matter cases in Section 12 of your office by Bureau representatives there were noted a number of cases which, based on a review of the data contained in the main case files involved, do not appear to fall within the current Bureau standards for opening security investigations. The cases in this category are identified in the attachment.

In connection with the cases thus identified it is desired that they be placed in line for immediate attention as follows. The file references on the subjects involved should be reviewed by correlation clerks to determine if there is sufficient subversive information in the file references to bring such subjects within the current Bureau standards for conducting security investigations. If so, such data should be incorporated into the main case files of the subjects involved and these cases must necessarily receive investigative attention when the work load of your office permits. In the remainder of the cases in the event no such data is located bringing such subjects within current Bureau standards for investigation such matters may be closed administratively. In some instances it will be noted that a review of individual case files will reflect that they require merely an indices check at Bureau instructions. In some instances, therefore, it may be necessary to advise the Bureau of the results of your indices search. Other cases in this group will be those which were referred to your office by another office on Form FD-128 or on which the Bureau has a pending case file. In such cases, of course, the Bureau should be advised by memorandum that no further investigation will be conducted as the results of the indices search reflect that no investigation is warranted under current Bureau standards. In the event any question arises as to the proper handling of any individual case in this category, you may desire to communicate with the Bureau for instructions and guidance.

cc: [unclear]

66-04-3563




PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LEVER 68-11
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 13, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.



66-11-303
(E) SECURITY INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS -- The emergence of the new left and expansion of the racial militant now pose dangers which parallel the threat of communism to the internal security of the United States.

In order to provide increased coverage of the new left movement and militant racial activity, the handling of investigations of individuals in the Reserve Index - A and Reserve Index - B is being changed as follows:

1. The criteria for placing individuals in the Security Index and the procedures in handling the investigations of these individuals remain the same.
2. The criteria for placing individuals on the Reserve Index - A remain the same. Current procedures for annual reopening and limited investigation in these cases be suspended at this time. The field office file for an RI-A subject should be reviewed by the field whenever informant information or other information is channeled to the file to determine if additional investigation is warranted.
3. The criteria for placing subjects on the Reserve Index - B remain the same. The current procedures for reopening of these cases be suspended at this time. The field office file of an RI-B subject be reviewed by the field whenever informant information or other information is channeled to the file to determine if additional investigation is warranted.
4. Maintenance of the RI-A and RI-B by the field office and the Bureau will remain the same.

Appropriate manual changes will be forwarded.

2-13-68

SAC LETTER 68-11

- 5 -





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

(Typed February 6, 1968)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATION
OF INDIVIDUALS

Dear Sir:

The emergence of the new, left and expansion of the racial militant now pose dangers which parallel the threat of communism to the internal security of the United States.

In order to provide increased coverage of the new left movement and militant racial activity, the handling of investigations of individuals in the Reserve Index - A and Reserve Index - B is being changed as follows:

1. The criteria for placing individuals in the Security Index and the procedures in handling the investigations of these individuals remain the same.
2. The criteria for placing individuals on the Reserve Index - A remain the same. Current procedures for annual reopening and limited investigation in these cases be suspended at this time. The field office file for an RI-A subject should be reviewed by the field whenever informant information or other information is channeled to the file to determine if additional investigation is warranted.
3. The criteria for placing subjects on the Reserve Index - B remain the same. The current procedures for reopening of these cases be suspended at this time. The field office file of an RI-B subject be reviewed by the field whenever informant information or other information is channeled to the file to determine if additional investigation is warranted.

66-04-3813
ENCLOSURE


Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
RE: Security Investigation of Individuals

4. Maintenance of the RI-A and RI-B by the field office and the Bureau will remain the same.

Appropriate manual changes will be forwarded.

Very truly yours,


J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

66-04-2677
PERSONAL ATTENTION
LETTER NO. 57-53
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

September 17, 1957 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



9/17/57
SAC LETTER NO. 57-53


(M) LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (SECURITY MATTER) -- Each office examine pending security investigations of individuals and Security Index cases for any subjects holding positions with labor organizations that normally require the execution of noncommunist affidavits, regarding whom Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, (Security Matter) investigations have not been instituted. If any such individuals identified, determine if they have filed noncommunist affidavits and, if they have, institute appropriate investigations. Advise Bureau by November 1, 1957, number of cases opened.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

9/17/57
SAC LETTER NO. 57-53



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(September 12, 1957)

PERSONAL ATTENTION


Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947
(SECURITY MATTER)

Dear Sir:

Each office examine pending security investigations of individuals and Security Index cases for any subjects holding positions with labor organizations that normally require the execution of noncommunist affidavits, regarding whom Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, (Security Matter) investigations have not been instituted. If any such individuals identified, determine if they have filed noncommunist affidavits and, if they have, institute appropriate investigations. Advise Bureau by November 1, 1957, number of cases opened.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

ENCLOSURE

66-16900-1225
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: June 22, 1956

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
DOCUMENTATION OF REPORTS

SUGGESTION: HANDLING OF MAIL IN FIELD DIVISION

While attending In-Service ending May 25, 1956, ASAC of the Chicago Office suggested that consideration be given by the Bureau to eliminating items (2), (3) and (4) of the documentation of reports in security cases. Complete documentation consists of five elements, namely (1) identity of the source, (2) date of activity and/or description of information, (3) date information was received, (4) identity of Agent receiving information, and (5) location by file and serial number of the original exhibit in the office files.

PRESENT PROCEDURE:

Since December, 1951, we have required the field to fully document on administrative pages all information concerning each subject in reports submitted by the field to enable us to be in a position to readily locate original documents and items of evidence or intelligence information that may be desired by United States attorneys for possible use at hearings in the event the Emergency Detention Program should go into effect. Since March, 1952, in addition to the above, the five elements of documentation have been set out in channelizing memoranda directed to individual subjects' case files, thus enabling us to determine immediately from a check of the channelizing memoranda the exact location in the office of the original source of information.

ADVANTAGES:

ASAC feels that, in eliminating items (2), (3) and (4), there would be a considerable saving in paper, file space, Agent time in preparing and reviewing reports, stenographic time in transcription, and would speed the production of reports in the field, enabling Agents engaged in security investigations to spend more time in actual investigations.

Enclosures

Memorandum for

FIELD OFFICE CONSIDERATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

By letter dated May 29, 1956, we requested specific comments from certain field offices regarding the above suggestion. Certain SACs were requested to take this matter up with personnel who were thoroughly acquainted with the procedure of preparing reports in security cases to determine from them if they believed the procedure suggested would facilitate their work and would result in a saving of time and money invested in the preparation of security reports, bearing in mind the basic purpose of requiring documentation, that is, to insure that the field would be in a position to readily locate original documents and evidence that may be required at some later date. The SACs were instructed to take into consideration the fact that, under conditions that would undoubtedly exist at the time of a national emergency, time would preclude us from conducting extensive file reviews to locate exhibits desired for presentation before hearing boards. Their recommendations are as follows:

Detroit, Philadelphia, San Francisco:

The above three offices recommend adoption of the suggestion. All feel that the elimination of these three items of documentation will not present any greater problem in finding the original information in the event of subsequent prosecution or administrative hearings. They feel that considerable saving will accrue by the adoption of this suggestion by the elimination of dictation and stenographic time in transcription.

Los Angeles and Newark:

These offices agree with the suggestion except they feel it necessary to show the serial which contains each item of information reported. For this purpose, Los Angeles recommends retention of item (2) (Date of Activity and/or Description of Information Being Reported), in those instances in which more than one item is attributed to an informant in a report, while Newark recommends retention of item (3) (Date Information Was Received). We agree that item (2) is the better one to retain.

66-16263-
1225

Memorandum for

New York:

New York agrees with the suggestion but recommends retention of item (4) to show the identity of the Agent receiving the information. We have considered this and it is not essential. We will merely require that the identity of the Agent or Agents receiving information be set forth only in those instances in which office files do not otherwise reflect the names of such Agents as having received the information reported.

Washington Field:

Washington Field recommends no change in the present procedure. Washington Field feels that the setting out of complete documentation is one method of insuring more accuracy in the preparation of reports by giving the Agent and the reviewing supervisor a method to recheck the dates in a report and the presence of this additional factor serves the purpose of making the preparation, dictation and proofreading of reports more accurate. This was not the initial purpose of requiring complete documentation and is not believed to be a valid reason for its retention.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Subversive Control Section recommends the adoption of the suggestion with the following exceptions: (1) that we retain item (2) only in those instances in which more than one item is attributed to a particular informant in a report; (2) that we set forth the identity of Agent or Agents receiving information in those instances in which office files do not otherwise reflect the names of such Agents as having received the information reported. If you agree, there are attached a proposed SAC Letter and appropriate Manual change.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

December 20, 1951

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

PER ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTENTION
SUBJECT NO. 121
Series 1951

SAC

ALBANY
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BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
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HOUSTON
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KNOXVILLE
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE
MEMPHIS
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QUANTICO

66-04-1476

(H) SECURITY INDEX - PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS -- Reference is made to SAC Letter Number 95 (B) dated September 22, 1951. In response to several suggestions and observations concerning the matter of preparation of summary reports on Security Index subjects, the following instructions shall be adhered to in all Security Index cases where summary reports are being submitted.

INTERVIEWS OF SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS WHEN WARRANTED

The following instructions should not be considered as changing in any way the standards for interviewing subjects of security investigations.

After the files have been reviewed concerning a Security Index subject for the purpose of preparing a summary report and all active investigation has been completed and it appears that the subject should be interviewed in accordance with current policy in our interview program, it will not be necessary to prepare a summary report until after the interview has been conducted.

In all instances, however, a current investigative report should be submitted with the necessary letter requesting authority to interview each subject. The investigative report should reflect all pertinent information not previously submitted in report form. Upon Bureau approval for interview the interview should be conducted in the prescribed manner.

If, after the interview, it is your recommendation that the subject not be retained in the Security Index, your letter to the Bureau advising of the results of the interview should contain your recommendation that the subject be removed from the Security Index. It will not be necessary to submit a summary report if the Security Index card is cancelled.

If, after the interview, it is your recommendation that the subject be continued in the Security Index, the summary report should be prepared immediately including the pertinent information concerning the subject developed in the interview. The administrative portion of the report should contain a statement advising that the subject is being continued in the Security Index.

In all instances where an interview is had with a subject of a security investigation who is of interest to other intelligence agencies, the results of the interview should be included in report form for dissemination to other interested agencies.

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Series 1951

FORM AND CONTENTSynopsis

A synopsis shall be prepared for each summary report on a pink summary report first page. The synopsis shall contain clear and concise statements summarizing the subversive activities of the subject of the report as set forth in the details. The synopsis should not include background information inasmuch as this will be clearly set forth in the first portion of the details under the outline recommended in SAC Letter Number 95. The reports are not to be designated as "Prosecutive" or as "Investigative" summary reports.

Status

The status of each case will be reflected in the summary report at the end of the synopsis and at the end of the details as in regular investigative reports.

Details

In those instances where it is felt that further investigation is warranted, leads shall be set forth in the summary report as they would otherwise be handled until the required investigation is completed. It is not desired that the submission of these summary reports be delayed for the sole purpose of conducting current investigation in previously closed cases. Where further investigation is warranted as reflected from a review of the case, it should be covered through the use of leads as instructed above.

In most instances summary reports which have been prepared in the past in these cases are suitable for dissemination. There may be certain cases in which previous summary reports are not suitable for dissemination because of disclosure of sources. In such cases where dissemination of previous summary reports is not advisable, the information contained therein should be incorporated in the current summary reports in such a manner that the sources are fully protected and the information can be disseminated. It will be the responsibility of each office to be certain that all pertinent information concerning a Security Index subject has been incorporated in either a past or current

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disseminative summary report as distinguished from investigative reports. It is intended that with the submission of the current summary reports on Security Index subjects each case will be in a current condition and that it will not be necessary to go beyond previous or current summary reports for pertinent information concerning each Security Index subject.

Sources whose identities would ordinarily be set forth in the details of an investigative report should be fully identified in the details of these summary reports. Sources whose identities would not ordinarily be set forth in the details of an investigative report should be identified by temporary symbols in the details and fully identified in the administrative pages. Only one temporary symbol should be utilized for each informant in each report. If one informant has furnished information which should logically be broken down under two or more of the headings in the report, this should be done with the same temporary symbol being used for that informant throughout the report.

DOCUMENTATION OF EVIDENCE

In those instances where documentary evidence is reflected by previous investigation and the names of those individuals who could produce such evidence are already known, the names of such individuals should be reflected either in the details by name, or, if their identities should be kept confidential, by temporary symbol with full identification in the administrative pages. A statement as to the location of the original exhibit should also appear in the administrative pages. For example, if the information was obtained from a written report of an informant furnished directly to an Agent, the identifying information appearing in the administrative portion of the report might read:

T-1 [] who furnished a written report to
Special Agent John J. Doe on July 16, 1950.
Informant's report is contained in New York
file 100-334433-73.

b7D

If the information was submitted by an informant to an office via mail, that informant should be identified and the name of the Bureau Agent initialing the mail into the file as well as the

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location of the exhibit in the office files should be set forth.

If the identity of the source of the information being reported, the identity of the Agent receiving the information and/or the date the information was received, are not available in the subject's main file for inclusion in the report such information should be obtained by file review or, if the information is reflected as being available in the files of another office, a request should be made for full identification of the evidence. It will not be necessary to engage in an extensive project of preparing documentary evidence through photostating of exhibits already in possession of the office of origin for inclusion in the main file of each subject.

It is not desired that extensive investigation be conducted further to identify and locate outside individuals who have furnished background information nor is it desired that extensive investigation be conducted to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation has reflected that a subject, according to reliable records such as birth records, school records, or records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in the report. It will not be necessary to request investigation to obtain documentary proof of such data in these cases at this time. The place where such information was verified should, of course, be set forth in the report. If satisfactory verification of pertinent background data has not been made previously, such verification should, of course, be made at this time.

DISSEMINATION

The Summary reports prepared under the instructions in SAC Letter Number 95 and in this SAC Letter must receive the same dissemination on a local level that regular investigative reports would receive in these cases. The summary reports must be prepared in a manner suitable for dissemination to outside agencies and such dissemination must be made in all instances where warranted.

It is not desired that these summary reports be furnished to United States Attorneys at this time or at any time in the future until specific instructions are received from the Bureau.

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PERIODIC SUMMARY REPORTS ON SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS

Key Figures, Prominent Individuals and Subjects
Employed in Vital Facilities

Current instructions require submission of investigative reports on these subjects each six months. After submission of the initial summary report in these cases as required by SAC Letter Number 95, the report submitted six months from that date shall be a regular investigative report. The report submitted one year from the date of the last summary report shall be a summary report. It will not be necessary to submit an investigative report at the time the yearly summary reports are submitted. Each summary report will include pertinent information not previously included in summary reports.

Top Functionaries

Current instructions require submission of investigative reports each three months on Top Functionaries. After submission of the current summary report as requested in SAC Letter Number 95, the quarterly investigative reports shall continue to be submitted as in the past. The report submitted one year from the date of the previous summary report will be a summary report and will include information not included in previous summary reports.

All Security Index Cases

In any of the Security Index cases when the yearly summary report becomes due and it is found that insufficient information has been developed to warrant the preparation of a summary report, a regular investigative report should be submitted. The reason for not submitting the required summary report should be stated in the administrative portion of the investigative report.

It is not desired that the yearly summary reports be coordinated with the previous summary reports in so far as the "T" symbols of the sources are concerned. If a certain temporary symbol number was used for a source in a previous summary report, the symbol number will not necessarily be the same for that source in the subsequent summary report. In other words, the temporary symbol numbers for each summary report on one subject will be listed in numerical order for that report independent of the other reports.


12/20/51
SAC LETTER NO. 121
Series 1951

66-04 1170
(I) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS --
Reference is made to SAC Letter Number 95 (B) dated September 22, 1951, which contained an outline of the form to be used in the preparation of summary reports on Security Index subjects.

In order that uniformity will be established throughout the Field, the form set forth in SAC Letter Number 95 shall be used wherever possible in investigative as well as summary reports on security investigations of individuals. The headings prescribed in the recommended form should be used in each investigative report whenever information is being included in the report which would logically fall under such headings. Information appearing under each heading should be in chronological order. Of course, when no information appears in an investigative or summary report which could logically be placed under one or more of the headings, such headings should not appear in the reports.

The Bureau feels that by this standardization of the form for all security reports on individuals and adherence thereto by all offices wherever possible, review of such reports and preparation of future yearly summary reports will be greatly facilitated. Agents handling these cases will more readily be able to obtain the desired information from the case files of the subjects for appropriate action and will be able more readily to determine weak points in each investigation. Direction of each investigation to a logical conclusion will thus be greatly facilitated.

These instructions should not preclude the addition of other appropriate headings when, in individual cases, certain information can more logically be set forth under such headings.



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
(Typed November 21, 1951)

(ENCL.)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to SAC Letter Number 95 (B) dated September 22, 1951, which contained an outline of the form to be utilized in the preparation of summary reports on Security Index subjects.


In order that uniformity will be established throughout the Field, the form set forth in SAC Letter Number 95 shall be used wherever possible in investigative as well as summary reports on security investigations of individuals. The headings prescribed in the recommended form should be used in each investigative report whenever information is being included in the report which would logically fall under such headings. Information appearing under each heading should be in chronological order. Of course, when no information appears in an investigative or summary report which could logically be placed under one or more of the headings, such headings should not appear in the reports.


The Bureau feels that by this standardization of the form for all security reports on individuals and adherence thereto by all offices wherever possible, review of such reports and preparation of future yearly summary reports will be greatly facilitated. Agents handling these cases will more readily be able to obtain the desired information from the case files of the subjects for appropriate action and will be able to more readily determine weak points in each investigation. Direction

of each investigation to a logical conclusion will thus be greatly facilitated.

These instructions should not preclude the addition of other appropriate headings when, in individual cases, certain information can more logically be set forth under such headings.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
(Typed November 21, 1951)

66-04-1476
(ENCL.)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INDEX -
PREPARATION OF SUMMARY REPORTS

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to SAC Letter Number 95 (B) dated September 22, 1951. In response to several suggestions and observations concerning the matter of preparation of summary reports on Security Index subjects, the following instructions shall be adhered to in all Security Index cases where summary reports are being submitted.


INTERVIEWS OF SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS WHEN WARRANTED

The following instructions should not be considered as changing in any way the standards for interviewing subjects of security investigations.

After the files have been reviewed concerning a Security Index subject for the purpose of preparing a summary report and all active investigation has been completed and it appears that the subject should be interviewed in accordance with current policy in our interview program, it will not be necessary to prepare a summary report until after the interview has been conducted.

In all instances, however, a current investigative report should be submitted with the necessary letter requesting authority to interview each subject. The investigative report should reflect all pertinent information not previously submitted in report form. Upon Bureau approval for interview the interview should be conducted in the prescribed manner.

66-04-1476



If, after the interview, it is your recommendation that the subject not be retained in the Security Index, your letter to the Bureau advising of the results of the interview should contain your recommendation that the subject be removed from the Security Index. It will not be necessary to submit a summary report if the Security Index card is cancelled.

If, after the interview, it is your recommendation that the subject be continued in the Security Index, the summary report should be prepared immediately including the pertinent information concerning the subject developed in the interview. The administrative portion of the report should contain a statement advising that the subject is being continued in the Security Index.

In all instances where an interview is had with a subject of a security investigation who is of interest to other intelligence agencies, the results of the interview should be included in report form for dissemination to other interested agencies.

FORM AND CONTENT

Synopsis

A synopsis shall be prepared for each summary report on a pink summary report first page. The synopsis shall contain clear and concise statements summarizing the subversive activities of the subject of the report as set forth in the details. The synopsis should not include background information inasmuch as this will be clearly set forth in the first portion of the details under the outline recommended in SAC Letter Number 95. The reports are not to be designated as "Prosecutive" or as "Investigative" summary reports.

Status

The status of each case will be reflected in the summary report at the end of the synopsis and at the end of the details as in regular investigative reports.

Details

In those instances where it is felt that further investigation is warranted, leads shall be set

forth in the summary report as they would otherwise be handled until the required investigation is completed. It is not desired that the submission of these summary reports be delayed for the sole purpose of conducting current investigation in previously closed cases. Where further investigation is warranted as reflected from a review of the case, it should be covered through the use of leads as instructed above.

In most instances summary reports which have been prepared in the past in these cases are suitable for dissemination. There may be certain cases in which previous summary reports are not suitable for dissemination because of disclosure of sources. In such cases where dissemination of previous summary reports is not advisable, the information contained therein should be incorporated in the current summary reports in such a manner that the sources are fully protected and the information can be disseminated. It will be the responsibility of each office to be certain that all pertinent information concerning a Security Index subject has been incorporated in either a past or current disseminative summary report as distinguished from investigative reports. It is intended that with the submission of the current summary reports on Security Index subjects each case will be in a current condition and that it will not be necessary to go beyond previous or current summary reports for pertinent information concerning each Security Index subject.

Sources whose identities would ordinarily be set forth in the details of an investigative report should be fully identified in the details of these summary reports. Sources whose identities would not ordinarily be set forth in the details of an investigative report should be identified by temporary symbols in the details and fully identified in the administrative pages. Only one temporary symbol should be utilized for each informant in each report. If one informant has furnished information which should logically be broken down under two or more of the headings in the report, this should be done with the same temporary symbol being utilized for that informant throughout the report.

DOCUMENTATION OF EVIDENCE

In those instances where documentary evidence is reflected by previous investigation and the names of those individuals who could produce such evidence is already known, the names of such individuals should be reflected either in the details by name, or, if their identities should be kept confidential, by temporary symbol with full identification in the administrative pages. A statement as to the location of the original exhibit should also appear in the administrative pages. For example, if the information was obtained from a written report of an informant furnished directly to an Agent, the identifying information appearing in the administrative portion of the report might read:

T-1 S-1012 who furnished a written report to Special Agent John J. Doe on July 16, 1950. Informant's report is contained in New York file 100-334433-73.

If the information was submitted by an informant to an office via mail, that informant should be identified and the name of the Bureau Agent initialing the mail into the file as well as the location of the exhibit in the office files should be set forth.

If the identity of the source of the information being reported, the identity of the Agent receiving the information and/or the date the information was received, ~~are~~ ^{are} not available in the subject's main file for inclusion in the report such information should be obtained by file review or, if the information is reflected as being available in the files of another office, a request should be made for full identification of the evidence. It will not be necessary to engage in an extensive project of preparing documentary evidence through photostating of exhibits already in possession of the office of origin for inclusion in the main file of each subject.

It is not desired that extensive investigation be conducted to further identify and locate outside individuals who have furnished background information nor is it desired that extensive investigation be conducted to obtain documentary evidence of background information. For example, if previous investigation has reflected

that a subject, according to reliable records such as birth records, school records, or records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was born at a certain place on a certain date, such information will be sufficient for inclusion in the report. It will not be necessary to request investigation to obtain documentary proof of such data in these cases at this time. The place where such information was verified should, of course, be set forth in the report. If satisfactory verification of pertinent background data has not been made previously, such verification should, of course, be made at this time.

DISSEMINATION

The summary reports prepared under the instructions in SAC Letter Number 95 and in this SAC Letter must receive the same dissemination on a local level that regular investigative reports would receive in these cases. The summary reports must be prepared in a manner suitable for dissemination to outside agencies and such dissemination must be made in all instances where warranted.

It is not desired that these summary reports be furnished to United States Attorneys at this time or at any time in the future until specific instructions are received from the Bureau.

PERIODIC SUMMARY REPORTS ON SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS

Key Figures, Prominent Individuals and Subjects Employed in Vital Facilities

Current instructions require submission of investigative reports on these subjects each six months. After submission of the initial summary report in these cases as required by SAC Letter Number 95, the report submitted six months from that date shall be a regular investigative report. The report submitted one year from the date of the last summary report shall be a summary report. It will not be necessary to submit an investigative report at the time the yearly summary reports are submitted. Each summary report will include pertinent information not previously included in summary reports.

Top Functionaries


Current instructions require submission of investigative reports each three months on Top Functionaries. After submission of the current summary report as requested in SAC Letter Number 95, the quarterly investigative reports shall continue to be submitted as in the past. The report submitted one year from the date of the previous summary report will be a summary report and will include information not included in previous summary reports.

All Security Index Cases

In any of the Security Index cases when the yearly summary report becomes due and it is found that insufficient information has been developed to warrant the preparation of a summary report, a regular investigative report should be submitted. The reason for not submitting the required summary report should be stated in the administrative portion of the investigative report.

It is not desired that the yearly summary reports be coordinated with the previous summary reports in so far as the "T" symbols of the sources are concerned. If a certain temporary symbol number was used for a source in a previous summary report, the symbol number will not necessarily be the same for that source in the subsequent summary report. In other words, the temporary symbol numbers for each summary report on one subject will be listed in numerical order for that report independent of the other reports.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-2521
PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC LETTER NO. 56-56

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

October 30, 1956

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

10-30-56
SAC LETTER NO. 56-56

(1) ~~SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - PHOTOGRAPHS OF~~
SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS -- Current Bureau instructions are that all
logical leads must be covered in an attempt to obtain photographs
of subjects of Security Index cards during the course of your
investigation of these subjects.

Effective immediately, the administrative page of reports
in Security Index cases should contain a statement with regard to
the existence of a suitable photograph.

C. Communist Index

The Communist Index, which was established a number of years ago, has grown unwieldy and is serving very little purpose today. In order that we may obtain maximum benefit from this Index, you should take the following steps, utilizing those Security Index cards which have been cancelled by application of the revised Security Index criteria since April, 1955, as a base:

1. Add Communist Index cards to the above on individuals currently under investigation when, following completion thereof, the information developed does not justify the inclusion of the subject's name in the Security Index when there is evidence of:

- a. Membership in a basic revolutionary organization over five years ago, together with some indication of continuing sympathy for the communist movement within the past five years and no reliable evidence of defection.

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SAC LETTER NO. 56-56

b. Unverified allegations of such membership within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period.

c. Leadership in a substantial capacity in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity or sympathy for the subversive cause within the past three years and no reliable evidence of disaffection.

d. Current subversive front membership and/or activity, together with evidence of sympathy for the subversive cause or antagonism toward the present form of Government not warranting placing on the Security Index.

2. Review those cases opened and subsequently closed without the subject's names being included in the Security Index since April 15, 1955, and include in the Communist Index the names of those individuals falling in the above categories.

3. Include in this Index the names of individuals deleted from the Security Index in the future by application of the Security Index criteria.

This Index should represent those persons who should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation or action at some future date. It should serve as an administrative aid and working index, reflecting a central repository of the names of individuals having sympathy or affiliation with the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary groups.

Each card should contain as a minimum the following:

1. Name and aliases.
2. Office file number.

10-30-56
SAC LETTER NO. 56-56

3. Membership and position or association in the subversive group or groups, together with the source and date of the information.

4. Residence.

5. Citizenship.

6. Employment.

The Index card should be prepared on 5 x 8 inch plain white cards and should be maintained alphabetically. However, if you desire to utilize it as an investigative aid, it may be set up by geographical area in conformance with your integrated investigative system. This should be done only with Bureau concurrence.

When the above steps have been taken, destroy the remaining cards presently contained in your Communist Index.

Expend no investigative or administrative efforts to keep the cards in an up-to-date status. However, destroy all cards on individuals who subsequently become security informants or sources, or subjects of Security Index cards.

You should advise the Bureau when the above has been accomplished. If not completed within 60 days, submit a status letter.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

(Typed October 24, 1956)

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

PERSONAL ATTENTION

66-04-2521
(ENCL.)

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:


RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
PHOTOGRAPHS OF SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS

Dear Sir:

Current Bureau instructions are that all logical leads must be covered in an attempt to obtain photographs of subjects of Security Index cards during the course of your investigation of these subjects.

Effective immediately, the administrative page of reports in Security Index cases should contain a statement with regard to the existence of a suitable photograph.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-2521
(ENCL.)



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

(Typed October 24, 1956)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS (L)

~~RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS~~

C. Communist Index

The Communist Index, which was established a number of years ago, has grown unwieldy and is serving very little purpose today. In order that we may obtain maximum benefit from this Index, you should take the following steps, utilizing those Security Index cards which have been cancelled by application of the revised Security Index criteria since April, 1955, as a base:

1. Add Communist Index cards to the above on individuals currently under investigation when, following completion thereof, the information developed does not justify the inclusion of the subject's name in the Security Index when there is evidence of:

a. Membership in a basic revolutionary organization over five years ago, together with some indication of continuing sympathy for the communist movement within the past five years and no reliable evidence of defection.

b. Unverified allegations of such membership within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period.

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge

c. Leadership in a substantial capacity in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity or sympathy for the subversive cause within the past three years and no reliable evidence of disaffection.

d. Current subversive front membership and/or activity, together with evidence of sympathy for the subversive cause or antagonism toward the present form of Government not warranting placing on the Security Index.

2. Review those cases opened and subsequently closed without the subjects' names being included in the Security Index since April 15, 1955, and include in the Communist Index the names of those individuals falling in the above categories.

3. Include in this Index the names of individuals deleted from the Security Index in the future by application of the Security Index criteria.

This Index should represent those persons who should be continually borne in mind from the standpoint of the security of the country with a view toward possible investigation, interrogation or action at some future date. It should serve as an administrative aid and working index, reflecting a central repository of the names of individuals having sympathy or affiliation with the Communist Party or other basic revolutionary groups.

Each card should contain as a minimum the following:

1. Name and aliases.
2. Office file number.

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge

3. *Membership and position or association in the subversive group or groups, together with the source and date of the information.*
4. *Residence.*
5. *Citizenship.*
6. *Employment.*

The Index card should be prepared on 5 x 8 inch plain white cards and should be maintained alphabetically. However, if you desire to utilize it as an investigative aid, it may be set up by geographical area in conformance with your integrated investigative system. This should be done only with Bureau concurrence.

When the above steps have been taken, destroy the remaining cards presently contained in your Communist Index.

Expend no investigative or administrative efforts to keep the cards in an up-to-date status. However, destroy all cards on individuals who subsequently become security informants or sources, or subjects of Security Index cards.

You should advise the Bureau when the above has been accomplished. If not completed within 60 days, submit a status letter.



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

June 21, 1960

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

66-04-2754
PERSONAL ATTENTION
LETTER NO. 60-30

66-04 2157

(c) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - RESERVE INDEX --
The presently constituted Communist Index will henceforth be known as the "Reserve Index."

Institute a review of the Reserve Index. In conducting this review the following minimum steps are to be taken in all instances.

1. Verify residence and employment.
2. Conduct an indices search and file review to determine whether investigation is warranted at this time or whether an interview with the individual is deemed desirable. Interviews with the individuals will be handled in accordance with current Bureau instructions set forth in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions.
3. If additional investigation is conducted or if there is unreported information of a subversive nature contained in the files, a report must be submitted.

The re-examination of the Reserve Index may be made in equal monthly divisions for one year. Advise the Bureau quarterly of your progress.

Recognizing that some individuals included in the Reserve Index represent a greater potential threat in time of an emergency than do others, this Reserve Index is being divided into two sections, Section A and Section B. Each is discussed separately herein.

SECTION A

Section A of the Reserve Index is designed to represent a special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and/or other action following the apprehension of our Security Index subjects.

Section A of the Reserve Index should include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within the Security Index criteria, but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Included in Section A will be those individuals falling within the following categories:

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1. Professors, teachers and educators.
2. Labor union organizers or leaders.
3. Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers and others in the mass media field.
4. Lawyers, doctors and scientists.
5. Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level.
6. Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid.

During the course of the re-examination of the Reserve Index, those individuals falling within the above criteria for inclusion in Section A should be selected therefrom, handled in accordance with the above instructions and, thereafter, nominated for inclusion in Section A of the Reserve Index. Appropriate forms for this purpose will be forwarded all offices in the immediate future. Attached to the form recommending the inclusion of the individual's name in Section A of the Reserve Index should be a succinct summary setting forth the basis for your recommendation. If no further investigation is warranted in the case at this time or if no report is accompanying the recommendation, a statement to that effect should appear on the page containing the succinct summary.

Investigations of individuals listed in Section A of the Reserve Index are to be brought up to date annually, and they are to be considered for Security Index status or retention in the Reserve Index. As a minimum, the previously mentioned investigative steps will be taken, including the submission of reports in the event additional subversive data is developed. Changes in residence and/or employment should be submitted to the Bureau on forms to be furnished the field in the immediate future. The administrative handling of the reopening of these cases should be similar to that in the case of annual reports in Security Index cases.

Section A of the Reserve Index will be maintained in the field and at the Seat of Government in the same manner as our Security Index except that this Index will be maintained only alphabetically. A copy of the Index will be relocated away from headquarters city in the same manner as the Security Index and at the same location. To avoid confusion with the Security Index, however, distinctive colored cards and forms used in connection therewith will be utilized.

6/21/60
SAC LETTER NO. 60-30

SECTION B

Section B, containing the names of the remaining individuals included in the Reserve Index, will be maintained in the field in the same manner in which the Communist Index is now being maintained.

Upon the deletion of a subject's name from the Security Index based upon the application of the Security Index criteria, it will be necessary to consider whether his name should then be placed in Section A of the Reserve Index. If his name should so be included, submit an appropriate recommendation. If the facts do not justify the inclusion of his name in Section A, the canceled Security Index card should be filed in Section B in accordance with current practice.

Standards for Inclusion of Names in the Reserve Index

The standards for inclusion of individual's names in the Reserve Index were discussed at the Internal Security - Espionage Conference composed of representatives from certain field offices and Bureau supervisors and officials held at the Bureau on June 9-10, 1960. The Conference recommended revision of our present standards for the inclusion of individual's names in the Reserve Index to insure that it fully represents a list of individuals who should be considered for investigation and/or other action following apprehension of our Security Index subjects. The revised standards follow:

1. Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949, together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection.
2. Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past five years, coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.
3. The individual, within the past five years, by his associations, writings, financial support or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.

6/21/60
SAC LETTER NO. 60-30

4. Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association or sympathy for the subversive cause within three years and no reliable evidence of defection.

5. Membership in a subversive front organization within the past three years and no reliable evidence of defection.

It is not desired that a wholesale review of closed security cases be conducted in efforts to identify additional individuals whose names should be included in the Reserve Index under the revised standards. However, such names should be added as the cases come to the attention of Agents handling security work.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6/21/60
SAC LETTER NO. 60-30



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Typed June 13, 1960)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF
INDIVIDUALS - RESERVE INDEX

Dear Sir:

The presently constituted Communist Index will henceforth be known as the "Reserve Index."

Institute a review of the Reserve Index. In conducting this review the following minimum steps are to be taken in all instances.

1. Verify residence and employment.
2. Conduct an indices search and file review to determine whether investigation is warranted at this time or whether an interview with the individual is deemed desirable. Interviews with the individuals will be handled in accordance with current Bureau instructions set forth in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions.
3. If additional investigation is conducted or if there is unreported information of a subversive nature contained in the files, a report must be submitted.

The re-examination of the Reserve Index may be made in equal monthly divisions for one year. Advise the Bureau quarterly of your progress.

Recognizing that some individuals included in the Reserve Index represent a greater potential threat in time of an emergency than do others, this Reserve Index is being divided into two sections, Section A and Section B. Each is discussed separately herein.

66-04-2954
(ENCL.)

66-04-2954

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Investigations of Individuals - Reserve Index

SECTION A

Section A of the Reserve Index is designed to represent a special group of individuals who should receive priority consideration with respect to investigation and/or other action following the apprehension of our Security Index subjects.

Section A of the Reserve Index should include those individuals whose subversive activities do not bring them within the Security Index criteria, but who, in a time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology. Included in Section A will be those individuals falling within the following categories:

1. Professors, teachers and educators.
2. Labor union organizers or leaders.
3. Writers, lecturers, newsmen, entertainers and others in the mass media field.
4. Lawyers, doctors and scientists.
5. Other potentially influential persons on a local or national level.
6. Individuals who could potentially furnish material financial aid.

During the course of the re-examination of the Reserve Index, those individuals falling within the above criteria for inclusion in Section A should be selected therefrom, handled in accordance with the above instructions and, thereafter, nominated for inclusion in Section A of the Reserve Index. Appropriate forms for this purpose will be forwarded all offices in the immediate future. Attached to the form recommending the inclusion of the individual's name in Section A of the Reserve Index should be a succinct summary setting forth the basis for your recommendation. If no further investigation is warranted in the case at this time or if no report is accompanying the recommendation, a statement to that effect should appear on the page containing the succinct summary.

Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Investigations of Individuals - Reserve Index

Investigations of individuals listed in Section A of the Reserve Index are to be brought up to date annually, and they are considered for Security Index status or retention in the Reserve Index. As a minimum, the previously mentioned investigative steps will be taken, including the submission of reports in the event additional subversive data is developed. Changes in residence and/or employment should be submitted to the Bureau on forms to be furnished the field in the immediate future. The administrative handling of the reopening of these cases should be similar to that in the case of annual reports in Security Index cases.

Section A of the Reserve Index will be maintained in the field and at the Seat of Government in the same manner as our Security Index except that this Index will be maintained only alphabetically. A copy of the Index will be relocated away from headquarters city in the same manner as the Security Index and at the same location. To avoid confusion with the Security Index, however, distinctive colored cards and forms used in connection therewith will be utilized.

SECTION B

Section B, containing the names of the remaining individuals included in the Reserve Index, will be maintained in the field in the same manner in which the Communist Index is now being maintained.

Upon the deletion of a subject's name from the Security Index based upon the application of the Security Index criteria, it will be necessary to consider whether his name should then be placed in Section A of the Reserve Index. If his name should so be included, submit an appropriate recommendation. If the facts do not justify the inclusion of his name in Section A, the canceled Security Index card should be filed in Section B in accordance with current practice.

Standards for Inclusion of Names in the Reserve Index

The standards for inclusion of individuals' names in the Reserve Index were discussed at the Internal Security - Espionage Conference composed of representatives from certain


Letter to All Special Agents in Charge
Re: Security Investigations of Individuals - Reserve Index

field offices and Bureau supervisors and officials held at the Bureau on June 9-10, 1960. The Conference recommended revision of our present standards for the inclusion of individuals' names in the Reserve Index to insure that it fully represents a list of individuals who should be considered for investigation and/or other action following apprehension of our Security Index subjects. The revised standards follow:

1. Membership in a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949, together with some indication of sympathy or association with such an organization or a subversive front organization subsequent to the reported membership and no reliable evidence of defection.
2. Investigation has failed to substantiate allegations of membership in a revolutionary organization within the past five years, and coupled with some evidence or information indicating activity, association or sympathy for the subversive cause within the same period, and no reliable evidence of defection.
3. The individual, within the past five years, by his associations, writings, financial support or conduct in relation to and support of subversive organizations or the international communist movement is in a position to influence others at the time of a national emergency and no reliable evidence of defection.
4. Leadership or substantial activities in a major subversive front group over three years ago, together with some evidence of continuing activity, association or sympathy for the subversive cause within three years and no reliable evidence of defection.
5. Membership in a subversive front organization within the past three years and no reliable evidence of defection.

It is not desired that a wholesale review of closed security cases be conducted in efforts to identify additional individuals whose names should be included in the Reserve Index under the revised standards. However, such names should be added as the cases come to the attention of Agents handling security work.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

PERSONAL ATTENTION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SAC LETTER NO. 73
Series 1951In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

July 24, 1951

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	PORTLAND
	ALBUQUERQUE	DETROIT	MINNEAPOLIS	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	EL PASO	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BALTIMORE	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BIRMINGHAM	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BOSTON	KANSAS CITY	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUFFALO	KNOXVILLE	NORFOLK	SAN JUAN
	BUTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CHARLOTTE	LOS ANGELES	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CHICAGO	LOUISVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SPRINGFIELD
	CINCINNATI	MEMPHIS	PHOENIX	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	CLEVELAND	MIAMI	PITTSBURGH	QUANTICO
	DALLAS			

(A) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS - SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS -- Your attention is directed to Title II, Section 109, (h) (3), of the Internal Security Act of 1950, which states that:

"In deciding the question of the existence of reasonable ground to believe a person probably will engage in or conspire with others to engage in espionage or sabotage, the Attorney General, any preliminary hearing officer, and the Board of Detention Review are authorized to consider evidence of ----- activity in espionage or sabotage operations of, or the holding at any time after January 1, 1949, of membership in, the Communist Party of the United States or any other organization or political party which seeks to overthrow or destroy by force and violence the Government of the United States or of any of its subdivisions and the substitution therefor of a totalitarian dictatorship controlled by a foreign government."

Standards for inclusion of individuals in the Security Index are now broadened to include persons holding at any time after January 1, 1949, membership in any organization or political party which seeks to overthrow or destroy by force and violence the Government of the United States or any of its political subdivisions and the substitution therefor of a totalitarian dictatorship controlled by a foreign government.

It is realized that many cases falling in this category probably have been opened in your office since receipt by you of copies of the Internal Security Act of 1950. However, effective

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66-04-1364
immediately, you should cause a check to be made of your office records for the purpose of opening cases on individuals who have been reported as having been members of the Communist Party or other basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations on or after January 1, 1949. All individuals falling in this category who are not now on the Security Index in your office should be afforded current investigation and should be considered for inclusion in the Security Index as soon as possible.

In order that you may open such cases where Security Index cards are not now in existence, it is suggested that you:
(1) Review all individual security cases which have been opened in your office since January 1, 1949. (2) Review your 100-0 file from January 1, 1949, to date. (3) Check your Communist index for the names of persons reported as members of such organizations subsequent to January 1, 1949. You should also include in your check any other files in your office which you believe may contain information pertinent to the above instructions.

It is not intended that the investigations you open as a result of these instructions include investigations of individuals who have been reported solely as having membership or activity in the organizations commonly known as front organizations between January 1, 1949, and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950.

It is rather intended that the investigations opened as a result of these instructions be confined to individuals reported as members of the basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations such as the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, Independent Socialist League, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, etc.

These instructions do not supplant the instructions set forth in SAC Letter Number 48 (B), dated July 25, 1950, pertaining to individuals who, subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, have continued to be active, participating members of the Communist Party or related groups and who actively espouse the line of those groups regardless of the individual's leadership in the Party, present employment or past activities. Standards for investigation of and inclusion in the Security Index of persons falling within this group remain the same.

The review of your files and the opening of cases on the individuals affected by these instructions must be completed immediately. The investigations of these individuals must be completed as soon as possible.

Henceforth, in keeping with the above instructions, when you currently receive information through your confidential sources or from individual complainants which allege membership in the Communist Party or other basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations on or after January 1, 1949, the individuals concerned should be investigated and a determination made as to whether they should be included in the Security Index.


7-24-51
SAC LETTER NO. 73
Series 1951

6604-1507

It is not desired that you open cases for investigation on the information currently received alleging subversive activities on the part of individuals prior to January 1, 1949, unless those allegations go beyond mere membership or association with the Communist Party or other basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations and include information such as involvement in espionage, special training in a subversive movement, membership in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, training in the Armed Forces, Reserve Officer status, current employment in vital industry, or include other factors rendering the individuals as particularly dangerous. If such factors are present the subject should be investigated and considered for inclusion in the Security Index. During the above-requested review you should be alert for information of this nature already in your files pertaining to persons on whom you have not previously opened investigations.

In connection with the above, I desire to call your attention to allegations which are received in matters of this nature from persons who do not disclose their identities. Complaints received from anonymous individuals should not be disregarded. If the facts of the complaint are sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight to warrant investigation and the allegations place the subject within the categories referred to above wherein we would otherwise conduct investigation, investigation should be conducted just as it would be if the identity of the source were known to the Bureau.

You are to advise the Bureau by separate letter under the caption "Security Investigations of Individuals-Security Index Standards" when you have completed the review of your files requested herein. At that time you should inform the Bureau of the total number of cases which you have opened pursuant to these instructions.



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

66-04-1366
(ENCL.)

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

(Typed July 6, 1951)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS-
SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

Dear Sir:

Your attention is directed to Title II, Section 109 (h), (3), of the Internal Security Act of 1950, which states that:

"In deciding the question of the existence of reasonable ground to believe a person probably will engage in or conspire with others to engage in espionage or sabotage, the Attorney General, any preliminary hearing officer, and the Board of Detention Review are authorized to consider evidence of ----- activity in espionage or sabotage operations of, or the holding at any time after January 1, 1949, of membership in, the Communist Party of the United States or any other organization or political party which seeks to overthrow or destroy by force and violence the Government of the United States or of any of its subdivisions and the substitution thereof of a totalitarian dictatorship controlled by a foreign government."

Standards for inclusion of individuals in the Security Index are now broadened to include persons holding at any time after January 1, 1949, membership in any organization or political party which seeks to overthrow or destroy by force and violence the Government of the United States or any of its political subdivisions and the substitution thereof of a totalitarian dictatorship controlled by a foreign government.

*Letter sent to all SACS Bureau
7-24-51*

ENCLOSURE

66-04-1366

It is realized that many cases falling in this category probably have been opened in your office since receipt by you of copies of the Internal Security Act of 1950. However, effective immediately, you should cause a check to be made of your office records for the purpose of opening cases on individuals who have been reported as having been members of the Communist Party or other basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations on or after January 1, 1949. All individuals falling in this category who are not now on the Security Index in your office should be afforded current investigation and should be considered for inclusion in the Security Index as soon as possible.

In order that you may open such cases where Security Index cards are not now in existence, it is suggested that you: (1) Review all individual security cases which have been opened in your office since January 1, 1949. (2) Review your 100-0 file from January 1, 1949, to date. (3) Check your Communist index for the names of persons reported as members of such organizations subsequent to January 1, 1949. You should also include in your check any other files in your office which you believe may contain information pertinent to the above instructions.

It is not intended that the investigations you open as a result of these instructions include investigations of individuals who have been reported solely as having membership or activity in the organizations commonly known as front organizations between January 1, 1949, and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950.

It is rather intended that the investigations opened as a result of these instructions be confined to individuals reported as members of the basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations such as the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, Independent Socialist League, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, etc.

These instructions do not supplant the instructions set forth in SAC Letter Number 48 (B), dated July 25, 1950, pertaining to individuals who, subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, have continued to be active, participating members of the Communist Party or related

groups and who actively espouse the line of those groups regardless of the individual's leadership in the Party, present employment or past activities. Standards for investigation of and inclusion in the Security Index of persons falling within this group remain the same.

The review of your files and the opening of cases on the individuals affected by these instructions must be completed immediately. The investigations of these individuals must be completed as soon as possible.

Henceforth, in keeping with the above instructions, when you currently receive information through your confidential sources or from individual complainants which allege membership in the Communist Party or other basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations on or after January 1, 1949, the individuals concerned should be investigated and a determination made as to whether they should be included in the Security Index.

It is not desired that you open cases for investigation on the information currently received alleging subversive activities on the part of individuals prior to January 1, 1949, unless those allegations go beyond mere membership or association with the Communist Party or other basic Marxist and revolutionary organizations and include information such as involvement in espionage, special training in a subversive movement, membership in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, training in the Armed Forces, Reserve Officer status, current employment in vital industry, or include other factors rendering the individuals as particularly dangerous. If such factors are present the subject should be investigated and considered for inclusion in the Security Index. During the above-requested review you should be alert for information of this nature already in your files pertaining to persons on whom you have not previously opened investigations.

In connection with the above, I desire to call your attention to allegations which are received in matters of this nature from persons who do not disclose their identities. Complaints received from anonymous individuals should not be disregarded. If the facts of the complaint are sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight to warrant investigation and the allegations place the subject within

66-04-1364
(ENCL.)

the categories referred to above wherein we would otherwise conduct investigation, investigation should be conducted just as it would be if the identity of the source were known to the Bureau.

You are to advise the Bureau by separate letter under the caption "Security Investigations of Individuals-Security Index Standards" when you have completed the review of your files requested herein. At that time you should inform the Bureau of the total number of cases which you have opened pursuant to these instructions.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

66-04-1615

File Copy



PERSONAL ATTENTION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SAC LETTER NO. 68
Series 1952

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

July 18, 1952

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


SAC

- | | | | |
|-------------|--------------|---------------|-------------------|
| ALBANY | DENVER | MILWAUKEE | PORTLAND |
| ALBUQUERQUE | DETROIT | MINNEAPOLIS | RICHMOND |
| ANCHORAGE | EL PASO | MOBILE | ST. LOUIS |
| ATLANTA | HONOLULU | NEWARK | SALT LAKE CITY |
| BALTIMORE | HOUSTON | NEW HAVEN | SAN ANTONIO |
| BIRMINGHAM | INDIANAPOLIS | NEW ORLEANS | SAN DIEGO |
| BOSTON | KANSAS CITY | NEW YORK | SAN FRANCISCO |
| BUFFALO | KNOXVILLE | NORFOLK | SAN JUAN |
| BUTTE | LITTLE ROCK | OKLAHOMA CITY | SAVANNAH |
| CHARLOTTE | LOS ANGELES | OMAHA | SEATTLE |
| CHICAGO | LOUISVILLE | PHILADELPHIA | SPRINGFIELD |
| CINCINNATI | MEMPHIS | PHOENIX | WASHINGTON, D. C. |
| CLEVELAND | MIAMI | PITTSBURGH | QUANTICO |
| DALLAS | | | |

*Per. 100-1 Files I-66-2277 ✓
Personnel Files 66-3482
62-83257 J 100-358086-1
Copy 66-6434-1
62-11-3482*

(I) ~~HANDLING~~ OF LEADS IN SECURITY CASES - ~~FBI FORM BOOK~~ -- Attached is a copy of Form FD-203, which has been approved by the Bureau. This form will be helpful in submitting information to resident and road-work Agents in Security Matters and in providing those Agents with background data on which to base certain investigative activities relative to Security Index subjects. This form should reduce the number of memoranda necessary and is intended to expedite the transmittal of information, as well as reduce the necessity for certain extensive file reviews. When used, this form should be serialized and filed. An original only of the form is needed, although copies may be prepared when warranted by local situations.

Form FD-203 should be added to the FBI Form Book. You should requisition an appropriate supply of FD-203 for the use of your office.



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Security file
66-04-
1615
(ENCL.)

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

FILE NO. _____

(Typed 7/10/52)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents In Charge:

RE: HANDLING OF LEADS IN
SECURITY CASES — FBI FORM BOOK

Dear Sir:

Attached is a copy of Form FD-203, which has been approved by the Bureau. This form will be helpful in submitting information to resident and road-work Agents in Security Matters and in providing those Agents with background data on which to base certain investigative activities relative to Security Index subjects. This form should reduce the number of memoranda necessary and is intended to expedite the transmittal of information, as well as reduce the necessity for certain extensive file reviews. WHEN USED, THIS FORM SHOULD BE SERIALIZED AND FILED. AN ORIGINAL ONLY OF THE FORM IS

NEEDED, ALTHOUGH COPIES MAY BE PREPARED WHEN WARRANTED BY LOCAL SITUATIONS.

FORM FD-203 SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE FBI FORM BOOK. YOU SHOULD REQUISITION AN APPROPRIATE SUPPLY OF FD-203 FOR THE USE OF YOUR OFFICE.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Attachment

7

11/4/70

Airtel

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI (100-439048)

PERSONAL ATTENTION.

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE STUDENTS FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND MILITANT NEW
LEFT CAMPUS ORGANIZATIONS

General
Effective immediately, the field is instructed to initiate investigation of all members of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and members of procommunist, militant New Left-type campus organizations who follow SDS advocacy of revolution and violence.

Members of the SDS to be investigated should include all members of the various factions of the organization. The Bureau is aware that many SDS chapters are unstructured, and formal membership is not a requisite for participating in SDS activity. As you are aware, SDS and other similar subversive campus-oriented groups are clearly symbolic of violence and Marxist-Leninist revolution on the Nation's campuses. As their intent has crystallized, the adherence to this philosophy of revolution and violence is, of necessity, more inherent among members and followers. These groups undoubtedly are the breeding ground for revolutionaries, extremists and terrorists. Logic and good judgment should be used in these investigations, bearing in mind the objective is to identify potential and actual extremists, revolutionaries and terrorists and to assess their threat to the internal security of the Government.

9 NOV 10 1970

Each office should include on the administrative part of future quarterly New Left Movement reports information as to the number of individual cases opened and the number of individual cases closed in this category during the pertinent period of the New Left Movement reports.

2 - All Offices (PERSONAL ATTENTION)

Airtel to Albany
Re: Security Investigations of Individuals
Who are Members of the Students for a
Democratic Society and Militant New
Left Campus Organizations
100-439048

Each individual investigated should be considered for inclusion on the Security Index. In the event your investigation establishes that the subject meets the criteria, his name should be recommended for inclusion on the Security Index.

NOTE:

See memorandum dated 11/3/70, captioned as above, prepared by to

66-04-
1790

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

March 17, 1953

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Please Refer to
File No.

SAC

ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
ANCHORAGE
ATLANTA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
BUFFALO
BUTTE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
CLEVELAND
DALLAS

DENVER
DETROIT
EL PASO
HONOLULU
HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
LOUISVILLE
MEMPHIS
MIAMI

MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
MOBILE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW ORLEANS
NEW YORK
NORFOLK
OKLAHOMA CITY
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGH

PORTLAND
RICHMOND
ST. LOUIS
SALT LAKE CITY
SAN ANTONIO
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
QUANTICO

is investigating him.

It is not desirable that local law enforcement officers be Agents in conducting security investigations. Therefore, Agents are instructed that under no circumstances should members of law enforcement agencies accompany Bureau Agents during the conduct of security-type investigations without prior Bureau authority.

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - THE MUSLIM CULT OF ISLAM, AKA - ALLAH CULT OF ISLAM -- Reference is made to Item (B) "Loyalty of Government Employees," SAC Letter Number 53-6, dated January 13, 1953, in which you were furnished certain information regarding the Muslim Cult of Islam.

For your additional information this Cult of which the membership is composed of Negroes was organized in Detroit, Michigan, in 1920 by an individual named A. Wallace Fard. The Cult is presently headed by Elijah Mohammed, was., W. F. Mohammed, Elijah Muk-Muhd, "Allah" and "The Prophet." Informants describe the Cult as a vicious and fanatical secret organization of which the members disavow allegiance to the United States and claim allegiance only to Islam and Allah's prophet, Elijah Mohammed. Organization rules imply civil disobedience to the laws of the United States while awaiting the advent of a "War of Armageddon" wherein Muslim, with the aid of Asiatic nations, will annihilate the white race in the United States and Great Britain.

The Cult teaches members that there is no such thing as a Negro race, the so-called Negro race is the original race of Asiatic origin and nature, the original race has been kept in slavery by "devils" or the white race, and that the original race will be liberated by the Muslims in the forthcoming war in which the United States and Great Britain will be destroyed. Various branches of the organization are identified as Temples. Elijah Mohammed and ministers of the local Temples reportedly lecture that the Chinese Communist and North Korean forces are allies of Muslim, are destroying the United Nations' forces in Korea and that Russia and other Asiatic nations are waiting for the Muslims to prepare before launching war against the United States and Great Britain. The Military Section of the Cult known as "Fruit of Islam" (FOI) allegedly is in possession of Army Springfield rifles and receives training in jujitsu and the use of knives and blackjacks.

3/17/53
SAC LETTER NO. 53-20

66-04 -
1790

It is reported that the Cult raises finances by voluntary contributions but informants have reported that the Cult appears to have a hidden source of income because expenses far exceed all other income. Members of the Cult have been convicted for Selective Service violations.

The headquarters of the Cult is located in Chicago, Illinois, and auxiliary Temples are known to exist at the following locations:

Temple of Islam #1
1474 Frederick Street
Detroit, Michigan

Temple of Islam #5
509 Central Avenue
Cincinnati, Ohio

Temple of Islam #2
(National Headquarters)
824 East 43rd Street
Chicago, Illinois

Temple of Islam #6
1103 East Madison Street
Baltimore, Maryland

Temple of Islam #3
1316 North Eighth Street
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Temple of Islam #7
38 West 135th Street
New York 30, New York

Temple of Islam #4
28th and Dunbarton Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Temple of Islam #8
3102 Clay Street
San Diego, California

Information has been received that the Cult has been or is active in Youngstown, Ohio; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Jacksonville, Florida; Atlantic City, New Jersey; and Gary, Indiana. Investigation to date has revealed the possibility of the existence of isolated cases of individuals throughout the country who may be members of the Cult but who are not connected with any local Temple.

Investigation of the Organization

The Chicago Office is the office of origin in the investigation of the Muslim Cult of Islam. The Chicago Office and offices covering auxiliary Temples or branches of this Cult are instructed to continue reporting the activities of this Cult in accordance with Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions. All offices should be alert for the existence of any activities of this Cult and promptly initiate an investigation when activity is noted. When any office develops information indicating activity in the Cult in another office

3/17/53
SAC LETTER NO. 53-20

appropriate leads should be set out.

In view of the fact that members of the Cult do not consider it their duty to register for Selective Service or serve in the United States Armed Forces, all offices investigating the activities of this Cult should be continually alert for possible violations of the Selective Service Act of 1948. In addition, you should be alert to develop fully any information indicating the activities of the Cult and its leaders are in violation of the Smith Act of 1940.

A thorough investigation of the Cult cannot be effectively pursued without substantial informant coverage because of the secret nature of the organization. It is imperative that all offices, in the territories of which Temples are known to exist or other activities of the group are reported, immediately undertake either to improve existing informant coverage or develop informant coverage.

When activities of this Cult are known to exist in your territory you should be particularly alert to develop information regarding the total membership of the Cult in the area.

All organizational reports on the Cult should be captioned "ELIJAH MOHAMMED, was., W. F. Mohammed, Elijah Muk-Muhd, 'Allah' and 'The Prophet'; The Muslim Cult of Islam, aka. Allah Temple of Islam - SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1948; CONSPIRACY; INTERNAL SECURITY - C."

Investigations of Individual Members of the Cult

When it is known or becomes known that this Cult is active in your territory you should immediately institute a security-type investigation on all individuals who are reported to be (1) functionaries or leaders of the Cult, (2) members of the Military Section of the Cult known as the "Fruit of Islam" or (3) active participants in carrying out fanatical and disloyal aims and purposes of the Cult. At this time it is not desired that investigations be initiated based on mere membership alone.

During the course of the security investigations of these individuals you should be continually alert for and fully develop any information indicating a possible violation of the Selective Service Act of 1948 or the Smith Act of 1940. If information is developed during the course of a security investigation that an individual has violated the Selective Service Act of 1948 you should

3/17/53
SAC LETTER NO. 53-20

Immediately open a separate case file on the Selective Service
Index.

In each case investigated you should consider whether the individual is a threat to the internal security of the country and because of anarchist and revolutionary beliefs is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety and welfare. If that determination is made you should submit Form FD-122 recommending the individual's name for the Security Index.

In order that the cases can be readily identified the investigations of these individuals should be reported under the character Security Matter - MCI.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington 25, D. C.

(Typed March 9, 1953)

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

FILE NO. _____

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -
THE MUSLIM CULT OF ISLAM, AKA
ALLAH TEMPLE OF ISLAM

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Item (B) "Loyalty of Government Employees," SAC Letter Number 6, ~~Series 1953~~, dated January 13, 1953, in which you were furnished certain information regarding the Muslim Cult of Islam.

For your additional information this Cult of which the membership is composed of Negroes was organized in Detroit, Michigan, in 1930 by an individual named A. Wallace Fard. The Cult is presently headed by Elijah Mohammed, was., W. F. Mohammed, Elijah Muk-Muhd, "Allah" and "The Prophet." Informants describe the Cult as a vicious and fanatical secret organization of which the members disavow allegiance to the United States and claim allegiance only to Islam and Allah's prophet, Elijah Mohammed. Organization rules imply civil disobedience to the laws of the United States while awaiting the advent of a "War of Armageddon" wherein Muslim, with the aid of Asiatic nations, will annihilate the white race in the United States and Great Britain.

The Cult teaches members that there is no such thing as a Negro race, the so-called Negro race is the original race of Asiatic origin and nature, the original race has been kept in slavery by "devils" or the white race, and that the original race will be liberated by the Muslims in the forthcoming war in which the United States and Great Britain will be destroyed. Various branches of the organization are identified as Temples. Elijah Mohammed and ministers of the local Temples reportedly lecture that the Chinese Communist and North Korean forces are allies of Muslim, are destroying the United Nations' forces in Korea and that Russia and other Asiatic nations are waiting for

the Muslims to prepare before launching war against the United States and Great Britain. The Military Section of the Cult known as "Fruit of Islam" (FOI) allegedly is in possession of Army Springfield rifles and receives training in jujitsu and the use of knives and blackjacks.

It is reported that the Cult raises finances by voluntary contributions but informants have reported that the Cult appears to have a hidden source of income because expenses far exceed apparent income. Members of the Cult have been convicted for Selective Service violations.

The headquarters of the Cult is located in Chicago, Illinois, and auxiliary Temples are known to exist at the following locations:

Temple of Islam #1
1474 Frederick Street
Detroit, Michigan

Temple of Islam #5
509 Central Avenue
Cincinnati, Ohio

Temple of Islam #2
(National Headquarters)
824 East 43rd Street
Chicago, Illinois

Temple of Islam #6
1103 East Madison Street
Baltimore, Maryland

Temple of Islam #3
1316 North Eighth Street
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Temple of Islam #7
38 West 135th Street
New York 30, New York

Temple of Islam #4
28th and Dunbarton Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Temple of Islam #8
3102 Clay Street
San Diego, California

Information has been received that the Cult has been or is active in Youngstown, Ohio; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Jacksonville, Florida; Atlantic City, New Jersey, and Gary, Indiana. Investigation to date has revealed the possibility of the existence of isolated cases of individuals throughout the country who may be members of the Cult but who are not connected with any local Temple.

Investigation of the Organization

The Chicago Office is the office of origin in the investigation of the Muslim Cult of Islam. The Chicago Office and offices covering auxiliary Temples or branches of this Cult are instructed to continue reporting the activities of this

Cult in accordance with Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions. All offices should be alert for the existence of any activities of this Cult and promptly initiate an investigation when activity is noted. When any office develops information indicating activity in the Cult in another office appropriate leads should be set out.

In view of the fact that members of the Cult do not consider it their duty to register for Selective Service or serve in the United States Armed Forces, all offices investigating the activities of this Cult should be continually alert for possible violations of the Selective Service Act of 1948. In addition, you should be alert to fully develop any information indicating the activities of the Cult and its leaders are in violation of the Smith Act of 1940.

A thorough investigation of the Cult cannot be effectively pursued without substantial informant coverage because of the secret nature of the organization. It is imperative that all offices, in the territories of which Temples are known to exist or other activities of the group are reported, immediately undertake to either improve existing informant coverage or develop informant coverage.

When activities of this Cult are known to exist in your territory you should be particularly alert to develop information regarding the total membership of the Cult in the area.

All organizational reports on the Cult should be captioned "ELIJAH MOHAMMED, was., W. F. Mohammed, Elijah Muk-Muhd, 'Allah' and 'The Prophet'; The Muslim Cult of Islam, aka. Allah Temple of Islam - SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1948; CONSPIRACY; INTERNAL SECURITY - C."

Investigations of Individual Members of the Cult

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(ENCL.)


fanatical and disloyal aims and purposes of the Cult. At this time it is not desired that investigations be initiated based on mere membership alone.


During the course of the security investigations of these individuals you should be continually alert for and fully develop any information indicating a possible violation of the Selective Service Act of 1948 or the Smith Act of 1940. If information is developed during the course of a security investigation that an individual has violated the Selective Service Act of 1948 you should immediately open a separate case file on the Selective Service violation.

In each case investigated you should consider whether the individual is a threat to the internal security of the country and because of anarchist and revolutionary beliefs is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety and welfare. If that determination is made you should submit Form FD-122 recommending the individual's name for the Security Index.

In order that the cases can be readily identified the investigations of these individuals should be reported under the character Security Matter - MCI.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

66-04-957
File Copy
PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC LETTER NO. 63
Series 1949

June 8, 1949

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	DETROIT	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	EL PASO	NEWARK	ST. PAUL
	BALTIMORE	HONOLULU	NEW HAVEN	SALT LAKE CITY
	BIRMINGHAM	HOUSTON	NEW ORLEANS	SAN ANTONIO
	BOSTON	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW YORK	SAN DIEGO
	BUFFALO	KANSAS CITY	NORFOLK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUTTE	KNOXVILLE	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN JUAN
	CHARLOTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OMAHA	SAVANNAH
	CHICAGO	LOS ANGELES	PHILADELPHIA	SEATTLE
	CINCINNATI	LOUISVILLE	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
	CLEVELAND	MEMPHIS	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	DALLAS	MIAMI	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

J. I. R. 48

(c) ~~SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - SECURITY INDEX (FD-122)~~ -- From time to time, Form FD-122 and an investigative report are forwarded to the Bureau together. At the Bureau, during the course of processing, the form becomes separated from the investigative report and they are handled at different times, which has caused unnecessary correspondence with the field.


In the future, to overcome this difficulty, it is desired that the Form FD-122 be stapled to the original copy of the investigative report whenever the investigative report and the Form FD-122 are submitted on the same date.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

6-8-49
SAC LETTER NO. 63
Series 1949



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

66-04-87
(ENCL.)

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

PERSONAL ATTENTION

(Typed May 31, 1949)

TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

Re: ~~SECURITY INDEX~~ *SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -*
SECURITY INDEX (FD-122)

Dear Sir:

From time to time, Form FD-122 and an investigative report are forwarded to the Bureau together. At the Bureau, during the course of processing, the form becomes separated from the investigative report and they are handled at different times, which has caused unnecessary correspondence with the field.

In the future, to overcome this difficulty, it is desired that the Form FD-122 be stapled to the original copy of the investigative report whenever the investigative report and the Form FD-122 are submitted on the same date.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

FILED

66-04-1755

File Copy

PERSONAL ATTENTION



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SAC LETTER NO. 5
Series 1953

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

January 9, 1953

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	PORTLAND
	ALBUQUERQUE	DETROIT	MINNEAPOLIS	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	EL PASO	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BALTIMORE	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BIRMINGHAM	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BOSTON	KANSAS CITY	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUFFALO	KNOXVILLE	NORFOLK	SAN JUAN
	BUTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CHARLOTTE	LOS ANGELES	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CHICAGO	LOUISVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SPRINGFIELD
	CINCINNATI	MEMPHIS	PHOENIX	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	CLEVELAND	MIAMI	PITTSBURGH	QUANTICO
	DALLAS			

(B) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - SUBMISSION OF FORM FD-122 REQUIRING
ADJUSTMENTS TO SECURITY INDEX CASES -- Reference is made to Item (E)
in SAC Letter Number 120, Series 1952, dated November 14, 1952, which
advised, under the above caption, that in the future Form FD-122
should be submitted to the Bureau without abstracts.

Since receipt of that SAC Letter certain offices have been
submitting all FD-122 forms without abstracts and have not limited
the instructions to those instances in which the form is submitted
to make adjustments or changes to existing Security Index cards.

FILED IN

FD-132 forms should be submitted with abstracts when used to recommend the preparation of Security Index cards. The forms should be submitted without abstracts when used to advise the Bureau regarding the changes to be made to existing Security Index cards.



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

(Typed December 23, 1952)

66-04-175
(ENCL.)

5
(B)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Letter To All Special Agents in Charge:

Re: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - SUBMISSION OF
FORM FD-122 REQUIRING ADJUSTMENTS TO
SECURITY INDEX CASES


Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Item (L) in SAC Letter Number 120, Series 1952, dated November 14, 1952, which advised, under the above caption, that in the future Form FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau without abstracts.

Since receipt of that SAC Letter certain offices have been submitting all FD-122 forms without abstracts and have not limited the instructions to those instances in which the form is submitted to make adjustments or changes to existing Security Index cards.

FD-122 forms should be submitted with abstracts when used to recommend the preparation of Security Index cards. The forms should be submitted without abstracts when used to advise the Bureau regarding the changes to be made to existing Security Index cards.

Very truly yours,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

Office Memo

UM • UNITED

62-92201-48
GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: January 4, 1951

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: ~~SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS~~ AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING
SAC, NEW YORK

In addition, during the week of November 28 to December 5, 1950, the Security Index Unit received forty-eight requests from the field for Bureau authority to institute investigations of individuals connected with institutions of learning. The present regulation requiring Bureau authority before initiating investigations of this type is causing considerable delay in the initiation of investigations and possibly unnecessary correspondence between the Bureau and the field.



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL ATTENTION
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 4, 1950

SAC LETTER NO. 54
Series 1950

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	PORTLAND
	ALBUQUERQUE	DETROIT	MINNEAPOLIS	RICHMOND
	ANCHORAGE	EL PASO	MOBILE	ST. LOUIS
	ATLANTA	HONOLULU	NEWARK	SALT LAKE CITY
	BALTIMORE	HOUSTON	NEW HAVEN	SAN ANTONIO
	BIRMINGHAM	INDIANAPOLIS	NEW ORLEANS	SAN DIEGO
	BOSTON	KANSAS CITY	NEW YORK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUFFALO	KNOXVILLE	NORFOLK	SAN JUAN
	BUTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAVANNAH
	CHARLOTTE	LOS ANGELES	OMAHA	SEATTLE
	CHICAGO	LOUISVILLE	PHILADELPHIA	SPRINGFIELD
	CINCINNATI	MEMPHIS	PHOENIX	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	CLEVELAND	MIAMI	PITTSBURGH	QUANTICO
	DALLAS			

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATION - INDIVIDUALS

In SAC Letter No. 48, Series 50, dated July 25, 1950, you were advised that in view of the critical international situation it was found necessary to broaden our standards to include in the Security Index the names of all individuals who are present, active, participating members of the Communist Party or related groups or who actively espouse the line of those groups, regardless of the individual's leadership in the Party, present employment or past activities.

Inasmuch as the Bureau may be called upon at any time to effect the apprehension of Security Index subjects, it is imperative that the names of all dangerous or potentially dangerous subjects be added to the Index as quickly as possible. To this end you must expedite these investigations in line with existing instructions and recommend the inclusion of an individual's name in the Index as soon as your investigation discloses his dangerous or potentially dangerous character. The remaining investigation must then be completed as soon as possible.

We have a direct responsibility to protect the internal security of the nation and I want it clearly understood that you must have included in the Security Index within the immediate future the names of all individuals in your division who meet the present standards for such inclusion.

This matter must receive your continuous personal attention.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

1166

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IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

(Typed 7-28-50)

(ENCL.)



PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

LETTER TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE:

RE: SECURITY INVESTIGATION -
INDIVIDUALS

Dear Sir:

In SAC Letter No. 48, Series 50, dated July 25, 1950, you were advised that in view of the critical international situation it was found necessary to broaden our standards to include in the Security Index the names of all individuals who are present, active, participating members of the Communist Party or related groups or who actively espouse the line of those groups, regardless of the individual's leadership in the Party, present employment or past activities.

Inasmuch as the Bureau may be called upon at any time to effect the apprehension of Security Index subjects, it is imperative that the names of all dangerous or potentially dangerous subjects be added to the Index as quickly as possible. To this end you must expedite these investigations in line with existing instructions and recommend the inclusion of an individual's name in the Index as soon as your investigation discloses his dangerous or potentially dangerous character. The remaining investigation must then be completed as soon as possible.

We have a direct responsibility to protect the internal security of the nation and I want it clearly understood that you must have included in the Security Index within the immediate future the names of all individuals in your division who meet the present standards for such inclusion.

This matter must receive your continuous personal attention.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: March 27, 1948

FROM : The Executive Conference

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DETENTION OF COMMUNISTS IN THE
EVENT OF SUDDEN DIFFICULTY WITH THE SOVIET UNION

At a meeting of the Executive Conference on March 27, 1948,
attended by Messrs.

a number of suggestions with reference to the Bureau's
activities in the event of a sudden emergency with Russia were discussed;
these suggestions having been made by the SACs and Supervisors who attended
a conference in Washington for this purpose on March 22, 1948.

The first four suggestions submitted hereinafter should be considered
together inasmuch as they are interrelated.

The Executive Conference was advised that the SACs and Supervisors
recommended the following procedures:

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

I. It is recommended that all offices should immediately
cause a review of their files to be made for the purpose
of ascertaining just what information we do and do not
have with respect to individual Communists, looking
toward the detention of the dangerous and potentially
dangerous ones in the event of an emergency. (In this
instance as in all subsequent instances discussed in
this memorandum, it should be noted that we are referring
not only to individual members of the Communist Party but
also individual members of the Socialist Workers Party,
the Workers Party, and other Communist splinter groups.)
All individuals present at the conference were unanimously
in favor of this recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

The Executive Conference unanimously concurred in the
above recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

II. Coincidental with the review that is to be made
of our Field Office files, it is recommended that a
Communist index, as distinguished from the security
index, be prepared in each office, which will contain
information on all known Communist Party members as well
as those who are known to be closely affiliated with and
sympathetic to the Communist Party.

COPIES DESTROYED
10 OCT 7 1969

RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

The Executive Conference unanimously recommended the
adoption of the above recommendation but suggested that
the field be instructed to eliminate all individuals
merely connected with front groups from such an index
and to confine it to Communist Party members.

O.H. but only
handle latter

RECORDED COPY

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

III. In connection with the file review proposed in Item No. I and the Communist index proposed in Item No. II, it is recommended that the Field Offices in the course of this review include the following data, where it appears in the file, on the Communist index card:

- A. Name
- B. File Number
- C. Position in the Party
- D. Place of Residence
- E. Place of Employment
- F. Citizenship
- G. Source and Date Information was Received (this is, of course, for evaluation purposes)
- H. A general statement to be included, if necessary, by the Reviewing Agent which will assist for evaluation purposes in determining whether the Communist in question is potentially or actually dangerous.

OK
RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

The Executive Conference unanimously recommended the adoption of such a form in order that Special Agents who have not been working on the Communist work would have a ready guide in front of them for their assistance in reviewing these files. *Item 3 on SAC letter*

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

IV. It was recommended that a mimeographed form be made available to the squad of Reviewing Agents in each office so that they might write in the pertinent information in the categories mentioned in Item No. III above, subsequent to which time appropriate cards will be prepared, which cards will actually comprise the Communist index.

OK
RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

The Executive Conference unanimously approved the above recommendation. *Item 4 on SAC letter*

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

V. It was recommended that we alter in part existing Bureau requirements relative to the criteria necessary and prerequisite to the preparation of a security index card. These criteria are listed in 443 in the Manual of Instructions. It is recommended that upon an analysis of the Communist index in the field that the Field Offices be permitted to recommend a security index card, without benefit of prior individual investigation, on all members of the Communist Party who fall in the categories listed in the Bureau Manual, Section 44D (7), which categories relate to the question of what individuals should and should not become the subjects of security index cards. This recommendation, of course, embodied the proposition that even though no investigation per se would be conducted of such subjects, it would be absolutely essential to establish their current place of abode and employment.

(Recom. of SACs cont'd.) In connection with this same recommendation, it was felt that in all instances where the field is permitted to recommend for security index consideration individual Communists without benefit of prior investigation, there should be a showing of membership in the Party, as obtained from a substantial source, before any individual is recommended for inclusion on the security index.

RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

OK.
H

The Executive Conference unanimously opposed this recommendation feeling that it would be dangerous to prepare security index cards on individuals without any investigation having been conducted of them and further by reason of the fact that the supplemental index which the conference recommends be adopted will take the place of any need for having security index cards prepared upon which activity investigation has not been conducted. The Executive Conference further pointed out that in the event the emergency did not arrive in the immediate future, an opportunity would be had to gradually investigate other Communists and subsequently add them to the security index.

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

VI. It was recommended in connection with point V that the security index card which is prepared on subjects without benefit of prior investigation per se, both at the field and at the Seat of Government, be earmarked in some fashion so as to readily indicate that an individual investigation has not been conducted of that subject. It was suggested that the card might be marked "NI" meaning "no investigation." This suggestion was predicated upon the belief that (a) an inquiry might be made at a later date as to the number of cases wherein we were carrying security index cards without benefit of individual investigation per se, or (b) the Attorney General might instruct that only those Communists appearing on the index be picked up who had been afforded prior investigation.

In connection with the foregoing, it should be observed that the vast bulk of our information showing membership in the Communist Party, as well as positive or potential dangerousness, comes to us through the medium of our investigation and general coverage of the Communist Party and, specifically, through the medium of

reliable live informants. In only a minimum number of cases does actual investigation by Bureau Agents, such as or neighborhood investigations, reveal anything in addition to the information already developed through the media indicated above.

(Recom. of SACs cont'd.)

Consequently, it was suggested that the distinction between those cases individually investigated per se and those cases on which a determination for a security index card was made on the basis of material in the file without benefit of per se individual investigation is a false distinction and serves no good purpose.

OK
H
RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

The Executive Conference was unanimously opposed to this recommendation for the same reason they were opposed to Item No. V.

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

VII. It was recommended that, if available in the file, there should be included on the reverse side of the security index card in the field a description and photograph of the subject for the assistance of the apprehending officer in the event that subject is to be taken into custody. *Item 5 in SAC L. 34*

RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

The Executive Conference unanimously approved and endorsed this recommendation but suggested that the field be advised that in the event only one photograph was available, such photograph should be placed on the security index card and that it would not be necessary to prepare a duplicate photograph for the file.

OK
H
RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

VIII. The conference took cognizance of the fact that the Manual of Instructions in outlining suggestions for standards for measuring dangerousness, includes administrative heads of the Party with experience in military tactics as well as Party members who have had training in the Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow. In this connection, it is recommended that the Bureau should extend its criteria relative to the prerequisites for inclusion of individuals on the security index to all Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, all attendants at the Lenin and Wilson Schools, as well as the Far Eastern Institute and the National Training School in this country; and all Communists who were members of the military establishments in World Wars I and II, as well as all other Communists who received military training in other (non-U.S.) armed forces. In elaborating on this point, the recommendation is made that any individual falling in any one of the aforementioned categories should automatically be catalogued on the security index without benefit of prior individual investigation per se. This suggestion was made inasmuch as individuals coming within the aforementioned categories were either trained to actually commit sabotage, and in some instances have had experience in the commission of sabotage, or because they received training of a military character which would aid them in directing the efforts of any military group which is Communist in context.

RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

The Executive Conference unanimously approved the above recommendation and recommended that it also be specifically pointed out to the field that this would include not only male, but also females of the Communist Party, in the above category. *See 6-1-54 letter*

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

IX. The conference made note of the fact that the security index as presently constituted in the Field is broken down alphabetically by states only. It was observed that this system alone is not sufficiently practical for purposes of immediate apprehension and, accordingly, to better the existing system several suggestions were made, namely:

A duplicate security index card should be made up in each Field Office containing all of the information appearing on the front side of the security index card. This duplicate card should then be filed alphabetically in the control index and the original security index card which contains, where available, a description and photograph on its reverse side should be filed geographically. This geographical breakdown should be in accordance with the needs existing in a particular office. For example, where necessary, it should be broken down into states, counties, cities and, if conditions warrant, into precincts, et cetera. It was felt that when the occasion demands, this card could readily be drawn from the geographical section of the index and utilized as the arrest card by the apprehending Agent, it being noted that it will contain pertinent information regarding the subject to be arrested, including name, place of employment, place of abode, and, where available, description and photograph. It was proposed that when this card is drawn from the geographical section of the index for apprehension purposes, an appropriate notation would be made on the duplicate in the alphabetical section of the index for the purpose of administrative handling. *See 6-1-54 letter*

RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

The Executive Conference was unanimously in favor of the above recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

X. It is recommended that our security index cards be appropriately tabbed for priority arrest purposes. The conference felt that it is only logical to consider the advisability of getting out of circulation as expeditiously as possible the most dangerous Communists and to that end the recommendation was made that the Field Offices be instructed to appropriately tab the security index cards on administrative heads of the Party who are

(Recom. of SACs cont'd.) covered by the top functionary and key figure classifications and such other individuals as in the judgment of the respective Agents in Charge are sufficiently dangerous to warrant their being afforded priority consideration when the time comes for detention of Communists. The Field Offices should advise the Bureau of the cards so tabbed in order that we might pursue a like tabbing system at the Seat of Government.

OK
RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

The Executive Conference was unanimously in favor of the above recommendation. Jan 7 in SAC's office

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

XI. The suggestion was made that the Bureau should consider the preparation of a duplicate Communist index card or in its absence should utilize a colored tabbing system with a view to cataloguing Communists according to their employment or position in life. Elaborating on this point, the view was expressed that if we were to tab all employees in restaurants and other eating establishments that this might be of particular significance and value in the event bacteriological warfare were to subsequently ensue. It was suggested that if a duplicate Communist index card is prepared that it be filed in accordance with the employment of said Communists or in the absence of such a duplicate that there be colored tabs showing, for example, doctors with a blue tab, food workers with a red tab, et cetera. Some members of the conference were agreed that this would be desirable but not absolutely essential at this time. Those in favor of adopting the suggestion at this time were Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] and the remaining members of the conference were opposed.

OK
RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

The Executive Conference was unanimously opposed to this recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

XII. The conference has taken cognizance of the fact that even though the Bureau does not publicly indicate that it is engaged in the conduct of investigations relating to Communists, it is very generally recognized and, in fact, very well known that the FBI does have an intense interest in Communist activities. Law enforcement agencies generally are well aware of this fact as is the citizenry. The conference has likewise taken repeated cognizance of the fact that we have very critical personnel limitations in so far as both the desirable and the necessary work in this field go. It is, accordingly, recommended that the Field Office be allowed, on a permissive rather than obligatory basis, to utilize trusted,

(Recom. of SACs cont'd.) reliable and competent law enforcement agencies in the respective Field Divisions for the conduct of certain of our inquiries relating to our Communist index and such other routine inquiries as in the judgment of the field are proper. It was pointed out in this connection that if this program is authorized by the Bureau that the field should be instructed to handle it with the greatest degree of discretion and on a very selective basis among those peace officers in whom they have the utmost confidence.

RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

OK.
H.

The Executive Conference was unanimously opposed to utilizing law enforcement agencies for the purpose of conducting any investigation in connection with its check of Communists, it being felt that this would be too dangerous, that there will be numerous leaks as a result of such a program and would result in embarrassment to the Bureau. Further, it would result in a particular police department in effect having a copy of the Bureau's security index of dangerous subjects.

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

XIII. The suggestion was made that the Bureau should press the Attorney General for a workable program which would allow the Field Offices to apprehend the most dangerous Communists if the emergency increases with sufficient intensity prior to an actual declaration of war and subsequent to the time when we get an actual showing of a concerted endeavor on the part of these individuals to vacate their places of abode and employment to go further underground.

RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

OK.
H.

The conference was advised that this matter has been presented to the Attorney General and he has delayed so from time to time with reference to the adoption of a workable program which would permit the apprehension of such Communists in the event of an actual declaration of war that it was not believed possible that anything could be done to pick up such subjects prior to an actual Declaration of war.

RECOMMENDATION OF SACs
AND SUPERVISORS:

XIV. The SACs suggested that they prepare a break down of the estimate as to the number of Agents it would require in a particular field division to make all the apprehensions of the individuals in their security index, a break down as to the number of Agents needed for all the arrests within a twenty-four hour period, in a two-day period and a seven-day period.

RECOMMENDATION OF
EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE:

The Executive Conference was of the opinion that this was unnecessary, that the estimate should be broken down only as to the number of Agents necessary for the arrest of all such Communists on a twenty-four basis, that in the event such an emergency arose, it would be necessary to take immediate action and it would not be possible to "string out" such investigations over a seven-day period.

In the event you approve of the action of the Executive Conference, an appropriate Bureau Bulletin will be prepared for the field.

Respectfully,
For the Conference...

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

All Supervisors in the Espionage and

December 5, 1950

TO : Internal Security Sections

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT: SPECIAL SECTION OF THE SECURITY INDEX

PURPOSE:

To provide for uniformity in handling the additions to and removals from the Special Section of the Security Index.

BACKGROUND:

SAC Letter No. 61, Series 1950, dated August 29, 1950, furnished to the field advice regarding the categories of subjects concerning whom cards were maintained in a Special Section of the Bureau's Security Index and instructing the field to set up such a Special Section. The identities of subjects in the Bureau's Special Section as of Jul. 31, 1950, were furnished to the appropriate field offices on that date.

On September 28, 1950, I instructed a review of all cases involving subjects then in the Special Section for the purpose of determining whether or not they were properly included therein.

The review was completed with recommendations on November 8, 1950, for the removal of seventy-two subjects from the Special Section of the Security Index. Of these seventy-two subjects cancellation of the Security Index card was recommended as to eleven. One hundred fifty-one subjects were recommended for retention in the Special Section. All recommendations were approved.

DETAILS:

To restate the basis for maintaining a Special Section:

Espionage subjects are maintained in the Special Section when apprehension in the event of an emergency would destroy chances of penetration and control of an operating Soviet espionage parallel or would destroy known chances of penetration and control of a "Grepper" control.

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U. S. Government employees are maintained in the Special Section where their cases are still pending under the Loyalty Program or the case has been determined in their favor by the Loyalty Board.

Atomic energy employees are maintained in the Special Section because their apprehension must be cleared with the Atomic Energy Commission representatives in order to avoid interference with atomic energy work.

Foreign government employees are maintained in the Special Section because we can only apprehend those employed by governments with which we are at war. (Inquiries have been directed to the Department regarding the possible apprehension of foreign government employees who would be employed by neutral or allied embassies or legations in the event of war.)

United Nations and international organization employees are maintained in the Special Section by reason of the fact that they are employees of international organizations regardless of their national origin and their status regarding their susceptibility to detention has not yet been determined by the Department.

Prominent individuals are in the Special Section because their apprehension might affect adversely other persons not in the Security Index who are necessary to the war effort, or their apprehension might be attended by considerable publicity tending to make martyrs of them and thereby embarrass the Bureau.

All supervisors who submitted recommendations regarding the subjects in their cases who were included in the Special Section of the Security Index at the time of the survey have had returned to them the memoranda prepared by them with the recommendations for retention or removal approved.

Your instructions in further handling these subjects and subjects who in the future may be recommended for inclusion in the Security Index are as follows:

1. In each case where removal from the Special Section has been approved and appropriate action has not yet been taken, the supervisor should:

a. Review the file.

b. If copies of reports have been transmitted to the Division of Records or to the Criminal Division of the Department, the field should be instructed to remove the subject from the Special Section and return the subject's card to the Regular Security Index in the field office.

c. If reports suitable for distribution are in the file and none have been sent to the Department, copies should be sent immediately to the Division of Records and the field advised as in b.

d. If there are no reports in the file suitable for distribution or if there have been no reports suitable for distribution during the past six-month period, the field should be instructed to prepare within thirty days a summary type report suitable for distribution to the Department in order that the subject can be removed from the Special Section of the Security Index. Your instructions to the field in this regard should be predicated upon the needs of the

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individual case and should point out to the field the desirability of setting forth evidence where possible which would bring the subject within the registration requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, particularly as amended by Section 20 of the Internal Security Act of 1950.

2. When letters are sent to the field instructing removal of a subject from the Special Section of the Security Index where that subject is supervised by the Internal Security Section there will be no change in current procedure. However, when that subject is supervised by the Espionage Section the following procedure will be observed:

a. The yellow of the letter to the field will have the name typed in the lower left hand corner.

b. There should be stapled to the yellow the supervisor's routing slip checked to the mail room with instructions to forward by special messenger to

c. Upon receipt of the yellow of the outgoing in the Internal Security Section, the appropriate action will be taken to have the cards relating to the subject changed in the Bureau records and new cards printed for the field. The date on which this is done will be entered on the yellow of the instructions to the field and after this is done the yellow will be initialed by or for [redacted] and returned to the case supervisor who will then see that it is promptly placed in the file of the case.

In connection with the foregoing, it is my desire that any such changes from the Special Section of the Security Index be handled in the Internal Security Section by reference from the Espionage Section immediately.

3. Where removals are made from the Special Section of the Security Index at the instruction of the Espionage Section, the letter instructing the field to remove the card from the Special Section should, unless the card is being canceled altogether, advise the field that revised cards will be forwarded by the Bureau. The preparation of these revised cards will be handled immediately.

4. In the cases of all subjects being retained in the Special Section of the Security Index, reports suitable for distribution will be prepared in the field to be retained in the Bureau's files until such time as the status of the subject is changed. A letter to all SAC's is in preparation instructing that this be done and that such investigations be brought up to date every six months by a summary type report suitable for distribution regardless of the number of investigative reports prepared in the field concerning such subjects which are not prepared for distribution. This rule will apply primarily to those Special Section subjects in the espionage, foreign government employee and United Nations and international organization employee categories since reports on subjects in the remaining categories are in most instances forwarded to the Department on receipt thereof.

5. Ticklers should be maintained on all Special Section cases for the following purposes:

a. So that periodically, whenever the case is reviewed on tickler, consideration be given to the appropriateness of retaining the subject in the Special Section of the Security Index.

b. In order that the field may be followed for the submission of a report suitable for distribution every six months.

6. Where a duplicate assignment card is used as a tickler for case review, the supervisor must note on that card the fact that the subject is in the Special Section of the Security Index in order that he may reconsider the subject's status each time the file is reviewed.

7. A separate list of all subjects in the Special Section of the Security Index broken down according to field offices, which subjects are supervised by the Espionage Section, will be maintained in the Espionage Section. Additions and deletions to this list will be made at the time they occur, upon notification by the Internal Security Section. It will be the duty of the case supervisor in the Espionage Section to bring to the attention of the section chief or No. 1 man the identity of individuals being removed from or added to the Special Section upon receipt of the action serial from the Internal Security Section with the appropriate notations thereon.

The use of the FD forms in initiating requests by the field will be continued and advice to the field regarding the placing of a subject in the Special Section of the Security Index will be handled in the same manner as the removals. The case supervisor will be responsible for following the matter through to its logical conclusion, but no requests for changes in the Special Section of the Security Index should be made orally or by routing slip.

8. Upon receipt of advice from the Department regarding the handling of U. S. Government employees, atomic energy employees, foreign government employees and the United Nations and other international organization employees, appropriate action should be taken in accordance with such instructions. It should be borne in mind, however, that even though a person is in one of the afore-mentioned categories and the Attorney General advises that persons in that category may be included in the Master Warrant of Arrest under the Detention Program, the subject should not be removed from the Special Section of the Security Index until consideration has been given to his case as a possible espionage subject. In other words, regardless of his current category, would his apprehension destroy the Bureau's chances of penetration and control of an espionage parallel? If this question can be answered in the negative, the subject should, of course, be removed from the Special Section.

9. In the future, no individuals will be maintained in the Special Section of the Security Index under the category "prominent individuals." With regard to all subjects currently carried in that category, immediate steps must be taken to instruct the field to bring the investigations of such persons into such condition that there would be no reasonable possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau by reason of the apprehension of such "prominent individuals" in the event of hostilities. In ninety days all subjects remaining in the "prominent individuals" category in the Special Section of the Security Index will be carefully reviewed for the purpose of eliminating as many of them as is possible. If we cannot justify the apprehension of a "prominent individual," the Security Index card should be canceled.

10. Each addition to or deletion from the Special Section must be approved by the Chief of the Section to which the investigation is assigned.

ACTION:

The instructions to be sent to the field concerning the removal of names from the Special Section where reports have been or can now be sent to the Department; the instructions to the field for the preparation of summary type reports in contemplation of removal from the Special Section; and the instructions to the field regarding proper investigation of individuals in the "prominent individuals" category must be in the mail seven days from the date of this memorandum.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: March 23, 1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM

Reference is made to my memorandum of March 22, 1955, suggesting that the Department be contacted to reach a prompt decision on our proposed change in the criteria for placing or retaining persons on the Security Index.

In accordance with instructions, I contacted Assistant Attorney General this morning and proposed to him that it would be desirable not to wait for the Attorney General's conference to decide this matter, inasmuch as it is a matter of great importance and considerable urgency and primarily concerns the work in the Internal Security Division. I told him I would be glad to confer with him and his assistants relative to any problems posed in this matter. He said that he had on his desk a three-page memorandum reflecting the views of the Internal Security Division and that he had not had a chance to personally go over it, but would do so and attempt to send it over to us today.

He said that this memorandum raises several questions which we might want to take into consideration, such as the establishment of a fixed "cut-off" date rather than a date based on a particular number of years. He also wondered whether the changed criteria proposed in our memorandum of March 9, 1955, to the Attorney General supplanted the previous criteria used by the Bureau. I told him, in effect, the new criteria did supplant the previous criteria because they spell out restrictions as to who shall go on the Index, or who shall stay on the Index. I told him that we would still use the previous criteria, at least to some extent, for assistance to our field offices in evaluating the type of persons who should be considered for the Security Index. In other words, the previous criteria would serve as factors to alert the Agents to the type of persons whose activities should be explored for possible inclusion in the Security Index. However, the revised criteria stand on their own as to who will be placed on or retained on the Security Index.

I told him we will be glad to sit down with him and representatives of the Division and go over this. He said that is out today, but he agreed that as soon as we look over the comments of the Internal Security Division, a conference will be set up with us to arrive at a

MEMORANDUM FOR

final conclusion. [redacted] agreed that we should push ahead on this as rapidly as possible.

ACTION:

Upon receipt of the Department's memorandum, which said he would send over today, we will analyze it immediately, advise you of the results, and arrange to set up a conference with [redacted] Division to iron out any difficulties. *W. H. [redacted]*

For your assistance, there is attached a copy of the proposed criteria we sent over to the Attorney General on March 9, 1955.

In view of the above action, if you agree, will hold up on any contact with Deputy Attorney General Rogers pending our review of the Department's memorandum and the subsequent conference with Tompkins' Division.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: March 29, 1955
abm

FROM :

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM
DETCON - Genl. Ben F. St. J.

In accordance with the Director's instructions and I
 Supervisor Section Chief and I
 conferred with the Department in office on the afternoon of
 March 29, 1955, concerning our proposed changes in the criteria
 for placing or retaining persons on our Security Index.

We advised the Department by letter to the Attorney General dated March 9, 1955, concerning the proposed changes in our new criteria and requested the Department's comments. Assistant Attorney General replied by letter dated March 25, 1955, which reflected that the Internal Security Division of the Department was in agreement with the proposed changes with the exception of Criteria 2 (b). Criteria 2 (b) reads as follows:

2(b) Other than as indicated above, interviews with Security Index subjects or potential Security Index subjects are not to be considered as factors requiring the placing or retaining of names of persons on the Security Index; for example, lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not to be regarded as such factors.

There is attached a complete copy of the new criteria for your information.

At the conference stated in referring to criteria 2 (b) that he wanted to raise the question as to whether the name of a subject should not be included in the Security Index if he refused to cooperate upon being interviewed. He said that if a person completely cooperates and furnishes full information his name is deleted from the Security Index. Therefore, it would seem to him that lack of cooperation might be considered a sufficient factor to warrant including a subject's name in the Security Index.

Attached *sent* 3-31-55- 100-356062-117

It was explained to [redacted] that the Department's inability to review the Security Index cases has placed the Bureau in the position of being both investigator and prosecutor; that the Bureau does not like this position; and in order to insure that only those persons will be detained against whom we have sound cases, our new proposed criteria were submitted to the Department. It was explained that unless we have actual overt acts on the part of subjects within the time limits set in the new criteria, (membership in a basic revolutionary organization within the past five years or leadership activity in a front group within the past three years) the refusal of a person to furnish information on interview will not be considered a factor which will require the placing of a name or the retaining of a name in our Security Index. It was pointed out to [redacted] that the mere refusal of an individual to furnish information on interview was not evidence of subversive activity and under our new proposed criteria such an interview will not be considered as a factor in determining whether the name of a subject shall be placed in the Security Index.

[redacted] then stated that criteria 2 (b) was clear to him but he felt that its application would result in the removal of a large number of names from the Security Index. I told [redacted] that the new criteria are not designed to the removal of any specific number of names from the Security Index but rather are directed at having completely sound cases for presentation to hearing boards.

[redacted] then stated he was concerned because he felt some individuals whose activities would not bring them within the new criteria are dangerous but their names will not be included in the Security Index. [redacted] attention was directed to criteria 1 (d) which provides that even though investigation fails to establish overt acts within the time limits set by the new criteria if the facts developed clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual his name will be included in the Security Index. *

Thereupon [redacted] stated that he clearly understands and is in complete agreement with the entire new criteria as set out in the Bureau's letter to the Attorney General of March 9, 1955.

* I told [redacted] however, that there will be very few individuals who will fall into this category.

ACTION:

1) The Attorney General has advised that he will have a conference on April 4, 1955, and that consideration of the proposed criteria will be an item on the agenda at the conference. A memorandum is being prepared for the Director's use at this conference. This memorandum will contain as one of the items a complete writeup on the proposed criteria.

2) We are preparing an SAC Letter which will set forth the revised criteria for the field. This letter will also instruct the field to make a complete review of Security Index cases with a view to deleting from the Index the names of those subjects whose activities do not meet with the criteria. This SAC Letter will not be submitted, however, until the decision of the Attorney General is obtained on Monday, April 4, 1955.

3) There is attached a letter to Assistant Attorney General Tompkins confirming our conference with Messrs. Yeagley and Doherty on March 29, 1955.

~~PROPOSED CRITERIA
FOR PLACING AND RETAINING
NAMES IN THE SECURITY INDEX~~

1) No name shall be added to or retained in the Security Index unless one or more of the following situations has been established through investigation:

- (a) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals;
- (b) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organization within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals;
- (c) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals;
- (d) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the security of the country in time of emergency.

100-356062-1707
ENCLOSURE

2) In evaluating interviews insofar as Security Index status is concerned you should be guided as follows:

(a) Whenever a subject of a security investigation by a positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicates a continued adherence to the doctrines, aims or purposes of a revolutionary organization or a front organization, the positive statement shall be considered an overt act on the part of the subject in establishing continued adherence.

(b) Other than as indicated above, interviews with Security Index subjects or potential Security Index subjects are not to be considered as factors requiring the placing or retaining of names of persons on the Security Index; for example, lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not to be regarded as such factors.

100-356062-2775

December 12, 1967

PERSONAL

4
100-356062-2775
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear

Thank you for the suggestions that two forms which you designed be approved as an aid in handling certain correspondence with the Department. I am pleased to advise you these proposals are being adopted and steps are being taken to place them into effect.

The interest and initiative you displayed in submitting these ideas to me are indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

1 - Personnel file of SA

(Suggestion 388-68 and Suggestion 389-68 dated 12/7/67)

NOTE: Suggestion 388-68 proposes a form (sample attached) be approved for use in advising the Department a Security Index (SI) subject is employed by Federal Government and the subject is being placed in a special section of the SI. Form to be printed on OF-10 with thin white, blocked yellow and plain yellow copies.

edm Suggestion 389-68 proposes a form letter (sample attached) be approved for use in advising the Department that a SI subject is no longer employed by Federal Government and that subject is being removed from special section of the SI tabbed "U. S. Government Employee" and is

(CONTINUED - OVER)

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returned to the regular section of the SI. Form to be printed on OF-10 with thin white, blocked yellow and plain yellow copies.

Training Division has no objection to approval of these two forms since it appears the time to be saved by their use will more than offset the cost involved in preparation of two new forms. On approval, this letter will serve as the authority for the Forms Management Desk, Training Division, to take appropriate action.

#388-68

100-356062
(ENCL.)

To: Director, FBI		From: (Suggester's name) SA	Date 12/7/67
		Division of Assignment Domestic Intelligence	
SUGGESTION			
<p>That a printed form (sample attached) be approved for use in advising the Department that a Security Index subject is employed by the Federal Government and that the subject is being placed in a Special Section of the Security Index. The form is to be printed on four types of paper: Optional Form 10 (original); thin whites (for copy to field file and ticklers); blocked yellow (100-356062); and plain yellow (for Bureau file). The form letter will consist of two pages.</p>			
Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts)			
<p>The above letters to the Department are handled by fully typed letter when information is received that a subject is employed by the Federal Government.</p>			
Advantages of suggestion and annual savings (include basis for estimate)			
<p>This is currently handled by fully typed letter in an estimated 30 to 35 cases per month. There will be a considerable saving of time in dictating, transcribing, and proofreading.</p>			
Disadvantages of suggestion			
<p>Additions to each specific case will have to be made on copies for the field, yellows, and ticklers.</p>			
<small>(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. I understand that I will be considered for a certified award only if my suggestion is adopted within two years after submission.)</small>			
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mr. <input type="checkbox"/> Mrs. <input type="checkbox"/> Miss _____ Signature and Title of Suggester	
Recommendations and comments of Division Head			
<p>I concur with the suggester's comments and recommend that the suggestion be adopted.</p>			

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The Deputy Attorney General

1 -
1 -
2 -

Director, FBI

PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION OF
PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS
TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
OF THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to previous communications
relating to Security Index subjects employed by the Federal
Government.

The name of _____, FBI file
number _____, is included in the Security Index.
Copies of all reports have been furnished to the Records
Administration Office. The results of this investigation
were reviewed by the Internal Security Division and
name was approved for retention in the Security
Index on _____.

It has now been determined that _____ has
recently become employed by the _____ In view of this,
the Security Index card pertaining to _____ is being tabbed
"U. S. Government Employee" and placed in the Special Section
of the Security Index.

100-356062

1 - Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

2-

(100-) (140-) SEE NOTE FOR SAC,
PAGE TWO

1 - 100-
1 - 140-

See note, page two

Cont (12)

1 XEROX
MAR 28 1963

ENCLOSURE

(SOG Ticklor Copy)

100-356062-2775

The Deputy Attorney General

NOTE FOR SAC, _____:

Reference is made to your Form FD-122 dated

New Security Index cards are being forwarded your office under separate cover showing employment by the 'S
These cards are designated for the Special Section of the Security Index. You should arrange to be advised of any change in the employment status of _____ and in any contacts with representatives of the employing agency it should be clearly understood that these contacts are for information and should not be construed as pressure in an effort to expedite 'S removal. Report any change in employment status by airtel under "Security Index" caption and promptly submit appropriate Forms FD-122 and FD-366.

NOTE:

Letter classified "Secret" as it pertains to Security Index and Emergency Detention Program, component parts of which are so classified by the Department.

This matter has been coordinated with appropriate personnel of the Employees Security and Special Inquiry Section, Special Investigative Division.

*Trabasso
&
Spencer*